Blog
/
Network
/
February 9, 2023

Vidar Network: Analyzing a Prolific Info Stealer

Discover the latest insights on the Vidar network-based info stealer from our Darktrace experts and stay informed on cybersecurity threats.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Roberto Romeu
Senior SOC Analyst
Default blog imageDefault blog imageDefault blog imageDefault blog imageDefault blog imageDefault blog image
09
Feb 2023

In the latter half of 2022, Darktrace observed a rise in Vidar Stealer infections across its client base. These infections consisted in a predictable series of network behaviors, including usage of certain social media platforms for the retrieval of Command and Control (C2) information and usage of certain URI patterns in C2 communications. In the blog post, we will provide details of the pattern of network activity observed in these Vidar Stealer infections, along with details of Darktrace’s coverage of the activity. 

Background on Vidar Stealer

Vidar Stealer, first identified in 2018, is an info-stealer capable of obtaining and then exfiltrating sensitive data from users’ devices. This data includes banking details, saved passwords, IP addresses, browser history, login credentials, and crypto-wallet data [1]. The info-stealer, which is typically delivered via malicious spam emails, cracked software websites, malicious ads, and websites impersonating legitimate brands, is known to access profiles on social media platforms once it is running on a user’s device. The info-stealer does this to retrieve the IP address of its Command and Control (C2) server. After retrieving its main C2 address, the info-stealer, like many other info-stealers, is known to download several third-party Dynamic Link Libraries (DLLs) which it uses to gain access to sensitive data saved on the infected device. The info-stealer then bundles the sensitive data which it obtains and sends it back to the C2 server.  

Details of Attack Chain 

In the second half of 2022, Darktrace observed the following pattern of activity within many client networks:

1. User’s device makes an HTTPS connection to Telegram and/or to a Mastodon server

2. User’s device makes an HTTP GET request with an empty User-Agent header, an empty Host header and a target URI consisting of 4 digits to an unusual, external endpoint

3. User’s device makes an HTTP GET request with an empty User-Agent header, an empty Host header and a target URI consisting of 10 digits followed by ‘.zip’ to the unusual, external endpoint

4. User’s device makes an HTTP POST request with an empty User-Agent header, an empty Host header, and the target URI ‘/’ to the unusual, external endpoint 

Figure 1: The above network logs, taken from Darktrace’s Advanced Search interface, show an infected device contacting Telegram and then making a series of HTTP requests to 168.119.167[.]188
Figure 2:  The above network logs, taken from Darktrace’s Advanced Search interface, show an infected device contacting a Mastadon server and then making a series of HTTP requests to 107.189.31[.]171

Each of these activity chains occurred as the result of a user running Vidar Stealer on their device. No common method was used to trick users into running Vidar Stealer on their devices. Rather, a variety of methods, ranging from malspam to cracked software downloads appear to have been used. 

Once running on a user’s device, Vidar Stealer went on to make an HTTPS connection to either Telegram (https://t[.]me/) or a Mastodon server (https://nerdculture[.]de/ or https://ioc[.]exchange/). Telegram and Mastodon are social media platforms on which users can create profiles. Malicious actors are known to create profiles on these platforms and then to embed C2 information within the profiles’ descriptions [2].  In the Vidar cases observed across Darktrace’s client base, it seems that Vidar contacted Telegram and/or Mastodon servers in order to retrieve the IP address of its C2 server from a profile description. Since social media platforms are typically trusted, this ‘Dead Drop’ method of sharing C2 details with malware samples makes it possible for threat actors to regularly update C2 details without the communication of these changes being blocked. 

Figure 3: A screenshot a profile on the Mastodon server, nerdculture[.]de. The profile’s description contains a C2 address 

After retrieving its C2 address from the description of a Telegram or Mastodon profile, Vidar went on to make an HTTP GET request with an empty User-Agent header, an empty Host header and a target URI consisting of 4 digits to its C2 server. The sequences of digits appearing in these URIs are campaign IDs. The C2 server responded to Vidar’s GET request with configuration details that likely informed Vidar’s subsequent data stealing activities. 

After receiving its configuration details, Vidar went on to make a GET request with an empty User-Agent header, an empty Host header and a target URI consisting of 10 digits followed by ‘.zip’ to the C2 server. This request was responded to with a ZIP file containing legitimate, third-party Dynamic Link Libraries such as ‘vcruntime140.dll’. Vidar used these libraries to gain access to sensitive data saved on the infected host. 

Figure 4: The above PCAP provides an example of the configuration details provided by a C2 server in response to Vidar’s first GET request 
Figure 5: Examples of DLLs included within ZIP files downloaded by Vidar samples

After downloading a ZIP file containing third-party DLLs, Vidar made a POST request containing hundreds of kilobytes of data to the C2 endpoint. This POST request likely represented exfiltration of stolen information. 

Darktrace Coverage

After infecting users’ devices, Vidar contacted either Telegram or Mastodon, and then made a series of HTTP requests to its C2 server. The info-stealer’s usage of social media platforms, along with its usage of ZIP files for tool transfer, complicate the detection of its activities. The info-stealer’s HTTP requests to its C2 server, however, caused the following Darktrace DETECT/Network models to breach:

  • Anomalous File / Zip or Gzip from Rare External Location 
  • Anomalous File / Numeric File Download
  • Anomalous Connection / Posting HTTP to IP Without Hostname

These model breaches did not occur due to users’ devices contacting IP addresses known to be associated with Vidar. In fact, at the time that the reported activities occurred, many of the contacted IP addresses had no OSINT associating them with Vidar activity. The cause of these model breaches was in fact the unusualness of the devices’ HTTP activities. When a Vidar-infected device was observed making HTTP requests to a C2 server, Darktrace recognised that this behavior was highly unusual both for the device and for other devices in the network. Darktrace’s recognition of this unusualness caused the model breaches to occur. 

Vidar Stealer infections move incredibly fast, with the time between initial infection and data theft sometimes being less than a minute. In cases where Darktrace’s Autonomous Response technology was active, Darktrace RESPOND/Network was able to autonomously block Vidar’s connections to its C2 server immediately after the first connection was made. 

Figure 6: The Event Log for an infected device, shows that Darktrace RESPOND/Network autonomously intervened 1 second after the device first contacted the C2 server 95.217.245[.]254

Conclusion 

In the latter half of 2022, a particular pattern of activity was prolific across Darktrace’s client base, with the pattern being seen in the networks of customers across a broad range of industry verticals and sizes. Further investigation revealed that this pattern of network activity was the result of Vidar Stealer infection. These infections moved fast and were effective at evading detection due to their usage of social media platforms for information retrieval and their usage of ZIP files for tool transfer. Since the impact of info-stealer activity typically occurs off-network, long after initial infection, insufficient detection of info-stealer activity leaves victims at risk of attackers operating unbeknownst to them and of powerful attack vectors being available to launch broad compromises. 

Despite the evasion attempts made by the operators of Vidar, Darktrace DETECT/Network was able to detect the unusual HTTP activities which inevitably resulted from Vidar infections. When active, Darktrace RESPOND/Network was able to quickly take inhibitive actions against these unusual activities. Given the prevalence of Vidar Stealer [3] and the speed at which Vidar Stealer infections progress, Autonomous Response technology proves to be vital for protecting organizations from info-stealer activity.  

Thanks to the Threat Research Team for its contributions to this blog.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

List of IOCs

107.189.31[.]171 - Vidar C2 Endpoint

168.119.167[.]188 – Vidar C2 Endpoint 

77.91.102[.]51 - Vidar C2 Endpoint

116.202.180[.]202 - Vidar C2 Endpoint

79.124.78[.]208 - Vidar C2 Endpoint

159.69.100[.]194 - Vidar C2 Endpoint

195.201.253[.]5 - Vidar C2 Endpoint

135.181.96[.]153 - Vidar C2 Endpoint

88.198.122[.]116 - Vidar C2 Endpoint

135.181.104[.]248 - Vidar C2 Endpoint

159.69.101[.]102 - Vidar C2 Endpoint

45.8.147[.]145 - Vidar C2 Endpoint

159.69.102[.]192 - Vidar C2 Endpoint

193.43.146[.]42 - Vidar C2 Endpoint

159.69.102[.]19 - Vidar C2 Endpoint

185.53.46[.]199 - Vidar C2 Endpoint

116.202.183[.]206 - Vidar C2 Endpoint

95.217.244[.]216 - Vidar C2 Endpoint

78.46.129[.]14 - Vidar C2 Endpoint

116.203.7[.]175 - Vidar C2 Endpoint

45.159.249[.]3 - Vidar C2 Endpoint

159.69.101[.]170 - Vidar C2 Endpoint

116.202.183[.]213 - Vidar C2 Endpoint

116.202.4[.]170 - Vidar C2 Endpoint

185.252.215[.]142 - Vidar C2 Endpoint

45.8.144[.]62 - Vidar C2 Endpoint

74.119.192[.]157 - Vidar C2 Endpoint

78.47.102[.]252 - Vidar C2 Endpoint

212.23.221[.]231 - Vidar C2 Endpoint

167.235.137[.]244 - Vidar C2 Endpoint

88.198.122[.]116 - Vidar C2 Endpoint

5.252.23[.]169 - Vidar C2 Endpoint

45.89.55[.]70 - Vidar C2 Endpoint

References

[1] https://blog.cyble.com/2021/10/26/vidar-stealer-under-the-lens-a-deep-dive-analysis/

[2] https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/44554/

[3] https://blog.sekoia.io/unveiling-of-a-large-resilient-infrastructure-distributing-information-stealers/

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Roberto Romeu
Senior SOC Analyst

More in this series

No items found.

Blog

/

Email

/

April 24, 2026

Email-Borne Cyber Risk: A Core Challenge for the CISO in the Age of Volume and Sophistication

Default blog imageDefault blog image

The challenge for CISOs

Despite continuous advances in security technologies, humans continue to be exploited by attackers. Credential abuse and social actions like phishing are major factors, accounting for around 60% of all breaches. These attacks rely less on technical vulnerabilities and more on exploiting human behavior and organizational processes. 

From my perspective as a former CISO, protecting humans concentrates three of today’s most pressing challenges: the sheer volume of email-based threats, their increasing sophistication, and the limitations of traditional employee awareness programs in moving the needle on risk. 

My personal experience of security awareness training as a CISO

With over 20 years’ experience as an ICT and Cybersecurity leader across various international organizations, I’ve seen security awareness training (SAT) in many guises. And while the cyber landscape is evolving in every direction, the effectiveness of SAT is reaching a plateau.  

Most programs I’ve seen follow a familiar pattern. Training is delivered through a combination of eLearning modules and internal sessions designed to reinforce IT policies. Employees are typically required to complete a slide deck or video, followed by a multiple-choice quiz. Occasional phishing simulations are distributed throughout the year.

The content is often static and unpersonalized, based on known threats that may already be outdated. Every employee regardless of role or risk exposure receives the same training and the same simulated phishing templates, from front-desk staff to the CEO.

The problem with traditional SAT programs

The issue with the approach to SAT outlined above is that the distribution of power is imbalanced. Humans will always be fallible, particularly when faced with increasingly sophisticated attacks. Providing generic, low-context training risks creating false confidence rather than genuine resilience. Let’s look at some of the problems in detail.

Timing and delivery

Employees today operate under constant cognitive load, making lots of rapid decisions every day to reduce their email volumes. Yet if employees are completing training annually, or on an ad hoc basis, it becomes a standalone occurrence rather than a continuous habit.  

As a result, retention is low. Employees often forget the lessons within weeks, a phenomenon known as the ‘Ebbinghaus Forgetting Curve.’

The graph illustrates that when you first learn something, the information disappears at an exponential rate without retention. In fact, according to the curve, you forget 50% of all new information within a day, and 90% of all new information within a week.  

Simultaneously, most training is conducted within a separate interface. Because it takes place away from the actual moment of decision-making, the "teachable moment" is lost. There is a cognitive disconnect between the action (clicking a link in Outlook) and the education (watching a video in a browser). 

People

In the context of professional risk management, the risks faced by different users are different. Static learning such as everyone receiving the same ‘Password Reset’ email doesn’t help users prepare for the specific threats they are likely to face. It also contributes to user fatigue, driven by repetitive training. And if users receive tests at the same time, news spreads among colleagues, hurting the efficacy of the test.  

Staff turnover introduces further risk. In many organizations, new employees gain access to systems before receiving meaningful training, reducing onboarding to little more than policy acknowledgment.

Measuring success

In my experience, solutions are standalone, without any correlation to other tools in the security stack. In some cases, the programs are delivered by HR rather than the security team, creating a complete silo.  

As a result, SAT is often perceived as a compliance exercise rather than a capability building function. The result is that poor-quality training does little to reduce the likelihood of compromise, regardless of completion rates or quiz performance.

What a modern SAT solution should look like

For today’s CISO, email represents the convergence point of high-volume, high-impact, and human-centric threats. Despite significant security investments, it remains one of the most difficult channels to secure effectively. Given these constraints, CISOs must evolve their approach to SAT.

Success lies in a balanced strategy one that combines advanced technology, attack surface reduction, and pragmatic user enablement, without over-relying on human vigilance as the final line of defense.

This means moving beyond traditional SAT toward continuous, contextual awareness, realistic simulations, and tight integration with security outcomes.

Three requirements for a modern SAT solution

  • Invisible protection: The optimum security solution is one that assists users without impeding their experience. The objective is to enhance human capabilities, rather than simply delivering a lecture. 
  • Real-time feedback: Rather than a monthly quiz, the ideal system would provide a prompt or warning when a user is about to engage with something suspicious. 
  • Positive culture: Shifting the focus away from a "gotcha" culture, which is a contributing factor to a resentment, and instead empowers employees to serve as "sensors" for the company. 

Discover how personalized security coaching can strengthen your human layer and make your email defenses more resilient. Explore Darktrace / Adaptive Human Defense.

Continue reading
About the author
Karim Benslimane
VP, Field CISO

Blog

/

Network

/

April 21, 2026

How a Compromised eScan Update Enabled Multi‑Stage Malware and Blockchain C2

multi-stage malwareDefault blog imageDefault blog image

The rise of supply chain attacks

In recent years, the abuse of trusted software has become increasingly common, with supply chain compromises emerging as one of the fastest growing vectors for cyber intrusions. As highlighted in Darktrace’s Annual Threat Report 2026, attackers and state-actors continue to find significant value in gaining access to networks through compromised trusted links, third-party tools, or legitimate software. In January 2026, a supply chain compromise affecting MicroWorld Technologies’ eScan antivirus product was reported, with malicious updates distributed to customers through the legitimate update infrastructure. This, in turn, resulted in a multi‑stage loader malware being deployed on compromised devices [1][2].

An overview of eScan exploitation

According to eScan’s official threat advisory, unauthorized access to a regional update server resulted in an “incorrect file placed in the update distribution path” [3]. Customers associated with the affected update servers who downloaded the update during a two-hour window on January 20 were impacted, with affected Windows devices subsequently have experiencing various errors related to update functions and notifications [3].

While eScan did not specify which regional update servers were affected by the malicious update, all impacted Darktrace customer environments were located in the Europe, Middle East, and Africa (EMEA) region.

External research reported that a malicious 32-bit executable file , “Reload.exe”, was first installed on affected devices, which then dropped the 64-bit downloader, “CONSCTLX.exe”. This downloader establishes persistence by creating scheduled tasks such as “CorelDefrag”, which are responsible for executing PowerShell scripts. Subsequently, it evades detection by tampering with the Windows HOSTS file and eScan registry to prevent future remote updates intended for remediation. Additional payloads are then downloaded from its command-and-control (C2) server [1].

Darktrace’s coverage of eScan exploitation

Initial Access and Blockchain as multi-distributed C2 Infrastructure

On January 20, the same day as the aforementioned two‑hour exploit window, Darktrace observed multiple devices across affected networks downloading .dlz package files from eScan update servers, followed by connections to an anomalous endpoint, vhs.delrosal[.]net, which belongs to the attackers’ C2 infrastructure.

The endpoint contained a self‑signed SSL certificate with the string “O=Internet Widgits Pty Ltd, ST=SomeState, C=AU”, a default placeholder commonly used in SSL/TLS certificates for testing and development environments, as well as in malicious C2 infrastructure [4].

Utilizing a multi‑distributed C2 infrastructure, the attackers also leveraged domains linked with the Solana open‑source blockchain for C2 purposes, namely “.sol”. These domains were human‑readable names that act as aliases for cryptocurrency wallet addresses. As browsers do not natively resolve .sol domains, the Solana Naming System (formerly known as Bonfida, an independent contributor within the Solana ecosystem) provides a proxy service, through endpoints such as sol-domain[.]org, to enable browser access.

Darktrace observed devices connecting to blackice.sol-domain[.]org, indicating that attackers were likely using this proxy to reach a .sol domain for C2 activity. Given this behavior, it is likely that the attackers leveraged .sol domains as a dead drop resolver, a C2 technique in which threat actors host information on a public and legitimate service, such as a blockchain. Additional proxy resolver endpoints, such as sns-resolver.bonfida.workers[.]dev, were also observed.

Solana transactions are transparent, allowing all activity to be viewed publicly. When Darktrace analysts examined the transactions associated with blackice[.]sol, they observed that the earliest records dated November 7, 2025, which coincides with the creation date of the known C2 endpoint vhs[.]delrosal[.]net as shown in WHOIS Lookup information [4][5].

WHOIS Look records of the C2 endpoint vhs[.]delrosal[.]net.
Figure 1: WHOIS Look records of the C2 endpoint vhs[.]delrosal[.]net.
 Earliest observed transaction record for blackice[.]sol on public ledgers.
Figure 2: Earliest observed transaction record for blackice[.]sol on public ledgers.

Subsequent instructions found within the transactions contained strings such as “CNAME= vhs[.]delrosal[.]net”, indicating attempts to direct the device toward the malicious endpoint. A more recent transaction recorded on January 28 included strings such as “hxxps://96.9.125[.]243/i;code=302”, suggesting an effort to change C2 endpoints. Darktrace observed multiple alerts triggered for these endpoints across affected devices.

Similar blockchain‑related endpoints, such as “tumama.hns[.]to”, were also observed in C2 activities. The hns[.]to service allows web browsers to access websites registered on Handshake, a decentralized blockchain‑based framework designed to replace centralized authorities and domain registries for top‑level domains. This shift toward decentralized, blockchain‑based infrastructure likely reflects increased efforts by attackers to evade detection.

In outgoing connections to these malicious endpoints across affected networks, Darktrace / NETWORK recognized that the activity was 100% rare and anomalous for both the devices and the wider networks, likely indicative of malicious beaconing, regardless of the underlying trusted infrastructure. In addition to generating multiple model alerts to capture this malicious activity across affected networks, Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst was able to compile these separate events into broader incidents that summarized the entire attack chain, allowing customers’ security teams to investigate and remediate more efficiently. Moreover, in customer environments where Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability was enabled, Darktrace took swift action to contain the attack by blocking beaconing connections to the malicious endpoints, even when those endpoints were associated with seemingly trustworthy services.

Conclusion

Attacks targeting trusted relationships continue to be a popular strategy among threat actors. Activities linked to trusted or widely deployed software are often unintentionally whitelisted by existing security solutions and gateways. Darktrace observed multiple devices becoming impacted within a very short period, likely because tools such as antivirus software are typically mass‑deployed across numerous endpoints. As a result, a single compromised delivery mechanism can greatly expand the attack surface.

Attackers are also becoming increasingly creative in developing resilient C2 infrastructure and exploiting legitimate services to evade detection. Defenders are therefore encouraged to closely monitor anomalous connections and file downloads. Darktrace’s ability to detect unusual activity amidst ever‑changing tactics and indicators of compromise (IoCs) helps organizations maintain a proactive and resilient defense posture against emerging threats.

Credit to Joanna Ng (Associate Principal Cybersecurity Analyst) and Min Kim (Associate Principal Cybersecurity Analyst) and Tara Gould (Malware Researcher Lead)

Edited by Ryan Traill (Content Manager)

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections

  • Anomalous File::Zip or Gzip from Rare External Location
  • Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Self-Signed SSL
  • Anomalous Connection / Rare External SSL Self-Signed
  • Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Expired SSL
  • Anomalous Server Activity / Anomalous External Activity from Critical Network Device

List of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

  • vhs[.]delrosal[.]net – C2 server
  • tumama[.]hns[.]to – C2 server
  • blackice.sol-domain[.]org – C2 server
  • 96.9.125[.]243 – C2 Server

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • T1071.001 - Command and Control: Web Protocols
  • T1588.001 - Resource Development
  • T1102.001 - Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver
  • T1195 – Supple Chain Compromise

References

[1] https://www.morphisec.com/blog/critical-escan-threat-bulletin/

[2] https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/escan-confirms-update-server-breached-to-push-malicious-update/

[3] hxxps://download1.mwti.net/documents/Advisory/eScan_Security_Advisory_2026[.]pdf

[4] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/delrosal.net

[5] hxxps://explorer.solana[.]com/address/2wFAbYHNw4ewBHBJzmDgDhCXYoFjJnpbdmeWjZvevaVv

Continue reading
About the author
Joanna Ng
Associate Principal Analyst
Your data. Our AI.
Elevate your network security with Darktrace AI