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February 9, 2023

Vidar Network: Analyzing a Prolific Info Stealer

Discover the latest insights on the Vidar network-based info stealer from our Darktrace experts and stay informed on cybersecurity threats.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Roberto Romeu
Senior SOC Analyst
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09
Feb 2023

In the latter half of 2022, Darktrace observed a rise in Vidar Stealer infections across its client base. These infections consisted in a predictable series of network behaviors, including usage of certain social media platforms for the retrieval of Command and Control (C2) information and usage of certain URI patterns in C2 communications. In the blog post, we will provide details of the pattern of network activity observed in these Vidar Stealer infections, along with details of Darktrace’s coverage of the activity. 

Background on Vidar Stealer

Vidar Stealer, first identified in 2018, is an info-stealer capable of obtaining and then exfiltrating sensitive data from users’ devices. This data includes banking details, saved passwords, IP addresses, browser history, login credentials, and crypto-wallet data [1]. The info-stealer, which is typically delivered via malicious spam emails, cracked software websites, malicious ads, and websites impersonating legitimate brands, is known to access profiles on social media platforms once it is running on a user’s device. The info-stealer does this to retrieve the IP address of its Command and Control (C2) server. After retrieving its main C2 address, the info-stealer, like many other info-stealers, is known to download several third-party Dynamic Link Libraries (DLLs) which it uses to gain access to sensitive data saved on the infected device. The info-stealer then bundles the sensitive data which it obtains and sends it back to the C2 server.  

Details of Attack Chain 

In the second half of 2022, Darktrace observed the following pattern of activity within many client networks:

1. User’s device makes an HTTPS connection to Telegram and/or to a Mastodon server

2. User’s device makes an HTTP GET request with an empty User-Agent header, an empty Host header and a target URI consisting of 4 digits to an unusual, external endpoint

3. User’s device makes an HTTP GET request with an empty User-Agent header, an empty Host header and a target URI consisting of 10 digits followed by ‘.zip’ to the unusual, external endpoint

4. User’s device makes an HTTP POST request with an empty User-Agent header, an empty Host header, and the target URI ‘/’ to the unusual, external endpoint 

Figure 1: The above network logs, taken from Darktrace’s Advanced Search interface, show an infected device contacting Telegram and then making a series of HTTP requests to 168.119.167[.]188
Figure 2:  The above network logs, taken from Darktrace’s Advanced Search interface, show an infected device contacting a Mastadon server and then making a series of HTTP requests to 107.189.31[.]171

Each of these activity chains occurred as the result of a user running Vidar Stealer on their device. No common method was used to trick users into running Vidar Stealer on their devices. Rather, a variety of methods, ranging from malspam to cracked software downloads appear to have been used. 

Once running on a user’s device, Vidar Stealer went on to make an HTTPS connection to either Telegram (https://t[.]me/) or a Mastodon server (https://nerdculture[.]de/ or https://ioc[.]exchange/). Telegram and Mastodon are social media platforms on which users can create profiles. Malicious actors are known to create profiles on these platforms and then to embed C2 information within the profiles’ descriptions [2].  In the Vidar cases observed across Darktrace’s client base, it seems that Vidar contacted Telegram and/or Mastodon servers in order to retrieve the IP address of its C2 server from a profile description. Since social media platforms are typically trusted, this ‘Dead Drop’ method of sharing C2 details with malware samples makes it possible for threat actors to regularly update C2 details without the communication of these changes being blocked. 

Figure 3: A screenshot a profile on the Mastodon server, nerdculture[.]de. The profile’s description contains a C2 address 

After retrieving its C2 address from the description of a Telegram or Mastodon profile, Vidar went on to make an HTTP GET request with an empty User-Agent header, an empty Host header and a target URI consisting of 4 digits to its C2 server. The sequences of digits appearing in these URIs are campaign IDs. The C2 server responded to Vidar’s GET request with configuration details that likely informed Vidar’s subsequent data stealing activities. 

After receiving its configuration details, Vidar went on to make a GET request with an empty User-Agent header, an empty Host header and a target URI consisting of 10 digits followed by ‘.zip’ to the C2 server. This request was responded to with a ZIP file containing legitimate, third-party Dynamic Link Libraries such as ‘vcruntime140.dll’. Vidar used these libraries to gain access to sensitive data saved on the infected host. 

Figure 4: The above PCAP provides an example of the configuration details provided by a C2 server in response to Vidar’s first GET request 
Figure 5: Examples of DLLs included within ZIP files downloaded by Vidar samples

After downloading a ZIP file containing third-party DLLs, Vidar made a POST request containing hundreds of kilobytes of data to the C2 endpoint. This POST request likely represented exfiltration of stolen information. 

Darktrace Coverage

After infecting users’ devices, Vidar contacted either Telegram or Mastodon, and then made a series of HTTP requests to its C2 server. The info-stealer’s usage of social media platforms, along with its usage of ZIP files for tool transfer, complicate the detection of its activities. The info-stealer’s HTTP requests to its C2 server, however, caused the following Darktrace DETECT/Network models to breach:

  • Anomalous File / Zip or Gzip from Rare External Location 
  • Anomalous File / Numeric File Download
  • Anomalous Connection / Posting HTTP to IP Without Hostname

These model breaches did not occur due to users’ devices contacting IP addresses known to be associated with Vidar. In fact, at the time that the reported activities occurred, many of the contacted IP addresses had no OSINT associating them with Vidar activity. The cause of these model breaches was in fact the unusualness of the devices’ HTTP activities. When a Vidar-infected device was observed making HTTP requests to a C2 server, Darktrace recognised that this behavior was highly unusual both for the device and for other devices in the network. Darktrace’s recognition of this unusualness caused the model breaches to occur. 

Vidar Stealer infections move incredibly fast, with the time between initial infection and data theft sometimes being less than a minute. In cases where Darktrace’s Autonomous Response technology was active, Darktrace RESPOND/Network was able to autonomously block Vidar’s connections to its C2 server immediately after the first connection was made. 

Figure 6: The Event Log for an infected device, shows that Darktrace RESPOND/Network autonomously intervened 1 second after the device first contacted the C2 server 95.217.245[.]254

Conclusion 

In the latter half of 2022, a particular pattern of activity was prolific across Darktrace’s client base, with the pattern being seen in the networks of customers across a broad range of industry verticals and sizes. Further investigation revealed that this pattern of network activity was the result of Vidar Stealer infection. These infections moved fast and were effective at evading detection due to their usage of social media platforms for information retrieval and their usage of ZIP files for tool transfer. Since the impact of info-stealer activity typically occurs off-network, long after initial infection, insufficient detection of info-stealer activity leaves victims at risk of attackers operating unbeknownst to them and of powerful attack vectors being available to launch broad compromises. 

Despite the evasion attempts made by the operators of Vidar, Darktrace DETECT/Network was able to detect the unusual HTTP activities which inevitably resulted from Vidar infections. When active, Darktrace RESPOND/Network was able to quickly take inhibitive actions against these unusual activities. Given the prevalence of Vidar Stealer [3] and the speed at which Vidar Stealer infections progress, Autonomous Response technology proves to be vital for protecting organizations from info-stealer activity.  

Thanks to the Threat Research Team for its contributions to this blog.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

List of IOCs

107.189.31[.]171 - Vidar C2 Endpoint

168.119.167[.]188 – Vidar C2 Endpoint 

77.91.102[.]51 - Vidar C2 Endpoint

116.202.180[.]202 - Vidar C2 Endpoint

79.124.78[.]208 - Vidar C2 Endpoint

159.69.100[.]194 - Vidar C2 Endpoint

195.201.253[.]5 - Vidar C2 Endpoint

135.181.96[.]153 - Vidar C2 Endpoint

88.198.122[.]116 - Vidar C2 Endpoint

135.181.104[.]248 - Vidar C2 Endpoint

159.69.101[.]102 - Vidar C2 Endpoint

45.8.147[.]145 - Vidar C2 Endpoint

159.69.102[.]192 - Vidar C2 Endpoint

193.43.146[.]42 - Vidar C2 Endpoint

159.69.102[.]19 - Vidar C2 Endpoint

185.53.46[.]199 - Vidar C2 Endpoint

116.202.183[.]206 - Vidar C2 Endpoint

95.217.244[.]216 - Vidar C2 Endpoint

78.46.129[.]14 - Vidar C2 Endpoint

116.203.7[.]175 - Vidar C2 Endpoint

45.159.249[.]3 - Vidar C2 Endpoint

159.69.101[.]170 - Vidar C2 Endpoint

116.202.183[.]213 - Vidar C2 Endpoint

116.202.4[.]170 - Vidar C2 Endpoint

185.252.215[.]142 - Vidar C2 Endpoint

45.8.144[.]62 - Vidar C2 Endpoint

74.119.192[.]157 - Vidar C2 Endpoint

78.47.102[.]252 - Vidar C2 Endpoint

212.23.221[.]231 - Vidar C2 Endpoint

167.235.137[.]244 - Vidar C2 Endpoint

88.198.122[.]116 - Vidar C2 Endpoint

5.252.23[.]169 - Vidar C2 Endpoint

45.89.55[.]70 - Vidar C2 Endpoint

References

[1] https://blog.cyble.com/2021/10/26/vidar-stealer-under-the-lens-a-deep-dive-analysis/

[2] https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/44554/

[3] https://blog.sekoia.io/unveiling-of-a-large-resilient-infrastructure-distributing-information-stealers/

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Roberto Romeu
Senior SOC Analyst

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July 6, 2026

NIST Just Proved It: AI Security Can’t Be Solved With Rules

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Static AI guardrails are inherently limited

As organizations adopt generative AI, many still assume that the right set of guardrails will be enough. The problem is you can’t anticipate every way these systems might be misused, abused or attacked. What NIST has done is put a mathematical foundation under that intuition.

In recent research building on Gödel’s incompleteness theorems, which showed that any system built on a fixed set of rules will always have gaps, NIST demonstrates that there is no finite set of guardrails that can be universally robust against adversarial prompts. In plain terms, if your defense is based on a fixed set of rules, there will always be inputs that bypass them. Not because the rules are badly written, but because the problem space is bigger than static rules can ever cover.

This is not new in cybersecurity - detection rules have always had to live with this trade-off. What is different with GenAI is the scale and shape of that problem. These systems are built on human language, and human language is not bounded. It is fluid, contextual and deliberately ambiguous. The number of ways intent can be hidden is effectively limitless. You are not defending against a defined protocol or a fixed exploit chain. You are defending against the entire expressive capacity of people.

So attempting to create a complete set of rules is the wrong starting point. It assumes the problem can be deterministically described. NIST’s work shows that it cannot. Organizations still need a way to manage AI risk, but the traditional approach of defining allowed and disallowed patterns is always going to lag behind what is actually happening. The same input can be benign in one context and risky in another, and static rules struggle to capture that distinction.

The question then is what fills that gap?

AI security must shift from rules to behavior

What's required is a shift in what you are trying to understand. Rules try to describe what should and shouldn't happen. Behavior shows you what is happening. Or to put it another way, if inputs are unbounded and adversaries adapt, the only stable signal is behavior.

In a GenAI context, that means analyzing how an AI model is being used, how prompts evolve over time, how outputs are shaped, and where AI agent interactions start to drift from what is expected. It means moving from static definitions of bad to a more dynamic understanding of intent.

Instead of trying to predict every bad prompt, you focus on identifying when behavior starts to move outside expected norms. Instead of asking whether a single input matches a rule, you ask whether the overall pattern of activity makes sense for the system and how it’s being used.

Guardrails remain important but they are only one layer

This does not eliminate the need for guardrails. They still play a role. But they will never address the entire problem space and are simply one part of your defense in depth approach.

NIST’s proof is useful because it makes this explicit. It removes the assumption that with enough effort, a complete rule set is achievable. It isn’t.

Once you accept that, the shift becomes unavoidable. This is no longer a problem of writing better rules, but of understanding behavior in a space where the possible inputs are effectively unbounded.

For security leaders, that changes the nature of the problem. It is less about defining what should be allowed, and more about recognizing when something is no longer consistent with expected behavior.

That does not remove the need for guardrails, but it does change their role. They set boundaries, but they do not define understanding. The gap between the two is where risk now sits.

In the end, this is what “can’t be solved with rules” really means. Rules will always leave gaps, and those gaps are not theoretical. They show up in how systems actually behave Not what we expect them to do, or what we intended them to do, but what they are doing in practice. That is where the signal is, and increasingly, that is where the security problem sits.

References:

https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2026/06/nist-mathematical-proof-supports-transition-continuous-monitor-and-update

https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/11475847

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About the author
Andrew Hollister
Principal Solutions Engineer, Cyber Technician

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July 1, 2026

5 Ways AI is changing traditional security models according to modern CISOs

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The Reality of Securing AI in Motion

Traditional security tools were built for environments defined by fixed rules and predictable workflows. But AI behavior is non-deterministic. The same prompt can produce different outcomes, and risk often emerges gradually as AI behavior adapts, and permissions drift over time. This creates a constantly shifting environment where security teams are working to define control in a system that resists stability. “In AI security, yesterday's priorities can become tomorrow's blind spots. The landscape shifts that fast,” warned the SVP and Head of Technology and Cybersecurity of a real estate investment trust. Conventional approaches, which rely on establishing and maintaining a steady baseline, struggle to keep up with that level of change.

At the same time, AI adoption is accelerating across organizations, often faster than security teams can implement the controls needed to manage it. “The car is being built while it’s already on the road,” explained the CISO of a global private fund administrator. “The threats we're securing against today won't be the threats we're facing tomorrow. What kept us up three months ago looks nothing like what we're dealing with today.”

As businesses move quickly to unlock value from AI, security teams are left closing gaps in real time, while also facing adversaries who are using AI to make their attacks more scalable, adaptive, and difficult to detect. In this recent roundtable discussion of CISOs and security leaders, five themes emerged around AI cyber risk.  

1. AI agents with human access but no human judgment

In Darktrace’s 2026 State of AI Cybersecurity report, 96% of the surveyed security professionals agree that AI significantly improves the speed and efficiency with which they work. Yet, 92% admitted that they’re concerned with the security implications of the use of AI agents across their workforce.

AI agents now operate with human-level permissions across systems, acting at machine speed, orchestrating actions across platforms, and making decisions without the judgment or caution a person would apply. Unlike human users, they cannot be expected to pause and question whether a given action is appropriate.

Their identities are also difficult to inventory, govern, and audit. As agents become easier to deploy than legacy IT systems ever were, organizations are quickly losing track of what is running, what it has access to, and what it is doing. This creates a growing class of highly privileged, autonomous actors operating without the visibility or oversight that traditional identity and access controls were designed to provide.“While AI adoption is critical to running a modern business, AI alone can’t solve all our cybersecurity challenges,” said a global financial sector CISO. “We still need think critically and use human judgement. Those are two things AI can’t do.”

This lack of human judgment becomes especially risky as new architectures, such as Model Context Protocol (MCP), can expand how agents connect to data, tools, and external systems. By design, MCP enables agents to dynamically discover and interact with new resources, increasing flexibility but also introducing new pathways for unintended access, data exposure, or abuse if not properly governed.

The CISO of a fund administrator highlighted one emerging vector as an example: rogue MCP servers. “Our developers want to move quickly and bring value to the business, but technologies like these can unintentionally expose sensitive data in ways that would never have happened before.”

2. Increased digital complexity and expanded attack surface

AI activity rarely stays contained. A single prompt can trigger a chain of actions across networks, email, cloud infrastructure, SaaS platforms, endpoints, identity systems, and development environments, spanning systems that were never designed to be secured as a single, connected flow. This expands both the scale and complexity of what security teams need to monitor and defend.

Yet no single control has visibility across that entire chain. “You can’t defend effectively what you can’t see,” cautioned the private fund administrator CISO. As AI-driven activity moves fluidly across environments, gaps in coverage become inevitable, creating blind spots that attackers can exploit.

Threat actors are already capitalizing on this lack of visibility. “Threat actors have advanced their use of generative AI to launch more convincing phishing campaigns, automate social engineering, and scale attacks with greater precision down to the individual level,” said the SVP of Technology and Cybersecurity for the real estate investment trust. What was once manual and targeted can now be automated and personalized at scale, making attacks harder to detect and easier to execute.

At the same time, the pace of exploitation is accelerating. As a global CISO operating across 40+ countries described it: “Zero-day vulnerabilities are no longer zero day; it’s minus one day. By the time you get to it and address it, it’s already a problem.” By the time risk is identified, it has often already been realized.

The result is a rapidly expanding and increasingly interconnected attack surface that challenges security teams to maintain visibility, context, and control across AI-driven activity.

3. Shadow AI is already everywhere

76% of organizations now cite shadow AI as a problem, one that is spreading through organizations in ways that are hard to track and even harder to control.

Employees are experimenting with publicly available Gen AI tools. Teams are spinning up low-code automations on their own. SaaS providers are quietly embedding AI into existing products. Developers are plugging AI services directly into workflows, often without pausing to consider what that exposure means.

The result is a lack of visibility into:

  • What AI tools are being used
  • What data those tools can access
  • Where prompts and outputs are going
  • Which AI agents are interacting with enterprise systems

The SVP of Cybersecurity at a real estate investment trust described the shift: “Before, I was worried about someone sending data erroneously to their personal email. Now we have all these agents online that people are utilizing, and we’re looking at those vectors as well.” For security teams, this means operating without a complete view of how AI is being used, what it can access, and where risk may already be emerging.

4. Built-in guardrails are not enough

Organizations often assume that native AI guardrails or provider-level controls are sufficient to manage AI risk. But securing AI requires ongoing visibility, oversight, and governance, not just controls configured at deployment. "It’s a misconception that adopting AI is going to solve all your problems,” warns a global financial services CISO.

Security leaders are increasingly recognizing the limitations of these controls as:

  • Fragmented and difficult to enforce consistently across multiple AI systems, workflows, and environments
  • Ambiguous in terms of accountability due to shared responsibility for AI governance between IT, security, developers, business teams, and third-party providers
  • Limited in end-to-end oversight, leaving gaps that stretch from the initial prompt all the way through to the downstream impact of an agent's actions

Securing AI demands more than simple prompt filtering or static policy enforcement. It requires understanding intent, behavior, and context across both human and AI activity.

The next phase of cybersecurity: securing AI

To safely and responsibly adopt AI at scale, organizations need a new operational model for cybersecurity that’s capable of:

• Understanding AI behavior

• Identifying risk in real time

• Maintaining governance without slowing innovation

The CSO of a $10 billion municipal utility organization described the challenge with precision: “We have to move at the speed of innovation and risk, because both are accelerating faster than ever.”

Embrace AI with confidence with Darktrace / SECURE AI

Darktrace has introduced Darktrace / SECURE AI™, a new product within the Darktrace ActiveAI Security Platform™  ,designed to provide enterprise-wide security for AI by applying industry leading behavioral analysis to how prompts, agents, and AI systems are used.

Darktrace / SECURE AITM delivers real-time visibility and control across Enterprise and SaaS GenAI prompts, AI agent identities, development and production environments, and Shadow AI - detecting even subtle misuse, misconfiguration, and drift that traditional, rule-based controls simply do not understand. By interpreting context and intent across humans and machines, Darktrace enables organizations to adopt AI at scale without introducing unmanaged risk

What makes this possible is Darktrace’s decade-long maturity and expertise in behavioral understanding and AI-native cybersecurity. Achieved with Self-Learning AI that has been proven across more than 10,000 organizations, Darktrace understands what “normal” looks like for a business, across its users, systems, and now AI, so that meaningful deviations can be detected and acted on before they become incidents.

With one CISO describing Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI as “a leap forward compared to other tools” and another as a “force multiplier,” the technology can interpret ambiguous interactions, understand how access accumulates over time, and recognize when behavior, human or machine, begins to drift.

“Strategically, we’re looking to gain more visibility into how AI is operating across the environment and achieve greater control over what AI should be allowed to access and do,” shared the CISO at a private fund administrator.  

“What I’ve seen from Darktrace / SECURE AI is extremely promising. I have tremendous confidence in Darktrace’s vision for where this is headed and its ability to execute on this new solution.”

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