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March 22, 2023

Amadey Info Stealer and N-Day Vulnerabilities

Understand the implications of the Amadey info stealer on cybersecurity and how it exploits N-day vulnerabilities for data theft.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Zoe Tilsiter
Cyber Analyst
Written by
The Darktrace Threat Research Team
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22
Mar 2023

The continued prevalence of Malware as a Service (MaaS) across the cyber threat landscape means that even the most inexperienced of would-be malicious actors are able to carry out damaging and wide-spread cyber-attacks with relative ease. Among these commonly employed MaaS are information stealers, or info-stealers, a type of malware that infects a device and attempts to gather sensitive information before exfiltrating it to the attacker. Info-stealers typically target confidential information, such as login credentials and bank details, and attempt to lie low on a compromised device, allowing access to sensitive data for longer periods of time. 

It is essential for organizations to have efficient security measures in place to defend their networks from attackers in an increasing versatile and accessible threat landscape, however incident response alone is not enough. Having an autonomous decision maker able to not only detect suspicious activity, but also take action against it in real time, is of the upmost importance to defend against significant network compromise. 

Between August and December 2022, Darktrace detected the Amadey info-stealer on more than 30 customer environments, spanning various regions and industry verticals across the customer base. This shows a continual presence and overlap of info-stealer indicators of compromise (IOCs) across the cyber threat landscape, such as RacoonStealer, which we discussed last November (Part 1 and Part 2).

Background on Amadey

Amadey Bot, a malware that was first discovered in 2018, is capable of stealing sensitive information and installing additional malware by receiving commands from the attacker. Like other malware strains, it is being sold in illegal forums as MaaS starting from $500 USD [1]. 

Researchers at AhnLab found that Amadey is typically distributed via existing SmokeLoader loader malware campaigns. Downloading cracked versions of legitimate software causes SmokeLoader to inject malicious payload into Windows Explorer processes and proceeds to download Amadey.  

The botnet has also been used for distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, and as a vector to install malware spam campaigns, such as LockBit 3.0 [2]. Regardless of the delivery techniques, similar patterns of activity were observed across multiple customer environments. 

Amadey’s primary function is to steal information and further distribute malware. It aims to extract a variety of information from infected devices and attempts to evade the detection of security measures by reducing the volume of data exfiltration compared to that seen in other malicious instances.

Darktrace DETECT/Network™ and its built-in features, such as Wireshark Packet Captures (PCAP), identified Amadey activity on customer networks, whilst Darktrace RESPOND/Network™ autonomously intervened to halt its progress.

Attack Details

Figure 1: Timeline of Amadey info-stealer kill chain.

Initial Access  

User engagement with malicious email attachments or cracked software results in direct execution of the SmokeLoader loader malware on a device. Once the loader has executed its payload, it is then able to download additional malware, including the Amadey info-stealer.

Unusual Outbound Connections 

After initial access by the loader and download of additional malware, the Amadey info-stealer captures screenshots of network information and sends them to Amadey command and control (C2) servers via HTTP POST requests with no GET to a .php URI. An example of this can be seen in Figure 2.  

Figure 2: PCAP from an affected customer showing screenshots being sent out to the Amadey C2 server via a .jpg file. 

C2 Communications  

The infected device continues to make repeated connections out to this Amadey endpoint. Amadey's C2 server will respond with instructions to download additional plugins in the form of dynamic-link libraries (DLLs), such as "/Mb1sDv3/Plugins/cred64.dll", or attempt to download secondary info-stealers such as RedLine or RaccoonStealer. 

Internal Reconnaissance 

The device downloads executable and DLL files, or stealer configuration files to steal additional network information from software including RealVNC and Outlook. Most compromised accounts were observed downloading additional malware following commands received from the attacker.

Data Exfiltration 

The stolen information is then sent out via high volumes of HTTP connection. It makes HTTP POSTs to malicious .php URIs again, this time exfiltrating more data such as the Amadey version, device names, and any anti-malware software installed on the system.

How did the attackers bypass the rest of the security stack?

Existing N-Day vulnerabilities are leveraged to launch new attacks on customer networks and potentially bypass other tools in the security stack. Additionally, exfiltrating data via low and slow HTTP connections, rather than large file transfers to cloud storage platforms, is an effective means of evading the detection of traditional security tools which often look for large data transfers, sometimes to a specific list of identified “bad” endpoints.

Darktrace Coverage 

Amadey activity was autonomously identified by DETECT and the Cyber AI Analyst. A list of DETECT models that were triggered on deployments during this kill chain can be found in the Appendices. 

Various Amadey activities were detected and highlighted in DETECT model breaches and their model breach event logs. Figure 3 shows a compromised device making suspicious HTTP POST requests, causing the ‘Anomalous Connection / Posting HTTP to IP Without Hostname’ model to breach. It also downloaded an executable file (.exe) from the same IP.

Figure 3: Amadey activity on a customer deployment captured by model breaches and event logs. 

DETECT’s built-in features also assisted with detecting the data exfiltration. Using the PCAP integration, the exfiltrated data was captured for analysis. Figure 4 shows a connection made to the Amadey endpoint, in which information about the infected device, such as system ID and computer name, were sent. 

Figure 4: PCAP downloaded from Darktrace event logs highlighting data egress to the Amadey endpoint. 

Further information about the infected system can be seen in the above PCAP. As outlined by researchers at Ahnlab and shown in Figure 5, additional system information sent includes the Amadey version (vs=), the device’s admin privilege status (ar=), and any installed anti-malware or anti-virus software installed on the infected environment (av=) [3]. 

Figure 5: AhnLab’s glossary table explaining the information sent to the Amadey C2 server. 

Darktrace’s AI Analyst was also able to connect commonalities between model breaches on a device and present them as a connected incident made up of separate events. Figure 6 shows the AI Analyst incident log for a device having breached multiple models indicative of the Amadey kill chain. It displays the timeline of these events, the specific IOCs, and the associated attack tactic, in this case ‘Command and Control’. 

Figure 6: A screenshot of multiple IOCs and activity correlated together by AI Analyst. 

When enabled on customer’s deployments, RESPOND was able to take immediate action against Amadey to mitigate its impact on customer networks. RESPOND models that breached include: 

  • Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Significant Anomaly from Client Block
  • Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious File Block 
  • Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Controlled and Model Breach

On one customer’s environment, a device made a POST request with no GET to URI ‘/p84Nls2/index.php’ and unepeureyore[.]xyz. RESPOND autonomously enforced a previously established pattern of life on the device twice for 30 minutes each and blocked all outgoing traffic from the device for 10 minutes. Enforcing a device’s pattern of life restricts it to conduct activity within the device and/or user’s expected pattern of behavior and blocks anything anomalous or unexpected, enabling normal business operations to continue. This response is intended to reduce the potential scale of attacks by disrupting the kill chain, whilst ensuring business disruption is kept to a minimum. 

Figure 7: RESPOND actions taken on a customer deployment to disrupt the Amadey kill chain. 

The Darktrace Threat Research team conducted thorough investigations into Amadey activity observed across the customer base. They were able to identify and contextualize this threat across the fleet, enriching AI insights with collaborative human analysis. Pivoting from AI insights as their primary source of information, the Threat Research team were able to provide layered analysis to confirm this campaign-like activity and assess the threat across multiple unique environments, providing a holistic assessment to customers with contextualized insights.

Conclusion

The presence of the Amadey info-stealer in multiple customer environments highlights the continuing prevalence of MaaS and info-stealers across the threat landscape. The Amadey info-stealer in particular demonstrates that by evading N-day vulnerability patches, threat actors routinely launch new attacks. These malicious actors are then able to evade detection by traditional security tools by employing low and slow data exfiltration techniques, as opposed to large file transfers.

Crucially, Darktrace’s AI insights were coupled with expert human analysis to detect, respond, and provide contextualized insights to notify customers of Amadey activity effectively. DETECT captured Amadey activity taking place on customer deployments, and where enabled, RESPOND’s autonomous technology was able to take immediate action to reduce the scale of such attacks. Finally, the Threat Research team were in place to provide enhanced analysis for affected customers to help security teams future-proof against similar attacks.

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections 

Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location

Device / Initial Breach Chain Compromise

Anomalous Connection / Posting HTTP to IP Without Hostname 

Anomalous Connection / POST to PHP on New External Host

Anomalous Connection / Multiple HTTP POSTs to Rare Hostname 

Compromise / Beaconing Activity To External Rare

Compromise / Slow Beaconing Activity To External Rare

Anomalous Connection / Multiple Failed Connections to Rare Endpoint

List of IOCs

f0ce8614cc2c3ae1fcba93bc4a8b82196e7139f7 - SHA1 - Amadey DLL File Hash

e487edceeef3a41e2a8eea1e684bcbc3b39adb97 - SHA1 - Amadey DLL File Hash

0f9006d8f09e91bbd459b8254dd945e4fbae25d9 - SHA1 - Amadey DLL File Hash

4069fdad04f5e41b36945cc871eb87a309fd3442 - SHA1 - Amadey DLL File Hash

193.106.191[.]201 - IP - Amadey C2 Endpoint

77.73.134[.]66 - IP - Amadey C2 Endpoint

78.153.144[.]60 - IP - Amadey C2 Endpoint

62.204.41[.]252 - IP - Amadey C2 Endpoint

45.153.240[.]94 - IP - Amadey C2 Endpoint

185.215.113[.]204 - IP - Amadey C2 Endpoint

85.209.135[.]11 - IP - Amadey C2 Endpoint

185.215.113[.]205 - IP - Amadey C2 Endpoint

31.41.244[.]146 - IP - Amadey C2 Endpoint

5.154.181[.]119 - IP - Amadey C2 Endpoint

45.130.151[.]191 - IP - Amadey C2 Endpoint

193.106.191[.]184 - IP - Amadey C2 Endpoint

31.41.244[.]15 - IP - Amadey C2 Endpoint

77.73.133[.]72 - IP - Amadey C2 Endpoint

89.163.249[.]231 - IP - Amadey C2 Endpoint

193.56.146[.]243 - IP - Amadey C2 Endpoint

31.41.244[.]158 - IP - Amadey C2 Endpoint

85.209.135[.]109 - IP - Amadey C2 Endpoint

77.73.134[.]45 - IP - Amadey C2 Endpoint

moscow12[.]at - Hostname - Amadey C2 Endpoint

moscow13[.]at - Hostname - Amadey C2 Endpoint

unepeureyore[.]xyz - Hostname - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/fb73jc3/index.php - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/panelis/index.php - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/panelis/index.php?scr=1 - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/panel/index.php - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/panel/index.php?scr=1 - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/panel/Plugins/cred.dll - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/jg94cVd30f/index.php - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/jg94cVd30f/index.php?scr=1 - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/o7Vsjd3a2f/index.php - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/o7Vsjd3a2f/index.php?scr=1 - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/o7Vsjd3a2f/Plugins/cred64.dll - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/gjend7w/index.php - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/hfk3vK9/index.php - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/v3S1dl2/index.php - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/f9v33dkSXm/index.php - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/p84Nls2/index.php - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/p84Nls2/Plugins/cred.dll - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/nB8cWack3/index.php - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/rest/index.php - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/Mb1sDv3/index.php - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/Mb1sDv3/index.php?scr=1 - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/Mb1sDv3/Plugins/cred64.dll  - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/h8V2cQlbd3/index.php - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/f5OknW/index.php - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/rSbFldr23/index.php - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/rSbFldr23/index.php?scr=1 - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/jg94cVd30f/Plugins/cred64.dll - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/mBsjv2swweP/Plugins/cred64.dll - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/rSbFldr23/Plugins/cred64.dll - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/Plugins/cred64.dll - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

Mitre Attack and Mapping 

Collection:

T1185 - Man the Browser

Initial Access and Resource Development:

T1189 - Drive-by Compromise

T1588.001 - Malware

Persistence:

T1176 - Browser Extensions

Command and Control:

T1071 - Application Layer Protocol

T1071.001 - Web Protocols

T1090.002 - External Proxy

T1095 - Non-Application Layer Protocol

T1571 - Non-Standard Port

T1105 - Ingress Tool Transfer

References 

[1] https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.amadey

[2] https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/41450/

[3] https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/36634/

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Zoe Tilsiter
Cyber Analyst
Written by
The Darktrace Threat Research Team

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May 16, 2025

Catching a RAT: How Darktrace neutralized AsyncRAT

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What is a RAT?

As the proliferation of new and more advanced cyber threats continues, the Remote Access Trojan (RAT) remains a classic tool in a threat actor's arsenal. RATs, whether standardized or custom-built, enable attackers to remotely control compromised devices, facilitating a range of malicious activities.

What is AsyncRAT?

Since its first appearance in 2019, AsyncRAT has become increasingly popular among a wide range of threat actors, including cybercriminals and advanced persistent threat (APT) groups.

Originally available on GitHub as a legitimate tool, its open-source nature has led to widespread exploitation. AsyncRAT has been used in numerous campaigns, including prolonged attacks on essential US infrastructure, and has even reportedly penetrated the Chinese cybercriminal underground market [1] [2].

How does AsyncRAT work?

Original source code analysis of AsyncRAT demonstrates that once installed, it establishes persistence via techniques such as creating scheduled tasks or registry keys and uses SeDebugPrivilege to gain elevated privileges [3].

Its key features include:

  • Keylogging
  • File search
  • Remote audio and camera access
  • Exfiltration techniques
  • Staging for final payload delivery

These are generally typical functions found in traditional RATs. However, it also boasts interesting anti-detection capabilities. Due to the popularity of Virtual Machines (VM) and sandboxes for dynamic analysis, this RAT checks for the manufacturer via the WMI query 'Select * from Win32_ComputerSystem' and looks for strings containing 'VMware' and 'VirtualBox' [4].

Darktrace’s coverage of AsyncRAT

In late 2024 and early 2025, Darktrace observed a spike in AsyncRAT activity across various customer environments. Multiple indicators of post-compromise were detected, including devices attempting or successfully connecting to endpoints associated with AsyncRAT.

On several occasions, Darktrace identified a clear association with AsyncRAT through the digital certificates of the highlighted SSL endpoints. Darktrace’s Real-time Detection effectively identified and alerted on suspicious activities related to AsyncRAT. In one notable incident, Darktrace’s Autonomous Response promptly took action to contain the emerging threat posed by AsyncRAT.

AsyncRAT attack overview

On December 20, 2024, Darktrace first identified the use of AsyncRAT, noting a device successfully establishing SSL connections to the uncommon external IP 185.49.126[.]50 (AS199654 Oxide Group Limited) via port 6606. The IP address appears to be associated with AsyncRAT as flagged by open-source intelligence (OSINT) sources [5]. This activity triggered the device to alert the ‘Anomalous Connection / Rare External SSL Self-Signed' model.

Model alert in Darktrace / NETWORK showing the repeated SSL connections to a rare external Self-Signed endpoint, 185.49.126[.]50.
Figure 1: Model alert in Darktrace / NETWORK showing the repeated SSL connections to a rare external Self-Signed endpoint, 185.49.126[.]50.

Following these initial connections, the device was observed making a significantly higher number of connections to the same endpoint 185.49.126[.]50 via port 6606 over an extended period. This pattern suggested beaconing activity and triggered the 'Compromise/Beaconing Activity to External Rare' model alert.

Further analysis of the original source code, available publicly, outlines the default ports used by AsyncRAT clients for command-and-control (C2) communications [6]. It reveals that port 6606 is the default port for creating a new AsyncRAT client. Darktrace identified both the Certificate Issuer and the Certificate Subject as "CN=AsyncRAT Server". This SSL certificate encrypts the packets between the compromised system and the server. These indicators of compromise (IoCs) detected by Darktrace further suggest that the device was successfully connecting to a server associated with AsyncRAT.

Model alert in Darktrace / NETWORK displaying the Digital Certificate attributes, IP address and port number associated with AsyncRAT.
Figure 2: Model alert in Darktrace / NETWORK displaying the Digital Certificate attributes, IP address and port number associated with AsyncRAT.
Darktrace’s detection of repeated connections to the suspicious IP address 185.49.126[.]50 over port 6606, indicative of beaconing behavior.
Figure 3: Darktrace’s detection of repeated connections to the suspicious IP address 185.49.126[.]50 over port 6606, indicative of beaconing behavior.
Darktrace's Autonomous Response actions blocking the suspicious IP address,185.49.126[.]50.
Figure 4: Darktrace's Autonomous Response actions blocking the suspicious IP address,185.49.126[.]50.

A few days later, the same device was detected making numerous connections to a different IP address, 195.26.255[.]81 (AS40021 NL-811-40021), via various ports including 2106, 6606, 7707, and 8808. Notably, ports 7707 and 8808 are also default ports specified in the original AsyncRAT source code [6].

Darktrace’s detection of connections to the suspicious endpoint 195.26.255[.]81, where the default ports (6606, 7707, and 8808) for AsyncRAT were observed.
Figure 5: Darktrace’s detection of connections to the suspicious endpoint 195.26.255[.]81, where the default ports (6606, 7707, and 8808) for AsyncRAT were observed.

Similar to the activity observed with the first endpoint, 185.49.126[.]50, the Certificate Issuer for the connections to 195.26.255[.]81 was identified as "CN=AsyncRAT Server". Further OSINT investigation confirmed associations between the IP address 195.26.255[.]81 and AsyncRAT [7].

Darktrace's detection of a connection to the suspicious IP address 195.26.255[.]81 and the domain name identified under the common name (CN) of a certificate as AsyncRAT Server
Figure 6: Darktrace's detection of a connection to the suspicious IP address 195.26.255[.]81 and the domain name identified under the common name (CN) of a certificate as AsyncRAT Server.

Once again, Darktrace's Autonomous Response acted swiftly, blocking the connections to 195.26.255[.]81 throughout the observed AsyncRAT activity.

Figure 7: Darktrace's Autonomous Response actions were applied against the suspicious IP address 195.26.255[.]81.

A day later, Darktrace again alerted to further suspicious activity from the device. This time, connections to the suspicious endpoint 'kashuub[.]com' and IP address 191.96.207[.]246 via port 8041 were observed. Further analysis of port 8041 suggests it is commonly associated with ScreenConnect or Xcorpeon ASIC Carrier Ethernet Transport [8]. ScreenConnect has been observed in recent campaign’s where AsyncRAT has been utilized [9]. Additionally, one of the ASN’s observed, namely ‘ASN Oxide Group Limited’, was seen in both connections to kashuub[.]com and 185.49.126[.]50.

This could suggest a parallel between the two endpoints, indicating they might be hosting AsyncRAT C2 servers, as inferred from our previous analysis of the endpoint 185.49.126[.]50 and its association with AsyncRAT [5]. OSINT reporting suggests that the “kashuub[.]com” endpoint may be associated with ScreenConnect scam domains, further supporting the assumption that the endpoint could be a C2 server.

Darktrace’s Autonomous Response technology was once again able to support the customer here, blocking connections to “kashuub[.]com”. Ultimately, this intervention halted the compromise and prevented the attack from escalating or any sensitive data from being exfiltrated from the customer’s network into the hands of the threat actors.

Darktrace’s Autonomous Response applied a total of nine actions against the IP address 191.96.207[.]246 and the domain 'kashuub[.]com', successfully blocking the connections.
Figure 8: Darktrace’s Autonomous Response applied a total of nine actions against the IP address 191.96.207[.]246 and the domain 'kashuub[.]com', successfully blocking the connections.

Due to the popularity of this RAT, it is difficult to determine the motive behind the attack; however, from existing knowledge of what the RAT does, we can assume accessing and exfiltrating sensitive customer data may have been a factor.

Conclusion

While some cybercriminals seek stability and simplicity, openly available RATs like AsyncRAT provide the infrastructure and open the door for even the most amateur threat actors to compromise sensitive networks. As the cyber landscape continually shifts, RATs are now being used in all types of attacks.

Darktrace’s suite of AI-driven tools provides organizations with the infrastructure to achieve complete visibility and control over emerging threats within their network environment. Although AsyncRAT’s lack of concealment allowed Darktrace to quickly detect the developing threat and alert on unusual behaviors, it was ultimately Darktrace Autonomous Response's consistent blocking of suspicious connections that prevented a more disruptive attack.

Credit to Isabel Evans (Cyber Analyst), Priya Thapa (Cyber Analyst) and Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Appendices

  • Real-time Detection Models
       
    • Compromise / Suspicious SSL Activity
    •  
    • Compromise / Beaconing Activity To      External Rare
    •  
    • Compromise / High Volume of      Connections with Beacon Score
    •  
    • Anomalous Connection / Suspicious      Self-Signed SSL
    •  
    • Compromise / Sustained SSL or HTTP      Increase
    •  
    • Compromise / SSL Beaconing to Rare      Destination
    •  
    • Compromise / Suspicious Beaconing      Behaviour
    •  
    • Compromise / Large Number of      Suspicious Failed Connections
  •  
  • Autonomous     Response Models
       
    • Antigena / Network / Significant      Anomaly / Antigena Controlled and Model Alert
    •  
    • Antigena / Network / Significant      Anomaly / Antigena Enhanced Monitoring from Client Block

List of IoCs

·     185.49.126[.]50 - IP – AsyncRAT C2 Endpoint

·     195.26.255[.]81 – IP - AsyncRAT C2 Endpoint

·      191.96.207[.]246 – IP – Likely AsyncRAT C2 Endpoint

·     CN=AsyncRAT Server - SSL certificate - AsyncRATC2 Infrastructure

·      Kashuub[.]com– Hostname – Likely AsyncRAT C2 Endpoint

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping:

Tactic –Technique – Sub-Technique  

 

Execution– T1053 - Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task

DefenceEvasion – T1497 - Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks

Discovery– T1057 – Process Discovery

Discovery– T1082 – System Information Discovery

LateralMovement - T1021.001 - Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol

Collection/ Credential Access – T1056 – Input Capture: Keylogging

Collection– T1125 – Video Capture

Commandand Control – T1105 - Ingress Tool Transfer

Commandand Control – T1219 - Remote Access Software

Exfiltration– T1041 - Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

 

References

[1]  https://blog.talosintelligence.com/operation-layover-how-we-tracked-attack/

[2] https://intel471.com/blog/china-cybercrime-undergrond-deepmix-tea-horse-road-great-firewall

[3] https://www.attackiq.com/2024/08/01/emulate-asyncrat/

[4] https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/spear-phishing-campaign-with-new-techniques-aimed-at-aviation-companies

[5] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/185.49.126[.]50/community

[6] https://dfir.ch/posts/asyncrat_quasarrat/

[7] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/195.26.255[.]81

[8] https://www.speedguide.net/port.php?port=8041

[9] https://www.esentire.com/blog/exploring-the-infection-chain-screenconnects-link-to-asyncrat-deployment

[10] https://scammer.info/t/taking-out-connectwise-sites/153479/518?page=26

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About the author
Isabel Evans
Cyber Analyst

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May 13, 2025

Revolutionizing OT Risk Prioritization with Darktrace 6.3

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Powering smarter protection for industrial systems

In industrial environments, security challenges are deeply operational. Whether you’re running a manufacturing line, a power grid, or a semiconductor fabrication facility (fab), you need to know: What risks can truly disrupt my operations, and what should I focus on first?

Teams need the right tools to shift from reactive defense, constantly putting out fires, to proactively thinking about their security posture. However, most OT teams are stuck using IT-centric tools that don’t speak the language of industrial systems, are consistently overwhelmed with static CVE lists, and offer no understanding of OT-specific protocols. The result? Compliance gaps, siloed insights, and risk models that don’t reflect real-world exposure, making risk prioritization seem like a luxury.

Darktrace / OT 6.3 was built in direct response to these challenges. Developed in close collaboration with OT operators and engineers, this release introduces powerful upgrades that deliver the context, visibility, and automation security teams need, without adding complexity. It’s everything OT defenders need to protect critical operations in one platform that understands the language of industrial systems.

additions to darktrace / ot 6/3

Contextual risk modeling with smarter Risk Scoring

Darktrace / OT 6.3 introduces major upgrades to OT Risk Management, helping teams move beyond generic CVE lists with AI-driven risk scoring and attack path modeling.

By factoring in real-world exploitability, asset criticality, and operational context, this release delivers a more accurate view of what truly puts critical systems at risk.

The platform now integrates:

  • CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) database
  • End-of-life status for legacy OT devices
  • Firewall misconfiguration analysis
  • Incident response plan alignment

Most OT environments are flooded with vulnerability data that lacks context. CVE scores often misrepresent risk by ignoring how threats move through the environment or whether assets are even reachable. Firewalls are frequently misconfigured or undocumented, and EOL (End of Life) devices, some of the most vulnerable, often go untracked.

Legacy tools treat these inputs in isolation. Darktrace unifies them, showing teams exactly which attack paths adversaries could exploit, mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, with visibility into where legacy tech increases exposure.

The result: teams can finally focus on the risks that matter most to uptime, safety, and resilience without wasting resources on noise.

Automating compliance with dynamic IEC-62443 reporting

Darktrace / OT now includes a purpose-built IEC-62443-3-3 compliance module, giving industrial teams real-time visibility into their alignment with regulatory standards. No spreadsheets required!

Industrial environments are among the most heavily regulated. However, for many OT teams, staying compliant is still a manual, time-consuming process.

Darktrace / OT introduces a dedicated IEC-62443-3-3 module designed specifically for industrial environments. Security and operations teams can now map their security posture to IEC standards in real time, directly within the platform. The module automatically gathers evidence across all four security levels, flags non-compliance, and generates structured reports to support audit preparation, all in just a few clicks.Most organizations rely on spreadsheets or static tools to track compliance, without clear visibility into which controls meet standards like IEC-62443. The result is hidden gaps, resource-heavy audits, and slow remediation cycles.

Even dedicated compliance tools are often built for IT, require complex setup, and overlook the unique devices found in OT environments. This leaves teams stuck with fragmented reporting and limited assurance that their controls are actually aligned with regulatory expectations.

By automating compliance tracking, surfacing what matters most, and being purpose built for industrial environments, Darktrace / OT empowers organizations to reduce audit fatigue, eliminate blind spots, and focus resources where they’re needed most.

Expanding protocol visibility with deep insights for specialized OT operations

Darktrace has expanded its Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) capabilities to support five industry-specific protocols, across healthcare, semiconductor manufacturing, and ABB control systems.

The new protocols build on existing capabilities across all OT industry verticals and protocol types to ensure the Darktrace Self-Learning AI TM can learn intelligently about even more assets in complex industrial environments. By enabling native, AI-driven inspection of these protocols, Darktrace can identify both security threats and operational issues without relying on additional appliances or complex integrations.

Most security platforms lack native support for industry-specific protocols, creating critical visibility gaps in customer environments like healthcare, semiconductor manufacturing, and ABB-heavy industrial automation. Without deep protocol awareness, organizations struggle to accurately identify specialized OT and IoT assets, detect malicious activity concealed within proprietary protocol traffic, and generate reliable device risk profiles due to insufficient telemetry.

These blind spots result in incomplete asset inventories, and ultimately, flawed risk posture assessments which over-index for CVE patching and legacy equipment.

By combining protocol-aware detection with full-stack visibility across IT, OT, and IoT, Darktrace’s AI can correlate anomalies across domains. For example, connecting an anomaly from a Medical IoT (MIoT) device with suspicious behavior in IT systems, providing actionable, contextual insights other solutions often miss.

Conclusion

Together, these capabilities take OT security beyond alert noise and basic CVE matching, delivering continuous compliance, protocol-aware visibility, and actionable, prioritized risk insights, all inside a single, unified platform built for the realities of industrial environments.

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About the author
Pallavi Singh
Product Marketing Manager, OT Security & Compliance
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