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March 22, 2023

Amadey Info Stealer and N-Day Vulnerabilities

Understand the implications of the Amadey info stealer on cybersecurity and how it exploits N-day vulnerabilities for data theft.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Zoe Tilsiter
Cyber Analyst
Written by
The Darktrace Threat Research Team
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22
Mar 2023

The continued prevalence of Malware as a Service (MaaS) across the cyber threat landscape means that even the most inexperienced of would-be malicious actors are able to carry out damaging and wide-spread cyber-attacks with relative ease. Among these commonly employed MaaS are information stealers, or info-stealers, a type of malware that infects a device and attempts to gather sensitive information before exfiltrating it to the attacker. Info-stealers typically target confidential information, such as login credentials and bank details, and attempt to lie low on a compromised device, allowing access to sensitive data for longer periods of time. 

It is essential for organizations to have efficient security measures in place to defend their networks from attackers in an increasing versatile and accessible threat landscape, however incident response alone is not enough. Having an autonomous decision maker able to not only detect suspicious activity, but also take action against it in real time, is of the upmost importance to defend against significant network compromise. 

Between August and December 2022, Darktrace detected the Amadey info-stealer on more than 30 customer environments, spanning various regions and industry verticals across the customer base. This shows a continual presence and overlap of info-stealer indicators of compromise (IOCs) across the cyber threat landscape, such as RacoonStealer, which we discussed last November (Part 1 and Part 2).

Background on Amadey

Amadey Bot, a malware that was first discovered in 2018, is capable of stealing sensitive information and installing additional malware by receiving commands from the attacker. Like other malware strains, it is being sold in illegal forums as MaaS starting from $500 USD [1]. 

Researchers at AhnLab found that Amadey is typically distributed via existing SmokeLoader loader malware campaigns. Downloading cracked versions of legitimate software causes SmokeLoader to inject malicious payload into Windows Explorer processes and proceeds to download Amadey.  

The botnet has also been used for distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, and as a vector to install malware spam campaigns, such as LockBit 3.0 [2]. Regardless of the delivery techniques, similar patterns of activity were observed across multiple customer environments. 

Amadey’s primary function is to steal information and further distribute malware. It aims to extract a variety of information from infected devices and attempts to evade the detection of security measures by reducing the volume of data exfiltration compared to that seen in other malicious instances.

Darktrace DETECT/Network™ and its built-in features, such as Wireshark Packet Captures (PCAP), identified Amadey activity on customer networks, whilst Darktrace RESPOND/Network™ autonomously intervened to halt its progress.

Attack Details

Figure 1: Timeline of Amadey info-stealer kill chain.

Initial Access  

User engagement with malicious email attachments or cracked software results in direct execution of the SmokeLoader loader malware on a device. Once the loader has executed its payload, it is then able to download additional malware, including the Amadey info-stealer.

Unusual Outbound Connections 

After initial access by the loader and download of additional malware, the Amadey info-stealer captures screenshots of network information and sends them to Amadey command and control (C2) servers via HTTP POST requests with no GET to a .php URI. An example of this can be seen in Figure 2.  

Figure 2: PCAP from an affected customer showing screenshots being sent out to the Amadey C2 server via a .jpg file. 

C2 Communications  

The infected device continues to make repeated connections out to this Amadey endpoint. Amadey's C2 server will respond with instructions to download additional plugins in the form of dynamic-link libraries (DLLs), such as "/Mb1sDv3/Plugins/cred64.dll", or attempt to download secondary info-stealers such as RedLine or RaccoonStealer. 

Internal Reconnaissance 

The device downloads executable and DLL files, or stealer configuration files to steal additional network information from software including RealVNC and Outlook. Most compromised accounts were observed downloading additional malware following commands received from the attacker.

Data Exfiltration 

The stolen information is then sent out via high volumes of HTTP connection. It makes HTTP POSTs to malicious .php URIs again, this time exfiltrating more data such as the Amadey version, device names, and any anti-malware software installed on the system.

How did the attackers bypass the rest of the security stack?

Existing N-Day vulnerabilities are leveraged to launch new attacks on customer networks and potentially bypass other tools in the security stack. Additionally, exfiltrating data via low and slow HTTP connections, rather than large file transfers to cloud storage platforms, is an effective means of evading the detection of traditional security tools which often look for large data transfers, sometimes to a specific list of identified “bad” endpoints.

Darktrace Coverage 

Amadey activity was autonomously identified by DETECT and the Cyber AI Analyst. A list of DETECT models that were triggered on deployments during this kill chain can be found in the Appendices. 

Various Amadey activities were detected and highlighted in DETECT model breaches and their model breach event logs. Figure 3 shows a compromised device making suspicious HTTP POST requests, causing the ‘Anomalous Connection / Posting HTTP to IP Without Hostname’ model to breach. It also downloaded an executable file (.exe) from the same IP.

Figure 3: Amadey activity on a customer deployment captured by model breaches and event logs. 

DETECT’s built-in features also assisted with detecting the data exfiltration. Using the PCAP integration, the exfiltrated data was captured for analysis. Figure 4 shows a connection made to the Amadey endpoint, in which information about the infected device, such as system ID and computer name, were sent. 

Figure 4: PCAP downloaded from Darktrace event logs highlighting data egress to the Amadey endpoint. 

Further information about the infected system can be seen in the above PCAP. As outlined by researchers at Ahnlab and shown in Figure 5, additional system information sent includes the Amadey version (vs=), the device’s admin privilege status (ar=), and any installed anti-malware or anti-virus software installed on the infected environment (av=) [3]. 

Figure 5: AhnLab’s glossary table explaining the information sent to the Amadey C2 server. 

Darktrace’s AI Analyst was also able to connect commonalities between model breaches on a device and present them as a connected incident made up of separate events. Figure 6 shows the AI Analyst incident log for a device having breached multiple models indicative of the Amadey kill chain. It displays the timeline of these events, the specific IOCs, and the associated attack tactic, in this case ‘Command and Control’. 

Figure 6: A screenshot of multiple IOCs and activity correlated together by AI Analyst. 

When enabled on customer’s deployments, RESPOND was able to take immediate action against Amadey to mitigate its impact on customer networks. RESPOND models that breached include: 

  • Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Significant Anomaly from Client Block
  • Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious File Block 
  • Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Controlled and Model Breach

On one customer’s environment, a device made a POST request with no GET to URI ‘/p84Nls2/index.php’ and unepeureyore[.]xyz. RESPOND autonomously enforced a previously established pattern of life on the device twice for 30 minutes each and blocked all outgoing traffic from the device for 10 minutes. Enforcing a device’s pattern of life restricts it to conduct activity within the device and/or user’s expected pattern of behavior and blocks anything anomalous or unexpected, enabling normal business operations to continue. This response is intended to reduce the potential scale of attacks by disrupting the kill chain, whilst ensuring business disruption is kept to a minimum. 

Figure 7: RESPOND actions taken on a customer deployment to disrupt the Amadey kill chain. 

The Darktrace Threat Research team conducted thorough investigations into Amadey activity observed across the customer base. They were able to identify and contextualize this threat across the fleet, enriching AI insights with collaborative human analysis. Pivoting from AI insights as their primary source of information, the Threat Research team were able to provide layered analysis to confirm this campaign-like activity and assess the threat across multiple unique environments, providing a holistic assessment to customers with contextualized insights.

Conclusion

The presence of the Amadey info-stealer in multiple customer environments highlights the continuing prevalence of MaaS and info-stealers across the threat landscape. The Amadey info-stealer in particular demonstrates that by evading N-day vulnerability patches, threat actors routinely launch new attacks. These malicious actors are then able to evade detection by traditional security tools by employing low and slow data exfiltration techniques, as opposed to large file transfers.

Crucially, Darktrace’s AI insights were coupled with expert human analysis to detect, respond, and provide contextualized insights to notify customers of Amadey activity effectively. DETECT captured Amadey activity taking place on customer deployments, and where enabled, RESPOND’s autonomous technology was able to take immediate action to reduce the scale of such attacks. Finally, the Threat Research team were in place to provide enhanced analysis for affected customers to help security teams future-proof against similar attacks.

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections 

Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location

Device / Initial Breach Chain Compromise

Anomalous Connection / Posting HTTP to IP Without Hostname 

Anomalous Connection / POST to PHP on New External Host

Anomalous Connection / Multiple HTTP POSTs to Rare Hostname 

Compromise / Beaconing Activity To External Rare

Compromise / Slow Beaconing Activity To External Rare

Anomalous Connection / Multiple Failed Connections to Rare Endpoint

List of IOCs

f0ce8614cc2c3ae1fcba93bc4a8b82196e7139f7 - SHA1 - Amadey DLL File Hash

e487edceeef3a41e2a8eea1e684bcbc3b39adb97 - SHA1 - Amadey DLL File Hash

0f9006d8f09e91bbd459b8254dd945e4fbae25d9 - SHA1 - Amadey DLL File Hash

4069fdad04f5e41b36945cc871eb87a309fd3442 - SHA1 - Amadey DLL File Hash

193.106.191[.]201 - IP - Amadey C2 Endpoint

77.73.134[.]66 - IP - Amadey C2 Endpoint

78.153.144[.]60 - IP - Amadey C2 Endpoint

62.204.41[.]252 - IP - Amadey C2 Endpoint

45.153.240[.]94 - IP - Amadey C2 Endpoint

185.215.113[.]204 - IP - Amadey C2 Endpoint

85.209.135[.]11 - IP - Amadey C2 Endpoint

185.215.113[.]205 - IP - Amadey C2 Endpoint

31.41.244[.]146 - IP - Amadey C2 Endpoint

5.154.181[.]119 - IP - Amadey C2 Endpoint

45.130.151[.]191 - IP - Amadey C2 Endpoint

193.106.191[.]184 - IP - Amadey C2 Endpoint

31.41.244[.]15 - IP - Amadey C2 Endpoint

77.73.133[.]72 - IP - Amadey C2 Endpoint

89.163.249[.]231 - IP - Amadey C2 Endpoint

193.56.146[.]243 - IP - Amadey C2 Endpoint

31.41.244[.]158 - IP - Amadey C2 Endpoint

85.209.135[.]109 - IP - Amadey C2 Endpoint

77.73.134[.]45 - IP - Amadey C2 Endpoint

moscow12[.]at - Hostname - Amadey C2 Endpoint

moscow13[.]at - Hostname - Amadey C2 Endpoint

unepeureyore[.]xyz - Hostname - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/fb73jc3/index.php - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/panelis/index.php - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/panelis/index.php?scr=1 - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/panel/index.php - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/panel/index.php?scr=1 - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/panel/Plugins/cred.dll - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/jg94cVd30f/index.php - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/jg94cVd30f/index.php?scr=1 - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/o7Vsjd3a2f/index.php - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/o7Vsjd3a2f/index.php?scr=1 - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/o7Vsjd3a2f/Plugins/cred64.dll - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/gjend7w/index.php - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/hfk3vK9/index.php - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/v3S1dl2/index.php - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/f9v33dkSXm/index.php - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/p84Nls2/index.php - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/p84Nls2/Plugins/cred.dll - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/nB8cWack3/index.php - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/rest/index.php - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/Mb1sDv3/index.php - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/Mb1sDv3/index.php?scr=1 - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/Mb1sDv3/Plugins/cred64.dll  - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/h8V2cQlbd3/index.php - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/f5OknW/index.php - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/rSbFldr23/index.php - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/rSbFldr23/index.php?scr=1 - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/jg94cVd30f/Plugins/cred64.dll - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/mBsjv2swweP/Plugins/cred64.dll - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/rSbFldr23/Plugins/cred64.dll - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

/Plugins/cred64.dll - URI - Amadey C2 Endpoint

Mitre Attack and Mapping 

Collection:

T1185 - Man the Browser

Initial Access and Resource Development:

T1189 - Drive-by Compromise

T1588.001 - Malware

Persistence:

T1176 - Browser Extensions

Command and Control:

T1071 - Application Layer Protocol

T1071.001 - Web Protocols

T1090.002 - External Proxy

T1095 - Non-Application Layer Protocol

T1571 - Non-Standard Port

T1105 - Ingress Tool Transfer

References 

[1] https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.amadey

[2] https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/41450/

[3] https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/36634/

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Zoe Tilsiter
Cyber Analyst
Written by
The Darktrace Threat Research Team

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June 9, 2025

Modernising UK Cyber Regulation: Implications of the Cyber Security and Resilience Bill

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The need for security and continued cyber resilience

The UK government has made national security a key priority, and the new Cyber Security and Resilience Bill (CSRB) is a direct reflection of that focus. In introducing the Bill, Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology, Peter Kyle, recognised that the UK is “desperately exposed” to cyber threats—from criminal groups to hostile nation-states that are increasingly targeting the UK's digital systems and critical infrastructure[1].

Context and timeline for the new legislation

First announced during the King’s Speech of July 2024, and elaborated in a Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT) policy statement published in April 2025, the CSRB is expected to be introduced in Parliament during the 2025-26 legislative session.

For now, organisations in the UK remain subject to the 2018 Network and Information Systems (NIS) Regulations – an EU-derived law which was drafted before today’s increasing digitisation of critical services, rise in cloud adoption and emergence of AI-powered threats.

Why modernisation is critical

Without modernisation, the Government believes UK’s infrastructure and economy risks falling behind international peers. The EU, which revised its cybersecurity regulation under the NIS2 Directive, already imposes stricter requirements on a broader set of sectors.

The urgency of the Bill is also underscored by recent high-impact incidents, including the Synnovis attack which targeted the National Health Service (NHS) suppliers and disrupted thousands of patient appointments and procedures[2]. The Government has argued that such events highlight a systemic failure to keep pace with a rapidly evolving threat landscape[3].

What the Bill aims to achieve

This Bill represents a decisive shift. According to the Government, it will modernise and future‑proof the UK’s cyber laws, extending oversight to areas where risk has grown but regulation has not kept pace[4]. While the legislation builds on previous consultations and draws lessons from international frameworks like the EU’s NIS2 directive, it also aims to tailor solutions to the UK’s unique threat environment.

Importantly, the Government is framing cybersecurity not as a barrier to growth, but as a foundation for it. The policy statement emphasises that strong digital resilience will create the stability businesses need to thrive, innovate, and invest[5]. Therefore, the goals of the Bill will not only be to enhance security but also act as an enabler to innovation and economic growth.

Recognition that AI changes cyber threats

The CSRB policy statement recognises that AI is fundamentally reshaping the threat landscape, with adversaries now leveraging AI and commercial cyber tools to exploit vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure and supply chains. Indeed, the NCSC has recently assessed that AI will almost certainly lead to “an increase in the frequency and intensity of cyber threats”[6]. Accordingly, the policy statement insists that the UK’s regulatory framework “must keep pace and provide flexibility to respond to future threats as and when they emerge”[7].

To address the threat, the Bill signals new obligations for MSPs and data centres, timely incident reporting and dynamic guidance that can be refreshed without fresh primary legislation, making it essential for firms to follow best practices.

What might change in day-to-day practice?

New organisations in scope of regulation

Under the existing Network and Information Systems (NIS) Regulations[8], the UK already supervises operators in five critical sectors—energy, transport, drinking water, health (Operators of Essential Services, OES) and digital infrastructure (Relevant Digital Service Providers, RDSPs).

The Cyber Security and Resilience Bill retains this foundation and adds Managed Service Providers (MSPs) and data centres to the scope of regulation to “better recognise the increasing reliance on digital services and the vulnerabilities posed by supply chains”[9]. It also grants the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology the power to add new sectors or sub‑sectors via secondary legislation, following consultation with Parliament and industry.

Managed service providers (MSPs)

MSPs occupy a central position within the UK’s enterprise information‑technology infrastructure. Because they remotely run or monitor clients’ systems, networks and data, they hold privileged, often continuous access to multiple environments. This foothold makes them an attractive target for malicious actors.

The Bill aims to bring MSPs in scope of regulation by making them subject to the same duties as those placed on firms that provide digital services under the 2018 NIS Regulations. By doing so, the Bill seeks to raise baseline security across thousands of customer environments and to provide regulators with better visibility of supply‑chain risk.

The proposed definition for MSPs is a service which:

  1. Is provided to another organisation
  2. Relies on the use of network and information systems to deliver the service
  3. Relates to ongoing management support, active administration and/or monitoring of AI systems, IT infrastructure, applications, and/or IT networks, including for the purpose of activities relating to cyber security.
  4. Involves a network connection and/or access to the customer’s network and information systems.

Data centres

Building on the September 2024 designation of data centres as critical national infrastructure, the CSRB will fold data infrastructure into the NIS-style regime by naming it an “relevant sector" and data centres as “essential service”[10].

About 182 colocation facilities run by 64 operators will therefore come under statutory duties to notify the regulator, maintain proportionate CAF-aligned controls and report significant incidents, regardless of who owns them or what workloads they host.

New requirements for regulated organisations

Incident reporting processes

There could be stricter timelines or broader definitions of what counts as a reportable incident. This might nudge organisations to formalise detection, triage, and escalation procedures.

The Government is proposing to introduce a new two-stage incident reporting process. This would include an initial notification which would be submitted within 24 hours of becoming aware of a significant incident, followed by a full incident report which should be submitted within 72 hours of the same.

Supply chain assurance requirements

Supply chains for the UK's most critical services are becoming increasingly complex and present new and serious vulnerabilities for cyber-attacks. The recent Synnovis ransomware attacks on the NHS[11] exemplify the danger posed by attacks against the supply chains of important services and organisations. This is concerning when reflecting on the latest Cyber Security Breaches survey conducted by DSIT, which highlights that fewer than 25% of large businesses review their supply chain risks[12].

Despite these risks, the UK’s legacy cybersecurity regulatory regime does not explicitly cover supply chain risk management. The UK instead relies on supporting and non-statutory guidance to close this gap, such as the NCSC’s Cyber Assessment Framework (CAF)[13].

The CSRB policy statement acts on this regulatory shortcoming and recognises that “a single supplier’s disruption can have far-reaching impacts on the delivery of essential or digital services”[14].

To address this, the Bill would make in-scope organisations (OES and RDPS) directly accountable for the cybersecurity of their supply chains. Secondary legislation would spell out these duties in detail, ensuring that OES and RDSPs systematically assess and mitigate third-party cyber risks.

Updated and strengthened security requirements

By placing the CAF into a firmer footing and backing it with a statutory Code of Practice, the Government is setting clearer expectations about government expectations on technical standards and methods organisations will need to follow to prove their resilience.

How Darktrace can help support affected organizations

Demonstrate resilience

Darktrace’s Self-Learning AITM continuously monitors your digital estate across cloud, network, OT, email, and endpoint to detect, investigate, and autonomously respond to emerging threats in real time. This persistent visibility and defense posture helps organizations demonstrate cyber resilience to regulators with confidence.

Streamline incident reporting and compliance

Darktrace surfaces clear alerts and automated investigation reports, complete with timeline views and root cause analysis. These insights reduce the time and complexity of regulatory incident reporting and support internal compliance workflows with auditable, AI-generated evidence.

Improve supply chain visibility

With full visibility across connected systems and third-party activity, Darktrace detects early indicators of lateral movement, account compromise, and unusual behavior stemming from vendor or partner access, reducing the risk of supply chain-originated cyber-attacks.

Ensure MSPs can meet new standards

For managed service providers, Darktrace offers native multi-tenant support and autonomous threat response that can be embedded directly into customer environments. This ensures consistent, scalable security standards across clients—helping MSPs address increasing regulatory obligations.

[related-resource]

References

[1] https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/article/2024/jul/29/uk-desperately-exposed-to-cyber-threats-and-pandemics-says-minister

[2] https://www.england.nhs.uk/2024/06/synnovis-cyber-attack-statement-from-nhs-england/

[3] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/cyber-security-and-resilience-bill-policy-statement/cyber-security-and-resilience-bill-policy-statement

[4] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/cyber-security-and-resilience-bill-policy-statement/cyber-security-and-resilience-bill-policy-statement

[5] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/cyber-security-and-resilience-bill-policy-statement/cyber-security-and-resilience-bill-policy-statement

[6] https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/report/impact-ai-cyber-threat-now-2027

[7] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/cyber-security-and-resilience-bill-policy-statement/cyber-security-and-resilience-bill-policy-statement

[8] https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/nis-directive-and-nis-regulations-2018

[9] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/cyber-security-and-resilience-bill-policy-statement/cyber-security-and-resilience-bill-policy-statement

[10] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/cyber-security-and-resilience-bill-policy-statement/cyber-security-and-resilience-bill-policy-statement

[11] https://www.england.nhs.uk/2024/06/synnovis-cyber-attack-statement-from-nhs-england/

[12] https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/cyber-security-breaches-survey-2025/cyber-security-breaches-survey-2025

[13] https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/cyber-assessment-framework

[14] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/cyber-security-and-resilience-bill-policy-statement/cyber-security-and-resilience-bill-policy-statement

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June 5, 2025

Unpacking ClickFix: Darktrace’s detection of a prolific social engineering tactic

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What is ClickFix and how does it work?

Amid heightened security awareness, threat actors continue to seek stealthy methods to infiltrate target networks, often finding the human end user to be the most vulnerable and easily exploited entry point.

ClickFix baiting is an exploitation of the end user, making use of social engineering techniques masquerading as error messages or routine verification processes, that can result in malicious code execution.

Since March 2024, the simplicity of this technique has drawn attention from a range of threat actors, from individual cybercriminals to Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) groups such as APT28 and MuddyWater, linked to Russia and Iran respectively, introducing security threats on a broader scale [1]. ClickFix campaigns have been observed affecting organizations in across multiple industries, including healthcare, hospitality, automotive and government [2][3].

Actors carrying out these targeted attacks typically utilize similar techniques, tools and procedures (TTPs) to gain initial access. These include spear phishing attacks, drive-by compromises, or exploiting trust in familiar online platforms, such as GitHub, to deliver malicious payloads [2][3]. Often, a hidden link within an email or malvertisements on compromised legitimate websites redirect the end user to a malicious URL [4]. These take the form of ‘Fix It’ or fake CAPTCHA prompts [4].

From there, users are misled into believing they are completing a human verification step, registering a device, or fixing a non-existent issue such as a webpage display error. As a result, they are guided through a three-step process that ultimately enables the execution of malicious PowerShell commands:

  1. Open a Windows Run dialog box [press Windows Key + R]
  2. Automatically or manually copy and paste a malicious PowerShell command into the terminal [press CTRL+V]
  3. And run the prompt [press ‘Enter’] [2]

Once the malicious PowerShell command is executed, threat actors then establish command and control (C2) communication within the targeted environment before moving laterally through the network with the intent of obtaining and stealing sensitive data [4]. Malicious payloads associated with various malware families, such as XWorm, Lumma, and AsyncRAT, are often deployed [2][3].

Attack timeline of ClickFix cyber attack

Based on investigations conducted by Darktrace’s Threat Research team in early 2025, this blog highlights Darktrace’s capability to detect ClickFix baiting activity following initial access.

Darktrace’s coverage of a ClickFix attack chain

Darktrace identified multiple ClickFix attacks across customer environments in both Europe, the Middle East, and Africa (EMEA) and the United States. The following incident details a specific attack on a customer network that occurred on April 9, 2025.

Although the initial access phase of this specific attack occurred outside Darktrace’s visibility, other affected networks showed compromise beginning with phishing emails or fake CAPTCHA prompts that led users to execute malicious PowerShell commands.

Darktrace’s visibility into the compromise began when the threat actor initiated external communication with their C2 infrastructure, with Darktrace / NETWORK detecting the use of a new PowerShell user agent, indicating an attempt at remote code execution.

Darktrace / NETWORK's detection of a device making an HTTP connection with new PowerShell user agent, indicating PowerShell abuse for C2 communications.
Figure 1: Darktrace / NETWORK's detection of a device making an HTTP connection with new PowerShell user agent, indicating PowerShell abuse for C2 communications.

Download of Malicious Files for Lateral Movement

A few minutes later, the compromised device was observed downloading a numerically named file. Numeric files like this are often intentionally nondescript and associated with malware. In this case, the file name adhered to a specific pattern, matching the regular expression: /174(\d){7}/. Further investigation into the file revealed that it contained additional malicious code designed to further exploit remote services and gather device information.

Darktrace / NETWORK's detection of a numeric file, one minute after the new PowerShell User Agent alert.
Figure 2: Darktrace / NETWORK's detection of a numeric file, one minute after the new PowerShell User Agent alert.

The file contained a script that sent system information to a specified IP address using an HTTP POST request, which also processed the response. This process was verified through packet capture (PCAP) analysis conducted by the Darktrace Threat Research team.

By analyzing the body content of the HTTP GET request, it was observed that the command converts the current time to Unix epoch time format (i.e., 9 April 2025 13:26:40 GMT), resulting in an additional numeric file observed in the URI: /1744205200.

PCAP highlighting the HTTP GET request that sends information to the specific IP, 193.36.38[.]237, which then generates another numeric file titled per the current time.
Figure 3: PCAP highlighting the HTTP GET request that sends information to the specific IP, 193.36.38[.]237, which then generates another numeric file titled per the current time.

Across Darktrace’s investigations into other customers' affected by ClickFix campaigns, both internal information discovery events and further execution of malicious code were observed.

Data Exfiltration

By following the HTTP stream in the same PCAP, the Darktrace Threat Research Team assessed the activity as indicative of data exfiltration involving system and device information to the same command-and-control (C2) endpoint, , 193.36.38[.]237. This endpoint was flagged as malicious by multiple open-source intelligence (OSINT) vendors [5].

PCAP highlighting HTTP POST connection with the numeric file per the URI /1744205200 that indicates data exfiltration to 193.36.38[.]237.
Figure 4: PCAP highlighting HTTP POST connection with the numeric file per the URI /1744205200 that indicates data exfiltration to 193.36.38[.]237.

Further analysis of Darktrace’s Advanced Search logs showed that the attacker’s malicious code scanned for internal system information, which was then sent to a C2 server via an HTTP POST request, indicating data exfiltration

Advanced Search further highlights Darktrace's observation of the HTTP POST request, with the second numeric file representing data exfiltration.
Figure 5: Advanced Search further highlights Darktrace's observation of the HTTP POST request, with the second numeric file representing data exfiltration.

Actions on objectives

Around ten minutes after the initial C2 communications, the compromised device was observed connecting to an additional rare endpoint, 188.34.195[.]44. Further analysis of this endpoint confirmed its association with ClickFix campaigns, with several OSINT vendors linking it to previously reported attacks [6].

In the final HTTP POST request made by the device, Darktrace detected a file at the URI /init1234 in the connection logs to the malicious endpoint 188.34.195[.]44, likely depicting the successful completion of the attack’s objective, automated data egress to a ClickFix C2 server.

Darktrace / NETWORK grouped together the observed indicators of compromise (IoCs) on the compromised device and triggered an Enhanced Monitoring model alert, a high-priority detection model designed to identify activity indicative of the early stages of an attack. These models are monitored and triaged 24/7 by Darktrace’s Security Operations Center (SOC) as part of the Managed Threat Detection service, ensuring customers are promptly notified of malicious activity as soon as it emerges.

Darktrace correlated the separate malicious connections that pertained to a single campaign.
Figure 6: Darktrace correlated the separate malicious connections that pertained to a single campaign.

Darktrace Autonomous Response

In the incident outlined above, Darktrace was not configured in Autonomous Response mode. As a result, while actions to block specific connections were suggested, they had to be manually implemented by the customer’s security team. Due to the speed of the attack, this need for manual intervention allowed the threat to escalate without interruption.

However, in a different example, Autonomous Response was fully enabled, allowing Darktrace to immediately block connections to the malicious endpoint (138.199.156[.]22) just one second after the initial connection in which a numerically named file was downloaded [7].

Darktrace Autonomous Response blocked connections to a suspicious endpoint following the observation of the numeric file download.
Figure 7: Darktrace Autonomous Response blocked connections to a suspicious endpoint following the observation of the numeric file download.

This customer was also subscribed to our Managed Detection and Response service, Darktrace’s SOC extended a ‘Quarantine Device’ action that had already been autonomously applied in order to buy their security team additional time for remediation.

Autonomous Response blocked connections to malicious endpoints, including 138.199.156[.]22, 185.250.151[.]155, and rkuagqnmnypetvf[.]top, and also quarantined the affected device. These actions were later manually reinforced by the Darktrace SOC.
Figure 8: Autonomous Response blocked connections to malicious endpoints, including 138.199.156[.]22, 185.250.151[.]155, and rkuagqnmnypetvf[.]top, and also quarantined the affected device. These actions were later manually reinforced by the Darktrace SOC.

Conclusion

ClickFix baiting is a widely used tactic in which threat actors exploit human error to bypass security defenses. By tricking end point users into performing seemingly harmless, everyday actions, attackers gain initial access to systems where they can access and exfiltrate sensitive data.

Darktrace’s anomaly-based approach to threat detection identifies early indicators of targeted attacks without relying on prior knowledge or IoCs. By continuously learning each device’s unique pattern of life, Darktrace detects subtle deviations that may signal a compromise. In this case, Darktrace's Autonomous Response, when operating in a fully autonomous mode, was able to swiftly contain the threat before it could progress further along the attack lifecycle.

Credit to Keanna Grelicha (Cyber Analyst) and Jennifer Beckett (Cyber Analyst)

Appendices

NETWORK Models

  • Device / New PowerShell User Agent
  • Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname
  • Anomalous Connection / Posting HTTP to IP Without Hostname
  • Anomalous Connection / Powershell to Rare External
  • Device / Suspicious Domain
  • Device / New User Agent and New IP
  • Anomalous File / New User Agent Followed By Numeric File Download (Enhanced Monitoring Model)
  • Device / Initial Attack Chain Activity (Enhanced Monitoring Model)

Autonomous Response Models

  • Antigena / Network::Significant Anomaly::Antigena Significant Anomaly from Client Block
  • Antigena / Network::Significant Anomaly::Antigena Enhanced Monitoring from Client Block
  • Antigena / Network::External Threat::Antigena File then New Outbound Block
  • Antigena / Network::External Threat::Antigena Suspicious File Block
  • Antigena / Network::Significant Anomaly::Antigena Alerts Over Time Block
  • Antigena / Network::External Threat::Antigena Suspicious File Block

IoC - Type - Description + Confidence

·       141.193.213[.]11 – IP address – Possible C2 Infrastructure

·       141.193.213[.]10 – IP address – Possible C2 Infrastructure

·       64.94.84[.]217 – IP address – Possible C2 Infrastructure

·       138.199.156[.]22 – IP address – C2 server

·       94.181.229[.]250 – IP address – Possible C2 Infrastructure

·       216.245.184[.]181 – IP address – Possible C2 Infrastructure

·       212.237.217[.]182 – IP address – Possible C2 Infrastructure

·       168.119.96[.]41 – IP address – Possible C2 Infrastructure

·       193.36.38[.]237 – IP address – C2 server

·       188.34.195[.]44 – IP address – C2 server

·       205.196.186[.]70 – IP address – Possible C2 Infrastructure

·       rkuagqnmnypetvf[.]top – Hostname – C2 server

·       shorturl[.]at/UB6E6 – Hostname – Possible C2 Infrastructure

·       tlgrm-redirect[.]icu – Hostname – Possible C2 Infrastructure

·       diagnostics.medgenome[.]com – Hostname – Compromised Website

·       /1741714208 – URI – Possible malicious file

·       /1741718928 – URI – Possible malicious file

·       /1743871488 – URI – Possible malicious file

·       /1741200416 – URI – Possible malicious file

·       /1741356624 – URI – Possible malicious file

·       /ttt – URI – Possible malicious file

·       /1741965536 – URI – Possible malicious file

·       /1.txt – URI – Possible malicious file

·       /1744205184 – URI – Possible malicious file

·       /1744139920 – URI – Possible malicious file

·       /1744134352 – URI – Possible malicious file

·       /1744125600 – URI – Possible malicious file

·       /1[.]php?s=527 – URI – Possible malicious file

·       34ff2f72c191434ce5f20ebc1a7e823794ac69bba9df70721829d66e7196b044 – SHA-256 Hash – Possible malicious file

·       10a5eab3eef36e75bd3139fe3a3c760f54be33e3 – SHA-1 Hash – Possible malicious file

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Tactic – Technique – Sub-Technique  

Spearphishing Link - INITIAL ACCESS - T1566.002 - T1566

Drive-by Compromise - INITIAL ACCESS - T1189

PowerShell - EXECUTION - T1059.001 - T1059

Exploitation of Remote Services - LATERAL MOVEMENT - T1210

Web Protocols - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1071.001 - T1071

Automated Exfiltration - EXFILTRATION - T1020 - T1020.001

References

[1] https://www.logpoint.com/en/blog/emerging-threats/clickfix-another-deceptive-social-engineering-technique/

[2] https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/security-brief-clickfix-social-engineering-technique-floods-threat-landscape

[3] https://cyberresilience.com/threatonomics/understanding-the-clickfix-attack/

[4] https://www.group-ib.com/blog/clickfix-the-social-engineering-technique-hackers-use-to-manipulate-victims/

[5] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/193.36.38.237/detection

[6] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/188.34.195.44/community

[7] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/138.199.156.22/detection

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About the author
Keanna Grelicha
Cyber Analyst
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