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June 23, 2023

How Darktrace Quickly Foiled An Information Stealer

Discover how Darktrace thwarted the CryptBot malware in just 2 seconds. Learn about this fast-moving threat and the defense strategies employed.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Alexandra Sentenac
Cyber Analyst
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23
Jun 2023

The recent trend of threat actors using information stealer malware, designed to gather and exfiltrate confidential data, shows no sign of slowing. With new or updated info-stealer strains appearing in the wild on a regular basis, it came as no surprise to see a surge in yet another prolific variant in late 2022, CryptBot.

What is CryptBot?

CryptBot is a Windows-based trojan malware that was first discovered in the wild in December 2019. It belongs to the prolific category of information stealers whose primary objective, as the name suggests, is to gather information from infected devices and send it to the threat actor.

ZeuS was reportedly the first info-stealer to be discovered, back in 2006. After its code was leaked, many other variants came to light and have been gaining popularity amongst cyber criminals [1] [2] [3]. Indeed, Inside the SOC has discussed multiple infections across its customer base associated with several types of stealers in the past months [4] [5] [6] [7]. 

The Darktrace Threat Research team investigated CryptBot infections on the digital environments of more than 40 different Darktrace customers between October 2022 and January 2023. Darktrace DETECT™ and its anomaly-based approach to threat detection allowed it to successfully identify the unusual activity surrounding these info-stealer infections on customer networks. Meanwhile, Darktrace RESPOND™, when enabled in autonomous response mode, was able to quickly intervene and prevent the exfiltration of sensitive company data.

Why is info-stealer malware popular?

It comes as no surprise that info-stealers have “become one of the most discussed malware types on the cybercriminal underground in 2022”, according to Accenture’s Cyber Threat Intelligence team [10]. This is likely in part due to the fact that:

More sensitive data on devices

Due to the digitization of many aspects of our lives, such as banking and social interactions, a trend accelerated by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Cost effective

Info-stealers provide a great return on investment (ROI) for threat actors looking to exfiltrate data without having to do the traditional internal reconnaissance and data transfer associated with data theft. Info-stealers are usually cheap to purchase and are available through Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) offerings, allowing less technical and resourceful threat actors in on the stealing action. This makes them a prevalent threat in the malware landscape. 

How does CryptBot work?

The techniques employed by info-stealers to gather and exfiltrate data as well as the type of data targeted vary from malware to malware, but the data targeted typically includes login credentials for a variety of applications, financial information, cookies and global information about the infected computer [8]. Given its variety and sensitivity, threat actors can leverage the stolen data in several ways to make a profit. In the case of CryptBot, the data obtained is sold on forums or underground data marketplaces and can be later employed in higher profile attacks [9]. For example, stolen login information has previously been leveraged in credential-based attacks, which can successfully bypass authentication-based security measures, including multi-factor authentication (MFA). 

CryptBot functionalities

Like many information stealers, CryptBot is designed to steal a variety of sensitive personal and financial information such as browser credentials, cookies and history information and social media accounts login information, as well as cryptocurrency wallets and stored credit card information [11]. General information (e.g., OS, installed applications) about the infected computer is also retrieved. Browsers targeted by CryptBot include Chrome, Firefox, and Edge. In early 2022, CryptBot’s code was revamped in order to streamline its data extraction capabilities and improve its overall efficiency, an update that coincided with a rise in the number of infections [11] [12].

Some of CryptBot's functionalities were removed and its exfiltration process was streamlined, which resulted in a leaner payload, around half its original size and a quicker infection process [11]. Some of the features removed included sandbox detection and evasion functionalities, the collection of desktop text files and screen captures, which were deemed unnecessary. At the same time, the code was improved in order to include new Chrome versions released after CryptBot’s first appearance in 2019. Finally, its exfiltration process was simplified: prior to its 2022 update, the malware saved stolen data in two separate folders before sending it to two separate command and control (C2) domains. Post update, the data is only saved in one location and sent to one C2 domain, which is hardcoded in the C2 transmission function of the code. This makes the infection process much more streamlined, taking only a few minutes from start to finish. 

Aside from the update to its malware code, CryptBot regularly updates and refreshes its C2 domains and dropper websites, making it a highly fluctuating malware with constantly new indicators of compromise and distribution sites. 

Even though CryptBot is less known than other info-stealers, it was reportedly infecting thousands of devices daily in the first months of 2020 [13] and its continued prevalence resulted in Google taking legal action against its distribution infrastructure at the end of April 2023 [14].  

How is CryptBot obtained?

CryptBot is primarily distributed through malicious websites offering free and illegally modified software (i.e., cracked software) for common commercial programs (e.g., Microsoft Windows and Office, Adobe Photoshop, Google Chrome, Nitro PDF Pro) and video games. From these ‘malvertising’ pages, the user is redirected through multiple sites to the actual payload dropper page [15]. This distribution method has seen a gain in popularity amongst info-stealers in recent months and is also used by other malware families such as Raccoon Stealer and Vidar [16] [17].

A same network of cracked software websites can be used to download different malware strains, which can result in multiple simultaneous infections. Additionally, these networks often use search engine optimization (SEO) in order to make adverts for their malware distributing sites appear at the top of the Google search results page, thus increasing the chances of the malicious payloads being downloaded.

Furthermore, CryptBot leverages Pay-Per-Install (PPI) services such as 360Installer and PrivateLoader, a downloader malware family used to deliver payloads of multiple malware families operated by different threat actors [18] [19] [20]. The use of this distribution method for CryptBot payloads appears to have stemmed from its 2022 update. According to Google, 161 active domains were associated with 360Installer, of which 90 were associated with malware delivery activities and 29 with the delivery of CryptBot malware specifically. Google further identified hundreds of domains used by CryptBot as C2 sites, all of which appear to be hosted on the .top top-level domain [21].

This simple yet effective distribution tactic, combined with the MaaS model and the lucrative prospects of selling the stolen data resulted in numerous infections. Indeed, CryptBot was estimated to have infected over 670,000 computers in 2022 [14]. Even though the distribution method chosen means that most of the infected devices are likely to be personal computers, bring your own device (BYOD) policies and users’ tendency to reuse passwords means that corporate environments are also at risk. 

CryptBot Attack Overview

In some cases observed by Darktrace, after connecting to malvertising websites, devices were seen making encrypted SSL connections to file hosting services such as MediaFire or Mega, while in others devices were observed connecting to an endpoint associated with a content delivery network. This is likely the location from where the malware payload was downloaded alongside cracked software, which is executed by the unsuspecting user. As the user expects to run an executable file to install their desired software, the malware installation often happens without the user noticing.

Some of the malvertising sites observed by Darktrace on customer deployments were crackful[.]com, modcrack[.]net, windows-7-activator[.]com and office-activator[.]com. However, in many cases detected by Darktrace, CryptBot was propagated via websites offering trojanized KMSPico software (e.g., official-kmspico[.]com, kmspicoofficial[.]com). KMSPico is a popular Microsoft Windows and Office product activator that emulates a Windows Key Management Services (KMS) server to activate licenses fraudulently. 

Once it has been downloaded and executed, CryptBot will search the system for confidential information and create a folder with a seemingly randomly generated name, matching the regex [a-zA-Z]{10}, to store the gathered sensitive data, ready for exfiltration. 

Figure 1: Packet capture (PCAP) of an HTTP POST request showing the file with the stolen data being sent over the connection.
Figure 1: Packet capture (PCAP) of an HTTP POST request showing the file with the stolen data being sent over the connection.

This data is then sent to the C2 domain via HTTP POST requests on port 80 to the URI /gate.php. As previously stated, CryptBot C2 infrastructure is changed frequently and many of the domains seen by Darktrace had been registered within the previous 30 days. The domain names detected appeared to have been generated by an algorithm, following the regex patterns [a-z]{6}[0-9]{2,3}.top or [a-z]{6}[0-9]{2,3}.cfd. In several cases, the C2 domain had not been flagged as malicious by other security vendors or had just one detection. This is likely because of the frequent changes in the C2 infrastructure operated by the threat actors behind CryptBot, with new malicious domains being created periodically to avoid detection. This makes signature-based security solutions much less efficient to detect and block connections to malicious domains. Additionally, the fact that the stolen data is sent over regular HTTP POST requests, which are used daily as part of a multitude of legitimate processes such as file uploads or web form submissions, allows the exfiltration connections to blend in with normal and legitimate traffic making it difficult to isolate and detect as malicious activity. 

In this context, anomaly-based security detections such as Darktrace DETECT are the best way to pick out these anomalous connections amidst legitimate Internet traffic. In the case of CryptBot, two DETECT models were seen consistently breaching for CryptBot-related activity: ‘Device / Suspicious Domain’, breaching for connections to 100% rare C2 .top domains, and ‘Anomalous Connection / POST to PHP on New External Host’, breaching on the data exfiltration HTTP POST request. 

In deployments where Darktrace RESPOND was deployed, a RESPOND model breached within two seconds of the first HTTP POST request. If enabled in autonomous mode, RESPOND would block the data exfiltration connections, thus preventing the data safe from being sold in underground forums to other threat actors. In one of the cases investigated by Darktrace’s Threat Research team, DETECT was able to successfully identify and alert the customer about CryptBot-related malicious activity on a device that Darktrace had only begun to monitor one day before, showcasing how fast Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI learns every nuance of customer networks and the devices within it.

In most cases investigated by Darktrace, fewer than 5 minutes elapsed between the first connection to the endpoint offering free cracked software and the data being exfiltrated to the C2 domain. For example, in one of the attack chains observed in a university’s network, a device was seen connecting to the 100% rare endpoint official-kmspico[.]com at 16:53:47 (UTC).

Device Event Log showing SSL connections to the official-kmspico[.]com malvertising website.
Figure 2: Device Event Log showing SSL connections to the official-kmspico[.]com malvertising website.

One minute later, at 16:54:19 (UTC), the same device was seen connecting to two mega[.]co[.]nz subdomains and downloading around 13 MB of data from them. As mentioned previously, these connections likely represent the CryptBot payload and cracked software download.

Device Event Log showing SSL connections to mega[.]com endpoints following the connection to the malvertising site.
Figure 3: Device Event Log showing SSL connections to mega[.]com endpoints following the connection to the malvertising site.

At 16:56:01 (UTC), Darktrace detected the device making a first HTTP POST request to the 100% rare endpoint, avomyj24[.]top, which has been associated with CryptBot’s C2 infrastructure [22]. This initial HTTP POST connection likely represents the transfer of confidential data to the attacker’s infrastructure.

Device Event Log showing HTTP connections made by the infected device to the C2 domain. 
Figure 4: Device Event Log showing HTTP connections made by the infected device to the C2 domain. 

The full attack chain, from visiting the malvertising website to the malicious data egress, took less than three minutes to complete. In this circumstance, the machine-speed detection and response capabilities offered by Darktrace DETECT and RESPOND are paramount in order to stop CryptBot before it can successfully exfiltrates sensitive data. This is an incredibly quick infection timeline, with no lateral movement nor privilege escalation required to carry out the malware’s objective. 

Device Event Log showing the DETECT and RESPOND models breached during the attack. 
Figure 5: Device Event Log showing the DETECT and RESPOND models breached during the attack. 

Darktrace Cyber AI Analyst incidents were also generated as a result of this activity, displaying all relevant information in one panel for easy review by customer security teams.

Cyber AI Analyst event log showing the HTTP connections made by the breach device to the C2 endpoint.
Figure 6: Cyber AI Analyst event log showing the HTTP connections made by the breach device to the C2 endpoint.

Conclusion 

CryptBot info-stealer is fast, efficient, and apt at evading detection given its small size and swift process of data gathering and exfiltration via legitimate channels. Its constantly changing C2 infrastructure further makes it difficult for traditional security tools that really on rules and signatures or known indicators of compromise (IoCs) to detect these infections. 

In the face of such a threat, Darktrace’s anomaly-based detection allows it to recognize subtle deviations in a device’s pattern of behavior that may signal an evolving threat and instantly bring it to the attention of security teams. Darktrace DETECT is able to distinguish between benign activity and malicious behavior, even from newly monitored devices, while Darktrace RESPOND can move at machine-speed to prevent even the fastest moving threat actors from stealing confidential company data, as it demonstrated here by stopping CryptBot infections in as little as 2 seconds.

Credit to Alexandra Sentenac, Cyber Analyst, Roberto Romeu, Senior SOC Analyst

Darktrace Model Detections  

AI Analyst Coverage 

  • Possible HTTP Command and Control  

DETECT Model Breaches  

  • Device / Suspicious Domain 
  • Anomalous Connection / POST to PHP on New External Host 
  • Anomalous Connection / Multiple HTTP POSTs to Rare Hostname 
  • Compromise / Multiple SSL to Rare DGA Domains

List of IOCs

Indicator Type Description
luaigz34[.]top Hostname CryptBot C2 endpoint
watibt04[.]top Hostname CryptBot C2 endpoint
avolsq14[.]top Hostname CryptBot C2 endpoint

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Category Technique Tactic
INITIAL ACCESS Drive-by Compromise - T1189 N/A
COMMAND AND CONTROL Web Protocols - T1071.001 N/A
COMMAND AND CONTROL Domain Generation Algorithm - T1568.002 N/A

References

[1] https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/threats/info-stealers

[2] https://cybelangel.com/what-are-infostealers/

[3] https://ke-la.com/information-stealers-a-new-landscape/

[4] https://darktrace.com/blog/vidar-info-stealer-malware-distributed-via-malvertising-on-google

[5] https://darktrace.com/blog/a-surge-of-vidar-network-based-details-of-a-prolific-info-stealer 

[6] https://darktrace.com/blog/laplas-clipper-defending-against-crypto-currency-thieves-with-detect-respond

[7] https://darktrace.com/blog/amadey-info-stealer-exploiting-n-day-vulnerabilities 

[8] https://cybelangel.com/what-are-infostealers/

[9] https://webz.io/dwp/the-top-10-dark-web-marketplaces-in-2022/

[10] https://www.accenture.com/us-en/blogs/security/information-stealer-malware-on-dark-web

[11] https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/revamped-cryptbot-malware-spread-by-pirated-software-sites/

[12] https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2022/03/threat-thursday-cryptbot-infostealer

[13] https://www.deepinstinct.com/blog/cryptbot-how-free-becomes-a-high-price-to-pay

[14] https://blog.google/technology/safety-security/continuing-our-work-to-hold-cybercriminal-ecosystems-accountable/

[15] https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/31802/

[16] https://darktrace.com/blog/the-last-of-its-kind-analysis-of-a-raccoon-stealer-v1-infection-part-1

[17] https://www.trendmicro.com/pt_br/research/21/c/websites-hosting-cracks-spread-malware-adware.html

[18] https://intel471.com/blog/privateloader-malware

[19] https://cyware.com/news/watch-out-pay-per-install-privateloader-malware-distribution-service-is-flourishing-888273be 

[20] https://regmedia.co.uk/2023/04/28/handout_google_cryptbot_complaint.pdf

[21] https://www.bankinfosecurity.com/google-wins-court-order-to-block-cryptbot-infrastructure-a-21905

[22] https://github.com/stamparm/maltrail/blob/master/trails/static/malware/cryptbot.txt

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Alexandra Sentenac
Cyber Analyst

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June 27, 2025

Patch and Persist: Darktrace’s Detection of Blind Eagle (APT-C-36)

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What is Blind Eagle?

Since 2018, APT-C-36, also known as Blind Eagle, has been observed performing cyber-attacks targeting various sectors across multiple countries in Latin America, with a particular focus on Colombian organizations.

Blind Eagle characteristically targets government institutions, financial organizations, and critical infrastructure [1][2].

Attacks carried out by Blind Eagle actors typically start with a phishing email and the group have been observed utilizing various Remote Access Trojans (RAT) variants, which often have in-built methods for hiding command-and-control (C2) traffic from detection [3].

What we know about Blind Eagle from a recent campaign

Since November 2024, Blind Eagle actors have been conducting an ongoing campaign targeting Colombian organizations [1].

In this campaign, threat actors have been observed using phishing emails to deliver malicious URL links to targeted recipients, similar to the way threat actors have previously been observed exploiting CVE-2024-43451, a vulnerability in Microsoft Windows that allows the disclosure of a user’s NTLMv2 password hash upon minimal interaction with a malicious file [4].

Despite Microsoft patching this vulnerability in November 2024 [1][4], Blind Eagle actors have continued to exploit the minimal interaction mechanism, though no longer with the intent of harvesting NTLMv2 password hashes. Instead, phishing emails are sent to targets containing a malicious URL which, when clicked, initiates the download of a malicious file. This file is then triggered by minimal user interaction.

Clicking on the file triggers a WebDAV request, with a connection being made over HTTP port 80 using the user agent ‘Microsoft-WebDAV-MiniRedir/10.0.19044’. WebDAV is a transmission protocol which allows files or complete directories to be made available through the internet, and to be transmitted to devices [5]. The next stage payload is then downloaded via another WebDAV request and malware is executed on the target device.

Attackers are notified when a recipient downloads the malicious files they send, providing an insight into potential targets [1].

Darktrace’s coverage of Blind Eagle

In late February 2025, Darktrace observed activity assessed with medium confidence to be  associated with Blind Eagle on the network of a customer in Colombia.

Within a period of just five hours, Darktrace / NETWORK detected a device being redirected through a rare external location, downloading multiple executable files, and ultimately exfiltrating data from the customer’s environment.

Since the customer did not have Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability enabled on their network, no actions were taken to contain the compromise, allowing it to escalate until the customer’s security team responded to the alerts provided by Darktrace.

Darktrace observed a device on the customer’s network being directed over HTTP to a rare external IP, namely 62[.]60[.]226[.]112, which had never previously been seen in this customer’s environment and was geolocated in Germany. Multiple open-source intelligence (OSINT) providers have since linked this endpoint with phishing and malware campaigns [9].

The device then proceeded to download the executable file hxxp://62[.]60[.]226[.]112/file/3601_2042.exe.

Darktrace’s detection of the affected device connecting to an unusual location based in Germany.
Figure 1: Darktrace’s detection of the affected device connecting to an unusual location based in Germany.
Darktrace’s detection of the affected device downloading an executable file from the suspicious endpoint.
Figure 2: Darktrace’s detection of the affected device downloading an executable file from the suspicious endpoint.

The device was then observed making unusual connections to the rare endpoint 21ene.ip-ddns[.]com and performing unusual external data activity.

This dynamic DNS endpoint allows a device to access an endpoint using a domain name in place of a changing IP address. Dynamic DNS services ensure the DNS record of a domain name is automatically updated when the IP address changes. As such, malicious actors can use these services and endpoints to dynamically establish connections to C2 infrastructure [6].

Further investigation into this dynamic endpoint using OSINT revealed multiple associations with previous likely Blind Eagle compromises, as well as Remcos malware, a RAT commonly deployed via phishing campaigns [7][8][10].

Darktrace’s detection of the affected device connecting to the suspicious dynamic DNS endpoint, 21ene.ip-ddns[.]com.
Figure 3: Darktrace’s detection of the affected device connecting to the suspicious dynamic DNS endpoint, 21ene.ip-ddns[.]com.

Shortly after this, Darktrace observed the user agent ‘Microsoft-WebDAV-MiniRedir/10.0.19045’, indicating usage of the aforementioned transmission protocol WebDAV. The device was subsequently observed connected to an endpoint associated with Github and downloading data, suggesting that the device was retrieving a malicious tool or payload. The device then began to communicate to the malicious endpoint diciembrenotasenclub[.]longmusic[.]com over the new TCP port 1512 [11].

Around this time, the device was also observed uploading data to the endpoints 21ene.ip-ddns[.]com and diciembrenotasenclub[.]longmusic[.]com, with transfers of 60 MiB and 5.6 MiB observed respectively.

Figure 4: UI graph showing external data transfer activity.

This chain of activity triggered an Enhanced Monitoring model alert in Darktrace / NETWORK. These high-priority model alerts are designed to trigger in response to higher fidelity indicators of compromise (IoCs), suggesting that a device is performing activity consistent with a compromise.

 Darktrace’s detection of initial attack chain activity.
Figure 5: Darktrace’s detection of initial attack chain activity.

A second Enhanced Monitoring model was also triggered by this device following the download of the aforementioned executable file (hxxp://62[.]60[.]226[.]112/file/3601_2042.exe) and the observed increase in C2 activity.

Following this activity, Darktrace continued to observe the device beaconing to the 21ene.ip-ddns[.]com endpoint.

Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst was able to correlate each of the individual detections involved in this compromise, identifying them as part of a broader incident that encompassed C2 connectivity, suspicious downloads, and external data transfers.

Cyber AI Analyst’s investigation into the activity observed on the affected device.
Figure 6: Cyber AI Analyst’s investigation into the activity observed on the affected device.
Figure 7: Cyber AI Analyst’s detection of the affected device’s broader connectivity throughout the course of the attack.

As the affected customer did not have Darktrace’s Autonomous Response configured at the time, the attack was able to progress unabated. Had Darktrace been properly enabled, it would have been able to take a number of actions to halt the escalation of the attack.

For example, the unusual beaconing connections and the download of an unexpected file from an uncommon location would have been shut down by blocking the device from making external connections to the relevant destinations.

Conclusion

The persistence of Blind Eagle and ability to adapt its tactics, even after patches were released, and the speed at which the group were able to continue using pre-established TTPs highlights that timely vulnerability management and patch application, while essential, is not a standalone defense.

Organizations must adopt security solutions that use anomaly-based detection to identify emerging and adapting threats by recognizing deviations in user or device behavior that may indicate malicious activity. Complementing this with an autonomous decision maker that can identify, connect, and contain compromise-like activity is crucial for safeguarding organizational networks against constantly evolving and sophisticated threat actors.

Credit to Charlotte Thompson (Senior Cyber Analyst), Eugene Chua (Principal Cyber Analyst) and Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Appendices

IoCs

IoC – Type - Confidence
Microsoft-WebDAV-MiniRedir/10.0.19045 – User Agent

62[.]60[.]226[.]112 – IP – Medium Confidence

hxxp://62[.]60[.]226[.]112/file/3601_2042.exe – Payload Download – Medium Confidence

21ene.ip-ddns[.]com – Dynamic DNS Endpoint – Medium Confidence

diciembrenotasenclub[.]longmusic[.]com  - Hostname – Medium Confidence

Darktrace’s model alert coverage

Anomalous File / Suspicious HTTP Redirect
Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location
Anomalous File / Multiple EXE from Rare External Location
Anomalous Server Activity / Outgoing from Server
Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data to New Endpoint
Device / Anomalous Github Download
Anomalous Connection / Multiple Connections to New External TCP Port
Device / Initial Attack Chain Activity
Anomalous Server Activity / Rare External from Server
Compromise / Suspicious File and C2
Compromise / Fast Beaconing to DGA
Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Failed Connections
Device / Large Number of Model Alert

Mitre Attack Mapping:

Tactic – Technique – Technique Name

Initial Access - T1189 – Drive-by Compromise
Initial Access - T1190 – Exploit Public-Facing Application
Initial Access ICS - T0862 – Supply Chain Compromise
Initial Access ICS - T0865 – Spearphishing Attachment
Initial Access ICS - T0817 - Drive-by Compromise
Resource Development - T1588.001 – Malware
Lateral Movement ICS - T0843 – Program Download
Command and Control - T1105 - Ingress Tool Transfer
Command and Control - T1095 – Non-Application Layer Protocol
Command and Control - T1571 – Non-Standard Port
Command and Control - T1568.002 – Domain Generation Algorithms
Command and Control ICS - T0869 – Standard Application Layer Protocol
Evasion ICS - T0849 – Masquerading
Exfiltration - T1041 – Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
Exfiltration - T1567.002 – Exfiltration to Cloud Storage

References

1)    https://research.checkpoint.com/2025/blind-eagle-and-justice-for-all/

2)    https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmgsites/in/pdf/2025/04/kpmg-ctip-blind-eagle-01-apr-2025.pdf.coredownload.inline.pdf

3)    https://www.checkpoint.com/cyber-hub/threat-prevention/what-is-remote-access-trojan/#:~:text=They%20might%20be%20attached%20to,remote%20access%20or%20system%20administration

4)    https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2024-43451

5)    https://www.ionos.co.uk/digitalguide/server/know-how/webdav/

6)    https://vercara.digicert.com/resources/dynamic-dns-resolution-as-an-obfuscation-technique

7)    https://threatfox.abuse.ch/ioc/1437795

8)    https://www.checkpoint.com/cyber-hub/threat-prevention/what-is-malware/remcos-malware/

9)    https://www.virustotal.com/gui/url/b3189db6ddc578005cb6986f86e9680e7f71fe69f87f9498fa77ed7b1285e268

10) https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/21ene.ip-ddns.com

11) https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/diciembrenotasenclub.longmusic.com/community

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Charlotte Thompson
Cyber Analyst

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June 18, 2025

Darktrace Collaborates with Microsoft: Unifying Email Security with a Shared Vision

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In today’s threat landscape, email remains the most targeted vector for cyberattacks. Organizations require not only multi-layered defenses but also advanced, integrated systems that work collaboratively to proactively mitigate threats before they cause damage

That’s why we’re proud to announce a new integration between Darktrace / EMAIL and Microsoft Defender for Office 365, delivering a Unified Quarantine experience that empowers security teams with seamless visibility, control, and response across both platforms.

This announcement builds on a strong and growing collaboration. In 2024, Darktrace was honored as Microsoft UK Partner of the Year and recognized as a Security Trailblazer at the annual Microsoft Security 20/20 Awards, a testament to our shared commitment to innovation and customer-centric security.

A Shared Mission: Stopping Threats at Machine Speed

This integration is more than a technical milestone,as it’s a reflection of a shared mission: to protect organizations from both known and unknown threats, with efficiency, accuracy, and transparency.

  • Microsoft Defender for Office 365 delivers a comprehensive security framework that safeguards Microsoft 365 email and collaboration workloads leveraging advanced AI, global threat intelligence and information on known attack infrastructure.
  • Darktrace / EMAIL complements this with Self-Learning AI that understands the unique communication patterns within each organization, detecting subtle anomalies that evade traditional detection methods.

Together, we’re delivering multi-layered, adaptive protection that’s greater than the sum of its parts.

“Our integration with Microsoft gives security teams the tools they need to act faster and more precisely to detect and respond to threats,” said Jill Popelka, CEO of Darktrace. “Together, we’re strengthening defenses where it matters most to our customers: at the inbox.”

Unified Quarantine: One View, Total Clarity

The new Unified Quarantine experience gives customers a single pane of glass to view and manage email threatsregardless of which product took action. This means:

  • Faster investigations with consolidated visibility
  • Clear attribution of actions and outcomes across both platforms
  • Streamlined workflows for security teams managing complex environments

“This integration is a testament to the power of combining Microsoft’s global threat intelligence with Darktrace’s unique ability to understand the ‘self’ of an organization,” said Jack Stockdale, CTO of Darktrace. “Together, we’re delivering a new standard in proactive, adaptive email security.”

A New Era of Collaborative Cyber Defense

This collaboration represents a broader shift in cybersecurity: from siloed tools to integrated ecosystems. As attackers become more sophisticated, defenders must move faster, smarter, and in unison.

Through this integration, Darktrace and Microsoft establish a new standard for collaboration between native and third-party security solutions, enhancing not only threat detection but also comprehensive understanding and proactive measures against threats.

We’re excited to bring this innovation to our customers and continue building a future where AI and human expertise collaborate to secure the enterprise.

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Carlos Gray
Senior Product Marketing Manager, Email
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