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January 9, 2019

Insider Analysis of Emotet Malware

Uncover the secrets of Emotet with our latest Darktrace expert analysis. Learn how to identify and understand trojan horse attacks.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Max Heinemeyer
Global Field CISO
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09
Jan 2019

While both traditional security tools and the attacks against them continue to improve, advanced cyber-criminals are increasingly exploiting the weakness inherent to any organization’s security posture: its employees. Designed to mislead such employees into compromising their devices, computer trojans are now rapidly on the rise. In 2018, Darktrace detected a 239% year-on-year uptick in incidents related specifically to banking trojans, which use deception to harvest the credentials of online banking customers from infected machines. And one banking trojan in particular, Emotet, is among the costliest and most destructive malware variants currently imperilling governments and companies worldwide.

Emotet is a highly sophisticated malware with a modular architecture, installing its main component first before delivering additional payloads. Further increasing its subtlety is the fact that Emotet is considered to be ‘polymorphic malware’, since it constantly changes its identifiable features to evade detection by antivirus products. And, as will be subsequently discussed in greater detail, Emotet has advanced persistence techniques and worm-like self-propagation abilities, which render it uniquely resilient and dangerous.

Since its launch in 2014, Emotet has been adapted and repurposed on numerous occasions as its targets have diversified. Initially, Emotet’s primary victims were German banks, from which the malware was designed to steal financial information by intercepting network traffic. By this past year’s end, Emotet had spread far and wide while shifting focus to U.S. targets, resulting in permanently lost files, costly business interruptions, and serious reputational harm.

How Emotet works

(Image courtesy of US-CERT)

Emotet is spread by targeting Windows-based systems via sophisticated phishing campaigns, employing social engineering techniques to fool users into believing that the malware-laden emails are legitimate. For instance, the latest versions of Emotet were delivered by way of Thanksgiving-related emails, which invited their American recipients to open an apparently innocuous Thanksgiving card:

These emails contain Microsoft Word documents that are either linked or attached directly. The Word files, in turn, act as vectors for malicious macros, which must be explicitly enabled by the user to be executed. For security reasons, running macros by default is disabled in most of the latest Microsoft application versions, meaning that the cyber-criminals responsible must resort to tricking users in order to enable them — in this case, by enticing them with the Thanksgiving card.

Once the macros are enabled, the Word file is executed and a PowerShell command is activated to retrieve the main Emotet component from compromised servers. The trojan payload is then downloaded and executed into the victim’s system. As mentioned above, Emotet payloads are polymorphic, often allowing them to slip past conventional security tools undetected.

How Emotet persists and propagates

Once Emotet has been executed on the victim’s device, it begins deploying itself with two main objectives: (1) achieving persistence and (2) spreading to more machines. To achieve the first aim, which involves resisting a reboot and various attempts at removal, Emotet does the following:

  • Creates scheduled tasks and registry key entries, ensuring its automatic execution during every system start-up.
  • Registers itself by creating files that have randomly generated names in system root directories, which are run as Windows services.
  • Typically stores payloads in paths located off AppData\Local and AppData\Roaming directories that it masks with names that appear legitimate, such as ‘flashplayer.exe’.

Emotet’s second key goal is that of spreading across local networks and beyond in order to infect as many machines as possible. To this end, Emotet first gathers information on both the victim’s system itself and the operating system it uses. Following this reconnaissance stage, it establishes encrypted command and control communications (C2) with its parent infrastructure before determining which payloads it will deliver. After reporting a new infection, Emotet downloads modules from the C2 servers, including:

  • WebBrowserPassView: A tool that steals passwords from most common web browsers like Chrome, Safari, Firefox and Internet Explorer.
  • NetPass.exe: A legitimate tool that recovers all the network passwords stored on the system for the current logged-on user.
  • MailPassView: A tool that reveals passwords and account details for popular email clients, such as Hotmail, Gmail, Microsoft Outlook, and Yahoo! Mail.
  • Outlook PST scraper: A module that searches Outlook’s messages to obtain names and email addresses from the victim’s Outlook account.
  • Credential enumerator: A module that enumerates network resources and attempts to gain access to other machines via SMB enumeration and brute-forcing connections.
  • Banking trojans: These include Dridex, IceID, Zeus Panda, Trickbot and Qakbot, all of which harvest banking account information via browser monitoring routines.

Whilst the WebBrowserPassView, NetPass.exe and MailPassView modules are able to steal the compromised user’s credentials, the PST scraper module can ransack the user’s contact list of friends, family members, colleagues and clients, enabling Emotet to self-propagate by sending phishing emails to those contacts. And because such emails are sent from the hijacked accounts of known acquaintances and loved ones, their recipients are more likely to open their infected attachments and links.

Emotet’s other self-propagation method is via brute-forcing credentials using various password lists, with the intent of gaining access to other machines within the network. When unsuccessful, the malware’s repeated failed login attempts can cause users to become locked out of their accounts, and when successful, the victims may become infected without even clicking on a malicious link or attachment. These tactics have collectively made Emotet remarkably durable and widespread. Indeed, in line with Darktrace’s discovery that incidents related to banking trojans have increased by 239% from 2017 to 2018, Emotet alone recorded a 39% increase, and the worst may be yet to come.

How AI fights back

Emotet presents significant challenges for traditional security tools, both because it exploits the ubiquitous vulnerability of human error, and because it is designed specifically to bypass endpoint solutions. Yet unlike such traditional tools, Darktrace leverages unsupervised machine learning algorithms to detect cyber-threats that have already infiltrated the network. Modelled after the human immune system, Darktrace AI works by learning the individual ‘pattern of life’ of every user, device, and network that it safeguards. From this ever-evolving sense of ‘self,’ Darktrace can differentiate between normal and anomalous behavior, allowing it to identify cyber-attacks in much the same way that our immune system spots harmful germs.

Recently, Darktrace’s AI models managed to detect a machine on a clients’ network that was experiencing active signs of an Emotet infection. The device was observed downloading a suspicious file and, shortly thereafter, began beaconing to a rare external destination, likely reporting the infection to a C2 server.

The device was then observed moving laterally across the network by performing brute force activities. In fact, Darktrace detected thousands of Kerberos failed logins, including to administrative accounts, as well as multiple SMB session failures that used a range of common usernames, such as ‘admin’ and ‘exchange’. Below is a graph showing the SMB and Kerberos brute-force activity on the breached device:

In addition to the brute-forcing activity performed by the credential enumerator module, Darktrace also detected another payload that was potentially functioning as an email spammer. The infected machine started to make a high number of outgoing connections over common email ports. This activity is consistent with Emotet’s typical spreading behavior, which revolves around sending emails to the victim’s hijacked email contacts. Below is an image of Darktrace models breached during the reported Emotet infection:

By forming a comprehensive understanding of normalcy, Darktrace can flag even the most minute anomalies in real time, thwarting subtle threats like Emotet that have already circumvented the network perimeter. To counter such advanced banking trojans, cyber AI defenses like Darktrace have become an organizational necessity.

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Max Heinemeyer
Global Field CISO

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April 24, 2026

Email-Borne Cyber Risk: A Core Challenge for the CISO in the Age of Volume and Sophistication

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The challenge for CISOs

Despite continuous advances in security technologies, humans continue to be exploited by attackers. Credential abuse and social actions like phishing are major factors, accounting for around 60% of all breaches. These attacks rely less on technical vulnerabilities and more on exploiting human behavior and organizational processes. 

From my perspective as a former CISO, protecting humans concentrates three of today’s most pressing challenges: the sheer volume of email-based threats, their increasing sophistication, and the limitations of traditional employee awareness programs in moving the needle on risk. 

My personal experience of security awareness training as a CISO

With over 20 years’ experience as an ICT and Cybersecurity leader across various international organizations, I’ve seen security awareness training (SAT) in many guises. And while the cyber landscape is evolving in every direction, the effectiveness of SAT is reaching a plateau.  

Most programs I’ve seen follow a familiar pattern. Training is delivered through a combination of eLearning modules and internal sessions designed to reinforce IT policies. Employees are typically required to complete a slide deck or video, followed by a multiple-choice quiz. Occasional phishing simulations are distributed throughout the year.

The content is often static and unpersonalized, based on known threats that may already be outdated. Every employee regardless of role or risk exposure receives the same training and the same simulated phishing templates, from front-desk staff to the CEO.

The problem with traditional SAT programs

The issue with the approach to SAT outlined above is that the distribution of power is imbalanced. Humans will always be fallible, particularly when faced with increasingly sophisticated attacks. Providing generic, low-context training risks creating false confidence rather than genuine resilience. Let’s look at some of the problems in detail.

Timing and delivery

Employees today operate under constant cognitive load, making lots of rapid decisions every day to reduce their email volumes. Yet if employees are completing training annually, or on an ad hoc basis, it becomes a standalone occurrence rather than a continuous habit.  

As a result, retention is low. Employees often forget the lessons within weeks, a phenomenon known as the ‘Ebbinghaus Forgetting Curve.’

The graph illustrates that when you first learn something, the information disappears at an exponential rate without retention. In fact, according to the curve, you forget 50% of all new information within a day, and 90% of all new information within a week.  

Simultaneously, most training is conducted within a separate interface. Because it takes place away from the actual moment of decision-making, the "teachable moment" is lost. There is a cognitive disconnect between the action (clicking a link in Outlook) and the education (watching a video in a browser). 

People

In the context of professional risk management, the risks faced by different users are different. Static learning such as everyone receiving the same ‘Password Reset’ email doesn’t help users prepare for the specific threats they are likely to face. It also contributes to user fatigue, driven by repetitive training. And if users receive tests at the same time, news spreads among colleagues, hurting the efficacy of the test.  

Staff turnover introduces further risk. In many organizations, new employees gain access to systems before receiving meaningful training, reducing onboarding to little more than policy acknowledgment.

Measuring success

In my experience, solutions are standalone, without any correlation to other tools in the security stack. In some cases, the programs are delivered by HR rather than the security team, creating a complete silo.  

As a result, SAT is often perceived as a compliance exercise rather than a capability building function. The result is that poor-quality training does little to reduce the likelihood of compromise, regardless of completion rates or quiz performance.

What a modern SAT solution should look like

For today’s CISO, email represents the convergence point of high-volume, high-impact, and human-centric threats. Despite significant security investments, it remains one of the most difficult channels to secure effectively. Given these constraints, CISOs must evolve their approach to SAT.

Success lies in a balanced strategy one that combines advanced technology, attack surface reduction, and pragmatic user enablement, without over-relying on human vigilance as the final line of defense.

This means moving beyond traditional SAT toward continuous, contextual awareness, realistic simulations, and tight integration with security outcomes.

Three requirements for a modern SAT solution

  • Invisible protection: The optimum security solution is one that assists users without impeding their experience. The objective is to enhance human capabilities, rather than simply delivering a lecture. 
  • Real-time feedback: Rather than a monthly quiz, the ideal system would provide a prompt or warning when a user is about to engage with something suspicious. 
  • Positive culture: Shifting the focus away from a "gotcha" culture, which is a contributing factor to a resentment, and instead empowers employees to serve as "sensors" for the company. 

Discover how personalized security coaching can strengthen your human layer and make your email defenses more resilient. Explore Darktrace / Adaptive Human Defense.

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About the author
Karim Benslimane
VP, Field CISO

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Network

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April 21, 2026

How a Compromised eScan Update Enabled Multi‑Stage Malware and Blockchain C2

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The rise of supply chain attacks

In recent years, the abuse of trusted software has become increasingly common, with supply chain compromises emerging as one of the fastest growing vectors for cyber intrusions. As highlighted in Darktrace’s Annual Threat Report 2026, attackers and state-actors continue to find significant value in gaining access to networks through compromised trusted links, third-party tools, or legitimate software. In January 2026, a supply chain compromise affecting MicroWorld Technologies’ eScan antivirus product was reported, with malicious updates distributed to customers through the legitimate update infrastructure. This, in turn, resulted in a multi‑stage loader malware being deployed on compromised devices [1][2].

An overview of eScan exploitation

According to eScan’s official threat advisory, unauthorized access to a regional update server resulted in an “incorrect file placed in the update distribution path” [3]. Customers associated with the affected update servers who downloaded the update during a two-hour window on January 20 were impacted, with affected Windows devices subsequently have experiencing various errors related to update functions and notifications [3].

While eScan did not specify which regional update servers were affected by the malicious update, all impacted Darktrace customer environments were located in the Europe, Middle East, and Africa (EMEA) region.

External research reported that a malicious 32-bit executable file , “Reload.exe”, was first installed on affected devices, which then dropped the 64-bit downloader, “CONSCTLX.exe”. This downloader establishes persistence by creating scheduled tasks such as “CorelDefrag”, which are responsible for executing PowerShell scripts. Subsequently, it evades detection by tampering with the Windows HOSTS file and eScan registry to prevent future remote updates intended for remediation. Additional payloads are then downloaded from its command-and-control (C2) server [1].

Darktrace’s coverage of eScan exploitation

Initial Access and Blockchain as multi-distributed C2 Infrastructure

On January 20, the same day as the aforementioned two‑hour exploit window, Darktrace observed multiple devices across affected networks downloading .dlz package files from eScan update servers, followed by connections to an anomalous endpoint, vhs.delrosal[.]net, which belongs to the attackers’ C2 infrastructure.

The endpoint contained a self‑signed SSL certificate with the string “O=Internet Widgits Pty Ltd, ST=SomeState, C=AU”, a default placeholder commonly used in SSL/TLS certificates for testing and development environments, as well as in malicious C2 infrastructure [4].

Utilizing a multi‑distributed C2 infrastructure, the attackers also leveraged domains linked with the Solana open‑source blockchain for C2 purposes, namely “.sol”. These domains were human‑readable names that act as aliases for cryptocurrency wallet addresses. As browsers do not natively resolve .sol domains, the Solana Naming System (formerly known as Bonfida, an independent contributor within the Solana ecosystem) provides a proxy service, through endpoints such as sol-domain[.]org, to enable browser access.

Darktrace observed devices connecting to blackice.sol-domain[.]org, indicating that attackers were likely using this proxy to reach a .sol domain for C2 activity. Given this behavior, it is likely that the attackers leveraged .sol domains as a dead drop resolver, a C2 technique in which threat actors host information on a public and legitimate service, such as a blockchain. Additional proxy resolver endpoints, such as sns-resolver.bonfida.workers[.]dev, were also observed.

Solana transactions are transparent, allowing all activity to be viewed publicly. When Darktrace analysts examined the transactions associated with blackice[.]sol, they observed that the earliest records dated November 7, 2025, which coincides with the creation date of the known C2 endpoint vhs[.]delrosal[.]net as shown in WHOIS Lookup information [4][5].

WHOIS Look records of the C2 endpoint vhs[.]delrosal[.]net.
Figure 1: WHOIS Look records of the C2 endpoint vhs[.]delrosal[.]net.
 Earliest observed transaction record for blackice[.]sol on public ledgers.
Figure 2: Earliest observed transaction record for blackice[.]sol on public ledgers.

Subsequent instructions found within the transactions contained strings such as “CNAME= vhs[.]delrosal[.]net”, indicating attempts to direct the device toward the malicious endpoint. A more recent transaction recorded on January 28 included strings such as “hxxps://96.9.125[.]243/i;code=302”, suggesting an effort to change C2 endpoints. Darktrace observed multiple alerts triggered for these endpoints across affected devices.

Similar blockchain‑related endpoints, such as “tumama.hns[.]to”, were also observed in C2 activities. The hns[.]to service allows web browsers to access websites registered on Handshake, a decentralized blockchain‑based framework designed to replace centralized authorities and domain registries for top‑level domains. This shift toward decentralized, blockchain‑based infrastructure likely reflects increased efforts by attackers to evade detection.

In outgoing connections to these malicious endpoints across affected networks, Darktrace / NETWORK recognized that the activity was 100% rare and anomalous for both the devices and the wider networks, likely indicative of malicious beaconing, regardless of the underlying trusted infrastructure. In addition to generating multiple model alerts to capture this malicious activity across affected networks, Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst was able to compile these separate events into broader incidents that summarized the entire attack chain, allowing customers’ security teams to investigate and remediate more efficiently. Moreover, in customer environments where Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability was enabled, Darktrace took swift action to contain the attack by blocking beaconing connections to the malicious endpoints, even when those endpoints were associated with seemingly trustworthy services.

Conclusion

Attacks targeting trusted relationships continue to be a popular strategy among threat actors. Activities linked to trusted or widely deployed software are often unintentionally whitelisted by existing security solutions and gateways. Darktrace observed multiple devices becoming impacted within a very short period, likely because tools such as antivirus software are typically mass‑deployed across numerous endpoints. As a result, a single compromised delivery mechanism can greatly expand the attack surface.

Attackers are also becoming increasingly creative in developing resilient C2 infrastructure and exploiting legitimate services to evade detection. Defenders are therefore encouraged to closely monitor anomalous connections and file downloads. Darktrace’s ability to detect unusual activity amidst ever‑changing tactics and indicators of compromise (IoCs) helps organizations maintain a proactive and resilient defense posture against emerging threats.

Credit to Joanna Ng (Associate Principal Cybersecurity Analyst) and Min Kim (Associate Principal Cybersecurity Analyst) and Tara Gould (Malware Researcher Lead)

Edited by Ryan Traill (Content Manager)

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections

  • Anomalous File::Zip or Gzip from Rare External Location
  • Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Self-Signed SSL
  • Anomalous Connection / Rare External SSL Self-Signed
  • Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Expired SSL
  • Anomalous Server Activity / Anomalous External Activity from Critical Network Device

List of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

  • vhs[.]delrosal[.]net – C2 server
  • tumama[.]hns[.]to – C2 server
  • blackice.sol-domain[.]org – C2 server
  • 96.9.125[.]243 – C2 Server

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • T1071.001 - Command and Control: Web Protocols
  • T1588.001 - Resource Development
  • T1102.001 - Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver
  • T1195 – Supple Chain Compromise

References

[1] https://www.morphisec.com/blog/critical-escan-threat-bulletin/

[2] https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/escan-confirms-update-server-breached-to-push-malicious-update/

[3] hxxps://download1.mwti.net/documents/Advisory/eScan_Security_Advisory_2026[.]pdf

[4] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/delrosal.net

[5] hxxps://explorer.solana[.]com/address/2wFAbYHNw4ewBHBJzmDgDhCXYoFjJnpbdmeWjZvevaVv

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About the author
Joanna Ng
Associate Principal Analyst
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