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January 9, 2019

Insider Analysis of Emotet Malware

Uncover the secrets of Emotet with our latest Darktrace expert analysis. Learn how to identify and understand trojan horse attacks.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Max Heinemeyer
Global Field CISO
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09
Jan 2019

While both traditional security tools and the attacks against them continue to improve, advanced cyber-criminals are increasingly exploiting the weakness inherent to any organization’s security posture: its employees. Designed to mislead such employees into compromising their devices, computer trojans are now rapidly on the rise. In 2018, Darktrace detected a 239% year-on-year uptick in incidents related specifically to banking trojans, which use deception to harvest the credentials of online banking customers from infected machines. And one banking trojan in particular, Emotet, is among the costliest and most destructive malware variants currently imperilling governments and companies worldwide.

Emotet is a highly sophisticated malware with a modular architecture, installing its main component first before delivering additional payloads. Further increasing its subtlety is the fact that Emotet is considered to be ‘polymorphic malware’, since it constantly changes its identifiable features to evade detection by antivirus products. And, as will be subsequently discussed in greater detail, Emotet has advanced persistence techniques and worm-like self-propagation abilities, which render it uniquely resilient and dangerous.

Since its launch in 2014, Emotet has been adapted and repurposed on numerous occasions as its targets have diversified. Initially, Emotet’s primary victims were German banks, from which the malware was designed to steal financial information by intercepting network traffic. By this past year’s end, Emotet had spread far and wide while shifting focus to U.S. targets, resulting in permanently lost files, costly business interruptions, and serious reputational harm.

How Emotet works

(Image courtesy of US-CERT)

Emotet is spread by targeting Windows-based systems via sophisticated phishing campaigns, employing social engineering techniques to fool users into believing that the malware-laden emails are legitimate. For instance, the latest versions of Emotet were delivered by way of Thanksgiving-related emails, which invited their American recipients to open an apparently innocuous Thanksgiving card:

These emails contain Microsoft Word documents that are either linked or attached directly. The Word files, in turn, act as vectors for malicious macros, which must be explicitly enabled by the user to be executed. For security reasons, running macros by default is disabled in most of the latest Microsoft application versions, meaning that the cyber-criminals responsible must resort to tricking users in order to enable them — in this case, by enticing them with the Thanksgiving card.

Once the macros are enabled, the Word file is executed and a PowerShell command is activated to retrieve the main Emotet component from compromised servers. The trojan payload is then downloaded and executed into the victim’s system. As mentioned above, Emotet payloads are polymorphic, often allowing them to slip past conventional security tools undetected.

How Emotet persists and propagates

Once Emotet has been executed on the victim’s device, it begins deploying itself with two main objectives: (1) achieving persistence and (2) spreading to more machines. To achieve the first aim, which involves resisting a reboot and various attempts at removal, Emotet does the following:

  • Creates scheduled tasks and registry key entries, ensuring its automatic execution during every system start-up.
  • Registers itself by creating files that have randomly generated names in system root directories, which are run as Windows services.
  • Typically stores payloads in paths located off AppData\Local and AppData\Roaming directories that it masks with names that appear legitimate, such as ‘flashplayer.exe’.

Emotet’s second key goal is that of spreading across local networks and beyond in order to infect as many machines as possible. To this end, Emotet first gathers information on both the victim’s system itself and the operating system it uses. Following this reconnaissance stage, it establishes encrypted command and control communications (C2) with its parent infrastructure before determining which payloads it will deliver. After reporting a new infection, Emotet downloads modules from the C2 servers, including:

  • WebBrowserPassView: A tool that steals passwords from most common web browsers like Chrome, Safari, Firefox and Internet Explorer.
  • NetPass.exe: A legitimate tool that recovers all the network passwords stored on the system for the current logged-on user.
  • MailPassView: A tool that reveals passwords and account details for popular email clients, such as Hotmail, Gmail, Microsoft Outlook, and Yahoo! Mail.
  • Outlook PST scraper: A module that searches Outlook’s messages to obtain names and email addresses from the victim’s Outlook account.
  • Credential enumerator: A module that enumerates network resources and attempts to gain access to other machines via SMB enumeration and brute-forcing connections.
  • Banking trojans: These include Dridex, IceID, Zeus Panda, Trickbot and Qakbot, all of which harvest banking account information via browser monitoring routines.

Whilst the WebBrowserPassView, NetPass.exe and MailPassView modules are able to steal the compromised user’s credentials, the PST scraper module can ransack the user’s contact list of friends, family members, colleagues and clients, enabling Emotet to self-propagate by sending phishing emails to those contacts. And because such emails are sent from the hijacked accounts of known acquaintances and loved ones, their recipients are more likely to open their infected attachments and links.

Emotet’s other self-propagation method is via brute-forcing credentials using various password lists, with the intent of gaining access to other machines within the network. When unsuccessful, the malware’s repeated failed login attempts can cause users to become locked out of their accounts, and when successful, the victims may become infected without even clicking on a malicious link or attachment. These tactics have collectively made Emotet remarkably durable and widespread. Indeed, in line with Darktrace’s discovery that incidents related to banking trojans have increased by 239% from 2017 to 2018, Emotet alone recorded a 39% increase, and the worst may be yet to come.

How AI fights back

Emotet presents significant challenges for traditional security tools, both because it exploits the ubiquitous vulnerability of human error, and because it is designed specifically to bypass endpoint solutions. Yet unlike such traditional tools, Darktrace leverages unsupervised machine learning algorithms to detect cyber-threats that have already infiltrated the network. Modelled after the human immune system, Darktrace AI works by learning the individual ‘pattern of life’ of every user, device, and network that it safeguards. From this ever-evolving sense of ‘self,’ Darktrace can differentiate between normal and anomalous behavior, allowing it to identify cyber-attacks in much the same way that our immune system spots harmful germs.

Recently, Darktrace’s AI models managed to detect a machine on a clients’ network that was experiencing active signs of an Emotet infection. The device was observed downloading a suspicious file and, shortly thereafter, began beaconing to a rare external destination, likely reporting the infection to a C2 server.

The device was then observed moving laterally across the network by performing brute force activities. In fact, Darktrace detected thousands of Kerberos failed logins, including to administrative accounts, as well as multiple SMB session failures that used a range of common usernames, such as ‘admin’ and ‘exchange’. Below is a graph showing the SMB and Kerberos brute-force activity on the breached device:

In addition to the brute-forcing activity performed by the credential enumerator module, Darktrace also detected another payload that was potentially functioning as an email spammer. The infected machine started to make a high number of outgoing connections over common email ports. This activity is consistent with Emotet’s typical spreading behavior, which revolves around sending emails to the victim’s hijacked email contacts. Below is an image of Darktrace models breached during the reported Emotet infection:

By forming a comprehensive understanding of normalcy, Darktrace can flag even the most minute anomalies in real time, thwarting subtle threats like Emotet that have already circumvented the network perimeter. To counter such advanced banking trojans, cyber AI defenses like Darktrace have become an organizational necessity.

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Max Heinemeyer
Global Field CISO

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February 3, 2026

Darktrace Malware Analysis: Unpacking SnappyBee

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Introduction

The aim of this blog is to be an educational resource, documenting how an analyst can perform malware analysis techniques such as unpacking. This blog will demonstrate the malware analysis process against well-known malware, in this case SnappyBee.

SnappyBee (also known as Deed RAT) is a modular backdoor that has been previously attributed to China-linked cyber espionage group Salt Typhoon, also known as Earth Estries [1] [2]. The malware was first publicly documented by TrendMicro in November 2024 as part of their investigation into long running campaigns targeting various industries and governments by China-linked threat groups.

In these campaigns, SnappyBee is deployed post-compromise, after the attacker has already obtained access to a customer's system, and is used to establish long-term persistence as well as deploying further malware such as Cobalt Strike and the Demodex rootkit.

To decrease the chance of detection, SnappyBee uses a custom packing routine. Packing is a common technique used by malware to obscure its true payload by hiding it and then stealthily loading and executing it at runtime. This hinders analysis and helps the malware evade detection, especially during static analysis by both human analysts and anti-malware services.

This blog is a practical guide on how an analyst can unpack and analyze SnappyBee, while also learning the necessary skills to triage other malware samples from advanced threat groups.

First principles

Packing is not a new technique, and threat actors have generally converged on a standard approach. Packed binaries typically feature two main components: the packed data and an unpacking stub, also called a loader, to unpack and run the data.

Typically, malware developers insert a large blob of unreadable data inside an executable, such as in the .rodata section. This data blob is the true payload of the malware, but it has been put through a process such as encryption, compression, or another form of manipulation to render it unreadable. Sometimes, this data blob is instead shipped in a different file, such as a .dat file, or a fake image. When this happens, the main loader has to read this using a syscall, which can be useful for analysis as syscalls can be easily identified, even in heavily obfuscated binaries.

In the main executable, malware developers will typically include an unpacking stub that takes the data blob, performs one or more operations on it, and then triggers its execution. In most samples, the decoded payload data is loaded into a newly allocated memory region, which will then be marked as executable and executed. In other cases, the decoded data is instead dropped into a new executable on disk and run, but this is less common as it increases the likelihood of detection.

Finding the unpacking routine

The first stage of analysis is uncovering the unpacking routine so it can be reverse engineered. There are several ways to approach this, but it is traditionally first triaged via static analysis on the initial stages available to the analyst.

SnappyBee consists of two components that can be analyzed:

  • A Dynamic-link Library (DLL) that acts as a loader, responsible for unpacking the malicious code
  • A data file shipped alongside the DLL, which contains the encrypted malicious code

Additionally, SnappyBee includes a legitimate signed executable that is vulnerable to DLL side-loading. This means that when the executable is run, it will inadvertently load SnappyBee’s DLL instead of the legitimate one it expects. This allows SnappyBee to appear more legitimate to antivirus solutions.

The first stage of analysis is performing static analysis of the DLL. This can be done by opening the DLL within a disassembler such as IDA Pro. Upon opening the DLL, IDA will display the DllMain function, which is the malware’s initial entry point and the first code executed when the DLL is loaded.

The DllMain function
Figure 1: The DllMain function

First, the function checks if the variable fdwReason is set to 1, and exits if it is not. This variable is set by Windows to indicate why the DLL was loaded. According to Microsoft Developer Network (MSDN), a value of 1 corresponds to DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH, meaning “The DLL is being loaded into the virtual address space of the current process as a result of the process starting up or as a result of a call to LoadLibrary” [3]. Since SnappyBee is known to use DLL sideloading for execution, DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH is the expected value when the legitimate executable loads the malicious DLL.

SnappyBee then uses the GetModule and GetProcAddress to dynamically resolve the address of the VirtualProtect in kernel32 and StartServiceCtrlDispatcherW in advapi32. Resolving these dynamically at runtime prevents them from showing up as a static import for the module, which can help evade detection by anti-malware solutions. Different regions of memory have different permissions to control what they can be used for, with the main ones being read, write, and execute. VirtualProtect is a function that changes the permissions of a given memory region.

SnappyBee then uses VirtualProtect to set the memory region containing the code for the StartServiceCtrlDispatcherW function as writable. It then inserts a jump instruction at the start of this function, redirecting the control flow to one of the SnappyBee DLL’s other functions, and then restores the old permissions.

In practice, this means when the legitimate executable calls StartServiceCtrlDispatcherW, it will immediately hand execution back to SnappyBee. Meanwhile, the call stack now appears more legitimate to outside observers such as antimalware solutions.

The hooked-in function then reads the data file that is shipped with SnappyBee and loads it into a new memory allocation. This pattern of loading the file into memory likely means it is responsible for unpacking the next stage.

The start of the unpacking routine that reads in dbindex.dat.
Figure 2: The start of the unpacking routine that reads in dbindex.dat.

SnappyBee then proceeds to decrypt the memory allocation and execute the code.

The memory decryption routine.
Figure 3: The memory decryption routine.

This section may look complex, however it is fairly straight forward. Firstly, it uses memset to zero out a stack variable, which will be used to store the decryption key. It then uses the first 16 bytes of the data file as a decryption key to initialize the context from.

SnappyBee then calls the mbed_tls_arc4_crypt function, which is a function from the mbedtls library. Documentation for this function can be found online and can be referenced to better understand what each of the arguments mean [4].

The documentation for mbedtls_arc4_crypt.
Figure 4: The documentation for mbedtls_arc4_ crypt.

Comparing the decompilation with the documentation, the arguments SnappyBee passes to the function can be decoded as:

  • The context derived from 16-byte key at the start of the data is passed in as the context in the first parameter
  • The file size minus 16 bytes (to account for the key at the start of the file) is the length of the data to be decrypted
  • A pointer to the file contents in memory, plus 16 bytes to skip the key, is used as the input
  • A pointer to a new memory allocation obtained from VirtualAlloc is used as the output

So, putting it all together, it can be concluded that SnappyBee uses the first 16 bytes as the key to decrypt the data that follows , writing the output into the allocated memory region.

SnappyBee then calls VirtualProtect to set the decrypted memory region as Read + Execute, and subsequently executes the code at the memory pointer. This is clearly where the unpacked code containing the next stage will be placed.

Unpacking the malware

Understanding how the unpacking routine works is the first step. The next step is obtaining the actual code, which cannot be achieved through static analysis alone.

There are two viable methods to retrieve the next stage. The first method is implementing the unpacking routine from scratch in a language like Python and running it against the data file.

This is straightforward in this case, as the unpacking routine in relatively simple and would not require much effort to re-implement. However, many unpacking routines are far more complex, which leads to the second method: allowing the malware to unpack itself by debugging it and then capturing the result. This is the approach many analysts take to unpacking, and the following will document this method to unpack SnappyBee.

As SnappyBee is 32-bit Windows malware, debugging can be performed using x86dbg in a Windows sandbox environment to debug SnappyBee. It is essential this sandbox is configured correctly, because any mistake during debugging could result in executing malicious code, which could have serious consequences.

Before debugging, it is necessary to disable the DYNAMIC_BASE flag on the DLL using a tool such as setdllcharacteristics. This will stop ASLR from randomizing the memory addresses each time the malware runs and ensures that it matches the addresses observed during static analysis.

The first place to set a breakpoint is DllMain, as this is the start of the malicious code and the logical place to pause before proceeding. Using IDA, the functions address can be determined; in this case, it is at offset 10002DB0. This can be used in the Goto (CTRL+G) dialog to jump to the offset and place a breakpoint. Note that the “Run to user code” button may need to be pressed if the DLL has not yet been loaded by x32dbg, as it spawns a small process to load the DLL as DLLs cannot be executed directly.

The program can then run until the breakpoint, at which point the program will pause and code recognizable from static analysis can be observed.

Figure 5: The x32dbg dissassembly listing forDllMain.

In the previous section, this function was noted as responsible for setting up a hook, and in the disassembly listing the hook address can be seen being loaded at offset 10002E1C. It is not necessary to go through the whole hooking process, because only the function that gets hooked in needs to be run. This function will not be naturally invoked as the DLL is being loaded directly rather than via sideloading as it expects. To work around this, the Extended Instruction Pointer (EIP) register can be manipulated to point to the start of the hook function instead, which will cause it to run instead of the DllMain function.

To update EIP, the CRTL+G dialog can again be used to jump to the hook function address (10002B50), and then the EIP register can be set to this address by right clicking the first instruction and selecting “Set EIP here”. This will make the hook function code run next.

Figure 6: The start of the hookedin-in function

Once in this function, there are a few addresses where breakpoints should be set in order to inspect the state of the program at critical points in the unpacking process. These are:

-              10002C93, which allocates the memory for the data file and final code

-              10002D2D, which decrypts the memory

-              10002D81, which runs the unpacked code

Setting these can be done by pressing the dot next to the instruction listing, or via the CTRL+G Goto menu.

At the first breakpoint, the call to VirtualAlloc will be executed. The function returns the memory address of the created memory region, which is stored in the EAX register. In this case, the region was allocated at address 00700000.

Figure 7: The result of the VirtualAlloc call.

It is possible to right click the address and press “Follow in dump” to pin the contents of the memory to the lower pane, which makes it easy to monitor the region as the unpacking process continues.

Figure 8: The allocated memory region shown in x32dbg’s dump.

Single-stepping through the application from this point eventually reaches the call to ReadFile, which loads the file into the memory region.

Figure 9: The allocated memory region after the file is read into it, showing high entropy data.

The program can then be allowed to run until the next breakpoint, which after single-stepping will execute the call to mbedtls_arc4_crypt to decrypt the memory. At this point, the data in the dump will have changed.

Figure 10: The same memory region after the decryption is run, showing lower entropy data.

Right-clicking in the dump and selecting "Disassembly” will disassemble the data. This yields valid shell code, indicating that the unpacking succeeded, whereas corrupt or random data would be expected if the unpacking had failed.

Figure 11: The disassembly view of the allocated memory.

Right-clicking and selecting “Follow in memory map” will show the memory allocation under the memory map view. Right-clicking this then provides an option to dump the entire memory block to file.

Figure 12: Saving the allocated memory region.

This dump can then be opened in IDA, enabling further static analysis of the shellcode. Reviewing the shellcode, it becomes clear that it performs another layer of unpacking.

As the debugger is already running, the sample can be allowed to execute up to the final breakpoint that was set on the call to the unpacked shellcode. Stepping into this call will then allow debugging of the new shellcode.

The simplest way to proceed is to single-step through the code, pausing on each call instruction to consider its purpose. Eventually, a call instruction that points to one of the memory regions that were assigned will be reached, which will contain the next layer of unpacked code. Using the same disassembly technique as before, it can be confirmed that this is more unpacked shellcode.

Figure 13: The unpacked shellcode’s call to RDI, which points to more unpacked shellcode. Note this screenshot depicts the 64-bit variant of SnappyBee instead of 32-bit, however the theory is the same.

Once again, this can be dumped out and analyzed further in IDA. In this case, it is the final payload used by the SnappyBee malware.

Conclusion

Unpacking remains one of the most common anti-analysis techniques and is a feature of most sophisticated malware from threat groups. This technique of in-memory decryption reduces the forensic “surface area” of the malware, helping it to evade detection from anti-malware solutions. This blog walks through one such example and provides practical knowledge on how to unpack malware for deeper analysis.

In addition, this blog has detailed several other techniques used by threat actors to evade analysis, such as DLL sideloading to execute code without arising suspicion, dynamic API resolving to bypass static heuristics, and multiple nested stages to make analysis challenging.

Malware such as SnappyBee demonstrates a continued shift towards highly modular and low-friction malware toolkits that can be reused across many intrusions and campaigns. It remains vital for security teams  to maintain the ability to combat the techniques seen in these toolkits when responding to infections.

While the technical details of these techniques are primarily important to analysts, the outcomes of this work directly affect how a Security Operations Centre (SOC) operates at scale. Without the technical capability to reliably unpack and observe these samples, organizations are forced to respond without the full picture.

The techniques demonstrated here help close that gap. This enables security teams to reduce dwell time by understanding the exact mechanisms of a sample earlier, improve detection quality with behavior-based indicators rather than relying on hash-based detections, and increase confidence in response decisions when determining impact.

Credit to Nathaniel Bill (Malware Research Engineer)
Edited by Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

SnappyBee Loader 1 - 25b9fdef3061c7dfea744830774ca0e289dba7c14be85f0d4695d382763b409b

SnappyBee Loader 2 - b2b617e62353a672626c13cc7ad81b27f23f91282aad7a3a0db471d84852a9ac          

SnappyBee Payload - 1a38303fb392ccc5a88d236b4f97ed404a89c1617f34b96ed826e7bb7257e296

References

[1] https://www.trendmicro.com/en_gb/research/24/k/earth-estries.html

[2] https://www.darktrace.com/blog/salty-much-darktraces-view-on-a-recent-salt-typhoon-intrusion

[3] https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/dlls/dllmain#parameters

[4] https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/projects/api/en/v2.28.4/api/file/arc4_8h/#_CPPv418mbedtls_arc4_cryptP20mbedtls_arc4_context6size_tPKhPh

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Nathaniel Bill
Malware Research Engineer

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February 3, 2026

The State of AI Cybersecurity 2026: Unveiling insights from over 1,500 security leaders

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2025 was the year enterprise AI went mainstream. In 2026, it’s made its way into every facet of the organizational structure – transforming workflows, revolutionizing productivity, and creating new value streams. In short, it’s opened up a whole new attack surface.  

At the same time, AI has accelerated the pace of cybersecurity arms race on both sides: adversaries are innovating using the latest AI technologies at their disposal while defenders scramble to outmaneuver them and stay ahead of AI-powered threats.  

That’s why Darktrace publishes this research every year. The State of AI Cybersecurity 2026 provides an annual snapshot of how the AI threat landscape is shifting, where organizations are adopting AI to maximum advantage, and how they are securing AI in the enterprise.

What is the State of AI Cybersecurity 2026?

We surveyed over 1,500 CISOs, IT leaders, administrators, and practitioners from a range of industries and different countries to uncover their attitudes, understanding, and priorities when it comes to AI threats, agents, tools, and operations in 2026. ​

The results show a fast-changing picture, as security leaders race to navigate the challenges and opportunities at play. Since last year, there has been enormous progress towards maturity in areas like AI literacy and confidence in AI-powered defense, while issues around AI governance remain inconclusive.

Let’s look at some of the key findings for 2026.

What’s the impact of AI on the attack surface?

Security leaders are seeing the adoption of AI agents across the workforce, and are increasingly concerned about the security implications.

  • 44% are extremely or very concerned with the security implications of third-party LLMs (like Copilot or ChatGPT)
  • 92% are concerned about the use of AI agents across the workforce and their impact on security

The rapid expansion of generative AI across the enterprise is outpacing the security frameworks designed to govern it. AI systems behave in ways that traditional defenses are not designed to monitor, introducing new risks around data exposure, unauthorized actions, and opaque decision-making as employees embed generative AI and autonomous agents into everyday workflows.  

Their top concerns? Sensitive data exposure ranks top (61%), while regulatory compliance violations are a close second (56%). These risks tend to have the fastest and most material fallout – ranging from fines to reputational harm – and are more likely to materialize in environments where AI governance is still evolving.

What’s the impact of AI on the cyber threat landscape?

AI is now being used to expedite every stage of the attack kill chain – from initial intrusion to privilege escalation and data exfiltration. 

“73% say that AI-powered threats are already having a significant impact on their organization.”

With AI, attackers can launch novel attacks at scale, and this is significantly increasing the number of threats requiring attention by the security team – often to the point of overwhelm.  

Traditional security solutions relying on historical attack data were never designed to handle an environment where attacks continuously evolve, multiply, and optimize at machine speed, so it’s no surprise that 92% agree that AI-powered cyber-threats are forcing them to significantly upgrade their defenses.

How is AI reshaping cybersecurity operations?

Cybersecurity workflows are still in flux as security leaders get used to the integration of AI agents into everyday operations.  

“Generative AI is now playing a role in 77% of security stacks.” But only 35% are using unsupervised machine learning.

AI technologies are diverse, ranging from LLMs to NLP systems, GANs, and unsupervised machine learning, with each type offering specific capabilities and facing particular limitations. The lack of familiarity with the different types of AI used within the security stack may be holding some practitioners back from using these new technologies to their best advantage.  

It also creates a lack of trust between humans and AI systems: only 14% of security professionals allow AI to take independent remediation actions in the SOC with no human in the loop.

Another new trend for this year is a strong preference (85%) for relying on Managed Security Service Providers (MSSPs) for SOC services instead of in-house teams, as organizations aim to secure expert, always-on support without the cost and operational burden of running an internal operation.

What impact is AI having on cybersecurity tools?

“96% of cybersecurity professionals agree that AI can significantly improve the speed and efficiency with which they work.”

The capacity of AI for augmenting security efforts is undisputed. But as vendor AI claims become far-reaching, it falls to security leaders to clarify which AI tools offer true value and can help solve their specific security challenges.  

Security professionals are aligned on the biggest area of impact: 72% agree that AI excels at detecting anomalies thanks to its advanced pattern recognition. This enables it to identify unusual behavior that may signal a threat, even when the specific attack has never been encountered or recorded in existing datasets.  

“When purchasing new security capabilities, 93% prefer ones that are part of a broader platform over individual point products.”

Like last year, the drive towards platform consolidation remains strong. Fewer vendors can mean tighter integrations, less console switching, streamlined management, and stronger cross-domain threat insights. The challenge is finding vendors that perform well across the board.

See the full report for more statistics and insights into how security leaders are responding to the AI landscape in 2026.

Learn more about securing AI in your enterprise.

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