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October 9, 2025

Inside Akira’s SonicWall Campaign: Darktrace’s Detection and Response

Starting in July 2025, Akira ransomware attacks surged globally, targeting SonicWall SSL VPN devices. In August, Darktrace detected suspicious activity in a US network, including scanning, lateral movement, and data exfiltration. A compromised SonicWall VPN server linked the incident to the broader Akira campaign exploiting known vulnerabilities.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Emily Megan Lim
Cyber Analyst
akira sonicwallDefault blog imageDefault blog imageDefault blog imageDefault blog imageDefault blog imageDefault blog image
09
Oct 2025

Introduction: Background on Akira SonicWall campaign

Between July and August 2025, security teams worldwide observed a surge in Akira ransomware incidents involving SonicWall SSL VPN devices [1]. Initially believed to be the result of an unknown zero-day vulnerability, SonicWall later released an advisory announcing that the activity was strongly linked to a previously disclosed vulnerability, CVE-2024-40766, first identified over a year earlier [2].

On August 20, 2025, Darktrace observed unusual activity on the network of a customer in the US. Darktrace detected a range of suspicious activity, including network scanning and reconnaissance, lateral movement, privilege escalation, and data exfiltration. One of the compromised devices was later identified as a SonicWall virtual private network (VPN) server, suggesting that the incident was part of the broader Akira ransomware campaign targeting SonicWall technology.

As the customer was subscribed to the Managed Detection and Response (MDR) service, Darktrace’s Security Operations Centre (SOC) team was able to rapidly triage critical alerts, restrict the activity of affected devices, and notify the customer of the threat. As a result, the impact of the attack was limited - approximately 2 GiB of data had been observed leaving the network, but any further escalation of malicious activity was stopped.

Threat Overview

CVE-2024-40766 and other misconfigurations

CVE-2024-40766 is an improper access control vulnerability in SonicWall’s SonicOS, affecting Gen 5, Gen 6, and Gen 7 devices running SonicOS version 7.0.1 5035 and earlier [3]. The vulnerability was disclosed on August 23, 2024, with a patch released the same day. Shortly after, it was reported to be exploited in the wild by Akira ransomware affiliates and others [4].

Almost a year later, the same vulnerability is being actively targeted again by the Akira ransomware group. In addition to exploiting unpatched devices affected by CVE-2024-40766, security researchers have identified three other risks potentially being leveraged by the group [5]:

*The Virtual Office Portal can be used to initially set up MFA/TOTP configurations for SSLVPN users.

Thus, even if SonicWall devices were patched, threat actors could still target them for initial access by reusing previously stolen credentials and exploiting other misconfigurations.

Akira Ransomware

Akira ransomware was first observed in the wild in March 2023 and has since become one of the most prolific ransomware strains across the threat landscape [6]. The group operates under a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) model and frequently uses double extortion tactics, pressuring victims to pay not only to decrypt files but also to prevent the public release of sensitive exfiltrated data.

The ransomware initially targeted Windows systems, but a Linux variant was later observed targeting VMware ESXi virtual machines [7]. In 2024, it was assessed that Akira would continue to target ESXi hypervisors, making attacks highly disruptive due to the central role of virtualisation in large-scale cloud deployments. Encrypting the ESXi file system enables rapid and widespread encryption with minimal lateral movement or credential theft. The lack of comprehensive security protections on many ESXi hypervisors also makes them an attractive target for ransomware operators [8].

Victimology

Akira is known to target organizations across multiple sectors, most notably those in manufacturing, education, and healthcare. These targets span multiple geographic regions, including North America, Latin America, Europe and Asia-Pacific [9].

Geographical distribution of organization’s affected by Akira ransomware in 2025 [9].
Figure 1: Geographical distribution of organization’s affected by Akira ransomware in 2025 [9].

Common Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) [7][10]

Initial Access
Targets remote access services such as RDP and VPN through vulnerability exploitation or stolen credentials.

Reconnaissance
Uses network scanning tools like SoftPerfect and Advanced IP Scanner to map the environment and identify targets.

Lateral Movement
Moves laterally using legitimate administrative tools, typically via RDP.

Persistence
Employs techniques such as Kerberoasting and pass-the-hash, and tools like Mimikatz to extract credentials. Known to create new domain accounts to maintain access.

Command and Control
Utilizes remote access tools including AnyDesk, RustDesk, Ngrok, and Cloudflare Tunnel.

Exfiltration
Uses tools such as FileZilla, WinRAR, WinSCP, and Rclone. Data is exfiltrated via protocols like FTP and SFTP, or through cloud storage services such as Mega.

Darktrace’s Coverage of Akira ransomware

Reconnaissance

Darktrace first detected of unusual network activity around 05:10 UTC, when a desktop device was observed performing a network scan and making an unusual number of DCE-RPC requests to the endpoint mapper (epmapper) service. Network scans are typically used to identify open ports, while querying the epmapper service can reveal exposed RPC services on the network.

Multiple other devices were also later seen with similar reconnaissance activity, and use of the Advanced IP Scanner tool, indicated by connections to the domain advanced-ip-scanner[.]com.

Lateral movement

Shortly after the initial reconnaissance, the same desktop device exhibited unusual use of administrative tools. Darktrace observed the user agent “Ruby WinRM Client” and the URI “/wsman” as the device initiated a rare outbound Windows Remote Management (WinRM) connection to two domain controllers (REDACTED-dc1 and REDACTED-dc2). WinRM is a Microsoft service that uses the WS-Management (WSMan) protocol to enable remote management and control of network devices.

Darktrace also observed the desktop device connecting to an ESXi device (REDACTED-esxi1) via RDP using an LDAP service credential, likely with administrative privileges.

Credential access

At around 06:26 UTC, the desktop device was seen fetching an Active Directory certificate from the domain controller (REDACTED-dc1) by making a DCE-RPC request to the ICertPassage service. Shortly after, the device made a Kerberos login using the administrative credential.

Figure 3: Darktrace’s detection of the of anomalous certificate download and subsequent Kerberos login.

Further investigation into the device’s event logs revealed a chain of connections that Darktrace’s researchers believe demonstrates a credential access technique known as “UnPAC the hash.”

This method begins with pre-authentication using Kerberos’ Public Key Cryptography for Initial Authentication (PKINIT), allowing the client to use an X.509 certificate to obtain a Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) from the Key Distribution Center (KDC) instead of a password.

The next stage involves User-to-User (U2U) authentication when requesting a Service Ticket (ST) from the KDC. Within Darktrace's visibility of this traffic, U2U was indicated by the client and service principal names within the ST request being identical. Because PKINIT was used earlier, the returned ST contains the NTLM hash of the credential, which can then be extracted and abused for lateral movement or privilege escalation [11].

Flowchart of Kerberos PKINIT pre-authentication and U2U authentication [12].
Figure 4: Flowchart of Kerberos PKINIT pre-authentication and U2U authentication [12]
Figure 5: Device event log showing the Kerberos Login and Kerberos Ticket events

Analysis of the desktop device’s event logs revealed a repeated sequence of suspicious activity across multiple credentials. Each sequence included a DCE-RPC ICertPassage request to download a certificate, followed by a Kerberos login event indicating PKINIT pre-authentication, and then a Kerberos ticket event consistent with User-to-User (U2U) authentication.

Darktrace identified this pattern as highly unusual. Cyber AI Analyst determined that the device used at least 15 different credentials for Kerberos logins over the course of the attack.

By compromising multiple credentials, the threat actor likely aimed to escalate privileges and facilitate further malicious activity, including lateral movement. One of the credentials obtained via the “UnPAC the hash” technique was later observed being used in an RDP session to the domain controller (REDACTED-dc2).

C2 / Additional tooling

At 06:44 UTC, the domain controller (REDACTED-dc2) was observed initiating a connection to temp[.]sh, a temporary cloud hosting service. Open-source intelligence (OSINT) reporting indicates that this service is commonly used by threat actors to host and distribute malicious payloads, including ransomware [13].

Shortly afterward, the ESXi device was observed downloading an executable named “vmwaretools” from the rare external endpoint 137.184.243[.]69, using the user agent “Wget.” The repeated outbound connections to this IP suggest potential command-and-control (C2) activity.

Cyber AI Analyst investigation into the suspicious file download and suspected C2 activity between the ESXI device and the external endpoint 137.184.243[.]69.
Figure 6: Cyber AI Analyst investigation into the suspicious file download and suspected C2 activity between the ESXI device and the external endpoint 137.184.243[.]69.
Packet capture (PCAP) of connections between the ESXi device and 137.184.243[.]69.
Figure 7: Packet capture (PCAP) of connections between the ESXi device and 137.184.243[.]69.

Data exfiltration

The first signs of data exfiltration were observed at around 7:00 UTC. Both the domain controller (REDACTED-dc2) and a likely SonicWall VPN device were seen uploading approximately 2 GB of data via SSH to the rare external endpoint 66.165.243[.]39 (AS29802 HVC-AS). OSINT sources have since identified this IP as an indicator of compromise (IoC) associated with the Akira ransomware group, known to use it for data exfiltration [14].

Cyber AI Analyst incident view highlighting multiple unusual events across several devices on August 20. Notably, it includes the “Unusual External Data Transfer” event, which corresponds to the anomalous 2 GB data upload to the known Akira-associated endpoint 66.165.243[.]39.
Figure 8: Cyber AI Analyst incident view highlighting multiple unusual events across several devices on August 20. Notably, it includes the “Unusual External Data Transfer” event, which corresponds to the anomalous 2 GB data upload to the known Akira-associated endpoint 66.165.243[.]39.

Cyber AI Analyst

Throughout the course of the attack, Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst autonomously investigated the anomalous activity as it unfolded and correlated related events into a single, cohesive incident. Rather than treating each alert as isolated, Cyber AI Analyst linked them together to reveal the broader narrative of compromise. This holistic view enabled the customer to understand the full scope of the attack, including all associated activities and affected assets that might otherwise have been dismissed as unrelated.

Overview of Cyber AI Analyst’s investigation, correlating all related internal and external security events across affected devices into a single pane of glass.
Figure 9: Overview of Cyber AI Analyst’s investigation, correlating all related internal and external security events across affected devices into a single pane of glass.

Containing the attack

In response to the multiple anomalous activities observed across the network, Darktrace's Autonomous Response initiated targeted mitigation actions to contain the attack. These included:

  • Blocking connections to known malicious or rare external endpoints, such as 137.184.243[.]69, 66.165.243[.]39, and advanced-ip-scanner[.]com.
  • Blocking internal traffic to sensitive ports, including 88 (Kerberos), 3389 (RDP), and 49339 (DCE-RPC), to disrupt lateral movement and credential abuse.
  • Enforcing a block on all outgoing connections from affected devices to contain potential data exfiltration and C2 activity.
Autonomous Response actions taken by Darktrace on an affected device, including the blocking of malicious external endpoints and internal service ports.
Figure 10: Autonomous Response actions taken by Darktrace on an affected device, including the blocking of malicious external endpoints and internal service ports.

Managed Detection and Response

As this customer was an MDR subscriber, multiple Enhanced Monitoring alerts—high-fidelity models designed to detect activity indicative of compromise—were triggered across the network. These alerts prompted immediate investigation by Darktrace’s SOC team.

Upon determining that the activity was likely linked to an Akira ransomware attack, Darktrace analysts swiftly acted to contain the threat. At around 08:05 UTC, devices suspected of being compromised were quarantined, and the customer was promptly notified, enabling them to begin their own remediation procedures without delay.

A wider campaign?

Darktrace’s SOC and Threat Research teams identified at least three additional incidents likely linked to the same campaign. All targeted organizations were based in the US, spanning various industries, and each have indications of using SonicWall VPN, indicating it had likely been targeted for initial access.

Across these incidents, similar patterns emerged. In each case, a suspicious executable named “vmwaretools” was downloaded from the endpoint 85.239.52[.]96 using the user agent “Wget”, bearing some resemblance to the file downloads seen in the incident described here. Data exfiltration was also observed via SSH to the endpoints 107.155.69[.]42 and 107.155.93[.]154, both of which belong to the same ASN also seen in the incident described in this blog: S29802 HVC-AS. Notably, 107.155.93[.]154 has been reported in OSINT as an indicator associated with Akira ransomware activity [15]. Further recent Akira ransomware cases have been observed involving SonicWall VPN, where no similar executable file downloads were observed, but SSH exfiltration to the same ASN was. These overlapping and non-overlapping TTPs may reflect the blurring lines between different affiliates operating under the same RaaS.

Lessons from the campaign

This campaign by Akira ransomware actors underscores the critical importance of maintaining up-to-date patching practices. Threat actors continue to exploit previously disclosed vulnerabilities, not just zero-days, highlighting the need for ongoing vigilance even after patches are released. It also demonstrates how misconfigurations and overlooked weaknesses can be leveraged for initial access or privilege escalation, even in otherwise well-maintained environments.

Darktrace’s observations further reveal that ransomware actors are increasingly relying on legitimate administrative tools, such as WinRM, to blend in with normal network activity and evade detection. In addition to previously documented Kerberos-based credential access techniques like Kerberoasting and pass-the-hash, this campaign featured the use of UnPAC the hash to extract NTLM hashes via PKINIT and U2U authentication for lateral movement or privilege escalation.

Credit to Emily Megan Lim (Senior Cyber Analyst), Vivek Rajan (Senior Cyber Analyst), Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead), and Sam Lister (Specialist Security Researcher)

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections

Anomalous Connection / Active Remote Desktop Tunnel

Anomalous Connection / Data Sent to Rare Domain

Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname

Anomalous Connection / Possible Data Staging and External Upload

Anomalous Connection / Rare WinRM Incoming

Anomalous Connection / Rare WinRM Outgoing

Anomalous Connection / Uncommon 1 GiB Outbound

Anomalous Connection / Unusual Admin RDP Session

Anomalous Connection / Unusual Incoming Long Remote Desktop Session

Anomalous Connection / Unusual Incoming Long SSH Session

Anomalous Connection / Unusual Long SSH Session

Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location

Anomalous Server Activity / Anomalous External Activity from Critical Network Device

Anomalous Server Activity / Outgoing from Server

Anomalous Server Activity / Rare External from Server

Compliance / Default Credential Usage

Compliance / High Priority Compliance Model Alert

Compliance / Outgoing NTLM Request from DC

Compliance / SSH to Rare External Destination

Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Successful Connections

Compromise / Sustained TCP Beaconing Activity To Rare Endpoint

Device / Anomalous Certificate Download Activity

Device / Anomalous SSH Followed By Multiple Model Alerts

Device / Anonymous NTLM Logins

Device / Attack and Recon Tools

Device / ICMP Address Scan

Device / Large Number of Model Alerts

Device / Network Range Scan

Device / Network Scan

Device / New User Agent To Internal Server

Device / Possible SMB/NTLM Brute Force

Device / Possible SMB/NTLM Reconnaissance

Device / RDP Scan

Device / Reverse DNS Sweep

Device / Suspicious SMB Scanning Activity

Device / UDP Enumeration

Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data to New Endpoint

Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data Transfer

User / Multiple Uncommon New Credentials on Device

User / New Admin Credentials on Client

User / New Admin Credentials on Server

Enhanced Monitoring Models

Compromise / Anomalous Certificate Download and Kerberos Login

Device / Initial Attack Chain Activity

Device / Large Number of Model Alerts from Critical Network Device

Device / Multiple Lateral Movement Model Alerts

Device / Suspicious Network Scan Activity

Unusual Activity / Enhanced Unusual External Data Transfer

Antigena/Autonomous Response Models

Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena File then New Outbound Block

Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious Activity Block

Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious File Block

Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena Large Data Volume Outbound Block

Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena Network Scan Block

Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena Unusual Privileged User Activities Block

Antigena / Network / Manual / Quarantine Device

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Alerts Over Time Block

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Controlled and Model Alert

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Enhanced Monitoring from Client Block

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Enhanced Monitoring from Server Block

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Significant Anomaly from Client Block

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Significant Server Anomaly Block

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Repeated Antigena Alerts

List of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

·      66.165.243[.]39 – IP Address – Data exfiltration endpoint

·      107.155.69[.]42 – IP Address – Probable data exfiltration endpoint

·      107.155.93[.]154 – IP Address – Likely Data exfiltration endpoint

·      137.184.126[.]86 – IP Address – Possible C2 endpoint

·      85.239.52[.]96 – IP Address – Likely C2 endpoint

·      hxxp://85.239.52[.]96:8000/vmwarecli  – URL – File download

·      hxxp://137.184.126[.]86:8080/vmwaretools – URL – File download

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Initial Access – T1190 – Exploit Public-Facing Application

Reconnaissance – T1590.002 – Gather Victim Network Information: DNS

Reconnaissance – T1590.005 – Gather Victim Network Information: IP Addresses

Reconnaissance – T1592.004 – Gather Victim Host Information: Client Configurations

Reconnaissance – T1595 – Active Scanning

Discovery – T1018 – Remote System Discovery

Discovery – T1046 – Network Service Discovery

Discovery – T1083 – File and Directory Discovery

Discovery – T1135 – Network Share Discovery

Lateral Movement – T1021.001 – Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol

Lateral Movement – T1021.004 – Remote Services: SSH

Lateral Movement – T1021.006 – Remote Services: Windows Remote Management

Lateral Movement – T1550.002 – Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Hash

Lateral Movement – T1550.003 – Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Ticket

Credential Access – T1110.001 – Brute Force: Password Guessing

Credential Access – T1649 – Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates

Persistence, Privilege Escalation – T1078 – Valid Accounts

Resource Development – T1588.001 – Obtain Capabilities: Malware

Command and Control – T1071.001 – Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols

Command and Control – T1105 – Ingress Tool Transfer

Command and Control – T1573 – Encrypted Channel

Collection – T1074 – Data Staged

Exfiltration – T1041 – Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

Exfiltration – T1048 – Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol

References

[1] https://thehackernews.com/2025/08/sonicwall-investigating-potential-ssl.html

[2] https://www.sonicwall.com/support/notices/gen-7-and-newer-sonicwall-firewalls-sslvpn-recent-threat-activity/250804095336430

[3] https://psirt.global.sonicwall.com/vuln-detail/SNWLID-2024-0015

[4] https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/arctic-wolf-observes-akira-ransomware-campaign-targeting-sonicwall-sslvpn-accounts/

[5] https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/dr-akira-ransomware-group-utilizing-sonicwall-devices-for-initial-access/

[6] https://www.ic3.gov/AnnualReport/Reports/2024_IC3Report.pdf

[7] https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa24-109a

[8] https://blog.talosintelligence.com/akira-ransomware-continues-to-evolve/

[9] https://www.ransomware.live/map?year=2025&q=akira

[10] https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1024/
[11] https://labs.lares.com/fear-kerberos-pt2/#UNPAC

[12] https://www.thehacker.recipes/ad/movement/kerberos/unpac-the-hash

[13] https://www.s-rminform.com/latest-thinking/derailing-akira-cyber-threat-intelligence)

[14] https://fieldeffect.com/blog/update-akira-ransomware-group-targets-sonicwall-vpn-appliances

[15] https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/arctic-wolf-observes-july-2025-uptick-in-akira-ransomware-activity-targeting-sonicwall-ssl-vpn/

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Emily Megan Lim
Cyber Analyst

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October 30, 2025

WSUS Exploited: Darktrace’s Analysis of Post-Exploitation Activities Related to CVE-2025-59287

WSUS Exploited: Darktrace’s Analysis of Post-Exploitation Activities Related to CVE-2025-59287Default blog imageDefault blog image

Introduction

On October 14, 2025, Microsoft disclosed a new critical vulnerability affecting the Windows Server Update Service (WSUS), CVE-2025-59287.  Exploitation of the vulnerability could allow an unauthenticated attacker to remotely execute code [1][6].

WSUS allows for centralized distribution of Microsoft product updates [3]; a server running WSUS is likely to have significant privileges within a network making it a valuable target for threat actors. While WSUS servers are not necessarily expected to be open to the internet, open-source intelligence (OSINT) has reported  thousands of publicly exposed instances that may be vulnerable to exploitation [2].

Microsoft’s initial ‘Patch Tuesday’ update for this vulnerability did not fully mitigate the risk, and so an out-of-band update followed on October 23 [4][5] . Widespread exploitation of this vulnerability started to be observed shortly after the security update [6], prompting CISA to add CVE-2025-59287 to its Known Exploited Vulnerability Catalog (KEV) on October 24 [7].

Attack Overview

The Darktrace Threat Research team have recently identified multiple potential cases of CVE-2025-59287 exploitation, with two detailed here. While the likely initial access method is consistent across the cases, the follow-up activities differed, demonstrating the variety in which such a CVE can be exploited to fulfil each attacker’s specific goals.

The first signs of suspicious activity across both customers were detected by Darktrace on October 24, the same day this vulnerability was added to CISA’s KEV. Both cases discussed here involve customers based in the United States.

Case Study 1

The first case, involving a customer in the Information and Communication sector, began with an internet-facing device making an outbound connection to the hostname webhook[.]site. Observed network traffic indicates the device was a WSUS server.

OSINT has reported abuse of the workers[.]dev service in exploitation of CVE-2025-59287, where enumerated network information gathered through running a script on the compromised device was exfiltrated using this service [8].

In this case, the majority of connectivity seen to webhook[.]site involved a PowerShell user agent; however, cURL user agents were also seen with some connections taking the form of HTTP POSTs. This connectivity appears to align closely with OSINT reports of CVE-2025-59287 post-exploitation behaviour [8][9].

Connections to webhook[.]site continued until October 26. A single URI was seen consistently until October 25, after which the connections used a second URI with a similar format.

Later on October 26, an escalation in command-and-control (C2) communication appears to have occurred, with the device starting to make repeated connections to two rare workers[.]dev subdomains (royal-boat-bf05.qgtxtebl.workers[.]dev & chat.hcqhajfv.workers[.]dev), consistent with C2 beaconing. While workers[.]dev is associated with the legitimate Cloudflare Workers service, the service is commonly abused by malicious actors for C2 infrastructure. The anomalous nature of the connections to both webhook[.]site and workers[.]dev led to Darktrace generating multiple alerts including high-fidelity Enhanced Monitoring alerts and alerts for Darktrace’s Autonomous Response.

Infrastructure insight

Hosted on royal-boat-bf05.qgtxtebl.workers[.]dev is a Microsoft Installer file (MSI) named v3.msi.

Screenshot of v3.msi content.
Figure 1: Screenshot of v3.msi content.

Contained in the MSI file is two Cabinet files named “Sample.cab” and “part2.cab”. After extracting the contents of the cab files, a file named “Config” and a binary named “ServiceEXE”. ServiceEXE is the legitimate DFIR tool Velociraptor, and “Config” contains the configuration details, which include chat.hcqhajfv.workers[.]dev as the server_url, suggesting that Velociraptor is being used as a tunnel to the C2. Additionally, the configuration points to version 0.73.4, a version of Velociraptor that is vulnerable to CVE-2025-6264, a privilege escalation vulnerability.

 Screenshot of Config file.
Figure 2: Screenshot of Config file.

Velociraptor, a legitimate security tool maintained by Rapid7, has been used recently in malicious campaigns. A vulnerable version of tool has been used by threat actors for command execution and endpoint takeover, while other campaigns have used Velociraptor to create a tunnel to the C2, similar to what was observed in this case [10] .

The workers[.]dev communication continued into the early hours of October 27. The most recent suspicious behavior observed on the device involved an outbound connection to a new IP for the network - 185.69.24[.]18/singapure - potentially indicating payload retrieval.

The payload retrieved from “/singapure” is a UPX packed Windows binary. After unpacking the binary, it is an open-source Golang stealer named “Skuld Stealer”. Skuld Stealer has the capabilities to steal crypto wallets, files, system information, browser data and tokens. Additionally, it contains anti-debugging and anti-VM logic, along with a UAC bypass [11].

A timeline outlining suspicious activity on the device alerted by Darktrace.
Figure 3: A timeline outlining suspicious activity on the device alerted by Darktrace.

Case Study 2

The second case involved a customer within the Education sector. The affected device was also internet-facing, with network traffic indicating it was a WSUS server

Suspicious activity in this case once again began on October 24, notably only a few seconds after initial signs of compromise were observed in the first case. Initial anomalous behaviour also closely aligned, with outbound PowerShell connections to webhook[.]site, and then later connections, including HTTP POSTs, to the same endpoint with a cURL user agent.

While Darktrace did not observe any anomalous network activity on the device after October 24, the customer’s security integration resulted in an additional alert on October 27 for malicious activity, suggesting that the compromise may have continued locally.

By leveraging Darktrace’s security integrations, customers can investigate activity across different sources in a seamless manner, gaining additional insight and context to an attack.

A timeline outlining suspicious activity on the device alerted by Darktrace.
Figure 4: A timeline outlining suspicious activity on the device alerted by Darktrace.

Conclusion

Exploitation of a CVE can lead to a wide range of outcomes. In some cases, it may be limited to just a single device with a focused objective, such as exfiltration of sensitive data. In others, it could lead to lateral movement and a full network compromise, including ransomware deployment. As the threat of internet-facing exploitation continues to grow, security teams must be prepared to defend against such a possibility, regardless of the attack type or scale.

By focussing on detection of anomalous behaviour rather than relying on signatures associated with a specific CVE exploit, Darktrace is able to alert on post-exploitation activity regardless of the kind of behaviour seen. In addition, leveraging security integrations provides further context on activities beyond the visibility of Darktrace / NETWORKTM, enabling defenders to investigate and respond to attacks more effectively.

With adversaries weaponizing even trusted incident response tools, maintaining broad visibility and rapid response capabilities becomes critical to mitigating post-exploitation risk.

Credit to Emma Foulger (Global Threat Research Operations Lead), Tara Gould (Threat Research Lead), Eugene Chua (Principal Cyber Analyst & Analyst Team Lead), Nathaniel Jones (VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO),

Edited by Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Appendices

References

1.        https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-59287

2.    https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-now-exploiting-critical-windows-server-wsus-flaw-in-attacks/

3.    https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-server-update-services/get-started/windows-server-update-services-wsus

4.    https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2025/10/24/microsoft-releases-out-band-security-update-mitigate-windows-server-update-service-vulnerability-cve

5.    https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2025-59287

6.    https://thehackernews.com/2025/10/microsoft-issues-emergency-patch-for.html

7.    https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog

8.    https://www.huntress.com/blog/exploitation-of-windows-server-update-services-remote-code-execution-vulnerability

9.    https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/microsoft-cve-2025-59287/

10. https://blog.talosintelligence.com/velociraptor-leveraged-in-ransomware-attacks/

11. https://github.com/hackirby/skuld

Darktrace Model Detections

·       Device / New PowerShell User Agent

·       Anomalous Connection / Powershell to Rare External

·       Compromise / Possible Tunnelling to Bin Services

·       Compromise / High Priority Tunnelling to Bin Services

·       Anomalous Server Activity / New User Agent from Internet Facing System

·       Device / New User Agent

·       Device / Internet Facing Device with High Priority Alert

·       Anomalous Connection / Multiple HTTP POSTs to Rare Hostname

·       Anomalous Server Activity / Rare External from Server

·       Compromise / Agent Beacon (Long Period)

·       Device / Large Number of Model Alerts

·       Compromise / Agent Beacon (Medium Period)

·       Device / Long Agent Connection to New Endpoint

·       Compromise / Slow Beaconing Activity To External Rare

·       Security Integration / Low Severity Integration Detection

·       Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Alerts Over Time Block

·       Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Enhanced Monitoring from Server Block

·       Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious Activity Block

·       Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Significant Server Anomaly Block

List of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

IoC - Type - Description + Confidence

o   royal-boat-bf05.qgtxtebl.workers[.]dev – Hostname – Likely C2 Infrastructure

o   royal-boat-bf05.qgtxtebl.workers[.]dev/v3.msi - URI – Likely payload

o   chat.hcqhajfv.workers[.]dev – Hostname – Possible C2 Infrastructure

o   185.69.24[.]18 – IP address – Possible C2 Infrastructure

o   185.69.24[.]18/bin.msi - URI – Likely payload

o   185.69.24[.]18/singapure - URI – Likely payload

The content provided in this blog is published by Darktrace for general informational purposes only and reflects our understanding of cybersecurity topics, trends, incidents, and developments at the time of publication. While we strive to ensure accuracy and relevance, the information is provided “as is” without any representations or warranties, express or implied. Darktrace makes no guarantees regarding the completeness, accuracy, reliability, or timeliness of any information presented and expressly disclaims all warranties.

Nothing in this blog constitutes legal, technical, or professional advice, and readers should consult qualified professionals before acting on any information contained herein. Any references to third-party organizations, technologies, threat actors, or incidents are for informational purposes only and do not imply affiliation, endorsement, or recommendation.

Darktrace, its affiliates, employees, or agents shall not be held liable for any loss, damage, or harm arising from the use of or reliance on the information in this blog.

The cybersecurity landscape evolves rapidly, and blog content may become outdated or superseded. We reserve the right to update, modify, or remove any content

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Emma Foulger
Global Threat Research Operations Lead

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Proactive Security

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October 24, 2025

Patch Smarter, Not Harder: Now Empowering Security Teams with Business-Aligned Threat Context Agents

Patch Smarter, Not Harder: Now Empowering Security Teams with Business-Aligned Threat Context Agents Default blog imageDefault blog image

Most risk management programs remain anchored in enumeration: scanning every asset, cataloging every CVE, and drowning in lists that rarely translate into action. Despite expensive scanners, annual pen tests, and countless spreadsheets, prioritization still falters at two critical points.

Context gaps at the device level: It’s hard to know which vulnerabilities actually matter to your business given existing privileges, what software it runs, and what controls already reduce risk.

Business translation: Even when the technical priority is clear, justifying effort and spend in financial terms—especially across many affected devices—can delay action. Especially if it means halting other areas of the business that directly generate revenue.

The result is familiar: alert fatigue, “too many highs,” and remediation that trails behind the threat landscape. Darktrace / Proactive Exposure Management addresses this by pairing precise, endpoint‑level context with clear, financial insight so teams can prioritize confidently and mobilize faster.

A powerful combination: No-Telemetry Endpoint Agent + Cost-Benefit Analysis

Darktrace / Proactive Exposure Management now uniquely combines technical precision with business clarity in a single workflow.  With this release, Darktrace / Proactive Exposure Management delivers a more holistic approach, uniting technical context and financial insight to drive proactive risk reduction. The result is a single solution that helps security teams stay ahead of threats while reducing noise, delays, and complexity.

  • No-Telemetry Endpoint: Collects installed software data and maps it to known CVEs—without network traffic—providing device-level vulnerability context and operational relevance.
  • Cost-Benefit Analysis for Patching: Calculates ROI by comparing patching effort with potential exploit impact, factoring in headcount time, device count, patch difficulty, and automation availability.

Introducing the No-Telemetry Endpoint Agent

Darktrace’s new endpoint agent inventories installed software on devices and maps it to known CVEs without collecting network data so you can prioritize using real device context and available security controls.

By grounding vulnerability findings in the reality of each endpoint, including its software footprint and existing controls, teams can cut through generic severity scores and focus on what matters most. The agent is ideal for remote devices, BYOD-adjacent fleets, or environments standardizing on Darktrace, and is available without additional licensing cost.

Darktrace / Proactive Exposure Management user interface
Figure 1: Darktrace / Proactive Exposure Management user interface

Built-In Cost-Benefit Analysis for Patching

Security teams often know what needs fixing but stakeholders need to understand why now. Darktrace’s new cost-benefit calculator compares the total cost to patch against the potential cost of exploit, producing an ROI for the patch action that expresses security action in clear financial terms.

Inputs like engineer time, number of affected devices, patch difficulty, and automation availability are factored in automatically. The result is a business-aligned justification for every patching decision—helping teams secure buy-in, accelerate approvals, and move work forward with one-click ticketing, CSV export, or risk acceptance.

Darktrace / Proactive Exposure Management Cost Benefit Analysis
Figure 2: Darktrace / Proactive Exposure Management Cost Benefit Analysis

A Smarter, Faster Approach to Exposure Management

Together, the no-telemetry endpoint and Cost–Benefit Analysis advance the CTEM motion from theory to practice. You gain higher‑fidelity discovery and validation signals at the device level, paired with business‑ready justification that accelerates mobilization. The result is fewer distractions, clearer priorities, and faster measurable risk reduction. This is not from chasing every alert, but by focusing on what moves the needle now.

  • Smarter Prioritization: Device‑level context trims noise and spotlights the exposures that matter for your business.
  • Faster Decisions: Built‑in ROI turns technical urgency into executive clarity—speeding approvals and action.
  • Practical Execution: Privacy‑conscious endpoint collection and ticketing/export options fit neatly into existing workflows.
  • Better Outcomes: Close the loop faster—discover, prioritize, validate, and mobilize—on the same operating surface.

Committed to innovation

These updates are part of the broader Darktrace release, which also included:

1. Major innovations in cloud security with the launch of the industry’s first fully automated cloud forensics solution, reinforcing Darktrace’s leadership in AI-native security.

2. Darktrace Network Endpoint eXtended Telemetry (NEXT) is revolutionizing NDR with the industry’s first mixed-telemetry agent using Self-Learning AI.

3. Improvements to our OT product, purpose built for industrial infrastructure, Darktrace / OT now brings dedicated OT dashboard, segmentation-aware risk modeling, and expanded visibility into edge assets and automation protocols.

Join our Live Launch Event

When? 

December 9, 2025

What will be covered?

Join our live broadcast to experience how Darktrace is eliminating blind spots for detection and response across your complete enterprise with new innovations in Agentic AI across our ActiveAI Security platform. Industry leaders from IDC will join Darktrace customers to discuss challenges in cross-domain security, with a live walkthrough reshaping the future of Network Detection & Response, Endpoint Detection & Response, Email Security, and SecOps in novel threat detection and autonomous investigations.

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About the author
Kelland Goodin
Product Marketing Specialist
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