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May 5, 2020

The Ongoing Threat of Dharma Ransomware Attacks

Stay informed about the dangers of Dharma ransomware and its methods of attack, ensuring your defenses are strong against potential intrusions.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Max Heinemeyer
Global Field CISO
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05
May 2020

Executive summary

  • In the past few weeks, Darktrace has observed an increase in attacks against internet-facing systems, such as RDP. The initial intrusions usually take place via existing vulnerabilities or stolen, legitimate credentials. The Dharma ransomware attack described in this blog post is one such example.
  • Old threats can be damaging – Dharma and its variants have been around for four years. This is a classic example of ‘legacy’ ransomware morphing and adapting to bypass traditional defenses.
  • The intrusion shows signs that indicate the threat-actors are aware of – and are actively exploiting – the COVID-19 situation.
  • In the current threat landscape surrounding COVID-19, Darktrace recommends monitoring internet-facing systems and critical servers closely – keeping track of administrative credentials and carefully considering security when rapidly deploying internet-facing infrastructure.

Introduction

In mid-April, Darktrace detected a targeted Dharma ransomware attack on a UK company. The initial point of intrusion was via RDP – this represents a very common attack method of infection that Darktrace has observed in the broader threat landscape over the past few weeks.

This blog post highlights every stage of the attack lifecycle and details the attacker’s techniques, tools and procedures (TTP) – all detected by Darktrace.

Dharma – a varient of the CrySIS malware family – first appeared in 2016 and uses multiple intrusion vectors. It distributes its malware as an attachment in a spam email, by disguising it as an installation file for legitimate software, or by exploiting an open RDP connection through internet-facing servers. When Dharma has finished encrypting files, it drops a ransom note with the contact email address in the encrypted SMB files.

Darktrace had strong, real-time detections of the attack – however the absence of eyes on the user interface prior to the encryption activity, and without Autonomous Response deployed in Active Mode, these alerts were only actioned after the ransomware was unleashed. Fortunately, it was unable to spread within the organization, thanks to human intervention at the peak of the attack. However, Darktrace Antigena in active mode would have significantly slowed down the attack.

Timeline

The timeline below provides a rough overview of the major attack phases over five days of activity.

Figure 1: A timeline of the attack

Technical analysis

Darktrace detected that the main device hit by the attack was an internet-facing RDP server (‘RDP server’). Dharma used network-level encryption here: the ransomware activity takes place over the network protocol SMB.

Below is a chronological overview of all Darktrace detections that fired during this attack: Darktrace detected and reported every single unusual or suspicious event occurring on the RDP server.

Figure 2: An overview of Darktrace detections

Initial compromise

On April 7, the RDP server began receiving a large number of incoming connections from rare IP addresses on the internet.

On April 7, the RDP server began receiving a large number of incoming connections from rare IP addresses on the internet. This means a lot of IP addresses on the internet that usually don’t connect to this company started connection attempts over RDP. The top five cookies used to authenticate show that the source IPs were located in Russia, the Netherlands, Korea, the United States, and Germany.

It is highly likely that the RDP credential used in this attack had been compromised prior to the attack – either via common brute-force methods, credential stuffing attacks, or phishing. Indeed, a TTP growing in popularity is to buy RDP credentials on marketplaces and skip to initial access.

Attempted privilege escalation

The following day, the malicious actor abused the SMB version 1 protocol, notorious for always-on null sessions which offer unauthenticated users’ information about the machine – such as password policies, usernames, group names, machine names, user and host SIDs. What followed was very unusual: the server connected externally to a rare IP address located in Morocco.

Next, the attacker attempted a failed SMB session to the external IP over an unusual port. Darktrace detected this activity as highly anomalous, as it had previously learned that SMB is usually not used in this fashion within this organization – and certainly not for external communication over this port.

Figure 3: Darktrace detecting the rare external IP address

Figure 4: The SMB session failure and the rare connection over port 1047

Command and control traffic

As the entire attack occurred over five days, this aligns with a smash-and-grab approach, rather than a highly covert, low-and-slow operation.

Two hours later, the server initiated a large number of anomalous and rare connections to external destinations located in India, China, and Italy – amongst other destinations the server had never communicated with before. The attacker was now attempting to establish persistence and create stronger channels for command and control (C2). As the entire attack occurred over five days, this aligns with a smash-and-grab approach, rather than a highly covert, low-and-slow operation.

Actions on target

Notwithstanding this approach, the malicious actor remained dormant for two days, biding their time until April 10 — a public holiday in the UK — when security teams would be notably less responsive. This pause in activity provides supporting evidence that the attack was human-driven.

Figure 5: The unusual RDP connections detected by Darktrace

The RDP server then began receiving incoming remote desktop connections from 100% rare IP addresses located in the Netherlands, Latvia, and Poland.

Internal reconnaissance

The IP address 85.93.20[.]6, hosted at the time of investigation in Panama, made two connections to the server, using an administrative credential. On April 12, as other inbound RDP connections scanned the network, the volume of data transferred by the RDP server to this IP address spiked. The RDP server never scans the internal network. Darktrace identified this as highly unusual activity.

Figure 6: Darktrace detects the anomalous external data transfer

Lateral movement and payload execution

Finally, on April 12, the attackers executed the Dharma payload at 13:45. The RDP server wrote a number of files over the SMB protocol, appended with a file extension containing a throwaway email account possibly evoking the current COVID-19 pandemic, ‘cov2020@aol[.]com’. The use of string ‘…@aol.com].ROGER’ and presence of a file named ‘FILES ENCRYPTED.txt’ resembles previous Dharma compromises.

Parallel to the encryption activity, the ransomware tried to spread and infect other machines by initiating successful SMB authentications using the same administrator credential seen during the internal reconnaissance. However, the destination devices did not encrypt any files themselves.

It was during the encryption activity that the internal IT staff pulled the plug from the compromised RDP server, thus ending the ransomware activity.

Conclusion

This incident supports the idea that ‘legacy’ ransomware may morph to resurrect itself to exploit vulnerabilities in remote working infrastructure during this pandemic.

Dharma executed here a fast-acting, planned, targeted, ransomware attack. The attackers used off-the-shelf tools (RDP, abusing SMB1 protocol) blurring detection and attribution by blending in with typical administrator activity.

Darktrace detected every stage of the attack without having to depend on threat intelligence or rules and signatures, and the internal security team acted on the malicious activity to prevent further damage.

This incident supports the idea that ‘legacy’ ransomware may morph to resurrect itself to exploit vulnerabilities in remote working infrastructure during this pandemic. Poorly-secured public-facing systems have been rushed out and security is neglected as companies prioritize availability – sacrificing security in the process. Financially-motivated actors weaponize these weak points.

The use of the COVID-related email ‘cov2020@aol[.]com’ during the attack indicates that the threat-actor is aware of and abusing the current global pandemic.

Recent attacks, such as APT41’s exploitation of the Zoho Manage Engine vulnerability last March, show that attacks against internet-facing infrastructure are gaining popularity as the initial intrusion vector. Indeed, as many as 85% of ransomware attacks use RDP as an entry vector. Ensuring that backups are isolated, configurations are hardened, and systems are patched is not enough – real-time detection of every anomalous action can help protect potential victims of ransomware.

Technical Details

Some of the detections on the RDP server:

  • Compliance / Internet Facing RDP server – exposure of critical server to Internet
  • Anomalous Connection / Application Protocol on Uncommon Port – external connections using an unusual port to rare endpoints
  • Device / Large Number of Connections to New Endpoints – indicative of peer-to-peer or scanning activity
  • Compliance / Incoming Remote Desktop – device is remotely controlled from an external source, increased rick of bruteforce
  • Compromise / Ransomware / Suspicious SMB Activity – reading and writing similar volumes of data to remote file shares, indicative of files being overwritten and encrypted
  • Anomalous File / Internal / Additional Extension Appended to SMB File – device is renaming network share files with an added extension, seen during ransomware activity

The graph below shows the timeline of Darktrace detections on the RDP server. The attack lifecycle is clearly observable.

Figure 7: The model breaches occurring over time

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Max Heinemeyer
Global Field CISO

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June 11, 2025

Proactive OT security: Lessons on supply chain risk management from a rogue Raspberry Pi

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Understanding supply chain risk in manufacturing

For industries running Industrial Control Systems (ICS) such as manufacturing and fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG), complex supply chains mean that disruption to one weak node can have serious impacts to the entire ecosystem. However, supply chain risk does not always originate from outside an organization’s ICS network.  

The implicit trust placed on software or shared services for maintenance within an ICS can be considered a type of insider threat [1], where defenders also need to look ‘from within’ to protect against supply chain risk. Attackers have frequently mobilised this form of insider threat:

  • Many ICS and SCADA systems were compromised during the 2014 Havex Watering Hole attack, where via operators’ implicit trust in the trojanized versions of legitimate applications, on legitimate but compromised websites [2].
  • In 2018, the world’s largest manufacturer of semiconductors and processers shut down production for three days after a supplier installed tainted software that spread to over 10,000 machines in the manufacturer’s network [3].
  • During the 2020 SolarWinds supply chain attack, attackers compromised a version of Orion software that was deployed from SolarWinds’ own servers during a software update to thousands of customers, including tech manufacturing companies such as Intel and Nvidia [4].

Traditional approaches to ICS security have focused on defending against everything from outside the castle walls, or outside of the ICS network. As ICS attacks become more sophisticated, defenders must not solely rely on static perimeter defenses and prevention. 

A critical part of active defense is understanding the ICS environment and how it operates, including all possible attack paths to the ICS including network connections, remote access points, the movement of data across zones and conduits and access from mobile devices. For instance, original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and vendors often install remote access software or third-party equipment in ICS networks to facilitate legitimate maintenance and support activities, which can unintentionally expand the ICS’ attack surface.  

This blog describes an example of the convergence between supply chain risk and insider risk, when a vendor left a Raspberry Pi device in a manufacturing customer’s ICS network without the customer’s knowledge.

Case study: Using unsupervised machine learning to detect pre-existing security issues

Raspberry Pi devices are commonly used in SCADA environments as low-cost, remotely accessible data collectors [5][6][7]. They are often paired with Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) for monitoring and tracking [8]. However, these devices also represent a security risk because their small physical size and time-consuming nature of physical inspection makes them easy to overlook. This poses a security risk, as these devices have previously been used to carry out USB-based attacks or to emulate Ethernet-over-USB connections to exfiltrate sensitive data [8][9].

In this incident, a Darktrace customer was unaware that their supplier had installed a Raspberry Pi device on their ICS network. Crucially, the installation occurred prior to Darktrace’s deployment on the customer’s network. 

For other anomaly detection tools, this order of events meant that this third-party device would likely have been treated as part of the customer’s existing infrastructure. However, after Darktrace was deployed, it analyzed the metadata from the encrypted HTTPS and DNS connections that the Raspberry Pi made to ‘call home’ to the supplier and determined that these connections were  unusual compared to the rest of the devices in the network, even in the absence of any malicious indicators of compromise (IoCs).  

Darktrace triggered the following alerts for this unusual activity that consequently notified the customer to the pre-existing threat of an unmanaged device already present in their network:

  • Compromise / Sustained SSL or HTTP Increase
  • Compromise / Agent Beacon (Short Period)
  • Compromise / Agent Beacon (Medium Period)
  • Compromise / Agent Beacon (Long Period)
  • Tags / New Raspberry Pi Device
  • Device / DNS Requests to Unusual Server
  • Device / Anomaly Indicators / Spike in Connections to Rare Endpoint Indicator
Darktrace’s External Sites Summary showing the rarity of the external endpoint that the Raspberry Pi device ‘called home’ to and the model alerts triggered.  
Figure 1: Darktrace’s External Sites Summary showing the rarity of the external endpoint that the Raspberry Pi device ‘called home’ to and the model alerts triggered.  

Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst launched an autonomous investigation into the activity, correlating related events into a broader incident and generating a report outlining the potential threat along with supporting technical details.

Darktrace’s anomaly-based detection meant that the Raspberry Pi device did not need to be observed performing clearly malicious behavior to alert the customer to the security risk, and neither can defenders afford to wait for such escalation.

Why is this significant?

In 2021 a similar attack took place. Aiming to poison a Florida water treatment facility, attackers leveraged a TeamViewer instance that had been dormant on the system for six months, effectively allowing the attacker to ‘live off the land’ [10].  

The Raspberry Pi device in this incident also remained outside the purview of the customer’s security team at first. It could have been leveraged by a persistent attacker to pivot within the internal network and communicate externally.

A proactive approach to active defense that seeks to minimize and continuously monitor the attack surface and network is crucial.  

The growing interest in manufacturing from attackers and policymakers

Significant motivations for targeting the manufacturing sector and increasing regulatory demands make the convergence of supply chain risk, insider risk, and the prevalence of stealthy living-off-the-land techniques particularly relevant to this sector.

Manufacturing is consistently targeted by cybercriminals [11], and the sector’s ‘just-in-time’ model grants attackers the opportunity for high levels of disruption. Furthermore, under NIS 2, manufacturing and some food and beverage processing entities are now designated as ‘important’ entities. This means stricter incident reporting requirements within 24 hours of detection, and enhanced security requirements such as the implementation of zero trust and network segmentation policies, as well as measures to improve supply chain resilience [12][13][14].

How can Darktrace help?

Ultimately, Darktrace successfully assisted a manufacturing organization in detecting a potentially disruptive 'near-miss' within their OT environment, even in the absence of traditional IoCs.  Through passive asset identification techniques and continuous network monitoring, the customer improved their understanding of their network and supply chain risk.  

While the swift detection of the rogue device allowed the threat to be identified before it could escalate, the customer could have reduced their time to respond by using Darktrace’s built-in response capabilities, had Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability been enabled.  Darktrace’s Autonomous Response can be configured to target specific connections on a rogue device either automatically upon detection or following manual approval from the security team, to stop it communicating with other devices in the network while allowing other approved devices to continue operating. Furthermore, the exportable report generated by Cyber AI Analyst helps security teams to meet NIS 2’s enhanced reporting requirements.  

Sophisticated ICS attacks often leverage insider access to perform in-depth reconnaissance for the development of tailored malware capabilities.  This case study and high-profile ICS attacks highlight the importance of mitigating supply chain risk in a similar way to insider risk.  As ICS networks adapt to the introduction of IIoT, remote working and the increased convergence between IT and OT, it is important to ensure the approach to secure against these threats is compatible with the dynamic nature of the network.  

Credit to Nicole Wong (Principal Cyber Analyst), Matthew Redrup (Senior Analyst and ANZ Team Lead)

[related-resource]

Appendices

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • Infrastructure / New Raspberry Pi Device - INITIAL ACCESS - T1200 Hardware Additions
  • Device / DNS Requests to Unusual Server - CREDENTIAL ACCESS, COLLECTION - T1557 Man-in-the-Middle
  • Compromise / Agent Beacon - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1071.001 Web Protocols

References

[1] https://www.cisa.gov/topics/physical-security/insider-threat-mitigation/defining-insider-threats

[2] https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/gb/threat-encyclopedia/web-attack/139/havex-targets-industrial-control-systems

[3]https://thehackernews.com/2018/08/tsmc-wannacry-ransomware-attack.html

[4] https://www.theverge.com/2020/12/21/22194183/intel-nvidia-cisco-government-infected-solarwinds-hack

[5] https://www.centreon.com/monitoring-ot-with-raspberry-pi-and-centreon/

[6] https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9107689

[7] https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/webicc-scada-integration-industrial-raspberry-pi-devices-mryff

[8] https://www.rowse.co.uk/blog/post/how-is-the-raspberry-pi-used-in-the-iiot

[9] https://sepiocyber.com/resources/whitepapers/raspberry-pi-a-friend-or-foe/#:~:text=Initially%20designed%20for%20ethical%20purposes,as%20cyberattacks%20and%20unauthorized%20access

[10] https://edition.cnn.com/2021/02/10/us/florida-water-poison-cyber/index.html

[11] https://www.mxdusa.org/2025/02/13/top-cyber-threats-in-manufacturing/

[12] https://www.shoosmiths.com/insights/articles/nis2-what-manufacturers-and-distributors-need-to-know-about-europes-new-cybersecurity-regime

[13] https://www.goodaccess.com/blog/nis2-require-zero-trust-essential-security-measure#zero-trust-nis2-compliance

[14] https://logisticsviewpoints.com/2024/11/06/the-impact-of-nis-2-regulations-on-manufacturing-supply-chains/

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About the author
Nicole Wong
Cyber Security Analyst

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June 9, 2025

Modernising UK Cyber Regulation: Implications of the Cyber Security and Resilience Bill

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The need for security and continued cyber resilience

The UK government has made national security a key priority, and the new Cyber Security and Resilience Bill (CSRB) is a direct reflection of that focus. In introducing the Bill, Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology, Peter Kyle, recognised that the UK is “desperately exposed” to cyber threats—from criminal groups to hostile nation-states that are increasingly targeting the UK's digital systems and critical infrastructure[1].

Context and timeline for the new legislation

First announced during the King’s Speech of July 2024, and elaborated in a Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT) policy statement published in April 2025, the CSRB is expected to be introduced in Parliament during the 2025-26 legislative session.

For now, organisations in the UK remain subject to the 2018 Network and Information Systems (NIS) Regulations – an EU-derived law which was drafted before today’s increasing digitisation of critical services, rise in cloud adoption and emergence of AI-powered threats.

Why modernisation is critical

Without modernisation, the Government believes UK’s infrastructure and economy risks falling behind international peers. The EU, which revised its cybersecurity regulation under the NIS2 Directive, already imposes stricter requirements on a broader set of sectors.

The urgency of the Bill is also underscored by recent high-impact incidents, including the Synnovis attack which targeted the National Health Service (NHS) suppliers and disrupted thousands of patient appointments and procedures[2]. The Government has argued that such events highlight a systemic failure to keep pace with a rapidly evolving threat landscape[3].

What the Bill aims to achieve

This Bill represents a decisive shift. According to the Government, it will modernise and future‑proof the UK’s cyber laws, extending oversight to areas where risk has grown but regulation has not kept pace[4]. While the legislation builds on previous consultations and draws lessons from international frameworks like the EU’s NIS2 directive, it also aims to tailor solutions to the UK’s unique threat environment.

Importantly, the Government is framing cybersecurity not as a barrier to growth, but as a foundation for it. The policy statement emphasises that strong digital resilience will create the stability businesses need to thrive, innovate, and invest[5]. Therefore, the goals of the Bill will not only be to enhance security but also act as an enabler to innovation and economic growth.

Recognition that AI changes cyber threats

The CSRB policy statement recognises that AI is fundamentally reshaping the threat landscape, with adversaries now leveraging AI and commercial cyber tools to exploit vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure and supply chains. Indeed, the NCSC has recently assessed that AI will almost certainly lead to “an increase in the frequency and intensity of cyber threats”[6]. Accordingly, the policy statement insists that the UK’s regulatory framework “must keep pace and provide flexibility to respond to future threats as and when they emerge”[7].

To address the threat, the Bill signals new obligations for MSPs and data centres, timely incident reporting and dynamic guidance that can be refreshed without fresh primary legislation, making it essential for firms to follow best practices.

What might change in day-to-day practice?

New organisations in scope of regulation

Under the existing Network and Information Systems (NIS) Regulations[8], the UK already supervises operators in five critical sectors—energy, transport, drinking water, health (Operators of Essential Services, OES) and digital infrastructure (Relevant Digital Service Providers, RDSPs).

The Cyber Security and Resilience Bill retains this foundation and adds Managed Service Providers (MSPs) and data centres to the scope of regulation to “better recognise the increasing reliance on digital services and the vulnerabilities posed by supply chains”[9]. It also grants the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology the power to add new sectors or sub‑sectors via secondary legislation, following consultation with Parliament and industry.

Managed service providers (MSPs)

MSPs occupy a central position within the UK’s enterprise information‑technology infrastructure. Because they remotely run or monitor clients’ systems, networks and data, they hold privileged, often continuous access to multiple environments. This foothold makes them an attractive target for malicious actors.

The Bill aims to bring MSPs in scope of regulation by making them subject to the same duties as those placed on firms that provide digital services under the 2018 NIS Regulations. By doing so, the Bill seeks to raise baseline security across thousands of customer environments and to provide regulators with better visibility of supply‑chain risk.

The proposed definition for MSPs is a service which:

  1. Is provided to another organisation
  2. Relies on the use of network and information systems to deliver the service
  3. Relates to ongoing management support, active administration and/or monitoring of AI systems, IT infrastructure, applications, and/or IT networks, including for the purpose of activities relating to cyber security.
  4. Involves a network connection and/or access to the customer’s network and information systems.

Data centres

Building on the September 2024 designation of data centres as critical national infrastructure, the CSRB will fold data infrastructure into the NIS-style regime by naming it an “relevant sector" and data centres as “essential service”[10].

About 182 colocation facilities run by 64 operators will therefore come under statutory duties to notify the regulator, maintain proportionate CAF-aligned controls and report significant incidents, regardless of who owns them or what workloads they host.

New requirements for regulated organisations

Incident reporting processes

There could be stricter timelines or broader definitions of what counts as a reportable incident. This might nudge organisations to formalise detection, triage, and escalation procedures.

The Government is proposing to introduce a new two-stage incident reporting process. This would include an initial notification which would be submitted within 24 hours of becoming aware of a significant incident, followed by a full incident report which should be submitted within 72 hours of the same.

Supply chain assurance requirements

Supply chains for the UK's most critical services are becoming increasingly complex and present new and serious vulnerabilities for cyber-attacks. The recent Synnovis ransomware attacks on the NHS[11] exemplify the danger posed by attacks against the supply chains of important services and organisations. This is concerning when reflecting on the latest Cyber Security Breaches survey conducted by DSIT, which highlights that fewer than 25% of large businesses review their supply chain risks[12].

Despite these risks, the UK’s legacy cybersecurity regulatory regime does not explicitly cover supply chain risk management. The UK instead relies on supporting and non-statutory guidance to close this gap, such as the NCSC’s Cyber Assessment Framework (CAF)[13].

The CSRB policy statement acts on this regulatory shortcoming and recognises that “a single supplier’s disruption can have far-reaching impacts on the delivery of essential or digital services”[14].

To address this, the Bill would make in-scope organisations (OES and RDPS) directly accountable for the cybersecurity of their supply chains. Secondary legislation would spell out these duties in detail, ensuring that OES and RDSPs systematically assess and mitigate third-party cyber risks.

Updated and strengthened security requirements

By placing the CAF into a firmer footing and backing it with a statutory Code of Practice, the Government is setting clearer expectations about government expectations on technical standards and methods organisations will need to follow to prove their resilience.

How Darktrace can help support affected organizations

Demonstrate resilience

Darktrace’s Self-Learning AITM continuously monitors your digital estate across cloud, network, OT, email, and endpoint to detect, investigate, and autonomously respond to emerging threats in real time. This persistent visibility and defense posture helps organizations demonstrate cyber resilience to regulators with confidence.

Streamline incident reporting and compliance

Darktrace surfaces clear alerts and automated investigation reports, complete with timeline views and root cause analysis. These insights reduce the time and complexity of regulatory incident reporting and support internal compliance workflows with auditable, AI-generated evidence.

Improve supply chain visibility

With full visibility across connected systems and third-party activity, Darktrace detects early indicators of lateral movement, account compromise, and unusual behavior stemming from vendor or partner access, reducing the risk of supply chain-originated cyber-attacks.

Ensure MSPs can meet new standards

For managed service providers, Darktrace offers native multi-tenant support and autonomous threat response that can be embedded directly into customer environments. This ensures consistent, scalable security standards across clients—helping MSPs address increasing regulatory obligations.

[related-resource]

References

[1] https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/article/2024/jul/29/uk-desperately-exposed-to-cyber-threats-and-pandemics-says-minister

[2] https://www.england.nhs.uk/2024/06/synnovis-cyber-attack-statement-from-nhs-england/

[3] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/cyber-security-and-resilience-bill-policy-statement/cyber-security-and-resilience-bill-policy-statement

[4] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/cyber-security-and-resilience-bill-policy-statement/cyber-security-and-resilience-bill-policy-statement

[5] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/cyber-security-and-resilience-bill-policy-statement/cyber-security-and-resilience-bill-policy-statement

[6] https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/report/impact-ai-cyber-threat-now-2027

[7] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/cyber-security-and-resilience-bill-policy-statement/cyber-security-and-resilience-bill-policy-statement

[8] https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/nis-directive-and-nis-regulations-2018

[9] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/cyber-security-and-resilience-bill-policy-statement/cyber-security-and-resilience-bill-policy-statement

[10] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/cyber-security-and-resilience-bill-policy-statement/cyber-security-and-resilience-bill-policy-statement

[11] https://www.england.nhs.uk/2024/06/synnovis-cyber-attack-statement-from-nhs-england/

[12] https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/cyber-security-breaches-survey-2025/cyber-security-breaches-survey-2025

[13] https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/cyber-assessment-framework

[14] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/cyber-security-and-resilience-bill-policy-statement/cyber-security-and-resilience-bill-policy-statement

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