Blog
/
/
August 22, 2024

From the Depths: Analyzing the Cthulhu Stealer Malware for macOS

Cado Security (now part of Darktrace) analyzed "Cthulhu Stealer," a macOS malware-as-a-service written in Go. It impersonates legitimate software, prompts for user and MetaMask passwords, and steals credentials, cryptocurrency wallets, and game accounts. Functionally similar to Atomic Stealer, Cthulhu was rented via an underground marketplace, but its operators faced complaints and a ban for alleged exit scamming.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Tara Gould
Malware Research Lead
Default blog imageDefault blog imageDefault blog imageDefault blog imageDefault blog imageDefault blog image
22
Aug 2024

Introduction

For years there has been a general belief that macOS systems are immune to malware. While MacOS has a reputation for being secure, macOS malware has been trending up in recent years with the emergence of Silver Sparrow [1],  KeRanger [2], and Atomic Stealer [3], among others. Recently, Cado Security has identified a malware-as-a-service (MaaS) targeting macOS users named “Cthulhu Stealer”. This blog will explore the functionality of this malware and provide insight into how its operators carry out their activities.

Technical analysis

File details:

Language: Go

Not signed

Stripped

Multiarch: x86_64 and arm

Screenshot
Figure 1: Screenshot of disk image when mounted

Cthulhu Stealer is an Apple disk image (DMG) that is bundled with two binaries, depending on the architecture. The malware is written in GoLang and disguises itself as legitimate software. Once the user mounts the dmg, the user is prompted to open the software. After opening the file, “osascript”, the macOS command-line tool for running AppleScript and JavaScript is used to prompt the user for their password. 

Password Prompt
Figure 2: Password Prompt 
Osascript
Figure 3: Osascript prompting user for password

Once the user enters their password, a second prompt requests the user’s MetaMask [4] password. A directory is created in ‘/Users/Shared/NW’ with the credentials stored in textfiles. Chainbreak [5] is used to dump Keychain passwords and stores the details in “Keychain.txt”.

Wallet Connect Password prompt
Figure 4: Password prompt for MetaMask
Directory
Figure 5: Directory /Users/Shared/NW with created files

A zip file containing the stolen data is created in: “/Users/Shared/NW/[CountryCode]Cthulhu_Mac_OS_[date]_[time].zip.” Additionally, a notification is sent to the C2, to alert to new logs. The malware fingerprints the victim’s system, gathering information including IP, with IP details that are retrieved from ipinfo.io.  

System information including system name, OS version, hardware and software information is also gathered and stored in a text file.

Parsed IP Details
Figure 6: Parsed IP Details 
Cthulhu Stealer
Figure 7: Contents of ‘Userinfo.txt’
Code
Figure 8: Part of the function saving system information to text file
Log Alert
Figure 9: Alert of Log that is sent to operators

Cthulhu Stealer impersonates disk images of legitimate software that include:

  • CleanMyMac
  • Grand Theft Auto IV (appears to be a typo for VI)
  • Adobe GenP

The main functionality of Cthulhu Stealer is to steal credentials and cryptocurrency wallets from various stores, including game accounts. Shown in Figure 10, there are multiple checker functions that check in the installation folders of targeted file stores, typically in “Library/Application Support/[file store]”. A directory is created in “/Users/Shared/NW” and the contents of the installation folder are dumped into text files for each store.

Code
Figure 10: “Checker” functions being called in main function
Code
Figure 11: Function BattleNetChecker

A list of stores Cthulhu Stealer steals from is shown in the list below:

  • Browser Cookies
  • Coinbase Wallet
  • Chrome Extension Wallets
  • Telegram Tdata account information
  • Minecraft user information
  • Wasabi Wallet
  • MetaMask Wallet
  • Keychain Passwords
  • SafeStorage Passwords
  • Battlenet game, cache and log data
  • Firefox Cookies
  • Daedalus Wallet
  • Electrum Wallet
  • Atomic Wallet
  • Binanace Wallet
  • Harmony Wallet
  • Electrum Wallet
  • Enjin Wallet
  • Hoo Wallet
  • Dapper Wallet
  • Coinomi Wallet
  • Trust Wallet

Comparison to atomic stealer

Atomic Stealer [6] is an information-stealer that targets macOS written in Go that was first identified in 2023. Atomic Stealer steals crypto wallets, browser credentials, and keychain. The stealer is sold on Telegram to affiliates for $1,000 per month. The functionality and features of Cthulhu Stealer are very similar to Atomic Stealer, indicating the developer of Cthulhu Stealer probably took Atomic Stealer and modified the code. The use of “osascript”  to prompt the user for their password is similar in Atomic Stealer and Cthulhu, even including the same spelling mistakes. 

Forum and operators

The developers and affiliates of Cthulhu Stealer operate as “Cthulhu Team” using Telegram for communications. The stealer appears to be being rented out to individuals for $500 USD/month, with the main developer paying out a percentage of earnings to affiliates based on their deployment. Each affiliate of the stealer is responsible for the deployment of the malware. Cado has found Cthulhu Stealer sold on two well-known malware marketplaces which are used for communication, arbitration and advertising of the stealer, along with Telegram. The user “Cthulhu” (also known as Balaclavv), first started advertising Cthulhu Stealer at the end of 2023 and appeared to be operating for the first few months of 2024, based on timestamps from the binaries. 

Various affiliates of the stealer started lodging complaints against Cthulhu in 2024 with regards to payments not being received. Users complained that Cthulhu had stolen money that was owed to them and accused the threat actor of being a scammer or participating in an exit scam. As a result, the threat actor received a permanent ban from the marketplace.

Screenshot
Figure 12: Screenshot of an arbitration an affiliate lodged against Cthulhu

Key takeaways 

In conclusion, while macOS has long been considered a secure system, the existence of malware targeting Mac users remains an increasing security concern. Although Cthulhu Team no longer appears to be active, this serves as a reminder that Apple users are not immune to cyber threats. It’s crucial to remain vigilant and exercise caution, particularly when installing software from unofficial sources.

To protect yourself from potential threats, always download software from trusted sources, such as the Apple App Store or the official websites of reputable developers. Enable macOS’s built-in security features such as Gatekeeper, which helps prevent the installation of unverified apps. Keep your system and applications up to date with the latest security patches. Additionally, consider using reputable antivirus software to provide an extra layer of protection.

By staying informed and taking proactive steps, you can significantly reduce the risk of falling victim to Mac malware and ensure your system remains secure.

Indicators of compromise

Launch.dmg  

6483094f7784c424891644a85d5535688c8969666e16a194d397dc66779b0b12  

GTAIV_EarlyAccess_MACOS_Release.dmg  

e3f1e91de8af95cd56ec95737669c3512f90cecbc6696579ae2be349e30327a7  

AdobeGenP.dmg  

f79b7cbc653696af0dbd867c0a5d47698bcfc05f63b665ad48018d2610b7e97b  

Setup2024.dmg  

de33b7fb6f3d77101f81822c58540c87bd7323896913130268b9ce24f8c61e24  

CleanMyMac.dmg  

96f80fef3323e5bc0ce067cd7a93b9739174e29f786b09357125550a033b0288  

Network indicators  

89[.]208.103.185  

89[.]208.103.185:4000/autocheckbytes  

89[.]208.103.185:4000/notification_archive  

MITRE ATTACK  

User Execution  

T1204  

Command and Scripting Interpreter: Apple Script  

T1059.002  

Credentials From Password Stores  

T1555  

Credentials From Password Stores: Keychain  

T1555.001  

Credentials From Password Stores: Credentials From Web Browser  

T1555.003  

Account Discovery   

T1087  

System Information Discovery  

T1082  

Data Staged  

T1074  

Data From Local System  

T1005  

Exfiltration Over C2 Channel  

T1041  

Financial Theft  

Detection

Yara

rule MacoOS_CthulhuStealer {   
meta:       
 Description = "Detects Cthulhu MacOS Stealer Binary"       
 author = "Cado Security"       
 date = "14/08/2024"       
 md5 = "897384f9a792674b969388891653bb58" strings:           
 $mach_o_x86_64 = {CF FA ED FE 07 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00}           
 $mach_o_arm64 = {CF FA ED FE 0C 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00}          $c2 = "http://89.208.103.185:4000"           
 $path1 = "/Users/Shared/NW" fullword          $path2 = "/Users/admin/Desktop/adwans/Builder/6987368329/generated_script.go" fullword          $path3 = "ic.png" fullword           
 $zip = "@====)>>>>>>>>> CTHULHU STEALER - BOT <<<<<<<<<(====@\n" fullword          $func1 = "copyKeychainFile"           
 $func2 = "grabberA1"           
 $func3 = "grabberA2"          
 $func4 = "decodeIPInfo"           
 $func5 = "battlenetChecker"           
 $func6 = "binanceChecker"          
 $func7 = "daedalusChecker"           
 $func8 = "CCopyFFolderContents"           
 $func9 = "electrumChecker"         
 
condition:         
 $mach_o_x86_64 or $mach_o_arm64           
 and any of ($func*) or any of ($path*) or ($c2) or ($zip) } 

References

[1] https://redcanary.com/blog/threat-intelligence/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/

[2] https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/new-os-x-ransomware-keranger-infected-transmission-bittorrent-client-installer/

[3] https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/atomic-stealer-threat-actor-spawns-second-variant-of-macos-malware-sold-on-telegram/

[4] https://metamask.io/

[5] https://github.com/n0fate/chainbreaker

[6] https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/atomic-stealer-threat-actor-spawns-second-variant-of-macos-malware-sold-on-telegram/

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Tara Gould
Malware Research Lead

More in this series

No items found.

Blog

/

/

January 15, 2026

React2Shell Reflections: Cloud Insights, Finance Sector Impacts, and How Threat Actors Moved So Quickly

React2Shell Default blog imageDefault blog image

Introduction

Last month’s disclosure of CVE 2025-55812, known as React2Shell, provided a reminder of how quickly modern threat actors can operationalize newly disclosed vulnerabilities, particularly in cloud-hosted environments.

The vulnerability was discovered on December 3, 2025, with a patch made available on the same day. Within 30 hours of the patch, a publicly available proof-of-concept emerged that could be used to exploit any vulnerable server. This short timeline meant many systems remained unpatched when attackers began actively exploiting the vulnerability.  

Darktrace researchers rapidly deployed a new honeypot to monitor exploitation of CVE 2025-55812 in the wild.

Within two minutes of deployment, Darktrace observed opportunistic attackers exploiting this unauthenticated remote code execution flaw in React Server Components, leveraging a single crafted request to gain control of exposed Next.js servers. Exploitation quickly progressed from reconnaissance to scripted payload delivery, HTTP beaconing, and cryptomining, underscoring how automation and pre‑positioned infrastructure by threat actors now compress the window between disclosure and active exploitation to mere hours.

For cloud‑native organizations, particularly those in the financial sector, where Darktrace observed the greatest impact, React2Shell highlights the growing disconnect between patch availability and attacker timelines, increasing the likelihood that even short delays in remediation can result in real‑world compromise.

Cloud insights

In contrast to traditional enterprise networks built around layered controls, cloud architectures are often intentionally internet-accessible by default. When vulnerabilities emerge in common application frameworks such as React and Next.js, attackers face minimal friction.  No phishing campaign, no credential theft, and no lateral movement are required; only an exposed service and exploitable condition.

The activity Darktrace observed during the React2shell intrusions reflects techniques that are familiar yet highly effective in cloud-based attacks. Attackers quickly pivot from an exposed internet-facing application to abusing the underlying cloud infrastructure, using automated exploitation to deploy secondary payloads at scale and ultimately act on their objectives, whether monetizing access through cryptomining or to burying themselves deeper in the environment for sustained persistence.

Cloud Case Study

In one incident, opportunistic attackers rapidly exploited an internet-facing Azure virtual machine (VM) running a Next.js application, abusing the React/next.js vulnerability to gain remote command execution within hours of the service becoming exposed. The compromise resulted in the staged deployment of a Go-based remote access trojan (RAT), followed by a series of cryptomining payloads such as XMrig.

Initial Access

Initial access appears to have originated from abused virtual private network (VPN) infrastructure, with the source IP (146.70.192[.]180) later identified as being associated with Surfshark

The IP address above is associated with VPN abuse leveraged for initial exploitation via Surfshark infrastructure.
Figure 1: The IP address above is associated with VPN abuse leveraged for initial exploitation via Surfshark infrastructure.

The use of commercial VPN exit nodes reflects a wider trend of opportunistic attackers leveraging low‑cost infrastructure to gain rapid, anonymous access.

Parent process telemetry later confirmed execution originated from the Next.js server, strongly indicating application-layer compromise rather than SSH brute force, misused credentials, or management-plane abuse.

Payload execution

Shortly after successful exploitation, Darktrace identified a suspicious file and subsequent execution. One of the first payloads retrieved was a binary masquerading as “vim”, a naming convention commonly used to evade casual inspection in Linux environments. This directly ties the payload execution to the compromised Next.js application process, reinforcing the hypothesis of exploit-driven access.

Command-and-Control (C2)

Network flow logs revealed outbound connections back to the same external IP involved in the inbound activity. From a defensive perspective, this pattern is significant as web servers typically receive inbound requests, and any persistent outbound callbacks — especially to the same IP — indicate likely post-exploitation control. In this case, a C2 detection model alert was raised approximately 90 minutes after the first indicators, reflecting the time required for sufficient behavioral evidence to confirm beaconing rather than benign application traffic.

Cryptominers deployment and re-exploitation

Following successful command execution within the compromised Next.js workload, the attackers rapidly transitioned to monetization by deploying cryptomining payloads. Microsoft Defender observed a shell command designed to fetch and execute a binary named “x” via either curl or wget, ensuring successful delivery regardless of which tooling was availability on the Azure VM.

The binary was written to /home/wasiluser/dashboard/x and subsequently executed, with open-source intelligence (OSINT) enrichment strongly suggesting it was a cryptominer consistent with XMRig‑style tooling. Later the same day, additional activity revealed the host downloading a static XMRig binary directly from GitHub and placing it in a hidden cache directory (/home/wasiluser/.cache/.sys/).

The use of trusted infrastructure and legitimate open‑source tooling indicates an opportunistic approach focused on reliability and speed. The repeated deployment of cryptominers strongly suggests re‑exploitation of the same vulnerable web application rather than reliance on traditional persistence mechanisms. This behavior is characteristic of cloud‑focused attacks, where publicly exposed workloads can be repeatedly compromised at scale more easily.

Financial sector spotlight

During the mass exploitation of React2Shell, Darktrace observed targeting by likely North Korean affiliated actors focused on financial organizations in the United Kingdom, Sweden, Spain, Portugal, Nigeria, Kenya, Qatar, and Chile.

The targeting of the financial sector is not unexpected, but the emergence of new Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) tooling, including a Beavertail variant and EtherRat, a previously undocumented Linux implant, highlights the need for updated rules and signatures for organizations that rely on them.

EtherRAT uses Ethereum smart contracts for C2 resolution, polling every 500 milliseconds and employing five persistence mechanisms. It downloads its own Node.js runtime from nodejs[.]org and queries nine Ethereum RPC endpoints in parallel, selecting the majority response to determine its C2 URL. EtherRAT also overlaps with the Contagious Interview campaign, which has targeted blockchain developers since early 2025.

Read more finance‑sector insights in Darktrace’s white paper, The State of Cyber Security in the Finance Sector.

Threat actor behavior and speed

Darktrace’s honeypot was exploited just two minutes after coming online, demonstrating how automated scanning, pre-positioned infrastructure and staging, and C2 infrastructure traced back to “bulletproof” hosting reflects a mature, well‑resourced operational chain.

For financial organizations, particularly those operating cloud‑native platforms, digital asset services, or internet‑facing APIs, this activity demonstrates how rapidly geopolitical threat actors can weaponize newly disclosed vulnerabilities, turning short patching delays into strategic opportunities for long‑term access and financial gain. This underscores the need for a behavioral-anomaly-led security posture.

Credit to Nathaniel Jones (VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO) and Mark Turner (Specialist Security Researcher)

Edited by Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Appendices

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

146.70.192[.]180 – IP Address – Endpoint Associated with Surfshark

References

https://www.darktrace.com/resources/the-state-of-cybersecurity-in-the-finance-sector

Continue reading
About the author
Nathaniel Jones
VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO

Blog

/

/

January 13, 2026

Runtime Is Where Cloud Security Really Counts: The Importance of Detection, Forensics and Real-Time Architecture Awareness

runtime, cloud security, cnaapDefault blog imageDefault blog image

Introduction: Shifting focus from prevention to runtime

Cloud security has spent the last decade focused on prevention; tightening configurations, scanning for vulnerabilities, and enforcing best practices through Cloud Native Application Protection Platforms (CNAPP). These capabilities remain essential, but they are not where cloud attacks happen.

Attacks happen at runtime: the dynamic, ephemeral, constantly changing execution layer where applications run, permissions are granted, identities act, and workloads communicate. This is also the layer where defenders traditionally have the least visibility and the least time to respond.

Today’s threat landscape demands a fundamental shift. Reducing cloud risk now requires moving beyond static posture and CNAPP only approaches and embracing realtime behavioral detection across workloads and identities, paired with the ability to automatically preserve forensic evidence. Defenders need a continuous, real-time understanding of what “normal” looks like in their cloud environments, and AI capable of processing massive data streams to surface deviations that signal emerging attacker behavior.

Runtime: The layer where attacks happen

Runtime is the cloud in motion — containers starting and stopping, serverless functions being called, IAM roles being assumed, workloads auto scaling, and data flowing across hundreds of services. It’s also where attackers:

  • Weaponize stolen credentials
  • Escalate privileges
  • Pivot programmatically
  • Deploy malicious compute
  • Manipulate or exfiltrate data

The challenge is complex: runtime evidence is ephemeral. Containers vanish; critical process data disappears in seconds. By the time a human analyst begins investigating, the detail required to understand and respond to the alert, often is already gone. This volatility makes runtime the hardest layer to monitor, and the most important one to secure.

What Darktrace / CLOUD Brings to Runtime Defence

Darktrace / CLOUD is purpose-built for the cloud execution layer. It unifies the capabilities required to detect, contain, and understand attacks as they unfold, not hours or days later. Four elements define its value:

1. Behavioral, real-time detection

The platform learns normal activity across cloud services, identities, workloads, and data flows, then surfaces anomalies that signify real attacker behavior, even when no signature exists.

2. Automated forensic level artifact collection

The moment Darktrace detects a threat, it can automatically capture volatile forensic evidence; disk state, memory, logs, and process context, including from ephemeral resources. This preserves the truth of what happened before workloads terminate and evidence disappears.

3. AI-led investigation

Cyber AI Analyst assembles cloud behaviors into a coherent incident story, correlating identity activity, network flows, and Cloud workload behavior. Analysts no longer need to pivot across dashboards or reconstruct timelines manually.

4. Live architectural awareness

Darktrace continuously maps your cloud environment as it operates; including services, identities, connectivity, and data pathways. This real-time visibility makes anomalies clearer and investigations dramatically faster.

Together, these capabilities form a runtime-first security model.

Why CNAPP alone isn’t enough

CNAPP platforms excel at pre deployment checks all the way down to developer workstations, identifying misconfigurations, concerning permission combinations, vulnerable images, and risky infrastructure choices. But CNAPP’s breadth is also its limitation. CNAPP is about posture. Runtime defense is about behavior.

CNAPP tells you what could go wrong; runtime detection highlights what is going wrong right now.

It cannot preserve ephemeral evidence, correlate active behaviors across domains, or contain unfolding attacks with the precision and speed required during a real incident. Prevention remains essential, but prevention alone cannot stop an attacker who is already operating inside your cloud environment.

Real-world AWS Scenario: Why Runtime Monitoring Wins

A recent incident detected by Darktrace / CLOUD highlights how cloud compromises unfold, and why runtime visibility is non-negotiable. Each step below reflects detections that occur only when monitoring behavior in real time.

1. External Credential Use

Detection: Unusual external source for credential use: An attacker logs into a cloud account from a never-before-seen location, the earliest sign of account takeover.

2. AWS CLI Pivot

Detection: Unusual CLI activity: The attacker switches to programmatic access, issuing commands from a suspicious host to gain automation and stealth.

3. Credential Manipulation

Detection: Rare password reset: They reset or assign new passwords to establish persistence and bypass existing security controls.

4. Cloud Reconnaissance

Detection: Burst of resource discovery: The attacker enumerates buckets, roles, and services to map high value assets and plan next steps.

5. Privilege Escalation

Detection: Anomalous IAM update: Unauthorized policy updates or role changes grant the attacker elevated access or a backdoor.

6. Malicious Compute Deployment

Detection: Unusual EC2/Lambda/ECS creation: The attacker deploys compute resources for mining, lateral movement, or staging further tools.

7. Data Access or Tampering

Detection: Unusual S3 modifications: They alter S3 permissions or objects, often a prelude to data exfiltration or corruption.

Only some of these actions would appear in a posture scan, crucially after the fact.
Every one of these runtime detections is visible only through real-time behavioral monitoring while the attack is in progress.

The future of cloud security Is runtime-first

Cloud defense can no longer revolve solely around prevention. Modern attacks unfold in runtime, across a fast-changing mesh of workloads, services, and — critically — identities. To reduce risk, organizations must be able to detect, understand, and contain malicious activity as it happens, before ephemeral evidence disappears and before attacker's pivot across identity layers.

Darktrace / CLOUD delivers this shift by turning runtime, the most volatile and consequential layer in the cloud, into a fully defensible control point through unified visibility across behavior, workloads, and identities. It does this by providing:

  • Real-time behavior detection across workloads and identity activity
  • Autonomous response actions for rapid containment
  • Automated forensic level artifact preservation the moment events occur
  • AI-driven investigation that separates weak signals from true attacker patterns
  • Live cloud environment insight to understand context and impact instantly

Cloud security must evolve from securing what might go wrong to continuously understanding what is happening; in runtime, across identities, and at the speed attackers operate. Unifying runtime and identity visibility is how defenders regain the advantage.

[related-resource]

Continue reading
About the author
Adam Stevens
Senior Director of Product, Cloud | Darktrace
Your data. Our AI.
Elevate your network security with Darktrace AI