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December 7, 2021

Conti Ransomware Strategies in Modern Cybercrime

Uncover the strategies behind the Conti ransomware gang's double extortion methods and what it means for businesses facing cyber threats.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Justin Fier
SVP, Red Team Operations
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07
Dec 2021

In a previous blog, we outlined how the Ryuk ransomware strain developed by Russian hacking group ‘Wizard Spider’ has fallen into the hands of small-time cyber criminals.

Wizard Spider – who allegedly operate with support from the Russian government and remain under investigation by the FBI and Interpol – adopted Ryuk ransomware’s successor ‘Conti’ in 2020. Conti affects all Windows operating systems and has been involved in more than 400 incidents. Wizard Spider were soon rebranded in cyber press as the ‘Conti Ransomware Gang’, though the group does not necessarily see itself as a ‘gang’. It prefers to present itself as a business.

The ransomware bubble

Ransomware has become a multibillion-dollar industry – and the Conti Ransomware Gang reportedly made up 15% of it in 2020. With this scale of income, groups like Conti find themselves adopting some crude imitations of legitimate business practice. This corporate mimicry dictates that their victims be called ‘customers’, their extortion attempts ‘negotiations’ and their criminal peers ‘affiliates’. They even publish ‘press releases’ via a dedicated Dark Web site.

The gang’s Ransomware-as-a-Service ‘business model’ consists of employing affiliates, training them in Conti ransomware’s deployment and management, and then taking 30% of the profits themselves. With exact profits known only to the malware writers and not the affiliates, however, the percentage Conti takes is often much higher than the 30% they claim.

There may not be checks and regulations in place to address fraud in the cyber underworld, but one business complication which Conti have not been able to escape is that of the disgruntled employee.

Unhappy with the malpractice of their superiors, an underpaid affiliate leaked the Conti Ransomware Gang’s training materials and the IP addresses for their Cobalt Strike C2 servers in August 2021, declaring, “they recruit suckers and divide the money among themselves”.

Meanwhile, the US Government has also been taking action to try to disrupt the profit margins of groups like the Conti Ransomware Gang, going as far as to impose sanctions on cryptocurrency exchanges seen as facilitating ransomware transactions. However, leaks and legislation have proved far from fatal for Conti.

The reality is that these actions have not lost the Conti Ransomware Gang any of its so-called “customers”, and where there are customers there is profit. Any individual or organization entrusting their cyber security to conventional, rules-based measures is in their target market.

Darktrace’s AI recently detected a Conti attack conducted along the lines of one of the methods outlined in the August leak. The target organization – a US transportation company – was trialing Darktrace but, without Darktrace’s Autonomous Response set in active mode, the attack was allowed to go ahead. In examining how it progressed, however, it should become clear not only how threatening double extortion ransomware attacks like this one can be, but also how effectively they can be stopped by Darktrace at each stage of the attack.

Figure 1: Timeline of the attack

Conti Ransomware Gang diversifies the ransomware playbook

A single uninstalled Microsoft patch had left the target organization with dangerous ProxyShell vulnerabilities. Conti exploited these vulnerabilities, quickly gaining the rights to remotely execute Exchange PowerShell commands on the company’s server and steadily broadened its presence within the digital environment. This is a relatively new approach for the Conti Ransomware Gang, who previously relied upon phishing attacks and firewall exploits. By diversifying its approach, it stays ahead of patches and intelligence.

Two weeks after the initial breach, C2 connections were made to an unusual endpoint located in Finland using an SSL client which appeared innocuous but was 100% rare for the organization. Had Autonomous Response been set in active mode, Darktrace would have shut the connections down at this very early stage.

The IP address of this suspicious endpoint has since been identified as a Conti IoC (Indicator of Compromise), allowing it to be incorporated into rules-based security solutions. This would have done little good for the company in question, however, which was breached weeks before this intelligence was made available.

As Conti continued to conduct internal reconnaissance and move laterally through the company’s digital environment, Darktrace detected further unusual activity. The suspicious Finnish endpoint then employed new ‘Living off the Land’ techniques, installing the usually legitimate tools AnyDesk and Cobalt Strike onto various parts of the environment.

A series of SSL connections were made to AnyDesk endpoints and external hosts, one of which lasted 95 hours, indicating an active remote session conducted by one of Conti’s affiliates. At this stage, Darktrace had 10 distinct reasons to suspect an imminent attack.

Conti News: Closing the deal with double extortion ransomware

Double extortion has become the Conti Ransomware Gang’s new favourite sales tactic. If you refuse to pay its ransom, Conti will not only take your most important files from you, but also exfiltrate and publish them using its dedicated ‘Conti News’ website, or sell them directly to your competitors.

Having expanded their reach across the transport company’s network, the Conti affiliate began rapidly exfiltrating large quantities of company data to Conti’s preferred cloud storage site, MEGA. Over four days, more than 3TB of data was uploaded, and then encrypted.

To avoid detection by a human security team, encryption was launched at close to midnight – Conti’s ‘business’ does not respect business hours. When the company’s security team returned to work the next day, they were met with a ransom note.

This attack was able to progress because Darktrace was only being trialed at this stage and was therefore allowed to detect threats but not to take action against them. With Autonomous Response employed in active mode, this ransomware attack would have ended in the very early stages, when Darktrace detected its first suspicious connections.

Nonetheless, the Cyber AI Analyst was able to investigate and connect the dots of the attack automatically, making the organization’s remediation efforts drastically quicker and easier than they would have been without even this partial Darktrace deployment.

Figure 2: Cyber AI Analyst generated this incident report following the initiation of data exfiltration

How the Conti Ransomware Gang evades cyber intelligence

Security systems that rely on human intelligence to detect threats fit Conti’s ideal customer profile perfectly. By adapting and diversifying their approach, moving from Ryuk to Conti, and from spear phishing and firewall exploits to this new ProxyShell approach, Conti stay ahead of regulations and hold on to their vulnerable customer base.

Even if the Conti Ransomware Gang is brought down by leaks or legislation, other groups will rise to fill the gap in the market, eager for their own cut of the illicit gains. If these groups are to be truly stopped, they must be made unprofitable.

The US government has tried to do this by imposing fines upon ransom payers, but companies still often consider the losses involved in not recovering their data too great. As I have argued previously, ‘to pay or not to pay,’ is not the question we should be asking.

If you’re deciding whether to pay or not to pay, you’re already too far down the line. Darktrace stops groups like Conti at the first encounter. As this case has shown, Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI is able to identify threats weeks before human analysts and threat intelligence can do the same, and neutralize them at every stage of an attack with Autonomous Response.

Thanks to Darktrace analyst Sam Lister for his insights on the above threat find.

Darktrace model detections:

  • Device / Long Agent Connection to New Endpoint
  • Device / ICMP Address Scan
  • Anomalous Connection / SMB Enumeration
  • Anomalous Server Activity / Outgoing from Server
  • Compromise / Beacon to Young Endpoint
  • Anomalous Server Activity / Rare External from Server
  • Compromise / Fast Beaconing to DGA
  • Compromise / SSL or HTTP Beacon
  • Compromise / Sustained SSL or HTTP Increase
  • Compromise / Beacon for 4 Days
  • Anomalous Connection / Multiple HTTP POSTs to Rare Hostname
  • Unusual Activity / Enhanced Unusual External Data Transfer
  • Anomalous Connection / Data Sent to Rare Domain
  • Anomalous Connection / Uncommon 1 GiB Outbound
  • Compliance / SMB Drive Write
  • Anomalous File / Internal / Additional Extension Appended to SMB File
  • Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Read Write Ratio
  • Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Read Write Ratio and Unusual SMB
  • Anomalous Connection / Sustained MIME Type Conversion
  • Unusual Activity / Anomalous SMB Move & Write
  • Unusual Activity / Unusual Internal Data Volume as Client or Server
  • Device / Suspicious File Writes to Multiple Hidden SMB Shares
  • Compromise / Ransomware / Suspicious SMB Activity
  • Anomalous File / Internal / Unusual SMB Script Write
  • Anomalous File / Internal / Masqueraded Executable SMB Write
  • Device / SMB Lateral Movement
  • Device / Multiple Lateral Movement Model Breaches

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Justin Fier
SVP, Red Team Operations

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July 24, 2025

Untangling the web: Darktrace’s investigation of Scattered Spider’s evolving tactics

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What is Scattered Spider?

Scattered Spider is a native English-speaking group, also referred to, or closely associated with, aliases such as UNC3944, Octo Tempest and Storm-0875. They are primarily financially motivated with a clear emphasis on leveraging social engineering, SIM swapping attacks, exploiting legitimate tooling as well as using Living-Off-the-Land (LOTL) techniques [1][2].

In recent years, Scattered Spider has been observed employing a shift in tactics, leveraging Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) platforms in their attacks. This adoption reflects a shift toward more scalable attacks with a lower barrier to entry, allowing the group to carry out sophisticated ransomware attacks without the need to develop it themselves.

While RaaS offerings have been available for purchase on the Dark Web for several years, they have continued to grow in popularity, providing threat actors a way to cause significant impact to critical infrastructure and organizations without requiring highly technical capabilities [12].

This blog focuses on the group’s recent changes in tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) reported by open-source intelligence (OSINT) and how TTPs in a recent Scattered Spider attack observed by Darktrace compare.

How has Scattered Spider been reported to operate?

First observed in 2022, Scattered Spider is known to target various industries globally including telecommunications, technology, financial services, and commercial facilities.

Overview of key TTPs

Scattered Spider has been known to utilize the following methods which cover multiple stages of the Cyber Kill Chain including initial access, lateral movement, evasion, persistence, and action on objective:

Social engineering [1]:

Impersonating staff via phone calls, SMS and Telegram messages; obtaining employee credentials (MITRE techniques T1598,T1656), multi-factor authentication (MFA) codes such as one-time passwords, or convincing employees to run commercial remote access tools enabling initial access (MITRE techniques T1204,T1219,T1566)

  • Phishing using specially crafted domains containing the victim name e.g. victimname-sso[.]com
  • MFA fatigue: sending repeated requests for MFA approval with the intention that the victim will eventually accept (MITRE technique T1621)

SIM swapping [1][3]:

  • Includes hijacking phone numbers to intercept 2FA codes
  • This involves the actor migrating the victim's mobile number to a new SIM card without legitimate authorization

Reconnaissance, lateral movement & command-and-control (C2) communication via use of legitimate tools:

  • Examples include Mimikatz, Ngrok, TeamViewer, and Pulseway [1]. A more recently reported example is Teleport [3].

Financial theft through their access to victim networks: Extortion via ransomware, data theft (MITRE technique T1657) [1]

Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) techniques [4]:

  • Exploiting vulnerable drivers to evade detection from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) security products (MITRE technique T1068) frequently used against Windows devices.

LOTL techniques

LOTL techniques are also closely associated with Scattered Spider actors once they have gained initial access; historically this has allowed them to evade detection until impact starts to be felt. It also means that specific TTPs may vary from case-to-case, making it harder for security teams to prepare and harden defences against the group.

Prominent Scattered Spider attacks over the years

While attribution is sometimes unconfirmed, Scattered Spider have been linked with a number of highly publicized attacks since 2022.

Smishing attacks on Twilio: In August 2022 the group conducted multiple social engineering-based attacks. One example was an SMS phishing (smishing) attack against the cloud communication platform Twilio, which led to the compromise of employee accounts, allowing actors to access internal systems and ultimately target Twilio customers [5][6].

Phishing and social engineering against MailChimp: Another case involved a phishing and social engineering attack against MailChimp. After gaining access to internal systems through compromised employee accounts the group conducted further attacks specifically targeting MailChimp users within cryptocurrency and finance industries [5][7].

Social engineering against Riot Games: In January 2023, the group was linked with an attack on video game developer Riot Games where social engineering was once again used to access internal systems. This time, the attackers exfiltrated game source code before sending a ransom note [8][9].

Attack on Caesars & MGM: In September 2023, Scattered Spider was linked with attacked on Caesars Entertainment and MGM Resorts International, two of the largest casino and gambling companies in the United States. It was reported that the group gathered nearly six terabytes of stolen data from the hotels and casinos, including sensitive information of guests, and made use of the RaaS strain BlackCat [10].

Ransomware against Marks & Spencer: More recently, in April 2025, the group has also been linked to the alleged ransomware incident against the UK-based retailer Marks & Spencer (M&S) making use of the DragonForce RaaS [11].

How a recent attack observed by Darktrace compares

In May 2025, Darktrace observed a Scattered Spider attack affecting one of its customers. While initial access in this attack fell outside of Darktrace’s visibility, information from the affected customer suggests similar social engineering techniques involving abuse of the customer’s helpdesk and voice phishing (vishing) were used for reconnaissance.

Initial access

It is believed the threat actor took advantage of the customer’s third-party Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) applications, such as Salesforce during the attack.

Such applications are a prime target for data exfiltration due to the sensitive data they hold; customer, personnel, and business data can all prove useful in enabling further access into target networks.

Techniques used by Scattered Spider following initial access to a victim network tend to vary more widely and so details are sparser within OSINT. However, Darktrace is able to provide some additional insight into what techniques were used in this specific case, based on observed activity and subsequent investigation by its Threat Research team.

Lateral movement

Following initial access to the customer’s network, the threat actor was able to pivot into the customer’s Virtual Desktop Infrastructure (VDI) environment.

Darktrace observed the threat actor spinning up new virtual machines and activating cloud inventory management tools to enable discovery of targets for lateral movement.

In some cases, these virtual machines were not monitored or managed by the customer’s security tools, allowing the threat actor to make use of additional tooling such as AnyDesk which may otherwise have been blocked.

Tooling in further stages of the attack sometimes overlapped with previous OSINT reporting on Scattered Spider, with anomalous use of Ngrok and Teleport observed by Darktrace, likely representing C2 communication. Additional tooling was also seen being used on the virtual machines, such as Pastebin.

 Cyber AI Analyst’s detection of C2 beaconing to a teleport endpoint with hostname CUSTOMERNAME.teleport[.]sh, likely in an attempt to conceal the traffic.
Figure 1: Cyber AI Analyst’s detection of C2 beaconing to a teleport endpoint with hostname CUSTOMERNAME.teleport[.]sh, likely in an attempt to conceal the traffic.

Leveraging LOTL techniques

Alongside use of third-party tools that may have been unexpected on the network, various LOTL techniques were observed during the incident; this primarily involved the abuse of standard network protocols such as:

  • SAMR requests to alter Active Directory account details
  • Lateral movement over RDP and SSH
  • Data collection over LDAP and SSH

Coordinated exfiltration activity linked through AI-driven analysis

Multiple methods of exfiltration were observed following internal data collection. This included SSH transfers to IPs associated with Vultr, alongside significant uploads to an Amazon S3 bucket.

While connections to this endpoint were not deemed unusual for the network at this stage due to the volume of traffic seen, Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst was still able to identify the suspiciousness of this behavior and launched an investigation into the activity.

Cyber AI Analyst successfully correlated seemingly unrelated internal download and external upload activity across multiple devices into a single, broader incident for the customer’s security team to review.

Cyber AI Analyst Incident summary showing a clear outline of the observed activity, including affected devices and the anomalous behaviors detected.
Figure 2: Cyber AI Analyst Incident summary showing a clear outline of the observed activity, including affected devices and the anomalous behaviors detected.
Figure 3: Cyber AI Analyst’s detection of internal data downloads and subsequent external uploads to an Amazon S3 bucket.

Exfiltration and response

Unfortunately, as Darktrace was not configured in Autonomous Response mode at the time, the attack was able to proceed without interruption, ultimately escalating to the point of data exfiltration.

Despite this, Darktrace was still able to recommend several Autonomous Response actions, aimed at containing the attack by blocking the internal data-gathering activity and the subsequent data exfiltration connections.

These actions required manual approval by the customer’s security team and as shown in Figure 3, at least one of the recommended actions was subsequently approved.

Had Darktrace been enabled in Autonomous Response mode, these measures would have been applied immediately, effectively halting the data exfiltration attempts.

Further recommendations for Autonomous Response actions in Darktrace‘s Incident Interface, with surgical response targeting both the internal data collection and subsequent exfiltration.
Figure 4: Further recommendations for Autonomous Response actions in Darktrace‘s Incident Interface, with surgical response targeting both the internal data collection and subsequent exfiltration.

Scattered Spider’s use of RaaS

In this recent Scattered Spider incident observed by Darktrace, exfiltration appears to have been the primary impact. While no signs of ransomware deployment were observed here, it is possible that this was the threat actors’ original intent, consistent with other recent Scattered Spider attacks involving RaaS platforms like DragonForce.

DragonForce emerged towards the end of 2023, operating by offering their platform and capabilities on a wide scale. They also launched a program which offered their affiliates 80% of the eventual ransom, along with tools for further automation and attack management [13].

The rise of RaaS and attacker customization is fragmenting TTPs and indicators, making it harder for security teams to anticipate and defend against each unique intrusion.

While DragonForce appears to be the latest RaaS used by Scattered Spider, it is not the first, showcasing the ongoing evolution of tactics used the group.

In addition, the BlackCat RaaS strain was reportedly used by Scattered Spider for their attacks against Caesars Entertainment and MGM Resorts International [10].

In 2024 the group was also seen making use of additional RaaS strains; RansomHub and Qilin [15].

What security teams and CISOs can do to defend against Scattered Spider

The ongoing changes in tactics used by Scattered Spider, reliance on LOTL techniques, and continued adoption of evolving RaaS providers like DragonForce make it harder for organizations and their security teams to prepare their defenses against such attacks.

CISOs and security teams should implement best practices such as MFA, Single Sign-On (SSO), notifications for suspicious logins, forward logging, ethical phishing tests.

Also, given Scattered Spider’s heavy focus on social engineering, and at times using their native English fluency to their advantage, it is critical to IT and help desk teams are reminded they are possible targets.

Beyond social engineering, the threat actor is also adept at taking advantage of third-party SaaS applications in use by victims to harvest common SaaS data, such as PII and configuration data, that enable the threat actor to take on multiple identities across different domains.

With Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI, anomaly-based detection, and Autonomous Response inhibitors, businesses can halt malicious activities in real-time, whether attackers are using known TTPs or entirely new ones. Offerings such as Darktrace /Attack Surface Management enable security teams to proactively identify signs of malicious activity before it can cause an impact, while more generally Darktrace’s ActiveAI Security Platform can provide a comprehensive view of an organization’s digital estate across multiple domains.

Credit to Justin Torres (Senior Cyber Analyst), Emma Foulger (Global Threat Research Operations Lead), Zaki Al-Dhamari (Cyber Analyst), Nathaniel Jones (VP, Security & AI Strategy, FCISO), and Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

---------------------

The information provided in this blog post is for general informational purposes only and is provided "as is" without any representations or warranties, express or implied. While Darktrace makes reasonable efforts to ensure the accuracy and timeliness of the content related to cybersecurity threats such as Scattered Spider, we make no warranties or guarantees regarding the completeness, reliability, or suitability of the information for any purpose.

This blog post does not constitute professional cybersecurity advice, and should not be relied upon as such. Readers should seek guidance from qualified cybersecurity professionals or legal counsel before making any decisions or taking any actions based on the content herein.

No warranty of any kind, whether express or implied, including, but not limited to, warranties of performance, merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, or non-infringement, is given with respect to the contents of this post.

Darktrace expressly disclaims any liability for any loss or damage arising from reliance on the information contained in this blog.

Appendices

References

[1] https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-320a

[2] https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1015/

[3] https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/scattered-spider-rapid7-insights-observations-and-recommendations/

[4] https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/blog/scattered-spider-attempts-to-avoid-detection-with-bring-your-own-vulnerable-driver-tactic/

[5] https://krebsonsecurity.com/2024/06/alleged-boss-of-scattered-spider-hacking-group-arrested/?web_view=true

[6] https://www.cxtoday.com/crm/uk-teenager-accused-of-hacking-twilio-lastpass-mailchimp-arrested/

[7] https://mailchimp.com/newsroom/august-2022-security-incident/

[8] https://techcrunch.com/2023/02/02/0ktapus-hackers-are-back-and-targeting-tech-and-gaming-companies-says-leaked-report/

[9] https://www.pcmag.com/news/hackers-behind-riot-games-breach-stole-league-of-legends-source-code

[10] https://www.bbrown.com/us/insight/a-look-back-at-the-mgm-and-caesars-incident/

[11] https://cyberresilience.com/threatonomics/scattered-spider-uk-retail-attacks/

[12] https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/cybersecurity-101/ransomware/ransomware-as-a-service-raas/

[13] https://www.group-ib.com/blog/dragonforce-ransomware/
[14] https://blackpointcyber.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/DragonForce.pdf
[15] https://x.com/MsftSecIntel/status/1812932749314978191?lang=en

Select MITRE tactics associated with Scattered Spider

Tactic – Technique – Technique Name

Reconnaissance - T1598 -   Phishing for Information

Initial Access - T1566 – Phishing

Execution - T1204 - User Execution

Privilege Escalation - T1068 - Exploitation for Privilege Escalation

Defense Evasion - T1656 - Impersonation

Credential Access - T1621 - Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation

Lateral Movement - T1021 - Remote Services

Command and Control - T1102 - Web Service

Command and Control - T1219 - Remote Access Tools

Command and Control - T1572 - Protocol Tunneling

Exfiltration - T1567 - Exfiltration Over Web Service

Impact - T1657 - Financial Theft

Select MITRE tactics associated with DragonForce

Tactic – Technique – Technique Name

Initial Access, Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation - T1078 - Valid Accounts

Initial Access, Persistence - T1133 - External Remote Services

Initial Access - T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application

Initial Access - T1566 – Phishing

Execution - T1047 - Windows Management Instrumentation

Privilege Escalation - T1068 - Exploitation for Privilege Escalation

Lateral Movement - T1021 - Remote Services

Impact - T1486 - Data Encrypted for Impact

Impact - T1657 - Financial Theft

Select Darktrace models

Compliance / Internet Facing RDP Server

Compliance / Incoming Remote Access Tool

Compliance / Remote Management Tool on Server

Anomalous File / Internet Facing System File Download

Anomalous Server Activity/ New User Agent from Internet Facing System

Anomalous Connection / Callback on Web Facing Device

Device / Internet Facing System with High Priority Alert

Anomalous Connection / Unusual Admin RDP

Anomalous Connection / High Priority DRSGetNCChanges

Anomalous Connection / Unusual Internal SSH

Anomalous Connection / Active Remote Desktop Tunnel

Compliance / Pastebin

Anomalous Connection / Possible Tunnelling to Rare Endpoint

Compromise / Beaconing Activity to External Rare

Device / Long Agent Connection to New Endpoint

Compromise / SSH to Rare External AWS

Compliance / SSH to Rare External Destination

Anomalous Server Activity / Outgoing from Server

Anomalous Connection / Large Volume of LDAP Download

Unusual Activity / Internal Data Transfer on New Device

Anomalous Connection / Download and Upload

Unusual Activity / Enhanced Unusual External Data Transfer

Compromise / Ransomware/Suspicious SMB Activity

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Emma Foulger
Global Threat Research Operations Lead

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July 24, 2025

Closing the Cloud Forensics and Incident Response Skills Gap

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Every alert that goes uninvestigated is a calculated risk — and teams are running out of room for error

Security operations today are stretched thin. SOCs face an overwhelming volume of alerts, and the shift to cloud has only made triage more complex.

Our research suggests that 23% of cloud alerts are never investigated, leaving risk on the table.

The rapid migration to cloud resources has security teams playing catch up. While they attempt to apply traditional on-prem tools to the cloud, it’s becoming increasingly clear that they are not fit for purpose. Especially in the context of forensics and incident response, the cloud presents unique complexities that demand cloud-specific solutions.

Organizations are increasingly adopting services from multiple cloud platforms (in fact, recent studies suggest 89% of organizations now operate multi-cloud environments), and container-based and serverless setups have become the norm. Security analysts already have enough on their plates; it’s unrealistic to expect them to be cloud experts too.

Why Digital Forensics and Incident Response (DFIR) roles are so hard to fill

Compounding these issues of alert fatigue and cloud complexity, there is a lack of DFIR talent. The cybersecurity skills gap is a well-known problem.

According to the 2024 ISC2 Cybersecurity Workforce Study, there is a global shortage of 4.8 million cybersecurity workers, up 19% from the previous year.

Why is this such an issue?

  • Highly specialized skill set: DFIR professionals need to have a deep understanding of various operating systems, network protocols, and security architectures, even more so when working in the cloud. They also need to be proficient in using a wide range of forensic tools and techniques. This level of expertise takes a lot of time and effort to develop.
  • Rapid technological changes: The cloud landscape is constantly changing and evolving with new services, monitoring tools, security mechanisms, and threats emerging regularly. Keeping up with these changes and staying current requires continuous learning and adaptation.
  • Lack of formal education and training: There are limited educational programs specifically dedicated for DFIR. Further, an industry for cloud DFIR has yet to be defined. While some universities and institutions offer courses or certifications in digital forensics, they may not cover the full spread of knowledge required in real-world incident response scenarios, especially for cloud-based environments.
  • High-stress nature of the job: DFIR professionals often work under tight deadlines in high-pressure situations, especially when handling security incidents. This can lead to burnout and high turnover rates in the profession.

Bridging the skills gap with usable cloud digital forensics and incident response tools  

To help organizations close the DFIR skills gap, it's critical that we modernize our approaches and implement a new way of doing things in DFIR that's fit for the cloud era. Modern cloud forensics and incident response platforms must prioritize usability in order to up-level security teams. A platform that is easy to use has the power to:

  • Enable more advanced analysts to be more efficient and have the ability to take on more cases
  • Uplevel more novel analysts to perform more advanced tasks than ever before
  • Eliminate cloud complexity– such as the complexities introduced by multi-cloud environments and container-based and serverless setups

What to look for in cloud forensics and incident response solutions

The following features greatly improve the impact of cloud forensics and incident response:

Data enrichment: Automated correlation of collected data with threat intelligence feeds, both external and proprietary, delivers immediate insight into suspicious or malicious activities. Data enrichment expedites investigations, enabling analysts to seamlessly pivot from key events and delve deeper into the raw data.

Single timeline view: A unified perspective across various cloud platforms and data sources is crucial. A single timeline view empowers security teams to seamlessly navigate evidence based on timestamps, events, users, and more, enhancing investigative efficiency. Pulling together a timeline has historically been a very time consuming task when using traditional approaches.

Saved search: Preserving queries during investigations allows analysts to re-execute complex searches or share them with colleagues, increasing efficiency and collaboration.

Faceted search: Facet search options provide analysts with quick insights into core data attributes, facilitating efficient dataset refinement.

Cross-cloud investigations: Analyzing evidence acquired from multiple cloud providers in a single platform is crucial for security teams. A unified view and timeline across cross cloud is critical in streamlining investigations.

How Darktrace can help

Darktrace’s cloud offerings have been bolstered with the acquisition of Cado Security Ltd., which enables security teams to gain immediate access to forensic-level data in multi-cloud, container, serverless, SaaS, and on-premises environments.

Not only does Darktrace offer centralized automation solutions for cloud forensics and investigation, but it also delivers a proactive approach Cloud Detection and Response (CDR). Darktrace / CLOUD is built with advanced AI to make cloud security accessible to all security teams and SOCs. By using multiple machine learning techniques, Darktrace brings unprecedented visibility, threat detection, investigation, and incident response to hybrid and multi-cloud environments.

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