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July 11, 2024

GuLoader: Evolving Tactics in Latest Campaign Targeting European Industry

Cado Security Labs identified a GuLoader campaign targeting European industrial companies via spearphishing emails with compressed batch files. This malware uses obfuscated PowerShell scripts and shellcode with anti-debugging techniques to establish persistence and inject into legitimate processes, to deliver Remote Access Trojans. GuLoader's ongoing evolution highlights the need for robust security.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Tara Gould
Malware Research Lead
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11
Jul 2024

Introduction: GuLoader

Researchers from Cado Security Labs (now part of Darktrace) recently discovered a  campaign targeting European industrial and engineering companies. GuLoader is an evasive shellcode downloader used to deliver Remote Access Trojans (RAT) that has been used by threat actors since 2019 and continues to advance. 

Figure 1

Initial access

Cado identified a number of spearphishing emails sent to electronic manufacturing, engineering and industrial companies in European countries including Romania, Poland, Germany and Kazakhstan. The emails typically include order inquiries and contain an archive file attachment (iso, 7z, gzip, rar). The emails are sent from various email addresses including from fake companies and compromised accounts. The emails typically hijack an existing email thread or request information about an order. 

PowerShell  

The first stage of GuLoader is a batch file that is compressed in the archive from the email attachment. As shown in Image 2, the batch file contains an obfuscated PowerShell script, which is done to evade detection.

Batch file
Figure 2: Obfuscated PowerShell

The obfuscated script contains strings that are deobfuscated through a function “Boendes” (in this sample) that contains a for loop that takes every fifth character, with the rest of the characters being junk. After deobfuscating, the functionality of the script is clearer. These values can be retrieved by debugging the script, however deobfuscating with Script 1 in the Scripts section, makes it easier to read for static analysis.

Deobfuscated Powershell
Figure 3 - Deobfuscated PowerShell

This Powershell script contains the function “Aromastofs” that is used to invoke the provided expressions. A secondary file is downloaded from careerfinder[.]ro and saved as “Knighting.Pro” in the user’s AppData/Roaming folder. The content retrieved from “Kighting.Pro” is decoded from Base64, converted to ASCII and selected from position 324537, with the length 29555. This is stored as “$Nongalactic” and contains more Powershell. 

Second Powershell script
Figure 4 - Second PowerShell script
Deobfuscated Secondary Powershell
Figure 5 - Deobfuscated Secondary PowerShell

As seen in Image 5, the secondary PowerShell is obfuscated in the same manner as before with the function “Boendes”. The script begins with checking which PowerShell is being used 32 or 64 bit. If 64 bit is in use, a 32 bit PowerShell process is spawned to execute the script, and to enable 32 bit processes later in the chain. 

The function named “Brevsprkkernes” is a secondary obfuscation function. The function takes the obfuscated hex string, converts to a byte array, applies XOR with a key of 173 and converts to ASCII. This obfuscation is used to evade detection and analysis more difficult. Again, these values can be retrieved with debugging; however for readability, using Script 2 in the Scripts section makes it easier to read. 

Obfuscated Hex Strings
Figure 6: Obfuscated Hex Strings
Deobfuscated PowersShell Strings
Figure 7 - Deobfuscated PowerShell Strings
Deobfuscated Process Injection
Figure 8: Deobfuscated Process Injection

The second PowerShell script contains functionality to allocate memory via VirtualAlloc and to execute shellcode. VirtualAlloc is a native Windows API function that allows programs to allocate, reserve, or commit memory in a specified process. Threat actors commonly use VirtualAlloc to allocate memory for malicious code execution, making it harder for security solutions to detect or prevent code injection. The variable “$Bakteriekulturs” contains the bytes that were stored in “AppData/Roaming/Knighting.Pro” and converted from Base64 in the first part of the PowerShell Script. Marshall::Copy is used to copy the first 657 bytes of that file, which is the first shellcode. Marshall.Copy is a method that enables the transfer of data between unmanaged memory and managed arrays, allowing data exchange between managed and unmanaged code. Marshal.Copy is typically abused to inject or manipulate malicious payloads in memory, bypassing traditional detection by directly accessing and modifying memory regions used by applications. Marshall::Copy is used again to copy bytes 657 to 323880 as a second shellcode. 

First Shellcode
Figure 9: First Shellcode

The first shellcode includes multiple anti-debugging techniques that make static and dynamic analysis difficult. There have been multiple evolutions of GuLoader’s evasive techniques that have been documented [1]. The main functionality of the first shellcode is to load and decrypt the second shellcode. The second shellcode adds the original PowerShell script as a Registry Key “Mannas” in HKCU/Software/Procentagiveless for persistence, with the path to PowerShell 32 bit executable stored as “Frenetic” in HKCU\Environment; however, these values change per sample. 

Registry Key created for PowerShell Script
Figure 10 - Registry Key created for PowerShell Script
PowerShell bit added to Registry
Figure 11 - PowerShell 32 bit added to Registry

The second shellcode is injected into the legitimate “msiexec.exe” process and appears to be reaching out to a domain to retrieve an additional payload, however at the time of analysis this request returns a 404. Based on previous research of GuLoader, the final payload is usually a RAT including Remcos, NetWire, and AgentTesla.[2]

msiexec abused to retrieve additional payload
Figure 12  - msiexec abused to retrieve additional payload

Key Takeaway

Guloader malware continues to adapt its techniques to evade detection to deliver RATs. Threat actors are continually targeting specific industries in certain countries. Its resilience highlights the need for proactive security measures. To counter Guloader and other threats, organizations must stay vigilant and employ a robust security plan.

Scripts

Script 1 to deobfuscate junk characters 

import re 
import argparse 
import os 
 
def deobfuscate_powershell(input_file, output_file): 
  try: 
      with open(input_file, 'r', encoding='utf-8') as f: 
          text = f.read() 
 
      function_name_match = re.search(r"function\s+(\w+)\s*\(", text) 
      if not function_name_match: 
          print("Could not find the obfuscation function name in the file.") 
          return 
      
      function_name = function_name_match.group(1) 
      print(f"Detected obfuscation function name: {function_name}") 
 
      obfuscated_pattern = rf"(?<={function_name} ')(.*?)(?=')" 
      matches = re.findall(obfuscated_pattern, text) 
 
      for match in matches: 
          deobfuscated = match[4::5] 
          full_obfuscated_call = f"{function_name} '{match}'" 
          text = text.replace(full_obfuscated_call, deobfuscated) 
 
      with open(output_file, 'w', encoding='utf-8') as f: 
          f.write(text) 
 
      print(f"Deobfuscation complete. Output saved to {output_file}") 
 
  except Exception as e: 
      print(f"An error occurred!: {e}") 
 
if __name__ == "__main__": 
  parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Deobfuscate an obfuscated PowerShell file.") 
  parser.add_argument("input_file", help="Path to the obfuscated PowerShell file.") 
  parser.add_argument("output_file", nargs='?', help="Path to save the deobfuscated file. Default is 'deobfuscated_powershell.ps1' in the same directory.", default=None) 
 
  args = parser.parse_args() 
 
  if args.output_file is None: 
      output_file = os.path.splitext(args.input_file)[0] + "_deobfuscated.ps1" 
  else: 
      output_file = args.output_file 
 
  deobfuscate_powershell(args.input_file, output_file) 

Script 2 to deobfuscate hex strings obfuscation (note this will need values changed based on sample)

import re 
import argparse 
 
def brevsprkkernes(spackle): 
  if not all(c in'0123456789abcdefABCDEF'for c in spackle): 
      return f"Invalid hex: {spackle}" 
  paronomasian = 2 
  polyurethane = bytearray(len(spackle) // 2) 
 
  for forstyrrets in range(0, len(spackle), paronomasian): 
      try: 
          polyurethane[forstyrrets // 2] = int(spackle[forstyrrets:forstyrrets + 2], 16) 
          polyurethane[forstyrrets // paronomasian] ^= 173 
      except ValueError: 
          return f"Error processing hex: {spackle}" 
 
  return polyurethane.decode('ascii', errors='ignore') 
 
def process_file(input_file, output_file): 
  with open(input_file, 'r') as infile: 
      content = infile.read() 
 
  def replace_function(match): 
      hex_string = match.group(1).strip() 
      result = brevsprkkernes(hex_string) 
      return f"Brevsprkkernes '{result}'" 
 
  updated_content = re.sub(r"Brevsprkkernes\s*['\"]?([0-9A-Fa-f]+)['\"]?", replace_function, content) 
 
  with open(output_file, 'w') as outfile: 
      outfile.write(updated_content) 
 
if __name__ == "__main__": 
  parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Process a PowerShell file and replace hex strings.") 
  parser.add_argument("input_file", help="Path to the input file.") 
  parser.add_argument("output_file", help="Path to save the deobufuscated file.") 
  args = parser.parse_args() 
 
  process_file(args.input_file, args.output_file) 

Indicators of compromise (IoCs)

GuLoader scripts

ZW_PCCE-010023024001.bat  36a9a24404963678edab15248ca95a4065bdc6a84e32fcb7a2387c3198641374  

ORDER_1ST.bat  26500af5772702324f07c58b04ff703958e7e0b57493276ba91c8fa87b7794ff  

IMG465244247443 GULF ORDER Opmagasinering.cmd  40b46bae5cca53c55f7b7f941b0a02aeb5ef5150d9eff7258c48f92de5435216  

EXSP 5634 HISP9005 ST MSDS DOKUME74247linierelet.bat  e0d9ebe414aca4f6d28b0f1631a969f9190b6fb2cf5599b99ccfc6b7916ed8b3  

LTEXSP 5634 HISP9005 ST MSDS DOKUME74247liniereletbrunkagerne.bat 4c697bdcbe64036ba8a79e587462960e856a37e3b8c94f9b3e7875aeb2f91959  

Quotation_final_buy_order_list_2024_po_nos_ART125673211020240000000000024.bat661f5870a5d8675719b95f123fa27c46bfcedd45001ce3479a9252b653940540  

MEC20241022001.bat  33ed102236533c8b01a224bd5ffb220cecc32900285d2984d4e41803f1b2b58d  

nMEC20241022001.iso  9617fa7894af55085e09a06b1b91488af37b8159b22616dfd5c74e6b9a081739  

Gescanneerde lijst met artikelen nr. 654398.bat  f5feabf1c367774dc162c3e29b88bf32e48b997a318e8dd03a081d7bfe6d3eb5  

DHL_Shipping_Invoices_Awb_BL_000000000102220242247820020031808174Global180030010222024.cmd f78319fcb16312d69c6d2e42689254dff3cb875315f7b2111f5c3d2b4947ab50  

Order Confirmation.bat  949cdd89ed5fb2da03c53b0e724a4d97c898c62995e03c48cbd8456502e39e57  

SKM_0001810-01-2024-GL-3762.bat  9493ad437ea4b55629ee0a8d18141977c2632de42349a995730112727549f40e  

21102024_0029_18102024_SKM_0001810-01-2024-GL-3762.iso  535dd8d9554487f66050e2f751c9f9681dadae795120bb33c3db9f71aafb472c  

\Device\CdRom1\MARSS-FILTRY_ZW015010024.BAT  e5ebe4d8925853fc1f233a5a6f7aa29fd8a7fa3a8ad27471c7d525a70f4461b6  

Myologist.cmd  51244e77587847280079e7db8cfdff143a16772fb465285b9098558b266c6b3f  

SKU_0001710-1-2024-SX-3762.bat  643cd5ba1ac50f5aa2a4c852b902152ffc61916dc39bd162f20283a0ecef39fe  

Stamcafeernes.cmd  54b8b9c01ce6f58eb6314c67f3acb32d7c3c96e70c10b9d35effabb7e227952e  

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\j4phhdbc.lti\Bank details Form.bat  c1f810194395ff53044e3ef87829f6dff63a283c568be4a83088483b6c043ec8  

SKGCRO COMANDA FAB SRL M60_647746748846748347474.bat  8dd5fd174ee703a43ab5084fdaba84d074152e46b84d588bf63f9d5cd2f673d1  

DHL_Shipping_Invoices_Awb_BL_000000000101620242247820020031808174Global180030010162024.bat bde5f995304e327d522291bf9886c987223a51a299b80ab62229fcc5e9d09f62  

Ciwies.cmd  b1be65efa06eb610ae0426ba7ac7f534dcb3090cd763dc8642ca0ede7a339ce7  

Zamówienie Agotech Begyndelsesord.cmd  18c0a772f0142bc8e5fb0c8931c0ba4c9e680ff97d7ceb8c496f68dea376f9da  

SKM_0001810-01-2024-GL-3762.iso  4a4c0918bdacd60e792a814ddacc5dc7edb83644268611313cb9b453991ac628  

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\Stemmeslugerens.bat  8bedbdaa09eefac7845278d83a08b17249913e484575be3a9c61cf6c70837fd2  

Agotech Zamówienie Fjeldkammes325545235562377.bat  ff6c4c8d899df66b551c84124e73c1f3ffa04a4d348940f983cf73b2709895d3  

Agotech Zamówienie Fjeldkammes3255452355623.bat  f3e046a7769b9c977053dd32ebc1b0e1bbfe3c61789d2b8d54e51083c3d0bed5  

SKU_0001710-1-2024-SX-3762.iso  0546b035a94953d33a5c6d04bdc9521b49b2a98a51d38481b1f35667f5449326  

SKU_0001710-1-2024-SX-3762.bat  4f1b5d4bb6d0a7227948fb7ebb7765f3eb4b26288b52356453b74ea530111520  

DOKUMENTEN_TOBIAS.bat  038113f802ef095d8036e86e5c6b2cb8bc1529e18f34828bcf5f99b4cc012d6a  

IMEG238668289485293885823085802835025Urfjeld.bat  6977043d30d8c1c5024669115590b8fd154905e01ab1f2832b2408d1dc811164  

SKM_C250i24100408500.iso  6370cbcb1ac3941321f93dd0939d5daba0658fb8c85c732a6022cc0ec8f0f082  

SKU_0001710-1-2024-SX-3762.iso  7f06382b781a8ba0d3f46614f8463f8857f0ade67e0f77606b8d918909ad37c2  

\Device\CdRom1\ORDINE ELECTRICAS BC CORP PO EDC0969388.BAT  e98fa3828fa02209415640c41194875c1496bc6f0ca15902479b012243d37c47  

Quote Request #2359 Bogota.msg  0f0dfe8c5085924e5ab722fa01ea182569872532a6162547a2e87a1d2780f902  

ORDER.1ST.bat  48dca5f3a12d3952531b05b556c30accafbf9a3c6cda3ec517e4700d5845ab61  

Fortryl105.cmd  f43b78e4dc3cba2ee9c6f0f764f97841c43419059691d670ca930ce84fb7143b  

SMX-0002607-1-2024-UP-3762.iso  a60dbbe88a1c4857f009a3c06a2641332d41dfd89726dd5f2c6e500f7b25b751

Quotation_final_buy_order_list_2024_po_nos_ART1256731610202400000000000.cmd efd80337104f2acde5c8f3820549110ad40f1aa9b494da9a356938103bda82e7

a60dbbe88a1c4857f009a3c06a2641332d41dfd89726dd5f2c6e500f7b25b751.iso 0327db7b754a16a7ae29265e7d8daed7a1caa4920d5151d779e96cd1536f2fbe  

MARSS-FILTRY_ZW015010024.iso c415127bde80302a851240a169fff0592e864d2f93e9a21c7fd775fdb4788145

SKM_C250i24100408500.bat 36c464519a4cce8d0fcdb22a8974923fd51d915075eba9e62ade54a9c396844d  

UPM-0002607-1-2024-UP-3762.iso  e9fc754844df1a7196a001ac3dfbcf28b80397a718a3ceb8d397378a6375ff62  

Comanda KOMARON TRADE SRL 435635Lukketid.bat 1bf09bcb5bfa440fc6ce5c1d3f310fb274737248bf9acdd28bea98c9163a745a  

311861751714730477170144.bat f87448d722e160584e40feaad0769e170056a21588679094f7d58879cdb23623  

Estimate_buy_product_purchase_order_import_list_10_10_2024_000000101024.cmd f20670ed0cdc2d9a2a75884548e6e6a3857bbf66cfbfb4afe04a3354da9067c9  

PAYMENT TERM.bat 4c90504c86f1e77b0a75a1c7408adf1144f2a0e3661c20f2bf28d168e3408429  

Arbitrre.cmd  8ef4cb5ad7d5053c031690b9d04d64ba5d0d90f7bf8ba5e74cb169b5388e92c5  

KZЗапрос продукта SKM_32532667622352352Arvehygiejnikernes.bat 4ddd3369a51621b0009b6d993126fcb74b52e72f8cacd71fcbc401cda03108cb  

Order_AP568.bat fda4e04894089be87f520144d8a6141074d63d33b29beb28fd042b0ecc06fbbc  

C:\Users\user\Documents\ConnectWiseControl\Temp\Blodprocenternes.cmd e5f5d9855be34b44ad4c9b1c5722d1a6dff2f4a6878a874df1209d813aea7094  

Productivenesses.cmd a7268e906b86f7c1bb926278bf88811cb12189de0db42616e5bbb3dc426a4ef5  

Doktriner.cmd 74d468acd0493a6c5d72387c8e225cc0243ae1a331cd1e2d38f75ed8812347dd  

final_buy_product_purchase_order_import_list_11_10_2024_000000111024.cmd a2127d63bc0204c17d4657e5ae6930cab6ab33ae3e65b82e285a8757f39c4da9  

ORDER_U769.bat b45d9b5dbe09b2ca45d66432925842b0f698c9d269d3c7b5148cc26bdc2a92d0  

Beschwerde-Rechtsanwalt.bat 229c4ce294708561801b16eed5a155c8cfe8c965ea99ac3cfb4717a35a1492f3  

upit nr5634 10_08_2024.cmd 5854d9536371389fb0f1152ebc1479266d36ec4e06b174619502a6db1b593d71  

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\Doktriner.cmd 140dcb39308d044e3e90610c65a08e0abc6a3ac22f0c9797971f0c652bb29add  

Fedtsyresammenstning.cmd 0b1c44b202ede2e731b2d9ee64c2ce333764fbff17273af831576a09fc9debfa  

HENIKENPLANT PROJECT PROPOSAL BID_24-0976·pdf.cmd 31a72d94b14bf63b07d66d023ced28092b9253c92b6e68397469d092c2ffb4a6  

MAIN ORDER.bat 85d1877ceda7c04125ca6383228ee158062301ae2b4e4a4a698ef8ed94165c7c  

Narudzba ACH0036173.bat 8d7324d66484383eba389bc2a8a6d4e9c4cb68bfec45d887b7766573a306af68  

Sludger.cmd 45b7b8772d9fe59d7df359468e3510df1c914af41bd122eeb5a408d045399a14  

Glasmester.bat b0e69f895f7b0bc859df7536d78c2983d7ed0ac1d66c243f44793e57d346049d  

PERMINTAAN ANGGARAN (Universitas IPB) ID177888·pdf.cmd 09a3bb4be0a502684bd37135a9e2cbaa3ea0140a208af680f7019811b37d28d6  

C:\Users\user\Documents\ConnectWiseControl\Temp\Bidcock.cmd 0996e7b37e8b41ff0799996dd96b5a72e8237d746c81e02278d84aa4e7e8534e  

PO++380.101483.bat a9af33c8a9050ee6d9fe8ce79d734d7f28ebf36f31ad8ee109f9e3f992a8d110  

Network IOCs

91[.]109.20.161

137[.]184.191.215

185[.]248.196.6

hxxps://filedn[.]com/lK8iuOs2ybqy4Dz6sat9kSz/Frihandelsaftalen40.fla

hxxps://careerfinder[.]ro/vn/Traurigheder[.]sea

hxxp://inversionesevza[.]com/wp-includes/blocks_/Dekupere.pcz

hxxps://rareseeds[.]zendesk[.]com/attachments/token/G9SQnykXWFAnrmBcy8MzhciEs/?name=PO++380.101483.bat

Detection

Yara rule

rule GuLoader_Obfuscated_Powershell 
{ 
   meta: 
       description = "Detects Obfuscated GuLoader Powershell Scripts" 
       author = "[email protected]" 
       date = "2024-10-14" 
   strings: 
      $hidden_window = { 7374617274202f6d696e20706f7765727368656c6c2e657865202d77696e646f777374796c652068696464656e2022 } 
      $for_loop = /for\s*\(\s*\$[a-zA-Z0-9_]+\s*=\s*\d+;\s*\$[a-zA-Z0-9_]+\s*-lt\s*\$[a-zA-Z0-9_]+\s*;\s*\$[a-zA-Z0-9_]+\s*\+=\s*\d+\s*\)/ 
   condition: 
      $for_loop and $hidden_window 

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001  Phishing: Malicious Attachment  

T1055 Process Injection  

T1204.002  User Execution: Malicious File  

T1547.001  Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder  

T1140  Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information  

T1622  Debugger Evasion  

T1001.001  Junk Code  

T1105  Ingress Tool Transfer  

T1059.001  Command and Scripting Interpreter: Powershell  

T1497.003  Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: Time Based Evasion  

T1071.001  Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols

References:

[1] https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/blog/guloader-dissection-reveals-new-anti-analysis-techniques-and-code-injection-redundancy/  

[2] https://www.checkpoint.com/cyber-hub/threat-prevention/what-is-malware/guloader-malware/

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Tara Gould
Malware Research Lead

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July 21, 2026

How to Secure AI in Stadium Operations?

Photo of a sports stadiumDefault blog imageDefault blog image

Key takeaways

  • AI is entering high-impact stadium functions such as access control, crowd management, ticketing, facilities, and surveillance.  
  • Shadow AI and third-party AI use can create risks that stadium security teams cannot readily see.  
  • Security teams must understand not only which AI systems exist, but also what they can access and what actions they can take.  
  • Live-event resilience requires continuous monitoring and response across AI, IT, OT, identities, and third parties.

Modern stadiums are infrastructure unlike any other. I’ve written before on event day sparking stadiums into life with shops and food stands, transport hubs, vast telecommunications infrastructure, field-side technology and beyond, acting as one super-sized, connected ecosystem. Stadiums’ scale and complexity make them some of the toughest environments in cybersecurity. Now, we’re adding AI to those operations and bringing a new dimension of risk.

The benefits of AI in stadium operations are easy to see. It can help stadium operators move fans safely through crowded gates, forecast demand at concession stands, support biometric entry, identify suspicious behavior on CCTV, and manage heating and ventilation. Used well, it can make live events safer, faster, and more efficient.

But it also changes the security model.

In Darktrace’s recent research into the threat landscape surrounding sports, we asked cybersecurity professionals protecting professional sports organizations where in their footprint a cyber compromise would have the greatest impact. The area they named most, highlighted by 34% of the professionals we spoke to, was stadium operations. At the same time, 35% said their organizations are already using AI in stadium operations, or plan to do so in the next 12 months.

Security teams are no longer just protecting traditional IT systems around a stadium. They are increasingly being asked to protect AI systems that are operating in the stadium’s most fundamental functions.

Approved AI vs. shadow AI in stadium operations

There is a clear difference between AI a stadium’s security team knows about and AI it does not.

Approved AI is the AI that has been reviewed, tested, and integrated into the venue’s operating environment. It may support CCTV analytics, access control, facility management, ticketing, logistics, broadcast operations, or anti-piracy monitoring. It should have clear ownership, access controls, logging, vendor review, and data protection rules. That does not make it risk-free, but it allows security teams to institute proper governance.

Shadow AI is different. It is the unapproved use of AI tools by employees, contractors, or suppliers. It often starts with good intent. Someone wants to work faster. A staff member pastes internal information into a public AI tool to draft a briefing. A developer uses an AI assistant to debug ticketing code. A supplier connects an AI scheduling tool to delivery routes. A designer uploads unreleased venue plans or sponsor material to generate a mockup.

None of those actions may feel like a security decision to the person doing them. But each one can move sensitive operational data into an environment the stadium does not control, creating hidden risk.

The approved AI stack may be visible to security teams. The shadow AI stack often is not.

Why game day increases AI cybersecurity risk

In a typical enterprise environment, a security team may have hours to investigate a strange login or an unexpected connection to a third-party service. Within a stadium, the moment an incident is likely to occur is also the moment when teams are at their most stretched and the incident can have the greatest repercussions: game day.

If an AI system used for crowd management behaves unexpectedly, the issue is not only technical. It may affect physical movement inside the venue.

If a supplier tool is sending operational data to an unapproved AI platform, the issue is not only data governance. It may expose delivery routes, restricted access schedules, or staffing plans.

The most dangerous scenario is not always a loud, dramatic attack but a hidden dependency that no one has mapped such as a vendor adding an AI feature through a software update or a staff workflow using an unapproved tool.

By the time the venue is live, those hidden connections can become operational risk.

The supply chain is part of the stadium attack surface

Any major sporting event is made by its supply chain and partnerships: catering firms, transport providers, broadcast systems, facilities teams. Every piece is necessary and each creates a security channel. The risk of supply chain compromise has been well established for some time and has been the source of some of the most high-profile breaches we’ve seen. The data breach at MSG Entertainment, owner of Madison Square Garden, that was widely reported in March, originated in a breach of Oracle’s E-Business Suite, used in MSG Entertainment’s back-office systems, while the 2018 Olympic Destroyer attack on the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics reportedly began with the compromise of the main IT service provider for the Games. The addition of AI is heightening the risk.

A stadium can have strict rules for its own AI systems, but its vendors may be using separate tools. Some may use AI to manage staffing, delivery windows, inventory, or customer communications. Others may not realize that AI features have been added into software they already use.

This is one of the hardest parts of securing AI in stadium operations. The risk does not always come from a tool the venue selected. It may come from a tool a supplier selected or a feature the supplier did not know had been turned on.

Security teams need to treat vendor AI the same way they treat vendor access. They need to know what suppliers can connect to, what data they can see, what tools they use, and whether those tools introduce new routes for data exposure or lateral movement.

A third-party AI tool does not need deep access to create risk. Sometimes it only needs the right operational detail at the wrong time.

Four questions for securing AI in stadium operations

As AI becomes part of stadium operations, security teams need to move beyond basic approval lists. There are four questions they need to ask:

1. Where is AI being used?

This includes obvious tools, such as computer vision, access control, ticketing, logistics, and facility management. But it also includes less visible AI inside SaaS platforms, vendor tools, browser extensions, developer workflows, smart building systems, and collaboration tools.

2. What can the AI access?

Can it see incident logs, staffing plans, ticketing data, video feeds, building controls, fan information, credentials, or supplier systems? Can it only analyze information, or can it also trigger actions?

3. What can the AI do?

AI agents are not just passive tools. Some can call APIs, update records, generate instructions, trigger workflows, or act with the permissions of a user or service account. In a stadium, that distinction is critical. There is a big difference between an AI system that recommends an action and one that can take an action.

4. What does normal look like?

In your security architecture, static rules will not be enough. AI use changes quickly: tools appear inside existing platforms, vendors add new services, and staff find workarounds when they are under pressure. Security teams need to understand normal behavior across people, identities, devices, networks, cloud services, suppliers, and AI tools so they can spot when something changes.

That is especially important in live-event environments, where small anomalies can matter. A connection to an unapproved AI service may be harmless in one context and serious in another, and an AI agent taking action at 3 a.m. may be expected during setup but suspicious during a match. Context is what turns raw activity into useful security insight. It’s also what enables rapid response. Your own AI-based security systems can respond to threats at machine speed if they can build the live context to know action needs to be taken.

AI can make stadiums safer, but only if it is secured

AI has a real role to play in stadium operations. It can help teams detect crowd pressure earlier, reduce bottlenecks, manage facilities more efficiently, improve the fan experience, and support event teams during high-pressure moments.

The answer is not to slow all AI adoption. That's not the goal. The answer is to make AI visible, governed, and secure before it becomes part of match-day operations.

For stadium operators and event organizers, that means mapping AI use across the venue and supplier ecosystem. It means understanding what each AI system can access and what actions it can take. It means giving staff approved tools that meet their needs, rather than leaving them to find workarounds. It means writing AI use into vendor contracts and audits. And it means monitoring behavior across the full environment, not only the systems that are easiest to see. A stadium cannot secure what it cannot see.

When AI becomes part of how a stadium moves people, controls access, manages facilities, supports suppliers, and protects media rights, it stops being a side project. It becomes part of the event infrastructure.

Event infrastructure must be thoroughly prepared before venue gates open and sustained with the operational resilience required to support a secure, seamless, and reliable event experience.

How Darktrace helps secure AI in stadium operations

Darktrace brings more than a decade of behavioral AI expertise, built on an enterprise‑wide platform designed to operate in complex, ambiguous environments. We protect the large-scale integrated IT and OT environments that underpin stadium operations from the 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar, to Formula 1 Grand Prixes around the world and stadiums across the USA.

Other cybersecurity technologies try to predict each new attack based on historical attacks. The problem is that AI operates like humans do. Every action introduces new information that changes how AI behaves, making it unpredictable in nature. Historical attack tactics are now only a small part of the equation, forcing vendors to retrofit unproven acquisitions to secure AI.  

Darktrace is fundamentally different. Our Adaptive AI continuously learns how your people and AI behave, building an understanding of your organization so it can detect and respond autonomously when behavior deviates. Our Behavioral Defense Platform secures your AI, people, and infrastructure as you onboard new workflows, agents, and applications, enabling your AI transformation at scale.

As AI changes what organizations can do, Darktrace helps them move forward with confidence. We give the security teams defending the people and technology within stadium infrastructure the understanding, visibility, and autonomous action they need to protect new technologies as they are integrated into operations, so their organizations drive the progress that will define the AI era.

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July 15, 2026

Security After Signatures: Operating in a World of Pre‑CVE Disclosure Exploitation, Collapsed Trust Boundaries, and Autonomous Systems

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Three shifts have reshaped what it means to defend an enterprise securely.  

First, exploitation often begins before defenders have a Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) identifier, a security advisory, or an entry in the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency's (CISA) Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog.

Secondly, the trust boundary has moved beyond the network edge into identities, tokens, APIs, and Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) workflows.  

Third, an increasing share of business activity is executed through automation, integrations, and AI agent-like systems that can act faster than teams can verify intent.  

If your security model still relies on detecting known bad artefacts, triaging isolated alerts, and waiting for confirmation before acting, you are already behind the threat.  

This is not a failure of security teams; it’s a failure of the operating model to keep pace with how the environment has changed.

A SOC built around alerts and signatures assumes that malicious activity will eventually surface as an event. In real incidents, however, the decisive evidence is rarely a single event. Instead, it is a chain of individually explainable actions that only appears malicious once you connect the dots across identity, non-human identity, cloud, email, SaaS, operational technology (OT), and network telemetry.

The defenders succeeding today observe behaviors, link them into sequences, understand what those sequences mean, and contain impact before the full story unfolds. That is the operating model the current threat environment demands.  

Exploitation before disclosure

The first shift is the straightforward: the time to exploit has dropped to nearly zero.  

In one example, Darktrace observed a sequence of subtle but strategically significant anomalies within a customer environment that later aligned with exploitation of CVE‑2025‑0994 in Trimble Cityworks by likely Chinese-nexus threat actors. Behavioral indicators were visible at least 18 days before public disclosure, with related anomalies emerging 40 to 50 days earlier during the intrusion window.  

This case illustrates a familiar pattern: clusters of weak‑signal anomalies combing to form an actionable picture of intrusion long before a CVE is published. Such activity reflects long‑horizon, option‑preserving operator models often associated with mature state‑linked activity.  

Figure 1: Darktrace’s detection of malicious exploitation of CVE 2025-0994, later tied to Chinese-nexus threat actors targeting critical national infrastructure (CNI) in the US, weeks before public disclosure.

Throughout 2025 and 2026, Darktrace has continued to observe the value of anomaly-based detections across a range of incidents.

CVE CVE Public Disclosure Date Darktrace Detection Date Days Between Detection of Exploitation and CVE Public Disclosure
CVE 2025 0994
(Trimble City Works)
2025-02-06 2025-01-19 18 Days
CVE 2025-24183
(Apache)
2025-03-10 2025-02-18 20 days
CVE 2025-10035
(Fortra GoAnywhere)
2025-09-18 2025-09-11 7 days

Identity is the real control plane

The second shift is that identity has replaced perimeter as the primary control plane. As Darktrace’s Annual Threat Report 2026 illustrated, identity remains the main challenge in defending against modern intrusions. A clear example is the Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) case published by Darktrace in December 2025. A phishing email led to the compromise of an Office 365 account. Session hijacking bypassed multi-factor authentication (MFA), and the compromised account was used for follow-on phishing and persistence activities including the creation of malicious email rules.  

Every step in that sequence mattered. A successful login alone does not prove legitimacy. An inbox rule, on its own, may not appear catastrophic. Mail activity, viewed in isolation, may seem operationally normal. But the behavioral chain tells a different story: credential theft, token abuse, persistence, and onward compromise through a trusted identity.  

This is why the question is no longer “Did the user authenticate successfully”. The more important question is, “Does this identity action make sense right now, in this context, given what came before it?” The AiTM case shows how identity can be compromised. In practice, however, attacks rarely remained confined to identity alone.  

In another Darktrace case, a compromised SaaS account triggered activity across the email, SaaS, and network layers, including inbox rule changes, phishing propagation, and connections to suspicious infrastructure. Viewed in isolation, none of these events were decisive. Together, however,  they formed a behavioral sequence that revealed the intrusion, with the full attack story automatically correlated and surfaced to defenders by Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst.  

Figure 2: Cyber AI Analyst correlated and appended additional events to the incident, including other users who connected to the suspicious redirect link after outbound phishing emails were sent.

AI accelerates the threat  

The third shift is the one many teams still underestimate: trusted tooling, integrations, and AI agent-like systems can create actions that appear legitimate but are strategically dangerous.  

The shift becomes clearer when examining how governments are now framing AI risk. In 2026, guidance published by CISA, UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) and Five Eyes partners warned that agentic systems expand attack surfaces, accumulate privilege, and can behave in ways that are difficult to predict or explain [1]. The advice is simple: assume unexpected behavior and design controls around it.  

The real risk is not AI usage. It is unknown autonomy: systems with credentials, data access, and action paths that can execute workflow steps without sufficient behavioral validation, traceability, or human oversight. Darktrace’s Model Context Protocol (MCP) risk analysis provides a useful framework for understanding this challenge. Over-privileged agents, content injection, and tool abuse become high-consequence risks when connected systems can dynamically retrieve data, execute actions, and communicate externally.  

Whether security teams like it or not, AI is already in the enterprise. It will help drive innovation, but it will also be abused, whether accidentally or maliciously. In each of the cases below, AI either scaled the attacker, built the tooling, or existed within the environment as something to exploit or misuse.

1. AI as an Attack Multiplier

In one campaign targeting Mexican government entities, a single operator used commercial AI platforms to generate exploits, automate reconnaissance, and process large volumes of data, compressing work that would traditionally have required an entire team into a single workflow [2].  

Darktrace is also observing this trend further down the stack. In one case, Darktrace identified AI-generated malware exploiting React2Shell, where an attacker used a Large Language Model (LLM) to produce working exploit code and deploy it at scale.  

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2. AI as an Attack Surface

Attempted AI exploitation is now appearing within customer environments. In one case involving an automation technology manufacturer, a compromised LLM proxy was seemingly used as a stepping stone to access additional AI services. When that attempt failed, the attacker pivoted to cryptomining.

What is clear is that the AI layer has already become an asset worth probing, exploiting, and pivoting through. It is also clear that defenders benefit from rapidly understanding how these activities connect. In this case, Cyber AI Analyst automatically pieced together the intrusion, while Darktrace’s Managed Threat Detection service alerted to the customer, enabling the activity to be contained before it could progress further.

Figure 3: Cyber AI Analyst's investigation into a compromised LLM proxy that was abused for cryptomining activity.

AI as a trusted but dangerous actor

This does not require a cinematic vision of “rogue AI.” The Salesloft incident provides a more grounded example, where AI and automation operate with legitimate access but served malicious intent. In that case, attackers abused compromised OAuth tokens associated with the Drift AI chat agent to export significant volumes of data from Salesforce environments.  

The activity resembled legitimate API usage and relied on trusted SaaS integrations rather than malware or other obvious signs of intrusion. That is precisely the challenge. Traditional security controls are good at detecting forced entry, but far less effective when a trusted application integration behaves in a way that is technically permitted yet operationally harmful.  

In these scenarios, the security challenge shifts from validating access to validating behavior.

This is what that looks like in practice: AI-linked identities executing legitimate actions that require behavioral validation rather than access validation.

Figure 4: Darktrace / SECURE AI highlights anomalous activity across AI identities, surfacing critical behavior that requires validation and containment.

Early observations from Darktrace / SECURE AI deployments reinforce this reality. Across Darktrace's observed fleet, AI service connections per deployment increased 13% during the first half of 2026, reaching over 16 million connections overall. The typical organisation now interacts with seven different AI providers, evidence that AI is no longer operating at the edges of the enterprise. It is increasingly woven into day-to-day business activity.

The most common risks are not compromised models or advanced AI attacks. Instead, they stem from employees and business functions exposing sensitive information through entirely legitimate-looking interactions. Darktrace has observed repeated submission of personally identifiable information (PII), tax information, identification documents, and medical data into LLM prompts, alongside widespread use of unsanctioned (shadow) AI services and growing AI activity from mobile devices.  

For defenders, the challenge is increasingly one of context: understanding when legitimate business use crosses into material risk, while preserving privacy and user trust.

Conclusion

Across all three shifts, the pattern is the same: behavior precedes understanding. Security teams are not losing because adversaries have become invisible. An increasingly outdated security model assumes that malicious activity will reveal itself cleanly and early. It no longer does.  

In 2026 and beyond, defenders win by understanding behavioral sequences, continuously validating trust, and acting before certainty becomes hindsight. That is security after signatures. That is security in the AI era.

Credit to: Daniel Levy, Threat Hunting Data Scientist

Edited by: Ryan Traill, Content Manager

References

[1] https://www.cyber.gov.au/business-government/secure-design/artificial-intelligence/careful-adoption-of-agentic-ai-services  

[2]https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2026-02-26/hacker-used-anthropics-claude-ai-to-steal-mexican-government-data

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About the author
Nathaniel Jones
VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO
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