From Containment to Remediation: Darktrace / CLOUD & Cado Reducing MTTR
Darktrace / CLOUD combines with Cado’s automated forensics capture to achieve rapid containment and deep investigative capabilities. Learn more about accelerating MTTR here.
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Adam Stevens
Director of Product, Cloud Security
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06
Mar 2025
Cloud environments operate at speed, with workloads spinning up and down in seconds. This agility is great for business and is one of the main reasons for cloud adoption. But this same agility and speed presents new challenges for security teams. When a threat emerges, every second counts—yet many organizations struggle with slow Mean Time to Respond (MTTR) due to operational bottlenecks, outdated tooling, and the complexity of modern cloud infrastructure.
To minimize disruption and potential damage, containment is a critical step in incident response. By effectively responding to contain a threat, organizations can help prevent lateral movement limiting an attack’s impact.
However, containment is not the end goal. Full remediation requires a deep understanding of exactly what happened, how far the threat spread, and what assets were involved and what changes may be needed to prevent it from happening again.
This is why Darktrace’s recent acquisition of Cado is so exciting. Darktrace / CLOUD provides real-time threat detection and automated cloud native response for containment. With Cado, Darktrace / CLOUD ensures security teams have the forensic insights that are required to fully remediate and strengthen their defenses.
Why do organizations struggle with MTTR in the cloud?
Many security teams experience delays in fully responding to cloud threats due to several key challenges:
1. Limited access to cloud resources
Security teams often don’t have direct access to cloud environments because often infrastructure is managed by a separate operations team—or even an outsourced provider. When a threat is detected, analysts must submit access requests or escalate to another team, slowing down investigations.
This delay can be particularly costly in cloud environments where attacks unfold rapidly. Without immediate access to affected resources, the time to contain, investigate, and remediate an incident can increase significantly.
2. The cloud’s ephemeral nature
Cloud workloads are often dynamic and short-lived. Serverless functions, containers, and auto-scaling resources can exist for minutes or even seconds. If a security event occurs in one of these ephemeral resources and it disappears before forensic data is captured, understanding the full scope of the attack becomes nearly impossible.
Traditional forensic methods, which rely on static endpoints, fail in these environments—leaving security teams blind to what happened.
3. Containment is critical, but businesses require more
Automated cloud native response for containment is essential for stopping an attack in progress. However, regulatory frameworks underline the need for a full understanding to prove the extent of an incident and determine the root cause, this goes beyond just containing a threat.
Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA):[1] Enacted by the European Union, DORA requires financial entities to establish robust incident reporting mechanisms. Organizations must detect, manage, and notify authorities of significant ICT-related incidents, ensuring a comprehensive understanding of each event's impact. This includes detailed analysis and documentation to enhance operational resilience and compliance.
Network and Information Security Directive 2 (NIS2):[2]This EU directive imposes advanced reporting obligations on essential and important entities, requiring them to report significant cybersecurity incidents to relevant authorities. Organizations must conduct thorough post-incident analysis to understand the incident's scope and prevent future occurrences.
Forensic analysis plays a critical role in full remediation, particularly when organizations need to:
Conduct post-incident investigations for compliance and reporting.
Identify affected data and impacted users.
Understand attacker behavior to prevent repeat incidents.
Without a clear forensic understanding, security teams are at risk of incomplete remediation, potentially leaving gaps that adversaries can exploit in a future attack.
How Darktrace / CLOUD & Cado reduce MTTR and enable full remediation
By combining Darktrace / CLOUD’s AI-driven platform with Cado’s automated forensics capture, organizations can achieve rapid containment and deep investigative capabilities, accelerating MTTR metrics while ensuring full remediation in complex cloud environments.
Darktrace / CLOUD provides deep visibility into hybrid cloud environments, by understanding the relationships between assets, identity behaviours, combined with misconfiguration data and runtime anomaly activity. Enabling customers to:
Detect and contain anomalous activity before threats escalate.
Understand how cloud identities, permissions, and configurations contribute to organizational risk.
Provide visibility into deployed cloud assets and services logically grouped into architectures.
Even in containerized services like AWS Fargate, where traditional endpoint security tools often struggle due to the lack of persistent accessible infrastructure, Darktrace / CLOUD monitors for anomalous behavior. If a threat is detected, security teams can launch a Cado forensic investigation from the Darktrace platform, ensuring rapid evidence collection and deeper analysis.
Ensuring:
Complete timeline reconstruction to understand the full impact.
Identification of persistence mechanisms that attackers may have left behind.
Forensic data preservation to meet compliance mandates like DORA, NIS2, and ISO 27001.
The outcome: Faster, smarter incident response
Darktrace / CLOUD with Cado enables organizations to detect, contain and forensically analyse activity across hybrid cloud environments
Reduce MTTR by automating containment and enabling forensic analysis.
Seamlessly pivot to a forensic investigation when needed—right from the Darktrace platform.
Ensure full remediation with deep forensic insights—even in ephemeral environments.
Stopping an attack is only the first step—understanding its impact is what prevents it from happening again. Together, Darktrace / CLOUD and Cado empower security teams to investigate, respond, and remediate cloud threats with speed and confidence.
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Cloud Security Evolution: Why Security Teams are Taking the Lead
While many internal teams contribute to general cloud hygiene, the security team has increasingly taken the lead on cloud security. Learn how AI-powered cloud detection and response tools can help these teams with new responsibilities.
Pallavi Singh
Product Marketing Manager, OT Security & Compliance
Fusing Vulnerability and Threat Data: Enhancing the Depth of Attack Analysis
This blog highlights how vulnerability data, collected using Cado's new vulnerability discovery feature, can be fused with threat data to help deepen the understanding of an attack, as well as guide remediation efforts.
CNAPP Alone Isn’t Enough: Focusing on CDR for Real-Time Cross Domain Protection
This blog dives into the strengths and limitations of CNAPP, explaining how a CDR solution can enhance cloud security to identify and mitigate cross-domain threats.
MFA Under Attack: AiTM Phishing Kits Abusing Legitimate Services
In late 2024 and early 2025, the Darktrace Security Operations Center (SOC) investigated alerts regarding separate cases of Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) account compromises on two customer environments that presented several similarities, suggesting they were part of a wider phishing campaign.
This campaign was found to leverage the project collaboration and note-taking application, Milanote, and the Tycoon 2FA phishing kit.
Legitimate services abused
As highlighted in Darktrace's 2024 Annual Threat Report [1], threat actors are abusing legitimate services, like Milanote, in their phishing campaigns. By leveraging these trusted platforms and domains, malicious actors can bypass traditional security measures, making their phishing emails appear benign and increasing the likelihood of successful attacks.
Darktrace categorizes these senders and platforms as free content senders. These services allow users to send emails containing custom content (e.g., files) from fully validated, fixed service address belonging to legitimate corporations. Although some of these services permit full body and subject customization by attackers, the structure of these emails is generally consistent, making it challenging to differentiate between legitimate and malicious emails.
What is Tycoon 2FA?
Tycoon 2FA is an Adversary-in-the-Middle (AitM) phishing kit, first seen in August 2023 and distributed via the Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) model [2]. It targets multi-factor authentication (MFA) by intercepting credentials and MFA tokens during authentication on fake Microsoft or Google login pages. The attacker captures session cookies after MFA is completed, allowing them to replay the session and access the user account, even if credentials are reset. The rise in MFA use has increased the popularity of AitM phishing kits like Tycoon 2FA and Mamba 2FA, another AiTM phishing kit investigated by Darktrace.
Initial access via phishing email
At the beginning of 2025, Darktrace observed phishing emails leveraging Milanote being sent to multiple internal recipients in an organization. In this attack, the same email was sent to 19 different users, all of which were held by Darktrace.
The subject line of the emails mentioned both a legitimate internal user of the company, the company name, as well as a Milanote board regarding a “new agreement” in German. It is a common social engineering technique to mention urgent matters, such as unpaid invoices, expired passwords, or awaiting voicemails, in the subject line to prompt immediate action from the user. However, this tactic is now widely covered in phishing awareness training, making users more suspicious of such emails. In this case, while the subject mentioned a “new agreement,” likely raising the recipient’s curiosity, the tone remained professional and not overly alarming. Additionally, the mention of a colleague and the standardized language typical of free content sender emails further helped dispel concerns regarding the email.
These emails were sent by the legitimate address support@milanote[.]com and referenced "Milanote" in the personal field of the header but originated from the freemail address “ahnermatternk.ef.od.13@gmail[.]com”. Darktrace / EMAIL recognized that none of the recipients had previously received a file share email from Milanote, making this sender unfamiliar in the customer's email environment
The emails contained several benign links to legitimate Milanote endpoints (including an unsubscribe link) which were not flagged by Darktrace. However, they also included a malicious link designed to direct recipients to a pre-filled credential harvesting page hosted on Milanote, prompting them to register for an account. Despite not blocking the legitimate Milanote links in the same email, Darktrace locked the malicious link, preventing users from visiting the credential harvester.
Figure 1: Credential harvesting page sent to recipients, as seen in. sandbox environment.
Around one minute later, one recipient received a legitimate email from Milanote confirming their successful account registration, indicating they had accessed the phishing page. This email had a lower anomaly score and was not flagged by Darktrace / EMAIL because, unlike the first email, it did not contain any suspicious links and was a genuine account registration notification. Similarly, in the malicious Milanote email, only the link leading to the phishing page was blocked, while the benign and legitimate Milanote links remained accessible, demonstrating Darktrace’s precise and targeted actioning.
Figure 2: A legitimate and a malicious Milanote email received by one recipient.
Around the same time, Darktrace / NETWORK observed the same user’s device making DNS query for the domain name “lrn.ialeahed[.]com” , which has been flagged as a Tycoon 2FA domain [2], suggesting the use of this phishing platform.
Once the user had entered their details in the credential harvester, it is likely that they were presented a document hosted on Milanote that contained the final payload link – likely hidden behind text instructing users to access a “new agreement” document.
External research indicates that the user was likely directed to a Cloudflare Turnstile challenge meant to reroute unwanted traffic, such as automated security scripts and penetration testing tools [2] [3]. After these checks and other background processes are completed, the user is directed to the final landing page. In this case, it was likely a fake login prompt hosted on the attacker’s server, where the user is asked to authenticate to their account using MFA. By burrowing malicious links and files in this manner, threat actors can evade analysis by traditional security email gateways, effectively bypassing their protection.
Darktrace’s analysis of the structure and word content of the phishing emails resulted in an 82% probability score that the email was malicious, and the email further received a 67% phishing inducement score, representing how closely the structure and word content of the emails compared to typical phishing emails.
All these unusual elements triggered multiple alerts in Darktrace / EMAIL, focusing on two main suspicious aspects: a new, unknown sender with no prior correspondence with the recipients or the environment, and the inclusion of a link to a previously unseen file storage solution.
Figure 3: Milanote phishing email as seen within Darktrace / EMAIL.
After detecting the fifth email, the “Sender Surge” model alert was triggered in Darktrace / EMAIL due to a significant number of recipients being emailed by this new suspicious sender in a short period. These recipients were from various departments across the customer’s organization, including sales, marketing, purchasing, and production. Darktrace / EMAIL determined that the emails were sent to a highly unusual group of internal recipients, further raising doubts about the business legitimacy.
Darktrace / EMAIL suggested actions to contain the attack by holding all Milanote phishing emails back from recipient’s inboxes, except for the detailed email with locked links. However, autonomous actions were not enabled at the time, allowing the initial email to reach recipients' inboxes, providing a brief window for interaction. Unfortunately, during this window, one recipient clicked on the Milanote payload link, leading to the compromise of their account.
SaaS account takeover
About three minutes after the malicious Milanote email was received, Darktrace / IDENTITY detected an unusual login to the email recipient’s SaaS account. The SaaS actor was observed accessing files from their usual location in Germany, while simultaneously, a 100% rare login occurred from a location in the US that had never been seen in the customer’s environment before. This login was also flagged as suspicious by Microsoft 365, triggering a 'Conditional Access Policy' that required MFA authentication, which was successfully completed.
Figure 4: Tycoon 2FA adnimistration panel login page dated from October 2023 [3].
Despite the successful authentication, Darktrace / IDENTITY recognized that the login from this unusual location, coupled with simultaneous activity in another geographically distant location, were highly suspicious. Darktrace went on to observe MFA-validated logins from three separate US-based IP addresses: 89.185.80[.]19, 5.181.3[.]68, and 38.242.7[.]252. Most of the malicious activity was performed from the latter, which is associated with the Hide My Ass (HMA) VPN network [5].
Figure 5: Darktrace’s detection of the suspicious login from the US while the legitimate user was logged in from Germany.
Figure 6: Darktrace’s detection of the suspicious login following successful MFA authentication.
Following this, the malicious actor accessed the user’s inbox and created a new mailbox rule named “GTH” that deleted any incoming email containing the string “milanote” in the subject line or body. Rules like this are a common technique used by attackers to leverage compromised accounts for launching phishing campaigns and concealing replies to phishing emails that might raise suspicions among legitimate account holders. Using legitimate, albeit compromised, accounts to send additional phishing emails enhances the apparent legitimacy of the malicious emails. This tactic has been reported as being used by Tycoon 2FA attackers [4].
The attacker accessed over 140 emails within the legitimate user’s inbox, including both the inbox and the “Sent Items” folder. Notably, the attacker accessed five emails in the “Sent Items” folder and modified their attachments. These emails were mainly related to invoices, suggesting the threat actor may have been looking to hijack those email threads to send fake invoices or replicate previous invoice emails.
Darktrace’s Cyber AI AnalystTM launched autonomous investigations into the individual events surrounding this suspicious activity. It connected these separate events into a single, broad account takeover incident, providing the customer with a clearer view of the ongoing compromise.
Figure 7: Cyber AI Analyst’s detection of unusual SaaS account activities in a single incident.
Figure 8: Cyber AI Analyst investigation of suspicious activities performed by the attacker.
Darktrace's response
Within three minutes of the first unusual login alert, Darktrace’s Autonomous Response intervened, disabling the compromised user account for two hours.
As the impacted customer was subscribed to the Managed Threat Detection Service, Darktrace’s SOC team investigated the activity further and promptly alerted the customer’s security team. With the user’s account still disabled by Autonomous Response, the attack was contained, allowing the customer’s security team valuable time to investigate and remediate. Within ten minutes of receiving the alert from Darktrace’s SOC, they reset the user’s password, closed all active SaaS sessions, and deleted the malicious email rule. Darktrace’s SOC further supported the customer through the Security Operations Service Support service by providing information about the data accessed and identifying any other affected users.
Figure 9: Autonomous Response actions carried out by Darktrace / IDENTITY to contain the malicious activity.
A wider Milanote phishing campaign?
Around a month before this compromise activity, Darktrace alerted another customer to similar activities involving two compromised user accounts. These accounts created new inbox rules named “GFH” and “GVB” to delete all incoming emails containing the string “milanote” in their subject line and/or body.
The phishing emails that led to the compromise of these user accounts were similar to the ones discussed above. Specifically, these emails were sent via the Milanote platform and referenced a “new agreement” (in Spanish) being shared by a colleague. Additionally, the payload link included in the phishing emails showed the same UserPrincipalName (UPN) attribute (i.e., click?upn=u001.qLX9yCzR), which has been seen in other Milanote phishing emails leveraging Tycoon 2FA reported by OSINT sources [6]. Interestingly, in some cases, the email also referenced a “new agreement” in Portuguese, indicating a global campaign.
Based on the similarities in the rule’s naming convention and action, as well as the similarities in the phishing email subjects, it is likely that these were part of the same campaign leveraging Milanote and Tycoon 2FA to compromise user accounts. Since its introduction, the Tycoon 2FA phishing kit has undergone several enhancements to increase its stealth and obfuscation methods, making it harder for security tools to detect. For example, the latest versions contain special source code to obstruct web page analysis by defenders, prevent users from copying meaningful text from the phishing webpages, and disable the right-click menu to prevent offline analysis [4].
Conclusion
Threat actors are continually employing new methods to bypass security detection tools and measures. As highlighted in this blog, even robust security mechanisms like MFA can be compromised using AitM phishing kits. The misuse of legitimate services such as Milanote for malicious purposes can help attackers evade traditional email security solutions by blurring the distinction between legitimate and malicious content.
This is why security tools based on anomaly detection are crucial for defending against such attacks. However, user awareness is equally important. Delays in processing can impact the speed of response, making it essential for users to be informed about these threats.
As threat actors become more adept at targeting and disabling EDR agents, relying solely on endpoint detection leaves critical blind spots.
Network detection and response (NDR) offers the visibility and resilience needed to catch what EDR can’t especially in environments with unmanaged devices or advanced threats that evade local controls.
This blog explores how threat actors can disable or bypass EDR-based XDR solutions and demonstrates how Darktrace’s approach to NDR closes the resulting security gaps with Self-Learning AI that enables autonomous, real-time detection and response.
Threat actors see local security agents as targets
Recent research by security firms has highlighted ‘EDR killers’: tools that deliberately target EDR agents to disable or damage them. These include the known malicious tool EDRKillShifter, the open source EDRSilencer, EDRSandblast and variants of Terminator, and even the legitimate business application HRSword.
The attack surface of any endpoint agent is inevitably large, whether the software is challenged directly, by contesting its local visibility and access mechanisms, or by targeting the Operating System it relies upon. Additionally, threat actors can readily access and analyze EDR tools, and due to their uniformity across environments an exploit proven in a lab setting will likely succeed elsewhere.
With the local EDR agent silently disabled or evaded, how will the threat be discovered?
What are the limitations of relying solely on EDR?
Cyber attackers will inevitably break through boundary defences, through innovation or trickery or exploiting zero-days. Preventive measures can reduce but not completely stop this. The attackers will always then want to expand beyond their initial access point to achieve persistence and discover and reach high value targets within the business. This is the primary domain of network activity monitoring and NDR, which includes responsibility for securing the many devices that cannot run endpoint agents.
In the insights from a CISA Red Team assessment of a US CNI organization, the Red Team was able to maintain access over the course of months and achieve their target outcomes. The top lesson learned in the report was:
“The assessed organization had insufficient technical controls to prevent and detect malicious activity. The organization relied too heavily on host-based endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions and did not implement sufficient network layer protections.”
This proves that partial, isolated viewpoints are not sufficient to track and analyze what is fundamentally a connected problem – and without the added visibility and detection capabilities of NDR, any downstream SIEM or MDR services also still have nothing to work with.
Why is network detection & response (NDR) critical?
An effective NDR finds threats that disable or can’t be seen by local security agents and generally operates out-of-band, acquiring data from infrastructure such as traffic mirroring from physical or virtual switches. This means that the security system is extremely inaccessible to a threat actor at any stage.
An advanced NDR such as Darktrace / NETWORK is fully capable of detecting even high-end novel and unknown threats.
Detecting exploitation of Ivanti CS/PS with Darktrace / NETWORK
On January 9th 2025, two new vulnerabilities were disclosed in Ivanti Connect Secure and Policy Secure appliances that were under malicious exploitation. Perimeter devices, like Ivanti VPNs, are designed to keep threat actors out of a network, so it's quite serious when these devices are vulnerable.
An NDR solution is critical because it provides network-wide visibility for detecting lateral movement and threats that an EDR might miss, such as identifying command and control sessions (C2) and data exfiltration, even when hidden within encrypted traffic and which an EDR alone may not detect.
Darktrace initially detected suspicious activity connected with the exploitation of CVE-2025-0282 on December 29, 2024 – 11 days before the public disclosure of the vulnerability, this early detection highlights the benefits of an anomaly-based network detection method.
Throughout the campaign and based on the network telemetry available to Darktrace, a wide range of malicious activities were identified, including the malicious use of administrative credentials, the download of suspicious files, and network scanning in the cases investigated.
Darktrace / NETWORK’s autonomous response capabilities played a critical role in containment by autonomously blocking suspicious connections and enforcing normal behavior patterns. At the same time, Darktrace Cyber AI Analyst™ automatically investigated and correlated the anomalous activity into cohesive incidents, revealing the full scope of the compromise.
This case highlights the importance of real-time, AI-driven network monitoring to detect and disrupt stealthy post-exploitation techniques targeting unmanaged or unprotected systems.
Unlocking adaptive protection for evolving cyber risks
Darktrace / NETWORK uses unique AI engines that learn what is normal behavior for an organization’s entire network, continuously analyzing, mapping and modeling every connection to create a full picture of your devices, identities, connections, and potential attack paths.
With its ability to uncover previously unknown threats as well as detect known threats Darktrace is an essential layer of the security stack. Darktrace has helped secure customers against attacks including 2024 threat actor campaigns against Fortinet’s FortiManager , Palo Alto firewall devices, and more.
Stay tuned for part II of this series which dives deeper into the differences between NDR types.
Credit to Nathaniel Jones VP, Security & AI Strategy, FCISO & Ashanka Iddya, Senior Director of Product Marketing for their contribution to this blog.