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March 11, 2020

How Darktrace Antigena Email Caught A Fearware Email Attack

Darktrace effectively detects and neutralizes fearware attacks evading gateway security tools. Learn more about how Antigena Email outsmarts cyber-criminals.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Dan Fein
VP, Product
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11
Mar 2020

The cyber-criminals behind email attacks are well-researched and highly responsive to human behaviors and emotions, often seeking to evoke a specific reaction by leveraging topical information and current news. It’s therefore no surprise that attackers have attempted to latch onto COVID-19 in their latest effort to convince users to open their emails and click on seemingly benign links.

The latest email trend involves attackers who claim to be from the Center for Disease Control and Prevention, purporting to have emergency information about COVID-19. This is typical of a recent trend we’re calling ‘fearware’: cyber-criminals exploit a collective sense of fear and urgency, and coax users into clicking a malicious attachment or link. While the tactic is common, the actual campaigns contain terms and content that’s unique. There are a few patterns in the emails we’ve seen, but none reliably predictable enough to create hard and fast rules that will stop emails with new wording without causing false positives.

For example, looking for the presence of “CDC” in the email sender would easily fail when the emails begin to use new wording, like “WHO”. We’ve also seen a mismatch of links and their display text – with display text that reads “https://cdc.gov/[random-path]” while the actual link is a completely arbitrary URL. Looking for a pattern match on this would likely lead to false positives and would serve as a weak indicator at best.

The majority of these emails, especially the early ones, passed most of our customers’ existing defenses including Mimecast, Proofpoint, and Microsoft’s ATP, and were approved to be delivered directly to the end user’s inbox. Fortunately, these emails were immediately identified and actioned by Antigena Email, Darktrace’s Autonomous Response technology for the inbox.

Gateways: The Current Approach

Most organizations employ Secure Email Gateways (SEGs), like Mimecast or Proofpoint, which serve as an inline middleman between the email sender and the recipient’s email provider. SEGs have largely just become spam-detection engines, as these emails are obvious to spot when seen at scale. They can identify low-hanging fruit (i.e. emails easily detectable as malicious), but they fail to detect and respond when attacks become personalized or deviate even slightly from previously-seen attacks.

Figure 1: A high-level diagram depicting an Email Secure Gateway’s inline position.

SEGs tend to use lists of ‘known-bad’ IPs, domains, and file hashes to determine an email’s threat level – inherently failing to stop novel attacks when they use IPs, domains, or files which are new and have not yet been triaged or reported as malicious.

When advanced detection methods are used in gateway technologies, such as anomaly detection or machine learning, these are performed after the emails have been delivered, and require significant volumes of near-identical emails to trigger. The end result is very often to take an element from one of these emails and simply deny-list it.

When a SEG can’t make the determination on these factors, they may resort to a technique known as sandboxing, which creates an isolated environment for testing links and attachments seen in emails. Alternatively, they may turn to basic levels of anomaly detection that are inadequate due to their lack of context of data outside of emails. For sandboxing, most advanced threats now typically employ evasion techniques like an activation time that waits until a certain date before executing. When deployed, the sandboxing attempts see a harmless file, not recognizing the sleeping attack waiting within.

Figure 2: This email was registered only 2 hours prior to an email we processed.

Taking a sample COVID-19 email seen in a Darktrace customer’s environment, we saw a mix of domains used in what appears to be an attempt to avoid pattern detection. It would be improbable to have the domains used on a list of ‘known-bad’ domains anywhere at the time of the first email, as it was received a mere two hours after the domain was registered.

Figure 3: While other defenses failed to block these emails, Antigena Email immediately marked them as 100% unusual and held them back from delivery.

Antigena Email sits behind all other defenses, meaning we only see emails when those defenses fail to block a malicious email or deem an email is safe for delivery. In the above COVID-19 case, the first 5 emails were marked by MS ATP with a spam confidence score of 1, indicating Microsoft scanned the email and it was determined to be clean – so Microsoft took no action whatsoever.

The Cat and Mouse Game

Cyber-criminals are permanently in flux, quickly moving to outsmart security teams and bypass current defenses. Recognizing email as the easiest entry point into an organization, they are capitalizing on the inadequate detection of existing tools by mass-producing personalized emails through factory-style systems that machine-research, draft, and send with minimal human interaction.

Domains are cheap, proxies are cheap, and morphing files slightly to change the entire fingerprint of a file is easy – rendering any list of ‘known-bads’ as outdated within seconds.

Cyber AI: The New Approach

A new approach is required that relies on business context and an inside-out understanding of a corporation, rather than analyzing emails in isolation.

An Immune System Approach

Darktrace’s core technology uses AI to detect unusual patterns of behavior in the enterprise. The AI is able to do this successfully by following the human immune system’s core principles: develop an innate sense of ‘self’, and use that understanding to detect abnormal activity indicative of a threat.

In order to identify threats across the entire enterprise, the AI is able to understand normal patterns of behavior beyond just the network. This is crucial when working towards a goal of full business understanding. There’s a clear connection between activity in, for example, a SaaS application and a corresponding network event, or an event in the cloud and a corresponding event elsewhere within the business.

There’s an explicit relationship between what people do on their computers and the emails they send and receive. Having the context that a user has just visited a website before they receive an email from the same domain lends credibility to that email: it’s very common to visit a website, subscribe to a mailing list, and then receive an email within a few minutes. On the contrary, receiving an email from a brand-new sender, containing a link that nobody in the organization has ever been to, lends support to the fact that the link is likely no good and that perhaps the email should be removed from the user’s inbox.

Enterprise-Wide Context

Darktrace’s Antigena Email extends this interplay of data sources to the inbox, providing unique detection capabilities by leveraging full business context to inform email decisions.

The design of Antigena Email provides a fundamental shift in email security – from where the tool sits to how it understands and processes data. Unlike SEGs, which sit inline and process emails only as they first pass through and never again, Antigena Email sits passively, ingesting data that is journaled to it. The technology doesn’t need to wait until a domain is fingerprinted or sandboxed, or until it is associated with a campaign that has a famous name and all the buzz.

Antigena Email extends its unique position of not sitting inline to email re-assessment, processing emails millions of times instead of just once, enabling actions to be taken well after delivery. A seemingly benign email with popular links may become more interesting over time if there’s an event within the enterprise that was determined to have originated via an email, perhaps when a trusted site becomes compromised. While Antigena Network will mitigate the new threat on the network, Antigena Email will neutralize the emails that contain links associated with those found in the original email.

Figure 4: Antigena Email sits passively off email providers, continuously re-assessing and issuing updated actions as new data is introduced.

When an email first arrives, Antigena Email extracts its raw metadata, processes it multiple times at machine speed, and then many millions of times subsequently as new evidence is introduced (typically based on events seen throughout the business). The system corroborates what it is seeing with what it has previously understood to be normal throughout the corporate environment. For example, when domains are extracted from envelope information or links in the email body, they’re compared against the popularity of the domain on the company’s network.

Figure 5: The link above was determined to be 100% rare for the enterprise.

Dissecting the above COVID-19 linked email, we can extract some of the data made available in the Antigena Email user interface to see why Darktrace thought the email was so unusual. The domain in the ‘From’ address is rare, which is supplemental contextual information derived from data across the customer’s entire digital environment, not limited to just email but including network data as well. The emails’ KCE, KCD, and RCE indicate that it was the first time the sender had been seen in any email: there had been no correspondence with the sender in any way, and the email address had never been seen in the body of any email.

Figure 6: KCE, KCD, and RCE scores indicate no sender history with the organization.

Correlating the above, Antigena Email deemed these emails 100% anomalous to the business and immediately removed them from the recipients’ inboxes. The platform did this for the very first email, and every email thereafter – not a single COVID-19-based email got by Antigena Email.

Conclusion

Cyber AI does not distinguish ‘good’ from ‘bad’; rather whether an event is likely to belong or not. The technology looks only to compare data with the learnt patterns of activity in the environment, incorporating the new email (alongside its own scoring of the email) into its understanding of day-to-day context for the organization.

By asking questions like “Does this email appear to belong?” or “Is there an existing relationship between the sender and recipient?”, the AI can accurately discern the threat posed by a given email, and incorporate these findings into future modelling. A model cannot be trained to think just because the corporation received a higher volume of emails from a specific sender, these emails are all of a sudden considered normal for the environment. By weighing human interaction with the emails or domains to make decisions on math-modeling reincorporation, Cyber AI avoids this assumption, unless there’s legitimate correspondence from within the corporation back out to the sender.

The inbox has traditionally been the easiest point of entry into an organization. But the fundamental differences in approach offered by Cyber AI drastically increase Antigena Email’s detection capability when compared with gateway tools. Customers with and without email gateways in place have therefore seen a noticeable curbing of their email problem. In the continuous cat-and-mouse game with their adversaries, security teams augmenting their defenses with Cyber AI are finally regaining the advantage.

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Dan Fein
VP, Product

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April 16, 2026

Why Behavioral AI Is the Answer to Mythos

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How AI is breaking the patch-and-prevent security model

The business world was upended last week by the news that Anthropic has developed a powerful new AI model, Claude Mythos, which poses unprecedented risk because of its ability to expose flaws in IT systems.  

Whether it’s Mythos or OpenAI’s GPT-5.4-Cyber, which was just announced on Tuesday, supercharged AI models in the hands of hackers will allow them to carry out attacks at machine speed, much faster than most businesses can stop them.  

This news underscores a stark reality for all leaders: Patching holes alone is not a sufficient control against modern cyberattacks. You must assume that your software is already vulnerable right now. And while LLMs are very good at spotting vulnerabilities, they’re pretty bad at reliably patching them.

Project Glasswing members say it could take months or years for patches to be applied. While that work is done, enterprises must be protected against Zero-Day attacks, or security holes that are still undiscovered.  

Most cybersecurity strategies today are built like a daily multivitamin: broad, preventative, and designed to keep the system generally healthy over time. Patch regularly. Update software. Reduce known vulnerabilities. It’s necessary, disciplined, and foundational. But it’s also built for a world where the risks are well known and defined, cycles are predictable, and exposure unfolds at a manageable pace.

What happens when that model no longer holds?

The AI cyber advantage: Behavioral AI

The vulnerabilities exposed by AI systems like Mythos aren’t the well-understood risks your “multivitamin” was designed to address. They are transient, fast-emerging entry points that exist just long enough to be exploited.

In that environment, prevention alone isn’t enough. You don’t need more vitamins—you need a painkiller. The future of cybersecurity won’t be defined by how well you maintain baseline health. It will be defined by how quickly you respond when something breaks and every second counts.

That’s why behavioral AI gives businesses a durable cyber advantage. Rather than trying to figure out what the attacker looks like, it learns what “normal” looks like across the digital ecosystem of each individual business.  

That’s exactly how behavioral AI works. It understands the self, or what's normal for the organization, and then it can spot deviations in from normal that are actually early-stage attacks.

The Darktrace approach to cybersecurity

At Darktrace, we’ve been defending our 10,000 customers using behavioral AI cybersecurity developed in our AI Research Centre in Cambridge, U.K.

Darktrace was built on the understanding that attacks do not arrive neatly labeled, and that the most damaging threats often emerge before signatures, indicators, or public disclosures can catch up.  

Our AI algorithms learn in real time from your personalized business data to learn what’s normal for every person and every asset, and the flows of data within your organization. By continuously understanding “normal” across your entire digital ecosystem, Darktrace identifies and contains threats emerging from unknown vulnerabilities and compromised supply chain dependencies, autonomously curtailing attacks at machine speed.  

Security for novel threats

Darktrace is built for a world where AI is not just accelerating attacks, but fundamentally reshaping how they originate. What makes our AI so unique is that it's proven time and again to identify cyber threats before public vulnerability disclosures, such as critical Ivanti vulnerabilities in 2025 and SAP NetWeaver exploitations tied to nation-state threat actors.  

As AI reshapes how vulnerabilities are found and exploited, cybersecurity must be anchored in something more durable than a list of known flaws. It requires a real-time understanding of the business itself: what belongs, what does not, and what must be stopped immediately.

What leaders should do right now

The leadership priority must shift accordingly.

First, stop treating unknown vulnerabilities as an edge case. AI‑driven discovery makes them the norm. Security programs built primarily around known flaws, signatures, and threat intelligence will always lag behind an attacker that is operating in real time.

Second, insist on an understanding of what is actually normal across the business. When threats are novel, labels are useless. The earliest and most reliable signal of danger is abnormal behavior—systems, users, or data flows that suddenly depart from what is expected. If you cannot see that deviation as it happens, you are effectively blind during the most critical window.

Finally, assume that the next serious incident will occur before remediation guidance is available. Ask what happens in those first minutes and hours. The organizations that maintain resilience are not the ones waiting for disclosure cycles to catch up—they are the ones that can autonomously identify and contain emerging threats as they unfold.

This is the reality of cybersecurity in an AI‑shaped world. Patching and prevention remain important foundations, but the advantage now belongs to those who can respond instantly when the unpredictable occurs.

Behavioral AI is security designed not just for known threats, but for the ones that AI will discover next.

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About the author
Ed Jennings
President and CEO

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April 16, 2026

Inside ZionSiphon: Darktrace’s Analysis of OT Malware Targeting Israeli Water Systems

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What is ZionSiphon?

Darktrace recently analyzed a malware sample, which identifies itself as ZionSiphon. This sample combines several familiar host-based capabilities, including privilege escalation, persistence, and removable-media propagation, with targeting logic themed around water treatment and desalination environments.

This blog details Darktrace’s investigation of ZionSiphon, focusing on how the malware identifies targets, establishes persistence, attempts to tamper with local configuration files, and scans for Operational Technology (OT)-relevant services on the local subnet. The analysis also assesses what the code suggests about the threat actor’s intended objectives and highlights where the implementation appears incomplete.

Function “ZionSiphon()” used by the malware author.
Figure 1: Function “ZionSiphon()” used by the malware author.

Targets and motivations

Israel-Focused Targeting and Messaging

The clearest indicators of intent in this sample are its hardcoded Israel-focused targeting checks and the strong political messaging found in some strings in the malware’s binary.

In the class initializer, the malware defines a set of IPv4 ranges, including “2.52.0.0-2.55.255.255”, “79.176.0.0-79.191.255.255”, and “212.150.0.0-212.150.255.255”, indicating that the author intended to restrict execution to a narrow range of addresses. All of the specified IP blocks are geographically located within Israel.

The malware obfuscates the IP ranges by encoding them in Base64.
Figure 2: The malware obfuscates the IP ranges by encoding them in Base64.

The ideological motivations behind this malware are also seemingly evident in two Base64-encoded strings embedded in the binary. The first (shown in Figure 1) is:

Netanyahu = SW4gc3VwcG9ydCBvZiBvdXIgYnJvdGhlcnMgaW4gSXJhbiwgUGFsZXN0aW5lLCBhbmQgWWVtZW4gYWdhaW5zdCBaaW9uaXN0IGFnZ3Jlc3Npb24uIEkgYW0gIjB4SUNTIi4=“, which decodes to “In support of our brothers in Iran, Palestine, and Yemen against Zionist aggression. I am "0xICS".

The second string, “Dimona = UG9pc29uaW5nIHRoZSBwb3B1bGF0aW9uIG9mIFRlbCBBdml2IGFuZCBIYWlmYQo=“, decodes to “Poisoning the population of Tel Aviv and Haifa”.  These strings do not appear to be used by the malware for any operational purpose, but they do offer an indication of the attacker’s motivations. Dimona, referenced in the second string, is an Israeli city in the Negev desert, primarily known as the site of the Shimon Peres Negev Nuclear Research Center.

The Dimona string as it appears in the decompiled malware, with the Base64-decoded text.
Figure 3: The Dimona string as it appears in the decompiled malware, with the Base64-decoded text.

The hardcoded IP ranges and propaganda‑style text suggest politically motivated intent, with Israel appearing to be a likely target.

Water and desalination-themed targeting?

The malware also includes Israel-linked strings in its target list, including “Mekorot, “Sorek”, “Hadera”, “Ashdod”, “Palmachim”, and “Shafdan”. All of the strings correspond to components of Israel’s national water infrastructure: Mekorot is Israel’s national water company responsible for managing the country’s water system, including major desalination and wastewater projects. Sorek, Hadera, Ashdod, and Palmachim are four of Israel’s five major seawater desalination plants, each producing tens of millions of cubic meters of drinking water annually. Shafdan is the country’s central wastewater treatment and reclamation facility. Their inclusion in ZionSiphon’s targeting list suggests an interest in infrastructure linked to Israel’s water sector.

Strings in the target list, all related to Israel and water treatment.
Figure 4: Strings in the target list, all related to Israel and water treatment.

Beyond geographic targeting, the sample contains a second layer of environment-specific checks aimed at water treatment and desalination systems. In the function ”IsDamDesalinationPlant()”, the malware first inspects running process names for strings such as “DesalPLC”, “ROController”, “SchneiderRO”, “DamRO”, “ReverseOsmosis”, “WaterGenix”, “RO_Pump”, “ChlorineCtrl”, “WaterPLC”, “SeaWaterRO”, “BrineControl”, “OsmosisPLC”, “DesalMonitor”, “RO_Filter”, “ChlorineDose”, “RO_Membrane”, “DesalFlow”, “WaterTreat”, and “SalinityCtrl”. These strings are directly related to desalination, reverse osmosis, chlorine handling, and plant control components typically seen in the water treatment industry.

The filesystem checks reinforce this focus. The code looks for directories such as “C:\Program Files\Desalination”, “C:\Program Files\Schneider Electric\Desal”, “C:\Program Files\IDE Technologies”, “C:\Program Files\Water Treatment”, “C:\Program Files\RO Systems”, “C:\Program Files\DesalTech”, “C:\Program Files\Aqua Solutions”, and “C:\Program Files\Hydro Systems”, as well as files including “C:\DesalConfig.ini”, “C:\ROConfig.ini”, “C:\DesalSettings.conf”, “C:\Program Files\Desalination\system.cfg”, “C:\WaterTreatment.ini”, “C:\ChlorineControl.dat”, “C:\RO_PumpSettings.ini”, and “C:\SalinityControl.ini.”

Malware Analysis

Privilege Escalation

The “RunAsAdmin” function from the malware sample.
Figure 5: The “RunAsAdmin” function from the malware sample.


The malware’s first major action is to check whether it is running with administrative rights. The “RunAsAdmin()” function calls “IsElevated()”, which retrieves the current Windows identity and checks whether it belongs to the local Administrators group. If the process is already elevated, execution proceeds normally.

The “IsElevated” function as seen in the sample.
Figure 6: The “IsElevated” function as seen in the sample.


If not, the code waits on the named mutex and launches “powershell.exe” with the argument “Start-Process -FilePath <current executable> -Verb RunAs”, after which it waits for that process to finish and then exits.

Persistence and stealth installation

Registry key creation.
Figure 7: Registry key creation.

Persistence is handled by “s1()”. This routine opens “HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run”, retrieves the current process path, and compares it to “stealthPath”. If the current file is not already running from that location, it copies itself to the stealth path and sets the copied file’s attributes to “hidden”.

The code then creates a “Run” value named “SystemHealthCheck” pointing to the stealth path. Because “stealthPath” is built from “LocalApplicationData” and the hardcoded filename “svchost.exe”, the result is a user-level persistence mechanism that disguises the payload under a familiar Windows process name. The combination of a hidden file and a plausible-sounding autorun value suggests an intent to blend into ordinary Windows artifacts rather than relying on more complex persistence methods.

Target determination

The malware’s targeting determination is divided between “IsTargetCountry()” and “IsDamDesalinationPlant()”. The “IsTargetCountry()” function retrieves the local IPv4 address, converts it to a numeric value, and compares it against each of the hardcoded ranges stored in “ipRanges”. Only if the address falls within one of these ranges does the code move on to next string-comparison step, which ultimately determines whether the country check succeeded.

The main target validation function.
Figure 8: The main target validation function.
 The “IsTargetCountry” function.
Figure 9 : The “IsTargetCountry” function.


IsDamDesalinationPlant()” then assesses whether the host resembles a relevant OT environment. It first scans running process names for the hardcoded strings previously mentioned, followed by checks for the presence of any of the hardcoded directories or files. The intended logic is clear: the payload activates only when both a geographic condition and an environment specific condition related to desalination or water treatment are met.

Figure. 10: An excerpt of the list of strings used in the “IsDamDesalinationPlant” function

Why this version appears dysfunctional

Although the file contains sabotage, scanning, and propagation functions, the current sample appears unable to satisfy its own target-country checking function even when the reported IP falls within the specified ranges. In the static constructor, every “ipRanges” entry is associated with the same decoded string, “Nqvbdk”, derived from “TnF2YmRr”. Later, “IsTargetCountry()” (shown in Figure 8) compares that stored value against “EncryptDecrypt("Israel", 5)”.

The “EncryptDecrypt” function
Figure 11: The “EncryptDecrypt” function

As implemented, “EncryptDecrypt("Israel", 5)” does not produce “Nqvbdk”, it produces a different string. This function seems to be a basic XOR encode/decode routine, XORing the string “Israel” with value of 5. Because the resulting output does not match “Nqvbdk” the comparison always fails, even when the host IP falls within one of the specified ranges. As a result, this build appears to consistently determine that the device is not a valid target. This behavior suggests that the version is either intentionally disabled, incorrectly configured, or left in an unfinished state. In fact, there is no XOR key that would transform “Israel” into “Nqvbdk” using this function.

Self-destruct function

The “SelfDestruct” function
Figure 12: The “SelfDestruct” function

If IsTargetCountry() returns false, the malware invokes “SelfDestruct()”. This routine removes the SystemHealthCheck value from “HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run”, writes a log file to “%TEMP%\target_verify.log” containing the message “Target not matched. Operation restricted to IL ranges. Self-destruct initiated.” and creates the batch file “%TEMP%\delete.bat”. This file repeatedly attempts to delete the malware’s executable, before deleting itself.

Local configuration file tampering

If the malware determines that the system it is on is a valid target, its first action is local file tampering. “IncreaseChlorineLevel()” checks a hardcoded list of configuration files associated with desalination, reverse osmosis, chlorine control, and water treatment OT/Industrial Control Systems (ICS).  As soon as it finds any one of these file present, it appends a fixed block of text to it and returns immediately.

The block of text appended to relevant configuration files.
Figure 13: The block of text appended to relevant configuration files.

The appended block of text contains the following entries: “Chlorine_Dose=10”, “Chlorine_Pump=ON”, “Chlorine_Flow=MAX”, “Chlorine_Valve=OPEN”, and “RO_Pressure=80”. Only if none of the hardcoded files are found does the malware proceed to its network-based OT discovery logic.

OT discovery and protocol logic

This section of the code attempts to identify devices on the local subnet, assign each one a protocol label, and then attempt protocol-specific communication. While the overall structure is consistent across protocols, the implementation quality varies significantly.

Figure 14: The ICS scanning function.

The discovery routine, “UZJctUZJctUZJct()”, obtains the local IPv4 address, reduces it to a /24 prefix, and iterates across hosts 1 through 255. For each host, it probes ports 502 (Modbus), 20000 (DNP3), and 102 (S7comm), which the code labels as “Modbus”, “DNP3”, and “S7” respectively if a valid response is received on the relevant port.

The probing is performed in parallel. For every “ip:port” combination, the code creates a task and attempts a TCP connection. The “100 ms” value in the probe routine is a per-connection timeout on “WaitOne(100, ...)”, rather than a delay between hosts or protocols. In practice, this results in a burst of short-lived OT-focused connection attempts across the local subnet.

Protocol validation and device classification

When a connection succeeds, the malware does not stop at the open port. It records the endpoint as an “ICSDevice” with an IP address, port, and protocol label. It then performs a second-stage validation by writing a NULL byte to the remote stream and reading the response that comes back.

For Modbus, the malware checks whether the first byte of the reply is between 1 and 255, for DNP3, it checks whether the first two bytes are “05 64”, and for S7comm, it checks whether the first byte is “03”. These checks are not advanced parsers, but they do show that the author understood the protocols well enough to add lightweight confirmation before sending follow-on data.

 The Modbus read request along with unfinished code for additional protocols.
Figure 15: The Modbus read request along with unfinished code for additional protocols.  

The most developed OT-specific logic is the Modbus-oriented path. In the function “IncreaseChlorineLevel(string targetIP, int targetPort, string parameter)”, the malware connects to the target and sends “01 03 00 00 00 0A”. It then reads the response and parses register values in pairs. The code then uses some basic logic to select a register index: for “Chlorine_Dose”, it looks for values greater than 0 and less than 1000; for “Turbine_Speed”, it looks for values greater than 100.

The Modbus command observed in the sample (01 03 00 00 00 0A) is a Read Holding Registers request. The first byte (0x01) represents the unit identifier, which in traditional Modbus RTU specifies the addressed slave device; in Modbus TCP, however, this value is often ignored or used only for gateway routing because device addressing is handled at the IP/TCP layer.

The second byte (0x03) is the Modbus function code indicating a Read Holding Registers request. The following two bytes (0x00 0x00) specify the starting register address, indicating that the read begins at address zero. The final two bytes (0x00 0A) define the number of registers to read, in this case ten consecutive registers. Taken together, the command requests the contents of the first ten holding registers from the target device and represents a valid, commonly used Modbus operation.

If a plausible register is found, the malware builds a six-byte Modbus write using function code “6” (Write)” and sets the value to 100 for “Chlorine_Dose”, or 0 for any other parameter. If no plausible register is found, it falls back to using hardcoded write frames. In the main malware path, however, the code only calls this function with “Chlorine_Dose".

If none of the ten registers meets the expected criteria, the malware does not abandon the operation. Instead, it defaults to a set of hardcoded Modbus write frames that specify predetermined register addresses and values. This behavior suggests that the attacker had only partial knowledge of the target environment. The initial register-scanning logic appears to be an attempt at dynamic discovery, while the fallback logic ensures that a write operation is still attempted even if that discovery fails.

Incomplete DNP3 and S7comm Logic

The DNP3 and S7comm branches appear much less complete. In “GetCommand()”, the DNP3 path returns the fixed byte sequence “05 64 0A 0C 01 02”, while the S7comm path returns “03 00 00 13 0E 00”. Neither sequence resembles a fully formed command for the respective protocol.

In the case of the S7comm section, the five byte‑ sequence found in the malware sample (05 00 1C 22 1E) most closely matches the beginning of an S7comm parameter block, specifically the header of a “WriteVar (0x05)” request, which is the S7comm equivalent of a Modbus register write operation. In the S7comm protocol, the first byte of a parameter block identifies the function code,  but the remaining bytes in this case do not form a valid item definition. A vaild S7 WriteVar parameter requires at least one item and a full 11-byte variable-specification structure. By comparison this 5‑ byte array is far too short to be a complete or usable command.

The zero item count (0x00) and the trailing three bytes appear to be either uninitialized data or the beginning of an incomplete address field. Together, these details suggest that the attacker likely intended to implement S7 WriteVar functionality, like the Modbus function, but left this portion of the code unfinished.

The DNP3 branch of the malware also appears to be only partially implemented. The byte sequence returned by the DNP3 path (05 64 0A 0C 01 02) begins with the correct two‑byte DNP3 link‑layer sync header (0x05 0x64) and includes additional bytes that resemble the early portion of a link‑layer header. However, the sequence is far too short to constitute a valid DNP3 frame. It lacks the required destination and source address fields, the 16‑bit CRC blocks, and any application‑layer payload in which DNP3 function code would reside. As a result, this fragment does not represent a meaningful DNP3 command.

The incomplete S7 and DNP3 fragments suggest that these protocol branches were still in a developmental or experimental state when the malware was compiled. Both contain protocol‑accurate prefixes, indicating an intent to implement multi‑protocol OT capabilities, however for reasons unknow, these sections were not fully implemented or could not be completed prior to deployment.

USB Propagation

The malware also includes a removable-media propagation mechanism. The “sdfsdfsfsdfsdfqw()” function scans for drives, selects those identified as removable, and copies the hidden payload to each one as “svchost.exe” if it is not already present. The copied executable is marked with the “Hidden” and “System” attributes to reduce visibility.

The malware then calls “CreateUSBShortcut()”, which uses “WScript.Shell” to create .lnk files for each file in the removable drive root. Each shortcut’s TargetPath is set to the hidden malware copy, the icon is set to “shell32.dll, 4” (this is the windows genericfile icon), and the original file is hidden. Were a victim to click this “file,” they would unknowingly run the malware.

Figure 14:The creation of the shortcut on the USB device.

Key Insights

ZionSiphon represents a notable, though incomplete, attempt to build malware capable of malicious interaction with OT systems targeting water treatment and desalination environments.

While many of ZionSiphon’s individual capabilities align with patterns commonly found in commodity malware, the combination of politically motivated messaging, Israel‑specific IP targeting, and an explicit focus on desalination‑related processes distinguishes it from purely opportunistic threats. The inclusion of Modbus sabotage logic, filesystem tampering targeting chlorine and pressure control, and subnet‑wide ICS scanning demonstrates a clear intent to interact directly with industrial processes controllers and to cause significant damage and potential harm, rather than merely disrupt IT endpoints.

At the same time, numerous implementation flaws, most notably the dysfunctional country‑validation logic and the placeholder DNP3 and S7comm components, suggest that analyzed version is either a development build, a prematurely deployed sample, or intentionally defanged for testing purposes. Despite these limitations, the overall structure of the code likely indicates a threat actor experimenting with multi‑protocol OT manipulation, persistence within operational networks, and removable‑media propagation techniques reminiscent of earlier ICS‑targeting campaigns.

Even in its unfinished state, ZionSiphon underscores a growing trend in which threat actors are increasingly experimenting with OT‑oriented malware and applying it to the targeting of critical infrastructure. Continued monitoring, rapid anomaly detection, and cross‑visibility between IT and OT environments remain essential for identifying early‑stage threats like this before they evolve into operationally viable attacks.

Credit to Calum Hall (Cyber Analyst)
Edited by Ryan Traill (Content Manager)

References

1.        https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/07c3bbe60d47240df7152f72beb98ea373d9600946860bad12f7bc617a5d6f5f/details

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About the author
Calum Hall
Technical Content Researcher
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