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November 3, 2021

Defending Against Living Off the Land Cyber Attacks

Find out how hackers utilize living off the land techniques to navigate environments without detection and how to safeguard against these threats.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Oakley Cox
Director of Product
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03
Nov 2021

What is Living off the Land attack?

While the term was first coined in 2013, Living off the Land tools, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) have boomed in popularity in recent years. In part, this is because the traditional approach of defensive security — blocklisting file hashes, domains, and other traces of threats encountered in previous attacks — is ill-equipped to identify these attacks. So these stealthy, often fileless attacks, have pushed their way into the mainstream.

Definition and overview

Living off the Land is a strategy which involves threat actors leveraging the utilities readily available within the target organization’s digital environment to move through the cyber kill chain. This is a popular method because It is often cheaper, easier, and more effective to make use of an organization’s own infrastructure in an attempt to attack rather than writing bespoke malware for every heist.

How does Living off the Land attack work?

Living off the Land attacks have a particular history in highly organized, targeted hacking. Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) groups have long favored Living off the Land TTPs, since evasion is a top priority. And trends show that ransomware groups are opting for human-operated ransomware that relies heavily on Living off the Land techniques, instead of commodity malware.

Among some of the most commonly used tools exploited for nefarious purposes are Powershell, Windows Management Interface (WMI), and PsExec. These tools are regularly used by network administrators as part of their daily routines, and traditional security tools reliant on static rules and signatures often have a hard time distinguishing between legitimate and malicious use.

Living off the Land attack techniques

Before a threat actor turns your infrastructure against you in a Living off the Land attack, they must be able to execute commands on a targeted system. Therefore, Living off the Land attacks are a post-infection framework for network reconnaissance, lateral movement, and persistence.

Once a device is infected, there are hundreds of system tools at the attacker’s disposal – these may be pre-installed on the system or downloaded via Microsoft-signed binaries. And, in the wrong hands, other trusted third-party administration tools on the network can also turn from friend to foe.

As Living off the Land techniques evolve, a single typical attack is hard to determine. However, we can group these TTPs in broader categories.

Microsoft-signed Living off the Land TTPs

Microsoft is ubiquitous in the business world and across industries. The Living off the Land Binaries and Scripts (LOLBAS) project aims to document all Microsoft-signed binaries and scripts that include functionality for APT groups in Living off the Land attacks. To date, there are 135 system tools on this list that are vulnerable to misuse, each aiding a different objective. These could be the creation of new user accounts, data compression and exfiltration, system information gathering, launching processes on a target destination or even the disablement of security services. Both Microsoft’s documentation of vulnerable pre-installed tools and the LOLBAS project are growing, non-exhaustive lists.

Command line exploitation

When it comes to delivering a malicious payload to the target, WMI (WMIC.exe), the command line tool (cmd.exe), and PowerShell (powershell.exe) were used most frequently by attackers, according to a recent study. These commonly exploited command line utilities are used during the configuration of security settings and system properties, provide sensitive network or device status updates, and facilitate the transfer and execution of files between devices.

Specifically, the command line group shares three key traits:

  1. They are readily available on Windows systems.
  2. They are frequently used by most administrators or internal processes to perform everyday tasks.
  3. They can perform their core functionalities without writing data to a disk.

Mimikatz

Mimikatz differs from other tools in that it is not pre-installed on most systems. It is an open-source utility used for the dumping of passwords, hashes, PINs and Kerberos tickets. While some network administrators may use Mimikatz to perform internal vulnerability assessments, it is not readily available on Windows systems.

Traditional security approaches used to detect the download, installation, and use of Mimikatz are often insufficient. There exists a wide range of verified and well documented techniques for obfuscating tooling like Mimikatz, meaning even an unsophisticated attacker can subvert basic string or hash-based detections.

Tips for stopping Living off the Land attacks

Living off the Land techniques have proven incredibly effective at enabling attackers to blend into organizations’ digital environments. It is normal for millions of credentials, network tools, and processes to be logged each day across a single digital ecosystem. So how can defenders spot malicious use of legitimate tools amidst this digital noise?

Network hygiene: As with most threats, basic network hygiene is the first step. This includes implementing the principle of least privilege, de-activating all unnecessary programs, setting up software whitelisting, and performing asset and application inventory checks. However, while these measures are a step in the right direction, with enough time a sophisticated attacker will always manage to work their way around them.

Self-Learning AI technology: This technology, exclusive to Darktrace, has become fundamental in shining a light on attackers using an organization’s own infrastructure against them. It learns any given unique digital environment from the ground up, understanding the ‘pattern of life’ for every device and user. Living off the Land attacks are therefore identified in real time from a series of subtle deviations. This might include a new credential or unusual SMB / DCE-RPC usage.

Its deep understanding of the business enables it to spot attacks that fly under the radar of other tools. With a Living off the Land attack, the AI will recognize that although usage of particular tool might be normal for an organization, the way in which that tool is used allows the AI to reveal seemingly benign behavior as unmistakably malicious.

Example of Self-Learning AI

Self-Learning AI might observe the frequent usage of Powershell user-agents across multiple devices, but will only report an incident if the user agent is observed on a device at an unusual time.

Similarly, Darktrace might observe WMI commands being sent between thousands of combinations of devices each day, but will only alert on such activity if the commands are uncommon for both the source and the destination.

And even the subtle indicators of Mimikatz exploitation, like new credential usage or uncommon SMB traffic, will not be buried among the normal operations of the infrastructure.

Final thoughts on Living off the Land techniques

Living off the Land techniques aren’t going away any time soon. Recognizing this, security teams are beginning to move away from ‘legacy’-based defenses that rely on historical attack data to catch the next attack, and towards AI that uses a bespoke and evolving understanding of its surroundings to detect subtle deviations indicative of a threat – even if that threat makes use of legitimate tools.

Thanks to Darktrace analysts Isabel Finn and Paul Jennings for their insights on the above threat find and supporting MITRE ATT&CK mapping.

Learn more about Self-Learning AI

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Oakley Cox
Director of Product

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May 20, 2025

Adapting to new USCG cybersecurity mandates: Darktrace for ports and maritime systems

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What is the Marine Transportation System (MTS)?

Marine Transportation Systems (MTS) play a substantial roll in U.S. commerce, military readiness, and economic security. Defined as a critical national infrastructure, the MTS encompasses all aspects of maritime transportation from ships and ports to the inland waterways and the rail and roadways that connect them.

MTS interconnected systems include:

  • Waterways: Coastal and inland rivers, shipping channels, and harbors
  • Ports: Terminals, piers, and facilities where cargo and passengers are transferred
  • Vessels: Commercial ships, barges, ferries, and support craft
  • Intermodal Connections: Railroads, highways, and logistics hubs that tie maritime transport into national and global supply chains

The Coast Guard plays a central role in ensuring the safety, security, and efficiency of the MTS, handling over $5.4 trillion in annual economic activity. As digital systems increasingly support operations across the MTS, from crane control to cargo tracking, cybersecurity has become essential to protecting this lifeline of U.S. trade and infrastructure.

Maritime Transportation Systems also enable international trade, making them prime targets for cyber threats from ransomware gangs to nation-state actors.

To defend against growing threats, the United States Coast Guard (USCG) has moved from encouraging cybersecurity best practices to enforcing them, culminating in a new mandate that goes into effect on July 16, 2025. These regulations aim to secure the digital backbone of the maritime industry.

Why maritime ports are at risk

Modern ports are a blend of legacy and modern OT, IoT, and IT digitally connected technologies that enable crane operations, container tracking, terminal storage, logistics, and remote maintenance.

Many of these systems were never designed with cybersecurity in mind, making them vulnerable to lateral movement and disruptive ransomware attack spillover.

The convergence of business IT networks and operational infrastructure further expands the attack surface, especially with the rise of cloud adoption and unmanaged IoT and IIoT devices.

Cyber incidents in recent years have demonstrated how ransomware or malicious activity can halt crane operations, disrupt logistics, and compromise safety at scale threatening not only port operations, but national security and economic stability.

Relevant cyber-attacks on maritime ports

Maersk & Port of Los Angeles (2017 – NotPetya):
A ransomware attack crippled A.P. Moller-Maersk, the world’s largest shipping company. Operations at 17 ports, including the Port of Los Angeles, were halted due to system outages, causing weeks of logistical chaos.

Port of San Diego (2018 – Ransomware Attack):
A ransomware attack targeted the Port of San Diego, disrupting internal IT systems including public records, business services, and dockside cargo operations. While marine traffic was unaffected, commercial activity slowed significantly during recovery.

Port of Houston (2021 – Nation-State Intrusion):
A suspected nation-state actor exploited a known vulnerability in a Port of Houston web application to gain access to its network. While the attack was reportedly thwarted, it triggered a federal investigation and highlighted the vulnerability of maritime systems.

Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust, India (2022 – Ransomware Incident):
India’s largest container port experienced disruptions due to a ransomware attack affecting operations and logistics systems. Container handling and cargo movement slowed as IT systems were taken offline during recovery efforts.

A regulatory shift: From guidance to enforcement

Since the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) of 2002, ports have been required to develop and maintain security plans. Cybersecurity formally entered the regulatory fold in 2020 with revisions to 33 CFR Part 105 and 106, requiring port authorities to assess and address computer system vulnerabilities.

In January 2025, the USCG finalized new rules to enforce cybersecurity practices across the MTS. Key elements include (but are not limited to):

  • A dedicated cyber incident response plan (PR.IP-9)
  • Routine cybersecurity risk assessments and exercises (ID.RA)
  • Designation of a cybersecurity officer and regular workforce training (section 3.1)
  • Controls for access management, segmentation, logging, and encryption (PR.AC-1:7)
  • Supply chain risk management (ID.SC)
  • Incident reporting to the National Response Center

Port operators are encouraged to align their programs with the NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF 2.0) and NIST SP 800-82r3, which provide comprehensive guidance for IT and OT security in industrial environments.

How Darktrace can support maritime & ports

Unified IT + OT + Cloud coverage

Maritime ports operate in hybrid environments spanning business IT systems (finance, HR, ERP), industrial OT (cranes, gates, pumps, sensors), and an increasing array of cloud and SaaS platforms.

Darktrace is the only vendor that provides native visibility and threat detection across OT/IoT, IT, cloud, and SaaS environments — all in a single platform. This means:

  • Cranes and other physical process control networks are monitored in the same dashboard as Active Directory and Office 365.
  • Threats that start in the cloud (e.g., phishing, SaaS token theft) and pivot or attempt to pivot into OT are caught early — eliminating blind spots that siloed tools miss.

This unification is critical to meeting USCG requirements for network-wide monitoring, risk identification, and incident response.

AI that understands your environment. Not just known threats

Darktrace’s AI doesn’t rely on rules or signatures. Instead, it uses Self-Learning AI TM that builds a unique “pattern of life” for every device, protocol, user, and network segment, whether it’s a crane router or PLC, SCADA server, Workstation, or Linux file server.

  • No predefined baselines or manual training
  • Real-time anomaly detection for zero-days, ransomware, and supply chain compromise
  • Continuous adaptation to new devices, configurations, and operations

This approach is critical in diverse distributed OT environments where change and anomalous activity on the network are more frequent. It also dramatically reduces the time and expertise needed to classify and inventory assets, even for unknown or custom-built systems.

Supporting incident response requirements

A key USCG requirement is that cybersecurity plans must support effective incident response.

Key expectations include:

  • Defined response roles and procedures: Personnel must know what to do and when (RS.CO-1).
  • Timely reporting: Incidents must be reported and categorized according to established criteria (RS.CO-2, RS.AN-4).
  • Effective communication: Information must be shared internally and externally, including voluntary collaboration with law enforcement and industry peers (RS.CO-3 through RS.CO-5).
  • Thorough analysis: Alerts must be investigated, impacts understood, and forensic evidence gathered to support decision-making and recovery (RS.AN-1 through RS.AN-5).
  • Swift mitigation: Incidents must be contained and resolved efficiently, with newly discovered vulnerabilities addressed or documented (RS.MI-1 through RS.MI-3).
  • Ongoing improvement: Organizations must refine their response plans using lessons learned from past incidents (RS.IM-1 and RS.IM-2).

That means detections need to be clear, accurate, and actionable.

Darktrace cuts through the noise using AI that prioritizes only high-confidence incidents and provides natural-language narratives and investigative reports that explain:

  • What’s happening, where it’s happening, when it’s happening
  • Why it’s unusual
  • How to respond

Result: Port security teams often lean and multi-tasked can meet USCG response-time expectations and reporting needs without needing to scale headcount or triage hundreds of alerts.

Built-for-edge deployment

Maritime environments are constrained. Many traditional SaaS deployment types often are unsuitable for tugboats, cranes, or air-gapped terminal systems.

Darktrace builds and maintains its own ruggedized, purpose-built appliances and unique virtual deployment options that:

  • Deploy directly into crane networks or terminal enclosures
  • Require no configuration or tuning, drop-in ready
  • Support secure over-the-air updates and fleet management
  • Operate without cloud dependency, supporting isolated and air-gapped systems

Use case: Multiple ports have been able to deploy Darktrace directly into the crane’s switch enclosure, securing lateral movement paths without interfering with the crane control software itself.

Segmentation enforcement & real-time threat containment

Darktrace visualizes real-time connectivity and attack pathways across IT, OT, and IoT it and integrates with firewalls (e.g., Fortinet, Cisco, Palo Alto) to enforce segmentation using AI insights alongside Darktrace’s own native autonomous and human confirmed response capabilities.

Benefits of autonomous and human confirmed response:

  • Auto-isolate rogue devices before the threat can escalate
  • Quarantine a suspicious connectivity with confidence operations won’t be halted
  • Autonomously buy time for human responders during off-hours or holidays
  • This ensures segmentation isn't just documented but that in the case of its failure or exploitation responses are performed as a compensating control

No reliance on 3rd parties or external connectivity

Darktrace’s supply chain integrity is a core part of its value to critical infrastructure customers. Unlike solutions that rely on indirect data collection or third-party appliances, Darktrace:

  • Uses in-house engineered sensors and appliances
  • Does not require transmission of data to or from the cloud

This ensures confidence in both your cyber visibility and the security of the tools you deploy.

See examples here of how Darktrace stopped supply chain attacks:

Readiness for USCG and Beyond

With a self-learning system that adapts to each unique port environment, Darktrace helps maritime operators not just comply but build lasting cyber resilience in a high-threat landscape.

Cybersecurity is no longer optional for U.S. ports its operationally and nationally critical. Darktrace delivers the intelligence, automation, and precision needed to meet USCG requirements and protect the digital lifeblood of the modern port.

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About the author
Daniel Simonds
Director of Operational Technology

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May 20, 2025

Catching a RAT: How Darktrace Neutralized AsyncRAT

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What is a RAT?

As the proliferation of new and more advanced cyber threats continues, the Remote Access Trojan (RAT) remains a classic tool in a threat actor's arsenal. RATs, whether standardized or custom-built, enable attackers to remotely control compromised devices, facilitating a range of malicious activities.

What is AsyncRAT?

Since its first appearance in 2019, AsyncRAT has become increasingly popular among a wide range of threat actors, including cybercriminals and advanced persistent threat (APT) groups.

Originally available on GitHub as a legitimate tool, its open-source nature has led to widespread exploitation. AsyncRAT has been used in numerous campaigns, including prolonged attacks on essential US infrastructure, and has even reportedly penetrated the Chinese cybercriminal underground market [1] [2].

How does AsyncRAT work?

Original source code analysis of AsyncRAT demonstrates that once installed, it establishes persistence via techniques such as creating scheduled tasks or registry keys and uses SeDebugPrivilege to gain elevated privileges [3].

Its key features include:

  • Keylogging
  • File search
  • Remote audio and camera access
  • Exfiltration techniques
  • Staging for final payload delivery

These are generally typical functions found in traditional RATs. However, it also boasts interesting anti-detection capabilities. Due to the popularity of Virtual Machines (VM) and sandboxes for dynamic analysis, this RAT checks for the manufacturer via the WMI query 'Select * from Win32_ComputerSystem' and looks for strings containing 'VMware' and 'VirtualBox' [4].

Darktrace’s coverage of AsyncRAT

In late 2024 and early 2025, Darktrace observed a spike in AsyncRAT activity across various customer environments. Multiple indicators of post-compromise were detected, including devices attempting or successfully connecting to endpoints associated with AsyncRAT.

On several occasions, Darktrace identified a clear association with AsyncRAT through the digital certificates of the highlighted SSL endpoints. Darktrace’s Real-time Detection effectively identified and alerted on suspicious activities related to AsyncRAT. In one notable incident, Darktrace’s Autonomous Response promptly took action to contain the emerging threat posed by AsyncRAT.

AsyncRAT attack overview

On December 20, 2024, Darktrace first identified the use of AsyncRAT, noting a device successfully establishing SSL connections to the uncommon external IP 185.49.126[.]50 (AS199654 Oxide Group Limited) via port 6606. The IP address appears to be associated with AsyncRAT as flagged by open-source intelligence (OSINT) sources [5]. This activity triggered the device to alert the ‘Anomalous Connection / Rare External SSL Self-Signed' model.

Model alert in Darktrace / NETWORK showing the repeated SSL connections to a rare external Self-Signed endpoint, 185.49.126[.]50.
Figure 1: Model alert in Darktrace / NETWORK showing the repeated SSL connections to a rare external Self-Signed endpoint, 185.49.126[.]50.

Following these initial connections, the device was observed making a significantly higher number of connections to the same endpoint 185.49.126[.]50 via port 6606 over an extended period. This pattern suggested beaconing activity and triggered the 'Compromise/Beaconing Activity to External Rare' model alert.

Further analysis of the original source code, available publicly, outlines the default ports used by AsyncRAT clients for command-and-control (C2) communications [6]. It reveals that port 6606 is the default port for creating a new AsyncRAT client. Darktrace identified both the Certificate Issuer and the Certificate Subject as "CN=AsyncRAT Server". This SSL certificate encrypts the packets between the compromised system and the server. These indicators of compromise (IoCs) detected by Darktrace further suggest that the device was successfully connecting to a server associated with AsyncRAT.

Model alert in Darktrace / NETWORK displaying the Digital Certificate attributes, IP address and port number associated with AsyncRAT.
Figure 2: Model alert in Darktrace / NETWORK displaying the Digital Certificate attributes, IP address and port number associated with AsyncRAT.
Darktrace’s detection of repeated connections to the suspicious IP address 185.49.126[.]50 over port 6606, indicative of beaconing behavior.
Figure 3: Darktrace’s detection of repeated connections to the suspicious IP address 185.49.126[.]50 over port 6606, indicative of beaconing behavior.
Darktrace's Autonomous Response actions blocking the suspicious IP address,185.49.126[.]50.
Figure 4: Darktrace's Autonomous Response actions blocking the suspicious IP address,185.49.126[.]50.

A few days later, the same device was detected making numerous connections to a different IP address, 195.26.255[.]81 (AS40021 NL-811-40021), via various ports including 2106, 6606, 7707, and 8808. Notably, ports 7707 and 8808 are also default ports specified in the original AsyncRAT source code [6].

Darktrace’s detection of connections to the suspicious endpoint 195.26.255[.]81, where the default ports (6606, 7707, and 8808) for AsyncRAT were observed.
Figure 5: Darktrace’s detection of connections to the suspicious endpoint 195.26.255[.]81, where the default ports (6606, 7707, and 8808) for AsyncRAT were observed.

Similar to the activity observed with the first endpoint, 185.49.126[.]50, the Certificate Issuer for the connections to 195.26.255[.]81 was identified as "CN=AsyncRAT Server". Further OSINT investigation confirmed associations between the IP address 195.26.255[.]81 and AsyncRAT [7].

Darktrace's detection of a connection to the suspicious IP address 195.26.255[.]81 and the domain name identified under the common name (CN) of a certificate as AsyncRAT Server
Figure 6: Darktrace's detection of a connection to the suspicious IP address 195.26.255[.]81 and the domain name identified under the common name (CN) of a certificate as AsyncRAT Server.

Once again, Darktrace's Autonomous Response acted swiftly, blocking the connections to 195.26.255[.]81 throughout the observed AsyncRAT activity.

Figure 7: Darktrace's Autonomous Response actions were applied against the suspicious IP address 195.26.255[.]81.

A day later, Darktrace again alerted to further suspicious activity from the device. This time, connections to the suspicious endpoint 'kashuub[.]com' and IP address 191.96.207[.]246 via port 8041 were observed. Further analysis of port 8041 suggests it is commonly associated with ScreenConnect or Xcorpeon ASIC Carrier Ethernet Transport [8]. ScreenConnect has been observed in recent campaign’s where AsyncRAT has been utilized [9]. Additionally, one of the ASN’s observed, namely ‘ASN Oxide Group Limited’, was seen in both connections to kashuub[.]com and 185.49.126[.]50.

This could suggest a parallel between the two endpoints, indicating they might be hosting AsyncRAT C2 servers, as inferred from our previous analysis of the endpoint 185.49.126[.]50 and its association with AsyncRAT [5]. OSINT reporting suggests that the “kashuub[.]com” endpoint may be associated with ScreenConnect scam domains, further supporting the assumption that the endpoint could be a C2 server.

Darktrace’s Autonomous Response technology was once again able to support the customer here, blocking connections to “kashuub[.]com”. Ultimately, this intervention halted the compromise and prevented the attack from escalating or any sensitive data from being exfiltrated from the customer’s network into the hands of the threat actors.

Darktrace’s Autonomous Response applied a total of nine actions against the IP address 191.96.207[.]246 and the domain 'kashuub[.]com', successfully blocking the connections.
Figure 8: Darktrace’s Autonomous Response applied a total of nine actions against the IP address 191.96.207[.]246 and the domain 'kashuub[.]com', successfully blocking the connections.

Due to the popularity of this RAT, it is difficult to determine the motive behind the attack; however, from existing knowledge of what the RAT does, we can assume accessing and exfiltrating sensitive customer data may have been a factor.

Conclusion

While some cybercriminals seek stability and simplicity, openly available RATs like AsyncRAT provide the infrastructure and open the door for even the most amateur threat actors to compromise sensitive networks. As the cyber landscape continually shifts, RATs are now being used in all types of attacks.

Darktrace’s suite of AI-driven tools provides organizations with the infrastructure to achieve complete visibility and control over emerging threats within their network environment. Although AsyncRAT’s lack of concealment allowed Darktrace to quickly detect the developing threat and alert on unusual behaviors, it was ultimately Darktrace Autonomous Response's consistent blocking of suspicious connections that prevented a more disruptive attack.

Credit to Isabel Evans (Cyber Analyst), Priya Thapa (Cyber Analyst) and Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Appendices

  • Real-time Detection Models
       
    • Compromise / Suspicious SSL Activity
    •  
    • Compromise / Beaconing Activity To      External Rare
    •  
    • Compromise / High Volume of      Connections with Beacon Score
    •  
    • Anomalous Connection / Suspicious      Self-Signed SSL
    •  
    • Compromise / Sustained SSL or HTTP      Increase
    •  
    • Compromise / SSL Beaconing to Rare      Destination
    •  
    • Compromise / Suspicious Beaconing      Behaviour
    •  
    • Compromise / Large Number of      Suspicious Failed Connections
  •  
  • Autonomous     Response Models
       
    • Antigena / Network / Significant      Anomaly / Antigena Controlled and Model Alert
    •  
    • Antigena / Network / Significant      Anomaly / Antigena Enhanced Monitoring from Client Block

List of IoCs

·     185.49.126[.]50 - IP – AsyncRAT C2 Endpoint

·     195.26.255[.]81 – IP - AsyncRAT C2 Endpoint

·      191.96.207[.]246 – IP – Likely AsyncRAT C2 Endpoint

·     CN=AsyncRAT Server - SSL certificate - AsyncRATC2 Infrastructure

·      Kashuub[.]com– Hostname – Likely AsyncRAT C2 Endpoint

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping:

Tactic –Technique – Sub-Technique  

 

Execution– T1053 - Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task

DefenceEvasion – T1497 - Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks

Discovery– T1057 – Process Discovery

Discovery– T1082 – System Information Discovery

LateralMovement - T1021.001 - Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol

Collection/ Credential Access – T1056 – Input Capture: Keylogging

Collection– T1125 – Video Capture

Commandand Control – T1105 - Ingress Tool Transfer

Commandand Control – T1219 - Remote Access Software

Exfiltration– T1041 - Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

 

References

[1]  https://blog.talosintelligence.com/operation-layover-how-we-tracked-attack/

[2] https://intel471.com/blog/china-cybercrime-undergrond-deepmix-tea-horse-road-great-firewall

[3] https://www.attackiq.com/2024/08/01/emulate-asyncrat/

[4] https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/spear-phishing-campaign-with-new-techniques-aimed-at-aviation-companies

[5] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/185.49.126[.]50/community

[6] https://dfir.ch/posts/asyncrat_quasarrat/

[7] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/195.26.255[.]81

[8] https://www.speedguide.net/port.php?port=8041

[9] https://www.esentire.com/blog/exploring-the-infection-chain-screenconnects-link-to-asyncrat-deployment

[10] https://scammer.info/t/taking-out-connectwise-sites/153479/518?page=26

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About the author
Isabel Evans
Cyber Analyst
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