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July 8, 2021

Minimizing the REvil Impact Delivered via Kaseya Servers

Ransomware group REvil recently infiltrated Managed Service Providers for 1,500+ companies. See how Darktrace's autonomous response protected customer data.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Max Heinemeyer
Global Field CISO
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08
Jul 2021

As the USA prepared for a holiday weekend ahead of the Fourth of July, the ransomware group REvil were leveraging a vulnerability in Kaseya software to attack Managed Service Providers (MSPs) and their downstream customers. At least 1,500 companies appear to have been affected, even ones with no direct relationship to Kaseya.

At the time of writing, it appears that a zero-day vulnerability was used to gain access to the Kaseya VSA servers, before deploying ransomware on the endpoints managed by those VSA servers. This modus operandi vastly differs from previous ransomware campaigns which have traditionally been human-operated, direct intrusions.

The analysis below offers Darktrace’s insights into the campaign by looking at a real-life example. It highlights how Self-Learning AI detected the ransomware attack, and how Antigena protected customer data on the network from being encrypted.

Dissecting REvil ransomware from the network perspective

Antigena detected the first signs of ransomware on the network as soon as encryption had begun. The graphic below illustrates the start of the ransomware encryption over SMB shares. When the graphic was taken, the attack was happening live and had never been seen before. As it was a novel threat, Darktrace stopped the network encryption without any static signatures or rules.

Figure 1: Darktrace detects encryption from the infected device

The ransomware began to take action at 11:08:32, shown by the ‘SMB Delete Success’ from the infected laptop to an SMB server. While the laptop sometimes reads files on that SMB server, it never deletes these types of files on this particular file share, so Darktrace detected this activity as new and unusual.

Simultaneously, the infected laptop created the ransom note ‘943860t-readme.txt’. Again, the ‘SMB Write Success’ to the SMB server was new activity – and crucially, Darktrace did not look for a static string or a known ransom note. Instead – by previously learning the ‘normal’ behavior of every entity, peer group, and the overall enterprise – it identified that the activity was unusual and new for this organization and device.

By detecting and correlating these subtle anomalies, Darktrace identified this as the earliest stages of ransomware encryption on the network and Antigena took immediate action.

Figure 2: Snapshot of Antigena’s actions

Antigena took two precise steps:

  1. Enforce ‘pattern of life’ for five minutes: This prevented the infected laptop from making any connections that were new or unusual. In this case, it prevented any further new SMB encryption activity.
  2. Quarantine device for 24 hours: Usually, Antigena would not take such drastic action, but it was clear that this activity closely resembled ransomware behavior, so Antigena decided to quarantine the device on the network completely to prevent it from doing any further damage.

For several minutes, the infected laptop kept trying to connect to other internal devices via SMB to continue the encryption activity. It was blocked by Antigena at every stage, limiting the spread of the attack and mitigating any damage posed via the network encryption.

Figure 3: End of the attack

On a technical level, Antigena delivered the blocking mechanisms via integrations with native security controls such as existing firewalls, or by taking action itself to disrupt the connections.

The below graphic shows the ‘pattern of life’ for all network connections for the infected laptop. The three red dots represent Darktrace’s detections and pinpoint the exact moment in time when REvil ransomware was installed on the laptop. The graphic also shows an abrupt stop to all network communication as Antigena quarantined the device.

Figure 4: Network connections from the compromised laptop

Attacks will always get in

During the incident, part of the encryption happened locally on the endpoint device, which Darktrace had no visibility over. Furthermore, the Internet-facing Kaseya VSA server that was initially compromised was not visible to Darktrace in this case.

Nevertheless, Self-Learning AI detected the infection as soon as it reached the network. This shows the importance of being able to defend against active ransomware within the enterprise. Organizations cannot rely solely on a single layer of defense to keep threats out. An attacker will always – eventually – breach your environment. Defense therefore needs to change its approach towards detecting and mitigating damage once an adversary is inside.

Many cyber-attacks succeed in bypassing endpoint controls and begin to spread aggressively in corporate environments. Autonomous Response can provide resilience in such cases, even for novel campaigns and new strains of malware.

Thanks to Self-Learning AI, ransomware from the REvil attack could not perform any encryption over the network, and files available on that network were saved. This included the organization’s critical file servers which did not have Kaseya installed and thus did not receive the initial payload via the malicious update directly. By interrupting the attack as it happened, Antigena prevented thousands of files on network shares from being encrypted.

Further observations

Data exfiltration

In contrast to other REvil intrusions Darktrace has caught in the past, no data exfiltration has been observed. This is interesting as it differs from the general trend this last year where cyber-criminal groups generally focus more on the exfiltration of data to hold their victims to ransom, in response to companies becoming better with backups.

Bitcoin

REvil has demanded a total payment of $70 million in Bitcoin. For a group that tries to maximize their profits, this seems odd for two reasons:

  1. How do they expect a single entity to collect $70 million from potentially thousands of affected organizations? They must be aware of the massive logistical challenges behind this, even if they do expect Kaseya to act as a focal point for collecting the money.
  2. Since DarkSide lost access to most of the Colonial Pipeline ransom, ransomware groups have shifted to demanding payments in Monero rather than Bitcoin. Monero appears to be more difficult to track for law enforcement agencies. The fact REvil are using Bitcoin, a more traceable cryptocurrency, appears counter-productive to their usual goal of maximizing profits.

Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS)

Darktrace also noticed that other, more traditional ‘big game hunting’ REvil ransomware operations took place over the same weekend. This is not surprising as REvil is running a RaaS model, so it is likely some affiliate groups continued their regular big game hunting attacks while the Kaseya supply chain attack was underway.

Unpredictable is not undefendable

The weekend of the Fourth of July experienced major supply chain attacks against Kaseya and separately, against California-based distributor Synnex. Threats are coming from every direction – leveraging zero-days, social engineering tactics, and other advanced tools.

The case study above demonstrates how self-learning technology detects such attacks and minimizes the damage. It functions as a crucial part of defense-in-depth when other layers – such as endpoint protection, threat intelligence or known signatures and rules – fail to detect unknown threats.

The attack happened in milliseconds, faster than any human security team could react. Autonomous Response has proven invaluable in outpacing this new generation of machine-speed threats. It keeps thousands of organizations safe around the world, around the clock, stopping an attack every second.

Darktrace model detections

  • Compromise / Ransomware / Suspicious SMB Activity
  • Compromise / Ransomware / Suspicious SMB File Extension
  • Compromise / Ransomware / Ransom or Offensive Words Written to SMB
  • Compromise / Ransomware / Ransom or Offensive Words Read from SMB
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Max Heinemeyer
Global Field CISO

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November 20, 2025

Securing Generative AI: Managing Risk in Amazon Bedrock with Darktrace / CLOUD

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Security risks and challenges of generative AI in the enterprise

Generative AI and managed foundation model platforms like Amazon Bedrock are transforming how organizations build and deploy intelligent applications. From chatbots to summarization tools, Bedrock enables rapid agent development by connecting foundation models to enterprise data and services. But with this flexibility comes a new set of security challenges, especially around visibility, access control, and unintended data exposure.

As organizations move quickly to operationalize generative AI, traditional security controls are struggling to keep up. Bedrock’s multi-layered architecture, spanning agents, models, guardrails, and underlying AWS services, creates new blind spots that standard posture management tools weren’t designed to handle. Visibility gaps make it difficult to know which datasets agents can access, or how model outputs might expose sensitive information. Meanwhile, developers often move faster than security teams can review IAM permissions or validate guardrails, leading to misconfigurations that expand risk. In shared-responsibility environments like AWS, this complexity can blur the lines of ownership, making it critical for security teams to have continuous, automated insight into how AI systems interact with enterprise data.

Darktrace / CLOUD provides comprehensive visibility and posture management for Bedrock environments, automatically detecting and proactively scanning agents and knowledge bases, helping teams secure their AI infrastructure without slowing down expansion and innovation.

A real-world scenario: When access goes too far

Consider a scenario where an organization deploys a Bedrock agent to help internal staff quickly answer business questions using company knowledge. The agent was connected to a knowledge base pointing at documents stored in Amazon S3 and given access to internal services via APIs.

To get the system running quickly, developers assigned the agent a broad execution role. This role granted access to multiple S3 buckets, including one containing sensitive customer records. The over-permissioning wasn’t malicious; it stemmed from the complexity of IAM policy creation and the difficulty of identifying which buckets held sensitive data.

The team assumed the agent would only use the intended documents. However, they did not fully consider how employees might interact with the agent or how it might act on the data it processed.  

When an employee asked a routine question about quarterly customer activity, the agent surfaced insights that included regulated data, revealing it to someone without the appropriate access.

This wasn’t a case of prompt injection or model manipulation. The agent simply followed instructions and used the resources it was allowed to access. The exposure was valid under IAM policy, but entirely unintended.

How Darktrace / CLOUD prevents these risks

Darktrace / CLOUD helps organizations avoid scenarios like unintended data exposure by providing layered visibility and intelligent analysis across Bedrock and SageMaker environments. Here’s how each capability works in practice:

Configuration-level visibility

Bedrock deployments often involve multiple components: agents, guardrails, and foundation models, each with its own configuration. Darktrace / CLOUD indexes these configurations so teams can:

  1. Inspect deployed agents and confirm they are connected only to approved data sources.
  2. Track evaluation job setups and their links to Amazon S3 datasets, uncovering hidden data flows that could expose sensitive information.
  3. Maintain full awareness of all AI components, reducing the chance of overlooked assets introducing risk.

By unifying configuration data across Bedrock, SageMaker, and other AWS services, Darktrace / CLOUD provides a single source of truth for AI asset visibility. Teams can instantly see how each component is configured and whether it aligns with corporate security policies. This eliminates guesswork, accelerates audits, and helps prevent misaligned settings from creating data exposure risks.

 Agents for bedrock relationship views.
Figure 1: Agents for bedrock relationship views

Architectural awareness

Complex AI environments can make it difficult to understand how components interact. Darktrace / CLOUD generates real-time architectural diagrams that:

  1. Visualize relationships between agents, models, and datasets.
  1. Highlight unintended data access paths or risk propagation across interconnected services.

This clarity helps security teams spot vulnerabilities before they lead to exposure. By surfacing these relationships dynamically, Darktrace / CLOUD enables proactive risk management, helping teams identify architectural drift, redundant data connections, or unmonitored agents before attackers or accidental misuse can exploit them. This reduces investigation time and strengthens compliance confidence across AI workloads.

Figure 2: Full Bedrock agent architecture including lambda and IAM permission mapping
Figure 2: Full Bedrock agent architecture including lambda and IAM permission mapping

Access & privilege analysis

IAM permissions apply to every AWS service, including Bedrock. When Bedrock agents assume IAM roles that were broadly defined for other workloads, they often inherit excessive privileges. Without strict least-privilege controls, the agent may have access to far more data and services than required, creating avoidable security exposure. Darktrace / CLOUD:

  1. Reviews execution roles and user permissions to identify excessive privileges.
  2. Flags anomalies that could enable privilege escalation or unauthorized API actions.

This ensures agents operate within the principle of least privilege, reducing attack surface. Beyond flagging risky roles, Darktrace / CLOUD continuously learns normal patterns of access to identify when permissions are abused or expanded in real time. Security teams gain context into why an action is anomalous and how it could affect connected assets, allowing them to take targeted remediation steps that preserve productivity while minimizing exposure.

Misconfiguration detection

Misconfigurations are a leading cause of cloud security incidents. Darktrace / CLOUD automatically detects:

  1. Publicly accessible S3 buckets that may contain sensitive training data.
  2. Missing guardrails in Bedrock deployments, which can allow inappropriate or sensitive outputs.
  3. Other issues such as lack of encryption, direct internet access, and root access to models.  

By surfacing these risks early, teams can remediate before they become exploitable. Darktrace / CLOUD turns what would otherwise be manual reviews into automated, continuous checks, reducing time to discovery and preventing small oversights from escalating into full-scale incidents. This automated assurance allows organizations to innovate confidently while keeping their AI systems compliant and secure by design.

Configuration data for Anthropic foundation model
Figure 3: Configuration data for Anthropic foundation model

Behavioral anomaly detection

Even with correct configurations, behavior can signal emerging threats. Using AWS CloudTrail, Darktrace / CLOUD:

  1. Monitors for unusual data access patterns, such as agents querying unexpected datasets.
  2. Detects anomalous training job invocations that could indicate attempts to pollute models.

This real-time behavioral insight helps organizations respond quickly to suspicious activity. Because it learns the “normal” behavior of each Bedrock component over time, Darktrace / CLOUD can detect subtle shifts that indicate emerging risks, before formal indicators of compromise appear. The result is faster detection, reduced investigation effort, and continuous assurance that AI-driven workloads behave as intended.

Conclusion

Generative AI introduces transformative capabilities but also complex risks that evolve alongside innovation. The flexibility of services like Amazon Bedrock enables new efficiencies and insights, yet even legitimate use can inadvertently expose sensitive data or bypass security controls. As organizations embrace AI at scale, the ability to monitor and secure these environments holistically, without slowing development, is becoming essential.

By combining deep configuration visibility, architectural insight, privilege and behavior analysis, and real-time threat detection, Darktrace gives security teams continuous assurance across AI tools like Bedrock and SageMaker. Organizations can innovate with confidence, knowing their AI systems are governed by adaptive, intelligent protection.

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About the author
Adam Stevens
Senior Director of Product, Cloud | Darktrace

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November 20, 2025

Unmasking Vo1d: Inside Darktrace’s Botnet Detection

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What is Vo1d APK malware?

Vo1d malware first appeared in the wild in September 2024 and has since evolved into one of the most widespread Android botnets ever observed. This large-scale Android malware primarily targets smart TVs and low-cost Android TV boxes. Initially, Vo1d was identified as a malicious backdoor capable of installing additional third-party software [1]. Its functionality soon expanded beyond the initial infection to include deploying further malicious payloads, running proxy services, and conducting ad fraud operations. By early 2025, it was estimated that Vo1d had infected 1.3 to 1.6 million devices worldwide [2].

From a technical perspective, Vo1d embeds components into system storage to enable itself to download and execute new modules at any time. External researchers further discovered that Vo1d uses Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs) to create new command-and-control (C2) domains, ensuring that regardless of existing servers being taken down, the malware can quickly reconnect to new ones. Previous published analysis identified dozens of C2 domains and hundreds of DGA seeds, along with new downloader families. Over time, Vo1d has grown increasingly sophisticated with clear signs of stronger obfuscation and encryption methods designed to evade detection [2].

Darktrace’s coverage

Earlier this year, Darktrace observed a surge in Vo1d-related activity across customer environments, with the majority of affected customers based in South Africa. Devices that had been quietly operating as expected began exhibiting unusual network behavior, including excessive DNS lookups. Open-source intelligence (OSINT) has long highlighted South Africa as one of the countries most impacted by Vo1d infections [2].

What makes the recent activity particularly interesting is that the surge observed by Darktrace appears to be concentrated specifically in South African environments. This localized spike suggests that a significant number of devices may have been compromised, potentially due to vulnerable software, outdated firmware, or even preloaded malware. Regions with high prevalence of low-cost, often unpatched devices are especially susceptible, as these everyday consumer electronics can be quietly recruited into the botnet’s network. This specifically appears to be the case with South Africa, where public reporting has documented widespread use of low-cost boxes, such as non-Google-certified Android TV sticks, that frequently ship with outdated firmware [3].

The initial triage highlighted the core mechanism Vo1d uses to remain resilient: its use of DGA. A DGA deterministically creates a large list of pseudo-random domain names on a predictable schedule. This enables the malware to compute hundreds of candidate domains using the same algorithm, instead of using a hard-coded single C2 hostname that defenders could easily block or take down. To ensure reproducible from the infected device’s perspective, Vo1d utilizes DGA seeds. These seeds might be a static string, a numeric value, or a combination of underlying techniques that enable infected devices to generate the same list of candidate domains for a time window, provided the same DGA code, seed, and date are used.

Interestingly, Vo1d’s DGA seeds do not appear to be entirely unpredictable, and the generated domains lack fully random-looking endings. As observed in Figure 1, there is a clear pattern in the names generated. In this case, researchers identified that while the first five characters would change to create the desired list of domain names, the trailing portion remained consistent as part of the seed: 60b33d7929a, which OSINT sources have linked to the Vo1d botnet. [2]. Darktrace’s Threat Research team also identified a potential second DGA seed, with devices in some cases also engaging in activity involving hostnames matching the regular expression /[a-z]{5}fc975904fc9\.(com|top|net). This second seed has not been reported by any OSINT vendors at the time of writing.

Another recurring characteristic observed across multiple cases was the choice of top-level domains (TLDs), which included .com, .net, and .top.

Figure 1: Advanced Search results showing DNS lookups, providing a glimpse on the DGA seed utilized.

The activity was detected by multiple models in Darktrace / NETWORK™, which triggered on devices making an unusually large volume of DNS requests for domains uncommon across the network.

During the network investigation, Darktrace analysts traced Vo1d’s infrastructure and uncovered an interesting pattern related to responder ASNs. A significant number of connections pointed to AS16509 (AMAZON-02). By hosting redirectors or C2 nodes inside major cloud environments, Vo1d is able to gain access to highly available and geographically diverse infrastructure. When one node is taken down or reported, operators can quickly enable a new node under a different IP within the same ASN. Another feature of cloud infrastructure that hardens Vo1d’s resilience is the fact that many organizations allow outbound connections to cloud IP ranges by default, assuming they are legitimate. Despite this, Darktrace was able to identify the rarity of these endpoints, identifying the unusualness of the activity.

Analysts further observed that once a generated domain successfully resolved, infected devices consistently began establishing outbound connections to ephemeral port ranges like TCP ports 55520 and 55521. These destination ports are atypical for standard web or DNS traffic. Even though the choice of high-numbered ports appears random, it is likely far from not accidental. Commonly used ports such as port 80 (HTTP) or 443 (HTTPS) are often subject to more scrutiny and deeper inspection or content filtering, making them riskier for attackers. On the other hand, unregistered ports like 55520 and 55521 are less likely to be blocked, providing a more covert channel that blends with outbound TCP traffic. This tactic helps evade firewall rules that focus on common service ports. Regardless, Darktrace was able to identify external connections on uncommon ports to locations that the network does not normally visit.

The continuation of the described activity was identified by Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst, which correlated individual events into a broader interconnected incident. It began with the multiple DNS requests for the algorithmically generated domains, followed by repeated connections to rare endpoints later confirmed as attacker-controlled infrastructure. Cyber AI Analyst’s investigation further enabled it to categorize the events as part of the “established foothold” phase of the attack.

Figure 2: Cyber AI Analyst incident illustrating the transition from DNS requests for DGA domains to connections with resolved attacker-controlled infrastructure.

Conclusion

The observations highlighted in this blog highlight the precision and scale of Vo1d’s operations, ranging from its DGA-generated domains to its covert use of high-numbered ports. The surge in affected South African environments illustrate how regions with many low-cost, often unpatched devices can become major hubs for botnet activity. This serves as a reminder that even everyday consumer electronics can play a role in cybercrime, emphasizing the need for vigilance and proactive security measures.

Credit to Christina Kreza (Cyber Analyst & Team Lead) and Eugene Chua (Principal Cyber Analyst & Team Lead)

Edited by Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections

  • Anomalous Connection / Devices Beaconing to New Rare IP
  • Anomalous Connection / Multiple Connections to New External TCP Port
  • Anomalous Connection / Multiple Failed Connections to Rare Endpoint
  • Compromise / DGA Beacon
  • Compromise / Domain Fluxing
  • Compromise / Fast Beaconing to DGA
  • Unusual Activity / Unusual External Activity

List of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

  • 3.132.75[.]97 – IP address – Likely Vo1d C2 infrastructure
  • g[.]sxim[.]me – Hostname – Likely Vo1d C2 infrastructure
  • snakeers[.]com – Hostname – Likely Vo1d C2 infrastructure

Selected DGA IoCs

  • semhz60b33d7929a[.]com – Hostname – Possible Vo1d C2 DGA endpoint
  • ggqrb60b33d7929a[.]com – Hostname – Possible Vo1d C2 DGA endpoint
  • eusji60b33d7929a[.]com – Hostname – Possible Vo1d C2 DGA endpoint
  • uacfc60b33d7929a[.]com – Hostname – Possible Vo1d C2 DGA endpoint
  • qilqxfc975904fc9[.]top – Hostname – Possible Vo1d C2 DGA endpoint

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • T1071.004 – Command and Control – DNS
  • T1568.002 – Command and Control – Domain Generation Algorithms
  • T1568.001 – Command and Control – Fast Flux DNS
  • T1571 – Command and Control – Non-Standard Port

[1] https://news.drweb.com/show/?lng=en&i=14900

[2] https://blog.xlab.qianxin.com/long-live-the-vo1d_botnet/

[3] https://mybroadband.co.za/news/broadcasting/596007-warning-for-south-africans-using-specific-types-of-tv-sticks.html

The content provided in this blog is published by Darktrace for general informational purposes only and reflects our understanding of cybersecurity topics, trends, incidents, and developments at the time of publication. While we strive to ensure accuracy and relevance, the information is provided “as is” without any representations or warranties, express or implied. Darktrace makes no guarantees regarding the completeness, accuracy, reliability, or timeliness of any information presented and expressly disclaims all warranties.

Nothing in this blog constitutes legal, technical, or professional advice, and readers should consult qualified professionals before acting on any information contained herein. Any references to third-party organizations, technologies, threat actors, or incidents are for informational purposes only and do not imply affiliation, endorsement, or recommendation.

Darktrace, its affiliates, employees, or agents shall not be held liable for any loss, damage, or harm arising from the use of or reliance on the information in this blog.

The cybersecurity landscape evolves rapidly, and blog content may become outdated or superseded. We reserve the right to update, modify, or remove any content.

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About the author
Christina Kreza
Cyber Analyst
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