Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Anna Gilbertson
Cyber Security Analyst
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01
Dec 2022
Side-by-side, data loss and cyber-attacks are two of the most common concerns expressed by IT directors. Whilst ransom has traditionally been seen as a big cause of this, ransom (and subsequently) data loss appears to be changing. This blog explores an incident seen within a middle eastern financial customer from May-June 2022. This customer suffered large data loss and a high volume of files with a ransom note were written on its network, but the institution’s data was not encrypted. This is an example of a growing trend in ransomware attacks, which involves exfiltration of the victim’s data and the write of a ransom note but no encryption of files. Instead of being extorted for the decryption of their files, companies are being extorted for the return of their stolen data.
Attack Summary
A threat actor spread laterally through a customer network by writing suspicious ‘.dat’ and ‘.exe’ files, exfiltrated more than 300GB of data over a two-month period and made beaconing connections to endpoints identified by OSINT as probable Cobalt Strike C2 servers.
Attack Details
In May an internal desktop was observed connecting to a rare external endpoint over the SSL protocol using a highly unusual port and the RClone client. These connections continued for several weeks and spiked at the same time as the device’s other malicious activity. It is likely that these connections reflected a potential point of infection.
The attacker then used the desktop and two other internal devices to perform network scanning and enumeration activity in order to discover other devices on the network it could infect. In total 856 unique IPs were scanned- largely over TCP, UDP and ICMP. Further directory replication service requests were also seen over DCE-RPC, suggesting an attempt to extract user credentials. One device was later seen accessing an unencrypted password file showing successful recon. The attacker then used the already compromised devices to infect other devices on the network by writing suspicious ‘.exe’ and ‘.dat’ files including ‘Bun.dat' and ‘Agent.exe’.
The compromised devices were then used by the attacker to download nearly 4GB of data from an internal server and to upload a similar amount to a suspicious IP address associated with a young domain. Over the following two months, the compromised devices went on to upload roughly 100GB of data to the same destination each week.
The attacker also used these devices to make beaconing connections to several rare and external endpoints. Some of these endpoints were created just before the beginning of the compromise and have all been identified by OSINT as probable Cobalt Strike command and control servers. During this beaconing an internal device was also observed making an extremely large number of writes of files that appeared to be ransom notes, these were appropriately named ‘YOURNETWORKDATAHASBEENCOMPROMISED.txt’.
Darktrace Coverage
How did this attack remain hidden from the company’s other tools? Neither the initial C2 IP Address, the follow-on Cobalt Strike C2 servers or the exfiltration server were associated with malicious activity in open-source reporting prior to this compromise. This meant they were likely omitted from expected blacklists and standard signature-based security. Furthermore, executable files written by the compromised devices included ‘anydesk.exe’ and ‘procdump64.exe’, both of which are legitimate tools commonly used by administrators. This demonstrates the use of living off the land tactics (LotL) which are typically hard to detect.
Given the attack’s novelty and LotL techniques, it is no surprise that Darktrace DETECT/Network identified anomalies in usual network behaviour. In particular, Cyber AI Analyst was a large highlight when it came to both Darktrace’s and the security team’s follow-up triage. AI Analyst collated different phases of the compromise such as the network scanning activity, the lateral movement activity over the DCE-RPC protocol, the data exfiltration, and the beaconing activity to the Cobalt Strike endpoints. This helped to map a clear timeline and progression of events along the kill chain.
Figure 1: An AI Analyst Graph showing the timeline of the beaconing activity to the Cobalt Strike Endpoints and the lateral movement activity over the DCE-RPC protocol.
Figure 2: AI Analyst Graph showing the timeline of overall suspicious activities carried out by the compromised devices.
On top of the DETECT product, Darktrace services had a large role to play in the aftermath. The customer subscribed to Darktrace’s Ask the Expert (ATE) service and only became fully aware of the compromise after submitting an ATE ticket requesting assistance investigating one of the related model breaches. Finally, RESPOND itself (although in human confirmation mode) was still able to be used to manually quarantine devices.
Conclusion
During this incident, the initial point of infection, data exfiltration endpoint, and Cobalt Strike C2 Servers were recently created and had no OSINT associating them with malicious activity. This demonstrates how ineffective traditional signature-based intrusion detection systems can be at detecting compromises and how effective Darktrace is at detecting novel campaigns and attacks. Despite this, detection is clearly not enough, especially as out-of-hours attacks increase in frequency and effectiveness. This customer had RESPOND in human confirmation mode which meant that the activity was acted upon and stopped slower than had it been set autonomously. If malicious data loss is to be stopped in full, companies need to reduce reliance on humans and embrace AI-based protection.
Thanks to Darktrace analyst Steve Robinson for his insights on the above threat investigation.
Appendices
Related AI Analyst Incidents
Unusual Repeated Connections
Suspicious DCE-RPC Activity
Internal Download and External Upload
Scanning of Multiple Devices
Possible SSL Command and Control Activity to Multiple Endpoints
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
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Learn how Darktrace could revolutionize DDoS defense, enabling companies to stop threats without 24/7 monitoring. Read more about how we thwart attacks!
From VPS to Phishing: How Darktrace Uncovered SaaS Hijacks through Virtual Infrastructure Abuse
What is a VPS and how are they abused?
A Virtual Private Server (VPS) is a virtualized server that provides dedicated resources and control to users on a shared physical device. VPS providers, long used by developers and businesses, are increasingly misused by threat actors to launch stealthy, scalable attacks. While not a novel tactic, VPS abuse is has seen an increase in Software-as-a-Service (SaaS)-targeted campaigns as it enables attackers to bypass geolocation-based defenses by mimicking local traffic, evade IP reputation checks with clean, newly provisioned infrastructure, and blend into legitimate behavior [3].
VPS providers like Hyonix and Host Universal offer rapid setup and minimal open-source intelligence (OSINT) footprint, making detection difficult [1][2]. These services are not only fast to deploy but also affordable, making them attractive to attackers seeking anonymous, low-cost infrastructure for scalable campaigns. Such attacks tend to be targeted and persistent, often timed to coincide with legitimate user activity, a tactic that renders traditional security tools largely ineffective.
Darktrace’s investigation into Hyonix VPS abuse
In May 2025, Darktrace’s Threat Research team investigated a series of incidents across its customer base involving VPS-associated infrastructure. The investigation began with a fleet-wide review of alerts linked to Hyonix (ASN AS931), revealing a noticeable spike in anomalous behavior from this ASN in March 2025. The alerts included brute-force attempts, anomalous logins, and phishing campaign-related inbox rule creation.
Darktrace identified suspicious activity across multiple customer environments around this time, but two networks stood out. In one instance, two internal devices exhibited mirrored patterns of compromise, including logins from rare endpoints, manipulation of inbox rules, and the deletion of emails likely used in phishing attacks. Darktrace traced the activity back to IP addresses associated with Hyonix, suggesting a deliberate use of VPS infrastructure to facilitate the attack.
On the second customer network, the attack was marked by coordinated logins from rare IPs linked to multiple VPS providers, including Hyonix. This was followed by the creation of inbox rules with obfuscated names and attempts to modify account recovery settings, indicating a broader campaign that leveraged shared infrastructure and techniques.
Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability was not enabled in either customer environment during these attacks. As a result, no automated containment actions were triggered, allowing the attack to escalate without interruption. Had Autonomous Response been active, Darktrace would have automatically blocked connections from the unusual VPS endpoints upon detection, effectively halting the compromise in its early stages.
Case 1
Figure 1: Timeline of activity for Case 1 - Unusual VPS logins and deletion of phishing emails.
Initial Intrusion
On May 19, 2025, Darktrace observed two internal devices on one customer environment initiating logins from rare external IPs associated with VPS providers, namely Hyonix and Host Universal (via Proton VPN). Darktrace recognized that these logins had occurred within minutes of legitimate user activity from distant geolocations, indicating improbable travel and reinforcing the likelihood of session hijacking. This triggered Darktrace / IDENTITY model “Login From Rare Endpoint While User Is Active”, which highlights potential credential misuse when simultaneous logins occur from both familiar and rare sources.
Shortly after these logins, Darktrace observed the threat actor deleting emails referring to invoice documents from the user’s “Sent Items” folder, suggesting an attempt to hide phishing emails that had been sent from the now-compromised account. Though not directly observed, initial access in this case was likely achieved through a similar phishing or account hijacking method.
Figure 2: Darktrace / IDENTITY model "Login From Rare Endpoint While User Is Active", which detects simultaneous logins from both a common and a rare source to highlight potential credential misuse.
Case 2
Figure 3: Timeline of activity for Case 2 – Coordinated inbox rule creation and outbound phishing campaign.
In the second customer environment, Darktrace observed similar login activity originating from Hyonix, as well as other VPS providers like Mevspace and Hivelocity. Multiple users logged in from rare endpoints, with Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) satisfied via token claims, further indicating session hijacking.
Establishing control and maintaining persistence
Following the initial access, Darktrace observed a series of suspicious SaaS activities, including the creation of new email rules. These rules were given minimal or obfuscated names, a tactic often used by attackers to avoid drawing attention during casual mailbox reviews by the SaaS account owner or automated audits. By keeping rule names vague or generic, attackers reduce the likelihood of detection while quietly redirecting or deleting incoming emails to maintain access and conceal their activity.
One of the newly created inbox rules targeted emails with subject lines referencing a document shared by a VIP at the customer’s organization. These emails would be automatically deleted, suggesting an attempt to conceal malicious mailbox activity from legitimate users.
Mirrored activity across environments
While no direct lateral movement was observed, mirrored activity across multiple user devices suggested a coordinated campaign. Notably, three users had near identical similar inbox rules created, while another user had a different rule related to fake invoices, reinforcing the likelihood of a shared infrastructure and technique set.
Privilege escalation and broader impact
On one account, Darktrace observed “User registered security info” activity was shortly after anomalous logins, indicating attempts to modify account recovery settings. On another, the user reset passwords or updated security information from rare external IPs. In both cases, the attacker’s actions—including creating inbox rules, deleting emails, and maintaining login persistence—suggested an intent to remain undetected while potentially setting the stage for data exfiltration or spam distribution.
On a separate account, outbound spam was observed, featuring generic finance-related subject lines such as 'INV#. EMITTANCE-1'. At the network level, Darktrace / NETWORK detected DNS requests from a device to a suspicious domain, which began prior the observed email compromise. The domain showed signs of domain fluxing, a tactic involving frequent changes in IP resolution, commonly used by threat actors to maintain resilient infrastructure and evade static blocklists. Around the same time, Darktrace detected another device writing a file named 'SplashtopStreamer.exe', associated with the remote access tool Splashtop, to a domain controller. While typically used in IT support scenarios, its presence here may suggest that the attacker leveraged it to establish persistent remote access or facilitate lateral movement within the customer’s network.
Conclusion
This investigation highlights the growing abuse of VPS infrastructure in SaaS compromise campaigns. Threat actors are increasingly leveraging these affordable and anonymous hosting services to hijack accounts, launch phishing attacks, and manipulate mailbox configurations, often bypassing traditional security controls.
Despite the stealthy nature of this campaign, Darktrace detected the malicious activity early in the kill chain through its Self-Learning AI. By continuously learning what is normal for each user and device, Darktrace surfaced subtle anomalies, such as rare login sources, inbox rule manipulation, and concurrent session activity, that likely evade traditional static, rule-based systems.
As attackers continue to exploit trusted infrastructure and mimic legitimate user behavior, organizations should adopt behavioral-based detection and response strategies. Proactively monitoring for indicators such as improbable travel, unusual login sources, and mailbox rule changes, and responding swiftly with autonomous actions, is critical to staying ahead of evolving threats.
Credit to Rajendra Rushanth (Cyber Analyst), Jen Beckett (Cyber Analyst) and Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)
• SaaS / Access / Unusual External Source for SaaS Credential Use
• SaaS / Compromise / High Priority Login From Rare Endpoint
• SaaS / Compromise / Login From Rare Endpoint While User Is Active
List of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)
Format: IoC – Type – Description
• 38.240.42[.]160 – IP – Associated with Hyonix ASN (AS931)
• 103.75.11[.]134 – IP – Associated with Host Universal / Proton VPN
• 162.241.121[.]156 – IP – Rare IP associated with phishing
• 194.49.68[.]244 – IP – Associated with Hyonix ASN
• 193.32.248[.]242 – IP – Used in suspicious login activity / Mullvad VPN
• 50.229.155[.]2 – IP – Rare login IP / AS 7922 ( COMCAST-7922 )
• 104.168.194[.]248 – IP – Rare login IP / AS 54290 ( HOSTWINDS )
• 38.255.57[.]212 – IP – Hyonix IP used during MFA activity
• 103.131.131[.]44 – IP – Hyonix IP used in login and MFA activity
• 178.173.244[.]27 – IP – Hyonix IP
• 91.223.3[.]147 – IP – Mevspace Poland, used in multiple logins
• 2a02:748:4000:18:0:1:170b[:]2524 – IPv6 – Hivelocity VPS, used in multiple logins and MFA activity
• 51.36.233[.]224 – IP – Saudi ASN, used in suspicious login
• 103.211.53[.]84 – IP – Excitel Broadband India, used in security info update
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
Tactic – Technique – Sub-Technique
• Initial Access – T1566 – Phishing
T1566.001 – Spearphishing Attachment
• Execution – T1078 – Valid Accounts
• Persistence – T1098 – Account Manipulation
T1098.002 – Exchange Email Rules
• Command and Control – T1071 – Application Layer Protocol
T1071.001 – Web Protocols
• Defense Evasion – T1036 – Masquerading
• Defense Evasion – T1562 – Impair Defenses
T1562.001 – Disable or Modify Tools
• Credential Access – T1556 – Modify Authentication Process
T1556.004 – MFA Bypass
• Discovery – T1087 – Account Discovery
• Impact – T1531 – Account Access Removal
The content provided in this blog is published by Darktrace for general informational purposes only and reflects our understanding of cybersecurity topics, trends, incidents, and developments at the time of publication. While we strive to ensure accuracy and relevance, the information is provided “as is” without any representations or warranties, express or implied. Darktrace makes no guarantees regarding the completeness, accuracy, reliability, or timeliness of any information presented and expressly disclaims all warranties.
Nothing in this blog constitutes legal, technical, or professional advice, and readers should consult qualified professionals before acting on any information contained herein. Any references to third-party organizations, technologies, threat actors, or incidents are for informational purposes only and do not imply affiliation, endorsement, or recommendation.
Darktrace, its affiliates, employees, or agents shall not be held liable for any loss, damage, or harm arising from the use of or reliance on the information in this blog.
The cybersecurity landscape evolves rapidly, and blog content may become outdated or superseded. We reserve the right to update, modify, or remove any content without notice.
From Exploit to Escalation: Tracking and Containing a Real-World Fortinet SSL-VPN Attack
Threat actors exploiting Fortinet CVEs
Over the years, Fortinet has issued multiple alerts about a wave of sophisticated attacks targeting vulnerabilities in its SSL-VPN infrastructure. Despite the release of patches to address these vulnerabilities, threat actors have continued to exploit a trio of Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) disclosed between 2022 and 2024 to gain unauthorized access to FortiGate devices.
Which vulnerabilities are exploited?
The vulnerabilities—CVE-2022-42475, CVE-2023-27997, and CVE-2024-21762—affect Fortinet’s SSL-VPN services and have been actively exploited by threat actors to establish initial access into target networks.
The vulnerabilities affect core components of FortiOS, allowing attackers to execute remote code on affected systems.
CVE-2022-42475
Type: Heap-Based Buffer Overflow in FortiOS SSL-VPN
This earlier vulnerability also targets the SSL-VPN interface and has been actively exploited in the wild. It allows attackers to execute arbitrary code remotely by overflowing a buffer in memory, often used to deploy malware or establish persistent backdoors [6].
CVE-2023-27997
Type: Heap-Based Buffer Overflow in FortiOS and FortiProxy
Impact: Remote Code Execution
This flaw exists in the SSL-VPN component of both FortiOS and FortiProxy. By exploiting a buffer overflow in the heap memory, attackers can execute malicious code remotely. This vulnerability is particularly dangerous because it can be triggered without authentication, making it ideal for an initial compromise [5].
CVE-2024-21762
Type: Out-of-Bounds Write in sslvpnd
Impact: Remote Code Execution
This vulnerability affects the SSL-VPN daemon (sslvpnd) in FortiOS. It allows unauthenticated remote attackers to send specially crafted HTTP requests that write data outside of allocated memory bounds. This can lead to arbitrary code execution, giving attackers full control over a device [4].
In short, these flaws enable remote attackers to execute arbitrary code without authentication by exploiting memory corruption issues such as buffer overflows and out-of-bounds writes. Once inside, threat actors use symbolic link (symlink) in order to maintain persistence on target devices across patches and firmware updates. This persistence then enables them to bypass security controls and manipulate firewall configurations, effectively turning patched systems into long-term footholds for deeper network compromise [1][2][3].
Darktrace’s Coverage
Darktrace detected a series of suspicious activities originating from a compromised Fortinet VPN device, including anomalous HTTP traffic, internal network scanning, and SMB reconnaissance, all indicative of post-exploitation behavior. Following initial detection by Darktrace’s real-time models, its Autonomous Response capability swiftly acted on the malicious activity, blocking suspicious connections and containing the threat before further compromise could occur.
Further investigation by Darktrace’s Threat Research team uncovered a stealthy and persistent attack that leveraged known Fortinet SSL-VPN vulnerabilities to facilitate lateral movement and privilege escalation within the network.
The attack on a Darktrace customer likely began on April 11 with the exploitation of a Fortinet VPN device running an outdated version of FortiOS. Darktrace observed a high volume of HTTP traffic originating from this device, specifically targeting internal systems. Notably, many of these requests were directed at the /cgi-bin/ directory, a common target for attackers attempting to exploit web interfaces to run unauthorized scripts or commands. This pattern strongly indicated remote code execution attempts via the SSL-VPN interface [7].
Once access was gained, the threat actor likely modified existing firewall rules, a tactic often used to disable security controls or create hidden backdoors for future access. While Darktrace does not have direct visibility into firewall configuration changes, the surrounding activity and post-exploitation behavior indicated that such modifications were made to support long-term persistence within the network.
Figure 1: HTTP activity from the compromised Fortinet device, including repeated requests to /cgi-bin/ over port 8080
Phase 2: Establishing Persistence & Lateral Movement
Shortly after the initial compromise of the Fortinet VPN device, the threat actor began to expand their foothold within the internal network. Darktrace detected initial signs of network scanning from this device, including the use of Nmap to probe the internal environment, likely in an attempt to identify accessible services and vulnerable systems.
Figure 2: Darktrace’s detection of unusual network scanning activities on the affected device.
Around the same time, Darktrace began detecting anomalous activity on a second device, specifically an internal firewall interface device. This suggested that the attacker had established a secondary foothold and was leveraging it to conduct deeper reconnaissance and move laterally through the network.
In an effort to maintain persistence within the network, the attackers likely deployed symbolic links in the SSL-VPN language file directory on the Fortinet device. While Darktrace did not directly observe symbolic link abuse, Fortinet has identified this as a known persistence technique in similar attacks [2][3]. Based on the observed post-exploitation behavior and likely firewall modifications, it is plausible that such methods were used here.
With lateral movement initiated from the internal firewall interface device, the threat actor proceeded to escalate their efforts to map the internal network and identify opportunities for privilege escalation.
Darktrace observed a successful NTLM authentication from the internal firewall interface to the domain controller over the outdated protocol SMBv1, using the account ‘anonymous’. This was immediately followed by a failed NTLM session connection using the hostname ‘nmap’, further indicating the use of Nmap for enumeration and brute-force attempts. Additional credential probes were also identified around the same time, including attempts using the credential ‘guest’.
Figure 3: Darktrace detection of a series of login attempts using various credentials, with a mix of successful and unsuccessful attempts.
The attacker then initiated DCE_RPC service enumeration, with over 300 requests to the Endpoint Mapper endpoint on the domain controller. This technique is commonly used to discover available services and their bindings, often as a precursor to privilege escalation or remote service manipulation.
Over the next few minutes, Darktrace detected more than 1,700 outbound connections from the internal firewall interface device to one of the customer’s subnets. These targeted common services such as FTP (port 21), SSH (22), Telnet (23), HTTP (80), and HTTPS (443). The threat actor also probed administrative and directory services, including ports 135, 137, 389, and 445, as well as remote access via RDP on port 3389.
Further signs of privilege escalation attempts were observed with the detection of over 300 Netlogon requests to the domain controller. Just over half of these connections were successful, indicating possible brute-force authentication attempts, credential testing, or the use of default or harvested credentials.
Figure 4: Netlogon and DCE-RPC activity from the affected device, showing repeated service bindings to epmapper and Netlogon, followed by successful and failed NetrServerAuthenticate3 attempts.
Phase 4: Privilege Escalation & Remote Access
A few minutes later, the attacker initiated an RDP session from the internal firewall interface device to an internal server. The session lasted over three hours, during which more than 1.5MB of data was uploaded and over 5MB was downloaded.
Notably, no RDP cookie was observed during this session, suggesting manual access, tool-less exploitation, or a deliberate attempt to evade detection. While RDP cookie entries were present on other occasions, none were linked to this specific session—reinforcing the likelihood of stealthy remote access.
Additionally, multiple entries during and after this session show SSL certificate validation failures on port 3389, indicating that the RDP connection may have been established using self-signed or invalid certificates, a common tactic in unauthorized or suspicious remote access scenarios.
Figure 5: Darktrace’s detection of an RDP session from the firewall interface device to the server, lasting over 3 hours.
Darktrace Autonomous Response
Throughout the course of this attack, Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability was active on the customer’s network. This enabled Darktrace to autonomously intervene by blocking specific connections and ports associated with the suspicious activity, while also enforcing a pre-established “pattern of life” on affected devices to ensure they were able to continue their expected business activities while preventing any deviations from it. These actions were crucial in containing the threat and prevent further lateral movement from the compromised device.
Figure 6: Darktrace’s Autonomous Response targeted specific connections and restricted affected devices to their expected patterns of life.
Conclusion
This incident highlights the importance of important staying on top of patching and closely monitoring VPN infrastructure, especially for internet-facing systems like Fortinet devices. Despite available patches, attackers were still able to exploit known vulnerabilities to gain access, move laterally and maintain persistence within the customer’s network.
Attackers here demonstrated a high level of stealth and persistence. Not only did they gain access to the network and carry out network scans and lateral movement, but they also used techniques such as symbolic link abuse, credential probing, and RDP sessions without cookies to avoid detection. Darktrace’s detection of the post-exploitation activity, combined with the swift action of its Autonomous Response technology, successfully blocked malicious connections and contained the attack before it could escalate
Credit to Priya Thapa (Cyber Analyst), Vivek Rajan (Cyber Analyst), and Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)
The content provided in this blog is published by Darktrace for general informational purposes only and reflects our understanding of cybersecurity topics, trends, incidents, and developments at the time of publication. While we strive to ensure accuracy and relevance, the information is provided “as is” without any representations or warranties, express or implied. Darktrace makes no guarantees regarding the completeness, accuracy, reliability, or timeliness of any information presented and expressly disclaims all warranties.
Nothing in this blog constitutes legal, technical, or professional advice, and readers should consult qualified professionals before acting on any information contained herein. Any references to third-party organizations, technologies, threat actors, or incidents are for informational purposes only and do not imply affiliation, endorsement, or recommendation.
Darktrace, its affiliates, employees, or agents shall not be held liable for any loss, damage, or harm arising from the use of or reliance on the information in this blog.
The cybersecurity landscape evolves rapidly, and blog content may become outdated or superseded. We reserve the right to update, modify, or remove any content without notice.
