Implications of TRITON attack on the Future of ICS Security
Explore how the TRITON malware attack reshapes OT cybersecurity strategies and the necessary steps to protect ICS networks effectively. Learn more here!
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Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
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21
Jan 2018
The recent TRITON malware attack against a critical infrastructure organization sought to modify and manipulate industrial safety systems with the intention of causing potentially catastrophic physical damage. ICS systems create an interface between physical and digital environments, meaning that the repercussions of an unhandled failure can be fatal.
The TRITON campaign can be divided into two conceptual phases. First, the attackers managed to gain remote access to an engineering workstation attached to the SIS (Safety Instrumented System) network, after which they deployed a program that was masquerading as a legitimate application produced by a critical control and system safety supplier. The framework for mimicking this legitimate application is not readily available, so there is reason to believe TRITON is the creation of well-funded and highly capable actors with intentions that probably reach beyond minor monetary gains.
The attackers successfully subverted traditional network defenses. Once they had established this foothold, they opted to delve deeper into the network and perform detailed reconnaissance – the second phase of the attack. Thankfully, they accidentally triggered a partial system failure which the internal security team investigated and remediated.
Having failed to achieve their ultimate goal, the attackers will likely be evaluating where they went wrong, so that next time they don’t give themselves away at such a late stage. They may also be considering whether that reconnaissance step is worthwhile, as clearly, they were capable of significant sabotage from that location without any further chances to be caught. Their success in penetrating the network as far as they did undetected with their current tools and methods means that they will almost certainly use them against other organizations.
TRITON should be considered a significant precedent for ICS security. What this incident shows is that traditional demilitarized zones, heavy network segregation and multiple firewalls are definitively not sufficient to protect the essentially defenseless machines that make up ICS networks. How then should infrastructure providers adjust their security postures in the light of the TRITON attack?
With regards to the second phase, anomaly detection is a clear solution for pinpointing unusual activity within the control system, highlighting unexpected reprogramming or reconnaissance for the security team’s attention. The typically predictable communications made between ICS devices such as HMIs and PLCs are intuitively a fertile ground for this type of approach. Regulators have taken notice, and in the UK for example the incoming NIS Directive legislation mandates that critical infrastructure providers have anomaly detection for their relevant networks.
However, defenders do not want their first opportunity to catch the attacker to be when they have already reached the control system and are making use of automation protocols and exploiting inherently vulnerable devices. They want to be alerted to the earlier parts of the cyber kill chain, as the attacker makes their way towards these networks, and be able to remediate them there instead. This can only be achieved by extending the anomaly and cyber-threat detection outwards from the control system through the other networks (demilitarized zones, corporate) that can form defensive buffers around it.
This is why Darktrace’s Industrial Immune System is designed to monitor all of these networks simultaneously, embracing the full range of device types from PLCs out through the nearly standard IT systems in OT control rooms, and all the way to the edge of the organization’s possible visibility – even into the cloud if need be. It is not sufficient for those tasked with protecting control system to monitor just the automation protocols or the networks that contain them.
No items found.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
React2Shell Reflections: Cloud Insights, Finance Sector Impacts, and How Threat Actors Moved So Quickly
Introduction
Last month’s disclosure of CVE 2025-55812, known as React2Shell, provided a reminder of how quickly modern threat actors can operationalize newly disclosed vulnerabilities, particularly in cloud-hosted environments.
The vulnerability was discovered on December 3, 2025, with a patch made available on the same day. Within 30 hours of the patch, a publicly available proof-of-concept emerged that could be used to exploit any vulnerable server. This short timeline meant many systems remained unpatched when attackers began actively exploiting the vulnerability.
Darktrace researchers rapidly deployed a new honeypot to monitor exploitation of CVE 2025-55812 in the wild.
Within two minutes of deployment, Darktrace observed opportunistic attackers exploiting this unauthenticated remote code execution flaw in React Server Components, leveraging a single crafted request to gain control of exposed Next.js servers. Exploitation quickly progressed from reconnaissance to scripted payload delivery, HTTP beaconing, and cryptomining, underscoring how automation and pre‑positioned infrastructure by threat actors now compress the window between disclosure and active exploitation to mere hours.
For cloud‑native organizations, particularly those in the financial sector, where Darktrace observed the greatest impact, React2Shell highlights the growing disconnect between patch availability and attacker timelines, increasing the likelihood that even short delays in remediation can result in real‑world compromise.
Cloud insights
In contrast to traditional enterprise networks built around layered controls, cloud architectures are often intentionally internet-accessible by default. When vulnerabilities emerge in common application frameworks such as React and Next.js, attackers face minimal friction. No phishing campaign, no credential theft, and no lateral movement are required; only an exposed service and exploitable condition.
The activity Darktrace observed during the React2shell intrusions reflects techniques that are familiar yet highly effective in cloud-based attacks. Attackers quickly pivot from an exposed internet-facing application to abusing the underlying cloud infrastructure, using automated exploitation to deploy secondary payloads at scale and ultimately act on their objectives, whether monetizing access through cryptomining or to burying themselves deeper in the environment for sustained persistence.
Cloud Case Study
In one incident, opportunistic attackers rapidly exploited an internet-facing Azure virtual machine (VM) running a Next.js application, abusing the React/next.js vulnerability to gain remote command execution within hours of the service becoming exposed. The compromise resulted in the staged deployment of a Go-based remote access trojan (RAT), followed by a series of cryptomining payloads such as XMrig.
Initial Access
Initial access appears to have originated from abused virtual private network (VPN) infrastructure, with the source IP (146.70.192[.]180) later identified as being associated with Surfshark
Figure 1: The IP address above is associated with VPN abuse leveraged for initial exploitation via Surfshark infrastructure.
The use of commercial VPN exit nodes reflects a wider trend of opportunistic attackers leveraging low‑cost infrastructure to gain rapid, anonymous access.
Parent process telemetry later confirmed execution originated from the Next.js server, strongly indicating application-layer compromise rather than SSH brute force, misused credentials, or management-plane abuse.
Payload execution
Shortly after successful exploitation, Darktrace identified a suspicious file and subsequent execution. One of the first payloads retrieved was a binary masquerading as “vim”, a naming convention commonly used to evade casual inspection in Linux environments. This directly ties the payload execution to the compromised Next.js application process, reinforcing the hypothesis of exploit-driven access.
Command-and-Control (C2)
Network flow logs revealed outbound connections back to the same external IP involved in the inbound activity. From a defensive perspective, this pattern is significant as web servers typically receive inbound requests, and any persistent outbound callbacks — especially to the same IP — indicate likely post-exploitation control. In this case, a C2 detection model alert was raised approximately 90 minutes after the first indicators, reflecting the time required for sufficient behavioral evidence to confirm beaconing rather than benign application traffic.
Cryptominers deployment and re-exploitation
Following successful command execution within the compromised Next.js workload, the attackers rapidly transitioned to monetization by deploying cryptomining payloads. Microsoft Defender observed a shell command designed to fetch and execute a binary named “x” via either curl or wget, ensuring successful delivery regardless of which tooling was availability on the Azure VM.
The binary was written to /home/wasiluser/dashboard/x and subsequently executed, with open-source intelligence (OSINT) enrichment strongly suggesting it was a cryptominer consistent with XMRig‑style tooling. Later the same day, additional activity revealed the host downloading a static XMRig binary directly from GitHub and placing it in a hidden cache directory (/home/wasiluser/.cache/.sys/).
The use of trusted infrastructure and legitimate open‑source tooling indicates an opportunistic approach focused on reliability and speed. The repeated deployment of cryptominers strongly suggests re‑exploitation of the same vulnerable web application rather than reliance on traditional persistence mechanisms. This behavior is characteristic of cloud‑focused attacks, where publicly exposed workloads can be repeatedly compromised at scale more easily.
Financial sector spotlight
During the mass exploitation of React2Shell, Darktrace observed targeting by likely North Korean affiliated actors focused on financial organizations in the United Kingdom, Sweden, Spain, Portugal, Nigeria, Kenya, Qatar, and Chile.
The targeting of the financial sector is not unexpected, but the emergence of new Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) tooling, including a Beavertail variant and EtherRat, a previously undocumented Linux implant, highlights the need for updated rules and signatures for organizations that rely on them.
EtherRAT uses Ethereum smart contracts for C2 resolution, polling every 500 milliseconds and employing five persistence mechanisms. It downloads its own Node.js runtime from nodejs[.]org and queries nine Ethereum RPC endpoints in parallel, selecting the majority response to determine its C2 URL. EtherRAT also overlaps with the Contagious Interview campaign, which has targeted blockchain developers since early 2025.
Darktrace’s honeypot was exploited just two minutes after coming online, demonstrating how automated scanning, pre-positioned infrastructure and staging, and C2 infrastructure traced back to “bulletproof” hosting reflects a mature, well‑resourced operational chain.
For financial organizations, particularly those operating cloud‑native platforms, digital asset services, or internet‑facing APIs, this activity demonstrates how rapidly geopolitical threat actors can weaponize newly disclosed vulnerabilities, turning short patching delays into strategic opportunities for long‑term access and financial gain. This underscores the need for a behavioral-anomaly-led security posture.
Credit to Nathaniel Jones (VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO) and Mark Turner (Specialist Security Researcher)
Edited by Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)
Appendices
Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)
146.70.192[.]180 – IP Address – Endpoint Associated with Surfshark
Runtime Is Where Cloud Security Really Counts: The Importance of Detection, Forensics and Real-Time Architecture Awareness
Introduction: Shifting focus from prevention to runtime
Cloud security has spent the last decade focused on prevention; tightening configurations, scanning for vulnerabilities, and enforcing best practices through Cloud Native Application Protection Platforms (CNAPP). These capabilities remain essential, but they are not where cloud attacks happen.
Attacks happen at runtime: the dynamic, ephemeral, constantly changing execution layer where applications run, permissions are granted, identities act, and workloads communicate. This is also the layer where defenders traditionally have the least visibility and the least time to respond.
Today’s threat landscape demands a fundamental shift. Reducing cloud risk now requires moving beyond static posture and CNAPP only approaches and embracing realtime behavioral detection across workloads and identities, paired with the ability to automatically preserve forensic evidence. Defenders need a continuous, real-time understanding of what “normal” looks like in their cloud environments, and AI capable of processing massive data streams to surface deviations that signal emerging attacker behavior.
Runtime: The layer where attacks happen
Runtime is the cloud in motion — containers starting and stopping, serverless functions being called, IAM roles being assumed, workloads auto scaling, and data flowing across hundreds of services. It’s also where attackers:
Weaponize stolen credentials
Escalate privileges
Pivot programmatically
Deploy malicious compute
Manipulate or exfiltrate data
The challenge is complex: runtime evidence is ephemeral. Containers vanish; critical process data disappears in seconds. By the time a human analyst begins investigating, the detail required to understand and respond to the alert, often is already gone. This volatility makes runtime the hardest layer to monitor, and the most important one to secure.
What Darktrace / CLOUD Brings to Runtime Defence
Darktrace / CLOUD is purpose-built for the cloud execution layer. It unifies the capabilities required to detect, contain, and understand attacks as they unfold, not hours or days later. Four elements define its value:
1. Behavioral, real-time detection
The platform learns normal activity across cloud services, identities, workloads, and data flows, then surfaces anomalies that signify real attacker behavior, even when no signature exists.
2. Automated forensic level artifact collection
The moment Darktrace detects a threat, it can automatically capture volatile forensic evidence; disk state, memory, logs, and process context, including from ephemeral resources. This preserves the truth of what happened before workloads terminate and evidence disappears.
3. AI-led investigation
Cyber AI Analyst assembles cloud behaviors into a coherent incident story, correlating identity activity, network flows, and Cloud workload behavior. Analysts no longer need to pivot across dashboards or reconstruct timelines manually.
4. Live architectural awareness
Darktrace continuously maps your cloud environment as it operates; including services, identities, connectivity, and data pathways. This real-time visibility makes anomalies clearer and investigations dramatically faster.
Together, these capabilities form a runtime-first security model.
Why CNAPP alone isn’t enough
CNAPP platforms excel at pre deployment checks all the way down to developer workstations, identifying misconfigurations, concerning permission combinations, vulnerable images, and risky infrastructure choices. But CNAPP’s breadth is also its limitation. CNAPP is about posture. Runtime defense is about behavior.
CNAPP tells you what could go wrong; runtime detection highlights what is going wrong right now.
It cannot preserve ephemeral evidence, correlate active behaviors across domains, or contain unfolding attacks with the precision and speed required during a real incident. Prevention remains essential, but prevention alone cannot stop an attacker who is already operating inside your cloud environment.
A recent incident detected by Darktrace / CLOUD highlights how cloud compromises unfold, and why runtime visibility is non-negotiable. Each step below reflects detections that occur only when monitoring behavior in real time.
1. External Credential Use
Detection: Unusual external source for credential use: An attacker logs into a cloud account from a never-before-seen location, the earliest sign of account takeover.
2. AWS CLI Pivot
Detection: Unusual CLI activity: The attacker switches to programmatic access, issuing commands from a suspicious host to gain automation and stealth.
3. Credential Manipulation
Detection: Rare password reset: They reset or assign new passwords to establish persistence and bypass existing security controls.
4. Cloud Reconnaissance
Detection: Burst of resource discovery: The attacker enumerates buckets, roles, and services to map high value assets and plan next steps.
5. Privilege Escalation
Detection: Anomalous IAM update: Unauthorized policy updates or role changes grant the attacker elevated access or a backdoor.
6. Malicious Compute Deployment
Detection: Unusual EC2/Lambda/ECS creation: The attacker deploys compute resources for mining, lateral movement, or staging further tools.
7. Data Access or Tampering
Detection: Unusual S3 modifications: They alter S3 permissions or objects, often a prelude to data exfiltration or corruption.
Only some of these actions would appear in a posture scan, crucially after the fact. Every one of these runtime detections is visible only through real-time behavioral monitoring while the attack is in progress.
The future of cloud security Is runtime-first
Cloud defense can no longer revolve solely around prevention. Modern attacks unfold in runtime, across a fast-changing mesh of workloads, services, and — critically — identities. To reduce risk, organizations must be able to detect, understand, and contain malicious activity as it happens, before ephemeral evidence disappears and before attacker's pivot across identity layers.
Darktrace / CLOUD delivers this shift by turning runtime, the most volatile and consequential layer in the cloud, into a fully defensible control point through unified visibility across behavior, workloads, and identities. It does this by providing:
Real-time behavior detection across workloads and identity activity
Autonomous response actions for rapid containment
Automated forensic level artifact preservation the moment events occur
AI-driven investigation that separates weak signals from true attacker patterns
Live cloud environment insight to understand context and impact instantly
Cloud security must evolve from securing what might go wrong to continuously understanding what is happening; in runtime, across identities, and at the speed attackers operate. Unifying runtime and identity visibility is how defenders regain the advantage.
