October 14, 2024

How Triada Affects Banking and Communication Apps

Explore the intricacies of the Triada Trojan and its targeting of communication and banking apps. Learn how to safeguard against this threat.

Written by

Justin Torres

Cyber Analyst

Inside the SOC

Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.

Written by

Justin Torres

Cyber Analyst

Oct 2024

The rise of android malware

Recently, there has been a significant increase in malware strains targeting mobile devices, with a growing number of Android-based malware families, such as banking trojans, which aim to steal sensitive banking information from organizations and individuals worldwide.

These malware families attempt to access users’ accounts to steal online banking credentials and cookies, bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA), and conduct automatic transactions to steal funds [1]. They often masquerade as legitimate software or communications from social media platforms to compromise devices. Once installed, they use tactics such as keylogging, dumping cached credentials, and searching the file system for stored passwords to steal credentials, take over accounts, and potentially perform identity theft [1].

One recent example is the Antidot Trojan, which infects devices by disguising itself as an update page for Google Play. It establishes a command-and-control (C2) channel with a server, allowing malicious actors to execute commands and collect sensitive data [2].

Despite these malware’s ability to evade detection by standard security software, for example, by changing their code [3], Darktrace recently detected another Android malware family, Triada, communicating with a C2 server and exfiltrating data.

Triada: Background and tactics

First surfacing in 2016, Triada is a modular mobile trojan known to target banking and financial applications, as well as popular communication applications like WhatsApp, Facebook, and Google Mail [4]. It has been deployed as a backdoor on devices such as CTV boxes, smartphones, and tablets during the supply chain process [5]. Triada can also be delivered via drive-by downloads, phishing campaigns, smaller trojans like Leech, Ztorg, and Gopro, or more recently, as a malicious module in applications such as unofficial versions of WhatsApp, YoWhatsApp, and FM WhatsApp [6] [7].

How does Triada work?

Once downloaded onto a user’s device, Triada collects information about the system, such as the device’s model, OS version, SD card space, and list of installed applications, and sends this information to a C2 server. The server then responds with a configuration file containing the device’s personal identification number and settings, including the list of modules to be installed.

After a device has been successfully infected by Triada, malicious actors can monitor and intercept incoming and outgoing texts (including two-factor authentication messages), steal login credentials and credit card information from financial applications, divert in-application purchases to themselves, create fake messaging and email accounts, install additional malicious applications, infect devices with ransomware, and take control of the camera and microphone [4] [7].

For devices infected by unofficial versions of WhatsApp, which are downloaded from third-party app stores [9] and from mobile applications such as Snaptube and Vidmate , Triada collects unique device identifiers, information, and keys required for legitimate WhatsApp to work and sends them to a remote server to register the device [7] [12]. The server then responds by sending a link to the Triada payload, which is downloaded and launched. This payload will also download additional malicious modules, sign into WhatsApp accounts on the target’s phone, and request the same permissions as the legitimate WhatsApp application, such as access to SMS messages. If granted, a malicious actor can sign the user up for paid subscriptions without their knowledge. Triada then collects information about the user’s device and mobile operator and sends it to the C2 server [9] [12].

How does Triada avoid detection?

Triada evades detection by modifying the Zygote process, which serves as a template for every application in the Android OS. This enables the malware to become part of every application launched on a device [3]. It also substitutes system functions and conceals modules from the list of running processes and installed apps, ensuring that the system does not raise the alarm [3]. Additionally, as Triada connects to a C2 server on the first boot, infected devices remain compromised even after a factory reset [4].

Triada attack overview

Across multiple customer deployments, devices were observed making a large number of connections to a range of hostnames, primarily over encrypted SSL and HTTPS protocols. These hostnames had never previously been observed on the customers’ networks and appear to be algorithmically generated. Examples include “68u91.66foh90o[.]com”, “92n7au[.]uhabq9[.]com”, “9yrh7.mea5ms[.]com”, and “is5jg.3zweuj[.]com”.

Figure 1: External Sites Summary Graph showing the rarity of the hostname “92n7au[.]uhabq9[.]com” on a customer network.

Most of the IP addresses associated with these hostnames belong to an ASN associated with the cloud provider Alibaba (i.e., AS45102 Alibaba US Technology Co., Ltd). These connections were made over a range of high number ports over 1000, most commonly over 30000 such as 32091, which Darktrace recognized as extremely unusual for the SSL and HTTPS protocols.

Figure 2: Screenshot of a Model Alert Event log showing a device connecting to the endpoint “is5jg[.]3zweuj[.]com” over port 32091.

On several customer deployments, devices were seen exfiltrating data to hostnames which also appeared to be algorithmically generated. This occurred via HTTP POST requests containing unusual URI strings that were made without a prior GET request, indicating that the infected device was using a hardcoded list of C2 servers.

Figure 3: Screenshot of a Model Alert Event Log showing the device posting the string “i8xps1” to the hostname “72zf6.rxqfd[.]com.

Figure 4: Screenshot of a Model Alert Event Log showing the device posting the string “sqyjyadwwq” to the hostname “9yrh7.mea5ms[.]com”.

These connections correspond with reports that devices affected by Triada communicate with the C2 server to transmit their information and receive instructions for installing the payload.

A number of these endpoints have communicating files associated with the unofficial WhatsApp versions YoWhatsApp and FM WhatsApp [11] [12] [13] . This could indicate that the devices connecting to these endpoints were infected via malicious modules in the unofficial versions of WhatsApp, as reported by open-source intelligence (OSINT) [10] [12]. It could also mean that the infected devices are using these connections to download additional files from the C2 server, which could infect systems with additional malicious modules related to Triada.

Moreover, on certain customer deployments, shortly before or after connecting to algorithmically generated hostnames with communicating files linked to YoWhatsApp and FM WhatsApp, devices were also seen connecting to multiple endpoints associated with WhatsApp and Facebook.

Figure 5: Screenshot from a device’s event log showing connections to endpoints associated with WhatsApp shortly after it connected to “9yrh7.mea5ms[.]com”.

These surrounding connections indicate that Triada is attempting to sign in to the users’ WhatsApp accounts on their mobile devices to request permissions such as access to text messages. Additionally, Triada sends information about users’ devices and mobile operators to the C2 server.

The connections made to the algorithmically generated hostnames over SSL and HTTPS protocols, along with the HTTP POST requests, triggered multiple Darktrace models to alert. These models include those that detect connections to potentially algorithmically generated hostnames, connections over ports that are highly unusual for the protocol used, unusual connectivity over the SSL protocol, and HTTP POSTs to endpoints that Darktrace has determined to be rare for the network.

Conclusion

Recently, the use of Android-based malware families, aimed at stealing banking and login credentials, has become a popular trend among threat actors. They use this information to perform identity theft and steal funds from victims worldwide.

Across affected customers, multiple devices were observed connecting to a range of likely algorithmically generated hostnames over SSL and HTTPS protocols. These devices were also seen sending data out of the network to various hostnames via HTTP POST requests without first making a GET request. The URIs in these requests appeared to be algorithmically generated, suggesting the exfiltration of sensitive network data to multiple Triada C2 servers.

This activity highlights the sophisticated methods used by malware like Triada to evade detection and exfiltrate data. It underscores the importance of advanced security measures and anomaly-based detection systems to identify and mitigate such mobile threats, protecting sensitive information and maintaining network integrity.

Credit to: Justin Torres (Senior Cyber Security Analyst) and Charlotte Thompson (Cyber Security Analyst).

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections

Model Alert Coverage

Anomalous Connection / Application Protocol on Uncommon Port

Anomalous Connection / Multiple Connections to New External TCP Port

Anomalous Connection / Multiple HTTP POSTS to Rare Hostname

Anomalous Connections / Multiple Failed Connections to Rare Endpoint

Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Expired SSL

Compromise / DGA Beacon

Compromise / Domain Fluxing

Compromise / Fast Beaconing to DGA

Compromise / Sustained SSL or HTTP Increase

Compromise / Unusual Connections to Rare Lets Encrypt

Unusual Activity / Unusual External Activity

‍

AI Analyst Incident Coverage

Unusual Repeated Connections to Multiple Endpoints

Possible SSL Command and Control

Unusual Repeated Connections

List of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

Ioc – Type - Description

is5jg[.]3zweuj[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
68u91[.]66foh90o[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
9yrh7[.]mea5ms[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
92n7au[.]uhabq9[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
4a5x2[.]fs4ah[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
jmll4[.]66foh90o[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
mrswd[.]wo87sf[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
lptkw[.]s4xx6[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
ya27fw[.]k6zix6[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
w0g25[.]66foh90o[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
kivr8[.]wd6vy[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
iuwe64[.]ct8pc6[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
qefgn[.]8z0le[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
a6y0x[.]xu0h7[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
wewjyw[.]qb6ges[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
vx9dle[.]n0qq3z[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
72zf6[.]rxqfd[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
dwq[.]fsdw4f[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
tqq6g[.]66foh90o[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
1rma1[.]4f8uq[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
0fdwa[.]7j3gj[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
5a7en[.]1e42t[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
gmcp4[.]1e42t[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
g7190[.]rt14v[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
goyvi[.]2l2wa[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
zq6kk[.]ca0qf[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
sv83k[.]bn3avv[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
9sae7h[.]ct8pc6[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
jpygmk[.]qt7tqr[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
av2wg[.]rt14v[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
ugbrg[.]osz1p[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
hw2dm[.]wtws9k[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
kj9atb[.]hai8j1[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
pls9b[.]b0vb3[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
8rweau[.]j7e7r[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
wkc5kn[.]j7e7r[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
v58pq[.]mpvflv[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
zmai4k[.]huqp3e[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
eajgum[.]huqp3e[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
mxl9zg[.]kv0pzv[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
ad1x7[.]mea5ms[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
ixhtb[.]s9gxw8[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
vg1ne[.]uhabq9[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
q5gd0[.]birxpk[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
dycsw[.]h99n6[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
a3miu[.]h99n6[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
qru62[.]5qwu8b5[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
3eox8[.]abxkoop[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
0kttj[.]bddld[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
gjhdr[.]xikuj[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
zq6kk[.]wm0hd[.]com - Hostname - Triada C2 Endpoint
8.222.219[.]234 - IP Address - Triada C2 Endpoint
8.222.244[.]205 - IP Address - Triada C2 Endpoint
8.222.243[.]182 - IP Address - Triada C2 Endpoint
8.222.240[.]127 - IP Address - Triada C2 Endpoint
8.219.123[.]139 - IP Address - Triada C2 Endpoint
8.219.196[.]124 - IP Address - Triada C2 Endpoint
8.222.217[.]73 - IP Address - Triada C2 Endpoint
8.222.251[.]253 - IP Address - Triada C2 Endpoint
8.222.194[.]254 - IP Address - Triada C2 Endpoint
8.222.251[.]34 - IP Address - Triada C2 Endpoint
8.222.216[.]105 - IP Address - Triada C2 Endpoint
47.245.83[.]167 - IP Address - Triada C2 Endpoint
198.200.54[.]56 - IP Address - Triada C2 Endpoint
47.236.113[.]126 - IP Address - Triada C2 Endpoint
47.241.47[.]128 - IP Address - Triada C2 Endpoint
/iyuljwdhxk - URI - Triada C2 URI
/gvuhlbzknh - URI - Triada C2 URI
/sqyjyadwwq - URI - Triada C2 URI
/cncyz3 - URI - Triada C2 URI
/42k0zk - URI - Triada C2 URI
/75kdl5 - URI - Triada C2 URI
/i8xps1 - URI - Triada C2 URI
/84gcjmo - URI - Triada C2 URI
/fkhiwf - URI - Triada C2 URI

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Technique Name - Tactic - ID - Sub-Technique of

Data Obfuscation - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1001

Non-Standard Port - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1571

Standard Application Layer Protocol - COMMAND AND CONTROL ICS - T0869

Non-Application Layer Protocol - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1095

Masquerading - EVASION ICS - T0849

Man in the Browser - COLLECTION - T1185

Web Protocols - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1071.001 -T1071

External Proxy - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1090.002 - T1090

Domain Generation Algorithms - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1568.002 - T1568

Web Services - RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT - T1583.006 - T1583

DNS - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1071.004 - T1071

Fast Flux DNS - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1568.001 - T1568

One-Way Communication - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1102.003 - T1102

Digital Certificates - RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT - T1587.003 - T1587

References

[1] https://www.checkpoint.com/cyber-hub/cyber-security/what-is-trojan/what-is-a-banking-trojan/

[2] https://cyberfraudcentre.com/the-rise-of-the-antidot-android-banking-trojan-a-comprehensive-guide

[3] https://www.zimperium.com/glossary/banking-trojans/

[4] https://www.geeksforgeeks.org/what-is-triada-malware/

[5] https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/malware-infected-devices-retailers/

[6] https://www.pcrisk.com/removal-guides/24926-triada-trojan-android

[7] https://securelist.com/malicious-whatsapp-mod-distributed-through-legitimate-apps/107690/

[8] https://securityboulevard.com/2024/02/impact-of-badbox-and-peachpit-malware-on-android-devices/

[9] https://threatpost.com/custom-whatsapp-build-malware/168892/

[10] https://securelist.com/triada-trojan-in-whatsapp-mod/103679/

[11] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/is5jg.3zweuj.com/relations

[12] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/92n7au.uhabq9.com/relations

[13] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/68u91.66foh90o.com/relations

Written by

Justin Torres

Cyber Analyst

Inside the SOC

Written by

Justin Torres

Cyber Analyst

VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO

Watch the NIS2 Webinar

Blog

Endpoint

January 30, 2026

ClearFake: From Fake CAPTCHAs to Blockchain-Driven Payload Retrieval

fake captcha to blockchain driven palyload retrieval

What is ClearFake?

As threat actors evolve their techniques to exploit victims and breach target networks, the ClearFake campaign has emerged as a significant illustration of this continued adaptation. ClearFake is a campaign observed using a malicious JavaScript framework deployed on compromised websites, impacting sectors such as e‑commerce, travel, and automotive. First identified in mid‑2023, ClearFake is frequently leveraged to socially engineer victims into installing fake web browser updates.

In ClearFake compromises, victims are steered toward compromised WordPress sites, often positioned by attackers through search engine optimization (SEO) poisoning. Once on the site, users are presented with a fake CAPTCHA. This counterfeit challenge is designed to appear legitimate while enabling the execution of malicious code. When a victim interacts with the CAPTCHA, a PowerShell command containing a download string is retrieved and executed.

Attackers commonly abuse the legitimate Microsoft HTML Application Host (MSHTA) in these operations. Recent campaigns have also incorporated Smart Chain endpoints, such as “bsc-dataseed.binance[.]org,” to obtain configuration code. The primary payload delivered through ClearFake is typically an information stealer, such as Lumma Stealer, enabling credential theft, data exfiltration, and persistent access [1].

Darktrace’s Coverage of ClearFake

Darktrace / ENDPOINT first detected activity likely associated with ClearFake on a single device on over the course of one day on November 18, 2025. The system observed the execution of “mshta.exe,” the legitimate Microsoft HTML Application Host utility. It also noted a repeated process command referencing “weiss.neighb0rrol1[.]ru”, indicating suspicious external activity. Subsequent analysis of this endpoint using open‑source intelligence (OSINT) indicated that it was a malicious, domain generation algorithm (DGA) endpoint [2].

‍

Figure 1: The process line referencing weiss.neighb0rrol1[.]ru, as observed by Darktrace / ENDPOINT.

This activity indicates that mshta.exe was used to contact a remote server, “weiss.neighb0rrol1[.]ru/rpxacc64mshta,” and execute the associated HTA file to initiate the next stage of the attack. OSINT sources have since heavily flagged this server as potentially malicious [3].

The first argument in this process uses the MSHTA utility to execute the HTA file hosted on the remote server. If successful, MSHTA would then run JavaScript or VBScript to launch PowerShell commands used to retrieve malicious payloads, a technique observed in previous ClearFake campaigns. Darktrace also detected unusual activity involving additional Microsoft executables, including “winlogon.exe,” “userinit.exe,” and “explorer.exe.” Although these binaries are legitimate components of the Windows operating system, threat actors can abuse their normal behavior within the Windows login sequence to gain control over user sessions, similar to the misuse of mshta.exe.

EtherHiding cover

Darktrace also identified additional ClearFake‑related activity, specifically a connection to bsc-testnet.drpc[.]org, a legitimate BNB Smart Chain endpoint. This activity was triggered by injected JavaScript on the compromised site www.allstarsuae[.]com, where the script initiated an eth_call POST request to the Smart Chain endpoint.

Figure 2: Example of a fake CAPTCHA on the compromised site www.allstarsuae[.]com.

EtherHiding is a technique in which threat actors leverage blockchain technology, specifically smart contracts, as part of their malicious infrastructure. Because blockchain is anonymous, decentralized, and highly persistent, it provides threat actors with advantages in evading defensive measures and traditional tracking [4].

In this case, when a user visits a compromised WordPress site, injected base64‑encoded JavaScript retrieved an ABI string, which was then used to load and execute a contract hosted on the BNB Smart Chain.

Figure 3: JavaScript hosted on the compromised site www.allstaruae[.]com.

Conducting malware analysis on this instance, the Base64 decoded into a JavaScript loader. A POST request to bsc-testnet.drpc[.]org was then used to retrieve a hex‑encoded ABI string that loads and executes the contract. The JavaScript also contained hex and Base64‑encoded functions that decoded into additional JavaScript, which attempted to retrieve a payload hosted on GitHub at “github[.]com/PrivateC0de/obf/main/payload.txt.” However, this payload was unavailable at the time of analysis.

Figure 4: Darktrace’s detection of the POST request to bsc-testnet.drpc[.]org.

Figure 5: Darktrace’s detection of the executable file and the malicious hostname.

Autonomous Response

As Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability was enabled on this customer’s network, Darktrace was able to take swift mitigative action to contain the ClearFake‑related activity early, before it could lead to potential payload delivery. The affected device was blocked from making external connections to a number of suspicious endpoints, including 188.114.96[.]6, *.neighb0rrol1[.]ru, and neighb0rrol1[.]ru, ensuring that no further malicious connections could be made and no payloads could be retrieved.

Autonomous Response also acted to prevent the executable mshta.exe from initiating HTA file execution over HTTPS from this endpoint by blocking the attempted connections. Had these files executed successfully, the attack would likely have resulted in the retrieval of an information stealer, such as Lumma Stealer.

Figure 6: Autonomous Response’s intervention against the suspicious connectivity observed.

Conclusion

ClearFake continues to be observed across multiple sectors, but Darktrace remains well‑positioned to counter such threats. Because ClearFake’s end goal is often to deliver malware such as information stealers and malware loaders, early disruption is critical to preventing compromise. Users should remain aware of this activity and vigilant regarding fake CAPTCHA pop‑ups. They should also monitor unusual usage of MSHTA and outbound connections to domains that mimic formats such as “bsc-dataseed.binance[.]org” [1].

In this case, Darktrace was able to contain the attack before it could successfully escalate and execute. The attempted execution of HTA files was detected early, allowing Autonomous Response to intervene, stopping the activity from progressing. As soon as the device began communicating with weiss.neighb0rrol1[.]ru, an Autonomous Response inhibitor triggered and interrupted the connections.

As ClearFake continues to rise, users should stay alert to social engineering techniques, including ClickFix, that rely on deceptive security prompts.

Credit to Vivek Rajan (Senior Cyber Analyst) and Tara Gould (Malware Research Lead)

Edited by Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)