ダークトレース、OpenAIのDaybreakサイバーパートナープログラムに参加

今日、ダークトレースがOpenAIのDaybreakサイバーパートナープログラムに参加したことが発表されました。私たちはOpenAIと協調して、OpenAIのサイバー機能をダークトレースの製品およびサービスにどう統合できるかを検証することで、ダークトレースの顧客に対して新たな機能を提供していきます。

このパートナーシップは、ダークトレースのビヘイビアAIモデリングをOpenAIの先進的コンテキスト機能と組み合わせることによりセキュリティチームに対して新たなレベルの理解を提供する、画期的な機会となります。この効果を理解していただくために、私たちがこの問題についてどう考えているかを説明することから始めたいと思います。

ダークトレースでは、サイバーセキュリティは防御対象のビジネスを理解する必要があるという基本的信念に基づいてAIを構築してきました。そのため、当社の自己学習型AIは、ユーザーやアイデンティティ、ネットワークやクラウド、Eメールやコラボレーションツール、そして現在はDarktrace / SECURE AI™の展開によりAIシステムやエージェントまでを含めて、各組織のデジタル環境全体における正常および異常な動作の理解を支援するよう設計されています。

私たちの目標は、これまでも単に既知の攻撃をより速く見つけることではありませんでした。自分たちの組織がどのように動作しているか、潜在的なリスクと影響、そして混乱がどこで起こり得るかを防御者が理解し、これまで見たことも想像したこともない未知の脅威に備えられるようにするためでした。

それはまさに今日の脅威ランドスケープで起こっていることです。攻撃は常に変化し続け、手法は移り変わり、インフラは進化し、攻撃者はより速く、正確に、そして状況に応じて動いています。そして今や彼らにはさらに多くの自動化とAIが味方についています。攻撃者は、アイデンティティ、信頼されたサービス、SaaSアプリケーション、およびビジネスワークフローを悪用しています。脅威は必ず外部から侵入しているわけではありません。脅威はしばしば組織内部から、内部関係者による脅威や悪意を持ったエージェントの形でやって来ることもあります。 

こうした現実のなかで、防御者は組織についての深いAIモデリングと、特定された脅威を具体的なビジネスコンテキストに結びつけ、この情報を現実の価値に変換し、リスクが障害に発展する前にアクションを取ることができるAIを必要としています。

私たちがOpenAIとの提携に見出しているチャンスはここにあります。

OpenAIのDaybreakサイバーパートナープログラムとは何か、そしてなぜダークトレースが参加するのか

OpenAI Daybreakサイバーパートナープログラムは、サイバーセキュリティへのAIの安全な利用を推進するためのプログラムです。プログラムの新たな段階として、OpenAIはダークトレースを含む選ばれた信頼できるパートナーと協調し、範囲を限定した製品インテグレーション、マネージド型サービス、パートナーを通じて提供される防御機能を検証します。私たちはOpenAIの高度なフロンティアAI機能が、日々利用しているツールやワークフローを通じてどのように防御者を支援できるかを模索します。

ダークトレースにとって、これは私たちの専門知識と過去10年間にわたって行ってきた取り組みの自然な延長線上にあります。それは、最も効果的なAI技術の組み合わせを安全かつ確実に適用することにより、組織を理解し、悪意あるアクティビティを最も早い兆候で検知し、サイバー防御者がより迅速に行動できるよう支援することです。

OpenAI Daybreakサイバーパートナープログラムで利用可能な高度なモデルとより精密なセーフガードを活用することで、ダークトレースとOpenAIは、組織のデジタルエステートについてのDarktraceのリアルタイムの動作理解と、広範なビジネスコンテキストを解釈するOpenAIの能力を組み合わせます。  

このユニークかつ強力な知見の組み合わせにより、技術的リスクについてより深いコンテキストを提供し、収益、業務、レジリエンスへの潜在的な影響に基づいて作業負荷や調査の優先順位を判断するのに役立てることができます。さらに、セキュリティチームや経営幹部に対して、どのイベントがビジネスにとって最も重要であるか、なぜ重要であるか、そしてどのような対応を取るべきかについての情報を提供することができます。たとえば、エージェントが侵害されていることを見つけるだけでなく、その侵害されたエージェントが今後3時間以内に注文の履行を停止させる可能性がある、ということを指摘することができます。

なぜダークトレースとOpenAIの提携が防御者にとって重要なのか

今日のセキュリティチームは、より多くのアタックサーフェスを管理し、より複雑な環境を保護しなければならず、脅威の量も増大しています。

迅速に行動する能力はきわめて重要ですが、それに加えて最もビジネスに影響を与えるリスクに集中できることも必要です。攻撃者がAIを使って大規模なフィッシングを行い、偵察を自動化し、弱点を見つけ、通常のビジネス活動に溶け込むことができる今、このことは特に重要です。同時に、組織とその従業員はAIを活用したイノベーションを進めており、そのことがアタックサーフェスをさらに広げ、新たなリスクをもたらしています。防御者は、こうした複雑な環境に対応し、安全で透明性があり、レジリエンスの強化に役立つAIを必要としています。また、組織全体でAIを安全に導入し、管理し、防御する方法が必要です。

OpenAI Daybreakサイバーパートナープログラムへの参加は、その方向へのさらなる一歩です。私たちはまだこの作業の初期段階にあり、慎重かつ規律あるアプローチで取り組んでいます。ただ、方向性は明確です。組織を守るには、攻撃だけでなくビジネスを理解するAIが必要です。

ダークトレースでは、まさにその点に重点をおいており、OpenAIとのこのパートナーシップに大きく期待しています。

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Introduction

In enterprise environments, non-compliant software traffic can introduce unexpected exposure by creating unmanaged paths for outbound connectivity. Hola VPN is a notable example because of its peer-to-peer design, which can effectively turn user devices into routing or exit nodes for other parties’ traffic, shifting the risk profile from that of a traditional virtual private network (VPN) to something closer to a distributed proxy.

As a result, the appearance of Hola-related activity, whether from prior installation or unintended background connections, should be treated with caution.  Such activity may provide a foothold for malicious behavior, including lateral movement or command-and-control communication.

This blog explores how Hola-associated activity appeared as part of broader patterns of suspicious behavior observed across the Darktrace customer base.

The campaign

In February and March 2026, Darktrace observed similar anomalous activity across multiple customer environments, with affected devices showing consistent behavioral patterns. These included connections to multiple *.hola[.]org endpoints using Hola-related user agents, suggesting interaction with Hola infrastructure rather than isolated or incidental traffic.

Following these connections, affected customer environments showed downloads of suspicious executable files from rare external endpoints 188.241.219[.]55 and 184.241.218[.]111. Both endpoints have been flagged as potentially malicious by open-source intelligence (OSINT) [1][2].

These downloads were conducted using consistent user agents across impacted customers, specifically ‘Hola svc_js_win32/1.249.408’ and ‘Hola svc_js_win32/1.251.389’, suggesting a possible association with Hola-related activity.

Notably, this pattern aligns with recent reporting that, in some cases, Hola distributed an undeclared executable component, me[.]exe, which was later assessed to be a likely Monero-mining binary introduced via a compromised delivery pipeline [3].

Case Study 1

Darktrace first observed a new device on January 19, 2026, within a customer environment based in the Europe, Middle East, and Africa (EMEA) region. On the same day it appeared on the network, the device communicated with multiple pieces of Hola VPN-linked infrastructure before downloading a binary from a hola[.]org subdomain.

Subsequent Darktrace telemetry revealed a recurring pattern of activity from the day the device was first observed through to March 4, 2026. During this period, the device repeatedly issued HTTP GET requests to the URI /bwfile?size=1048576, each returning a 200 OK response, indicating successful file retrieval.

This behavior was accompanied by a POST request to /bwfile, followed by an additional GET request for a significantly larger file at /bwfile?size=26214400, suggesting a deliberate and structured file transfer pattern.

Notably, the binary download activity was not tied to a single static host. Instead, it was observed across multiple URLs that changed over time while remaining within the same hola[.]org domain. This pattern suggests the use of rotating or distributed delivery infrastructure rather than a fixed endpoint.

Across these events, the activity was consistently associated with the user agent Hola svc_js_win32/1.249.408, further linking the traffic to Hola-related service components. Amid these persistent and unusual connections, on February 22, Darktrace observed the device connecting to 188.241.219[.]55/proxy-peer-windows-amd64[.]exe, resulting in the download of an executable file.

Based on its file hash, the downloaded file was assessed as a likely Trojan downloader [4], with import hash (imphash) values showing similarities to samples linked to Vidar, Rhadamanthys, and Stealc according to OSINT [5]. Overall, this sequence of activity suggests that Hola-related connectivity may have been leveraged as part of a broader malware delivery chain.

Darktrace’s Autonomous Response

Due to the highly unusual activity observed, Darktrace Autonomous Response was triggered by the device’s behavior. However, as the customer deployment was configured in “Human Confirmation” mode, manual approval was required before any action could be taken.

Had the deployment been set to “Fully Autonomous” mode, Darktrace would have automatically:

1. Blocked connections to the associated ports and external endpoints
2. Prevented all outgoing network connections from the device
3. Enforced the device’s established ‘pattern of life’, allowing normal activity to continue while restricting any anomalous behavior

Case Study 2

While the first case focused on anomalous activity from a newly observed device, Darktrace also identified cases in which devices had already been communicating with Hola-related endpoints prior to the suspected campaign. This may suggest pre-existing Hola usage within the environment, potentially increasing exposure and creating an avenue for subsequent suspicious activity.

One case involved three devices within a customer network based in the Americas (AMS). In this instance, a different payload was identified: me[.]exe, a potentially malicious cryptocurrency miner also referred to as HolaMonitorService[.]exe [6][7]. The downloads were observed from infrastructure similar to that seen in Case 1, including an IP address within the same 188.241.0.0/16 subnet.

Connections to *.hola[.]org, alongside the use of potential Hola-related user agents consistent with those in Case 1, were also identified, further suggesting a link between the observed activity and Hola-associated infrastructure.

Darktrace observed activity indicative of unusual VPN usage on the first affected device on February 2, followed by telemetry suggesting potential Tor usage. This was later followed by the download of me[.]exe on March 10 from 188.241.218[.]111. Notably, this device was the earliest among the three within the deployment to exhibit the presence of the suspicious executable.

On March 5, 2026, the second affected device exhibited a slightly different progression, initiating connections to http-test1[.]hola[.]org using the user agent ‘hola_get’. This activity was followed by the download of me[.]exe from the same endpoint on March 13, consistent with the broader pattern of Hola-related downloads observed across the environment.

The final affected device within this customer’s network demonstrated a more limited but related pattern, also downloading me[.]exe on March 17 using the same ‘hola_get’ user agent.

While the earlier Hola VPN usage observed across the deployment may not have been directly related to the suspected malware campaign, it may nonetheless have contributed to reduced visibility. The presence of pre-existing Hola-related traffic could have obscured malicious activity, making it more difficult to distinguish legitimate usage from attacker-driven behavior and, in turn, hindering the timely identification of the emerging compromise.

Darktrace’s Autonomous Response

For this deployment, the customer had their Autonomous Response capability configured in “Fully Autonomous” mode, allowing Darktrace to take action without human intervention. As a result, the system was able to autonomously disrupt the activity as soon as relevant events were identified through model detections.

Suspected cryptomining activity

As previously noted, some of the observed executable payloads appear to be linked to cryptomining malware. Across a subset of affected customer environments, this assessment was further supported by subsequent device activity consistent with Monero mining. Affected devices established follow-on connections to multiple external endpoints aligned with known mining infrastructure, indicating post-download execution.

Considering the broader sequence of activity, this pattern may point to a wider form of abuse in which legitimate VPN-related traffic is used to mask or facilitate malicious behavior following compromise.

On several devices, the download of executable files, including a newly observed peer[.]exe, was followed by alerts indicative of cryptocurrency mining activity. Mining-related credentials such as ‘x’ were observed using the Minergate protocol to communicate with endpoints within the 89.125.255.0/24 subnet and 188.241.218[.]111, the same endpoint involved in earlier download activity. Additional credentials appeared to reflect device-specific CPU identifiers, for example ‘12th Gen Intel(R) Core (TM) i5-1235U’.

Observed mining methods included login, submit, and job, consistent with active participation in a pool-based mining workflow rather than passive or incidental contact. The login method indicates that the host authenticated to the mining service as a worker, job reflects the assignment of computational tasks, and submit shows completed work being returned to the pool [8]. This sequence suggests that affected devices were actively contributing processing resources as part of an unauthorized distributed mining operation.

The presence of unauthorized cryptominers can lead to degraded system performance and reduced device stability. Beyond the immediate resource impact, such activity often serves as an indicator of a broader compromise rather than an isolated issue. This may increase the risk of further malware deployment, persistence mechanisms, and lateral movement, particularly in environments where the initial intrusion has not been fully contained.

Conclusion

Across affected environments, detections such as unusual VPN usage, connections to Hola infrastructure, anomalous HTTP activity, suspicious file downloads, and subsequent cryptomining behavior were linked into a single, evolving incident narrative. This aggregation provided a clearer view of attack progression, enabling security teams to understand not just isolated alerts, but the full sequence of compromise from initial contact through to post-exploitation.

Ultimately, these activities show that the risk posed by non-compliant software such as Hola VPN can extend far beyond simple policy violations. What began as traffic to Hola-related infrastructure was, in multiple cases, followed by behavior suggesting deliberate misuse, including suspicious executable downloads using Hola-related user agents and, in some instances, evidence of active cryptomining. These were not isolated anomalies, but elements of a broader pattern in which seemingly benign proxy or VPN-related communications may have created a pathway for malicious delivery and unauthorized resource exploitation.

The significance of this activity lies not only in the downloads or mining, but in what it reveals about an attacker’s ability to blend malicious operations into traffic associated with software that may already have a foothold in the environment. When unapproved software operates within an enterprise, it can reduce visibility, blur the distinction between legitimate and malicious traffic, and create opportunities to extend compromise in ways that are persistent and difficult to detect. Darktrace’s anomaly-based approach enables these behavioral distinctions to be identified, regardless of whether the device is new or long established within the network.

Credit to Min Kim (Associate Principal Analyst), Priya Thapa (Senior Cyber Analyst)
Edited by Ryan Traill (Content Manager)

Appendices

References

[1] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/188.241.219.55

[2]  https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/188.241.218.111

[3] https://www.sophos.com/en-us/blog/you-do-surprise-me-exe-an-unexpected-executable-in-hola-browser

[4] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/d275abca286cd75af971d0459fdf1df37c7b19c514abafae5d0b04bf42ccfb45/detection

[5] https://bazaar.abuse.ch/sample/d275abca286cd75af971d0459fdf1df37c7b19c514abafae5d0b04bf42ccfb45/

[6] https://any.run/report/4cdeb5df217764a8b6a20d518b76ccb30cbe623365a13d9dcd40900950f1ed99/de3a756a-3101-4369-8922-52c586c939fb

[7] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/e3541caf708c075f0bb22fc68b03acd8457fea7cf0732ea935b1eb016d1c7721/community

[8] https://bitcoinwiki.org/wiki/stratum

Darktrace Model Detections

·      Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location

·      Anomalous File / Multiple EXE from Rare External Locations

·      Compromise / Crypto Currency Mining Activity

·      Compromise / High Priority Crypto Currency Mining (EM)

·      Device / New User Agent

·      Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname

·      Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Controlled and Model Alert

·      Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Alerts Over Time Block

·      Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Tor Block

·      Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena File then New Outbound Block

·      Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious Activity Block

·      Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious File Pattern of Life Block

·      Antigena / Network / External threat / Antigena Suspicious File Block

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

IoC –Type -Description + Confidence

188.241.219[.]55 - IP Address - Malware distribution source

188.241.218[.]111 - IP Address -Malware distribution source

hxxp://188.241.218[.]111:8080/me[.]exe - URI - Malicious payload

hxxp://188.241.219[.]55:9000/proxy-peer-windows-amd64[.]exe - URI - Malicious payload

hxxp://188.241.219[.]55:9000/peer[.]exe - URI - Malicious payload

C8088f3c8bc3542eb1ad78a7cc5306d866c8ac81 - SHA1 - Malicious payload, me[.]exe

b595a6de0f6a18975b29e6f8ebe604956a173478 - SHA1 - Malicious payload, me[.]exe

e9139a2e0839e8b9e5c9787ea936347ae56e5460 - SHA1 - Possible malicious payload

c2e80073e4cafe757d5643bd8fd45f28ad89bff9 - SHA1 - Possible malicious payload

695355eceedcdd337d8fcbd35e6a531cda75b847 - SHA1 - Possible malicious payload

f0b0d8068a1b9ab5d68a8a46842d72b870b292e7 - SHA1 - Possible malicious payload

a21c8b8cabc7670ea45bc175e185a0f9bfcf4733 - SHA1 - Malicious payload, me[.]exe

0353ca44b9f397d8f492db0b2f7a1d00a9e4406a - SHA1 - Possible malicious payload

56824c8a110e35ab303dc27a6c758cd50c36174c - SHA1 - Malicious payload, peer[.]exe

c141fa0fa505fe7f9ad5dd21d9d4d6d411739682 - SHA1 - Malicious payload, peer[.]exe

0417ec988b16f1267065185a6eea98f0bd2e17cd - SHA1 - Possible malicious payload

c54f7eaaeb3e0b528cd2584bdcb3a4b13cc0f8a2 - SHA1 - Malicious payload, peer[.]exe

11c78f15fafd53f8cc5a52b828d7cbf2a99e0b09 - SHA1 - Malicious payload, peer[.]exe

0258bf7dbb0123247db29e8799991140bbdbd9bb - SHA1 - Malicious payload, proxy-peer-windows-amd64[.]exe

b46043a06dd9bbd63e4214d5fbc7fd56e1ff0618 - SHA1 - Possible malicious payload

753afdecd9f5402d004e8e5f768170ae9a468ca5 - SHA1 - Possible malicious payload

8f533c7cb1524b00f7b0311c2ea8603298d6b2ca - SHA1 - Possible malicious payload

3a3bc6a5b4db1a4e961abcb002d26fe9d5e5c349 - SHA1 - Possible malicious payload

897f70eb41d302b045fcb05ed0693675e778ce57 - SHA1 - Possible malicious payload

6ddd5644809606e3dc1e2cc06059c3f5e6176f85 - SHA1 - Malicious payload, proxy-peer-windows-amd64[.]exe

68a94f7cdcaf8853ea99251c1ecc67ae9b32eba8 - SHA1 - Malicious payload, proxy-peer-windows-amd64[.]exe

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

T1659 -Initial Access, Command and Control -Content Injection

T1588.001 -Resource Development -Malware

T1189 -Initial Access -Drive-by Compromise

T1105 -Command and Control -Ingress Tool Transfer

T1657 -Impact -Financial Theft

T1497.001 -Impact -Compute Hijacking

T1496 -Impact -Resource Hijacking

T1210 -Lateral Movement -Exploitation of Remote Services

T1036.012 -Stealth -Browser Fingerprint

T1071.001 -Command and Control -Web Protocols