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May 19, 2020

Understanding a SaaS Attack and How AI Can Investigate

The Cyber AI Platform recently detected and investigated two incidents of SaaS account takeover in real-time. Learn about the importance of cyber security here!
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Max Heinemeyer
Global Field CISO
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19
May 2020

Executive summary

  • Darktrace has observed a significant increase in attacks against SaaS platforms, including file storage, collaborative work, and email solutions.
  • This blog post details two example threats that are representative of the current threat landscape: an Office 365 business email compromise and a Box.com file sharing account compromise.
  • Organizations are recommended to enable multi-factor authentication to combat credential stuffing attacks and the re-use of stolen credentials from data dumps. It is further advised to actively monitor SaaS environments for in-progress cyber-attacks.
  • SaaS exacerbates the skill gap in security – identifying and investigating threats in SaaS environments is a different skill to traditional security operations skill-sets.

Introduction

The digital transformation – whether planned naturally or forced by the global pandemic – has increased the use of Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) solutions in modern organizations. The annual growth rate of the SaaS market is currently 18%, and as the workforce becomes increasingly remote throughout 2020, this is set to skyrocket.

Attackers have been targeting SaaS solutions for a long time – but almost nobody talks about how the Techniques, Tools & Procedures (TTPs) in SaaS attacks differ significantly from traditional TTPs seen in networks and endpoint attacks.

How do you create meaningful detections in SaaS environments that don’t have endpoint or network data? How can you investigate threats in a SaaS environment as an analyst? What does a ‘good’ SaaS event look like, and what does a threat look like? Finding skilled security analysts that can work in traditional IT environments is already hard – it gets even harder when trying to hire security people with SaaS domain knowledge.

SaaS consumers are left with only a few choices: either use the native SaaS security controls provided in each SaaS solution – and rely on the (non-)maturity of the SaaS provider – or go with a third party SaaS security solution, often in the form of Cloud Access Security Brokers (CASBs). Both cases are often not ideal.

This blog outlines two attacks we have recently observed in SaaS environments that are representative for the broader SaaS threat landscape: a Microsoft (Office) 365 business email compromise (BEC) and the compromise of a corporate Box.com account. The analysis serves to illuminate the sharp distinction between a traditional network attack and a SaaS compromise – demonstrating how using machine learning to detect anomalies in behavior offers crucial hope for defenders as SaaS applications define this new era of work.

Anonymized SaaS Threat 1: Office 365 Business Email Compromise

Figure 1: The timeline of attack for the Microsoft 365 Compromise

In this case of a classic BEC attack, a threat-actor infiltrated an employee’s Microsoft 365 account to access sensitive financial documents hosted in SharePoint, including pay slip and banking details. The attacker went on to make configuration changes to the hacked inbox, deleting items and making updates that may have allowed them to cover their tracks.

Darktrace first observed the employee’s account log in from unusual IP ranges. The particular account had never logged in from Bulgaria before, and the peer accounts belonging to those from the same department had not exhibited similar behavioral traits. This in itself was a low-level anomaly and not necessarily indicative of malicious activity – employees might change locations after all.

The unusual login location was then accompanied by an unusual login time and a new user-agent. All of these anomalies triggered Cyber AI Analyst – Darktrace’s automated threat investigation technology – to launch a deeper analysis.

Darktrace then identified that the account was starting to access highly sensitive information, including payroll information on a Sharepoint. Two examples that were highlighted by AI Analyst are shown below:

  • hxxps://anonymised[.]sharepoint[.]com/anonymised/pages/Understanding-my-payslip[.]aspx
  • hxxps:// anonymised [.]sharepoint[.]com/anonymised /pages/Changing-my-bank-details[.]aspx

The attacker tried to gain insights about payment information and credit card details, with the likely intention of changing the payroll details to an attacker-controlled bank account. But with its ability to automatically analyze events to piece together attack narratives, Cyber AI Analyst was able to put together these weak signals of a threat and illuminate the likely account compromise. The security team was then able to lock the account and alert the user, who subsequently changed their credentials.

Anonymized SaaS Threat 2: Box.com Compromise

Figure 2: The timeline of attack for the Box.com Compromise

Darktrace observed a case of unauthorized access to a corporate Box.com file storage account belonging to an employee of a global supply company. The Box.com account login took place in the US – the same country that this organization operates in – but from an unusual IP space and ASN. Made suspicious by this low-level anomaly, Cyber AI Analyst did further, ongoing investigations into the user’s activity.

The actor behind the account logged in to Box.com successfully, and then proceeded to download expense reports, invoices, and other financial documents. It became evident that the account started accessing files that were highly unusual for the account to access. Darktrace recognized that neither the account itself, nor its peer group were usually accessing the file called ‘PASSWORD SHEET.xlsx’.

With Cyber AI’s bespoke knowledge of ‘self’ for every member of the organization’s workforce, the technology was able to identify the threat immediately. The Darktrace Cyber AI Platform detected that the activity occurred at a highly unusual time for the legitimate user, and that the location of the actor’s IP address was also anomalous compared to the employee’s previous access locations for this particular SaaS service.

While accessing these documents may have been normal for the employee in another context, Darktrace Cyber AI’s deep understanding of user behavior and granular visibility within the Box.com application allowed it to spot the subtle signs of account compromise. Moreover, when Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst automatically investigated the threat, it was able to illuminate the wider narrative, understanding that each unauthorized file exposure was part of a connected incident and highlighted the breach as a key concern for the security team.

Conclusion

Traditional detection approaches like ‘more than X failed logins from Y’ are not enough to ensure sufficient security across SaaS applications. Keeping threat intelligence lists up to date is even more difficult, as most SaaS attacks don’t involve any Command & Control – just indiscriminate logins from remote devices. Attackers may use VPN, Tor, other compromised devices, dynamic DNS, or virtual private servers to further mask their tracks.

A more intricate and effective approach to SaaS security requires understanding the dynamic individual behind the account. SaaS applications are fundamentally platforms for humans to communicate – allowing them to exchange and store ideas and information. Abnormal, threatening behavior is therefore impossible to detect without a nuanced understanding of those unique individuals: where and when do they typically access a SaaS account, which files are they like to access, who do they typically connect with?

Cyber AI asks these questions, continuously analyzing data not only across SaaS platforms, but from the unique ‘patterns of life’ of every user and device in the organization as a whole. With this context, it can chain together seemingly disparate anomalies – unusual login times, login locations, access of new or unusual files, and hundreds of other indicators of threat. These anomalies then act as a trigger for more in-depth investigations via Cyber AI Analyst that can link the anomalies together and create a coherent attack narrative.

Both of the above SaaS attacks were comprehensively but succinctly investigated and fully reported on by the Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst, which then surfaced an easy-to-understand incident report, ready for executive review. For a more in-depth look at how Cyber AI Analyst investigated an emerging APT threat in the wild, read: Catching APT41 exploiting a zero-day vulnerability.

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Max Heinemeyer
Global Field CISO

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April 24, 2026

Email-Borne Cyber Risk: A Core Challenge for the CISO in the Age of Volume and Sophistication

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The challenge for CISOs

Despite continuous advances in security technologies, humans continue to be exploited by attackers. Credential abuse and social actions like phishing are major factors, accounting for around 60% of all breaches. These attacks rely less on technical vulnerabilities and more on exploiting human behavior and organizational processes. 

From my perspective as a former CISO, protecting humans concentrates three of today’s most pressing challenges: the sheer volume of email-based threats, their increasing sophistication, and the limitations of traditional employee awareness programs in moving the needle on risk. 

My personal experience of security awareness training as a CISO

With over 20 years’ experience as an ICT and Cybersecurity leader across various international organizations, I’ve seen security awareness training (SAT) in many guises. And while the cyber landscape is evolving in every direction, the effectiveness of SAT is reaching a plateau.  

Most programs I’ve seen follow a familiar pattern. Training is delivered through a combination of eLearning modules and internal sessions designed to reinforce IT policies. Employees are typically required to complete a slide deck or video, followed by a multiple-choice quiz. Occasional phishing simulations are distributed throughout the year.

The content is often static and unpersonalized, based on known threats that may already be outdated. Every employee regardless of role or risk exposure receives the same training and the same simulated phishing templates, from front-desk staff to the CEO.

The problem with traditional SAT programs

The issue with the approach to SAT outlined above is that the distribution of power is imbalanced. Humans will always be fallible, particularly when faced with increasingly sophisticated attacks. Providing generic, low-context training risks creating false confidence rather than genuine resilience. Let’s look at some of the problems in detail.

Timing and delivery

Employees today operate under constant cognitive load, making lots of rapid decisions every day to reduce their email volumes. Yet if employees are completing training annually, or on an ad hoc basis, it becomes a standalone occurrence rather than a continuous habit.  

As a result, retention is low. Employees often forget the lessons within weeks, a phenomenon known as the ‘Ebbinghaus Forgetting Curve.’

The graph illustrates that when you first learn something, the information disappears at an exponential rate without retention. In fact, according to the curve, you forget 50% of all new information within a day, and 90% of all new information within a week.  

Simultaneously, most training is conducted within a separate interface. Because it takes place away from the actual moment of decision-making, the "teachable moment" is lost. There is a cognitive disconnect between the action (clicking a link in Outlook) and the education (watching a video in a browser). 

People

In the context of professional risk management, the risks faced by different users are different. Static learning such as everyone receiving the same ‘Password Reset’ email doesn’t help users prepare for the specific threats they are likely to face. It also contributes to user fatigue, driven by repetitive training. And if users receive tests at the same time, news spreads among colleagues, hurting the efficacy of the test.  

Staff turnover introduces further risk. In many organizations, new employees gain access to systems before receiving meaningful training, reducing onboarding to little more than policy acknowledgment.

Measuring success

In my experience, solutions are standalone, without any correlation to other tools in the security stack. In some cases, the programs are delivered by HR rather than the security team, creating a complete silo.  

As a result, SAT is often perceived as a compliance exercise rather than a capability building function. The result is that poor-quality training does little to reduce the likelihood of compromise, regardless of completion rates or quiz performance.

What a modern SAT solution should look like

For today’s CISO, email represents the convergence point of high-volume, high-impact, and human-centric threats. Despite significant security investments, it remains one of the most difficult channels to secure effectively. Given these constraints, CISOs must evolve their approach to SAT.

Success lies in a balanced strategy one that combines advanced technology, attack surface reduction, and pragmatic user enablement, without over-relying on human vigilance as the final line of defense.

This means moving beyond traditional SAT toward continuous, contextual awareness, realistic simulations, and tight integration with security outcomes.

Three requirements for a modern SAT solution

  • Invisible protection: The optimum security solution is one that assists users without impeding their experience. The objective is to enhance human capabilities, rather than simply delivering a lecture. 
  • Real-time feedback: Rather than a monthly quiz, the ideal system would provide a prompt or warning when a user is about to engage with something suspicious. 
  • Positive culture: Shifting the focus away from a "gotcha" culture, which is a contributing factor to a resentment, and instead empowers employees to serve as "sensors" for the company. 

Discover how personalized security coaching can strengthen your human layer and make your email defenses more resilient. Explore Darktrace / Adaptive Human Defense.

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About the author
Karim Benslimane
VP, Field CISO

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April 21, 2026

How a Compromised eScan Update Enabled Multi‑Stage Malware and Blockchain C2

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The rise of supply chain attacks

In recent years, the abuse of trusted software has become increasingly common, with supply chain compromises emerging as one of the fastest growing vectors for cyber intrusions. As highlighted in Darktrace’s Annual Threat Report 2026, attackers and state-actors continue to find significant value in gaining access to networks through compromised trusted links, third-party tools, or legitimate software. In January 2026, a supply chain compromise affecting MicroWorld Technologies’ eScan antivirus product was reported, with malicious updates distributed to customers through the legitimate update infrastructure. This, in turn, resulted in a multi‑stage loader malware being deployed on compromised devices [1][2].

An overview of eScan exploitation

According to eScan’s official threat advisory, unauthorized access to a regional update server resulted in an “incorrect file placed in the update distribution path” [3]. Customers associated with the affected update servers who downloaded the update during a two-hour window on January 20 were impacted, with affected Windows devices subsequently have experiencing various errors related to update functions and notifications [3].

While eScan did not specify which regional update servers were affected by the malicious update, all impacted Darktrace customer environments were located in the Europe, Middle East, and Africa (EMEA) region.

External research reported that a malicious 32-bit executable file , “Reload.exe”, was first installed on affected devices, which then dropped the 64-bit downloader, “CONSCTLX.exe”. This downloader establishes persistence by creating scheduled tasks such as “CorelDefrag”, which are responsible for executing PowerShell scripts. Subsequently, it evades detection by tampering with the Windows HOSTS file and eScan registry to prevent future remote updates intended for remediation. Additional payloads are then downloaded from its command-and-control (C2) server [1].

Darktrace’s coverage of eScan exploitation

Initial Access and Blockchain as multi-distributed C2 Infrastructure

On January 20, the same day as the aforementioned two‑hour exploit window, Darktrace observed multiple devices across affected networks downloading .dlz package files from eScan update servers, followed by connections to an anomalous endpoint, vhs.delrosal[.]net, which belongs to the attackers’ C2 infrastructure.

The endpoint contained a self‑signed SSL certificate with the string “O=Internet Widgits Pty Ltd, ST=SomeState, C=AU”, a default placeholder commonly used in SSL/TLS certificates for testing and development environments, as well as in malicious C2 infrastructure [4].

Utilizing a multi‑distributed C2 infrastructure, the attackers also leveraged domains linked with the Solana open‑source blockchain for C2 purposes, namely “.sol”. These domains were human‑readable names that act as aliases for cryptocurrency wallet addresses. As browsers do not natively resolve .sol domains, the Solana Naming System (formerly known as Bonfida, an independent contributor within the Solana ecosystem) provides a proxy service, through endpoints such as sol-domain[.]org, to enable browser access.

Darktrace observed devices connecting to blackice.sol-domain[.]org, indicating that attackers were likely using this proxy to reach a .sol domain for C2 activity. Given this behavior, it is likely that the attackers leveraged .sol domains as a dead drop resolver, a C2 technique in which threat actors host information on a public and legitimate service, such as a blockchain. Additional proxy resolver endpoints, such as sns-resolver.bonfida.workers[.]dev, were also observed.

Solana transactions are transparent, allowing all activity to be viewed publicly. When Darktrace analysts examined the transactions associated with blackice[.]sol, they observed that the earliest records dated November 7, 2025, which coincides with the creation date of the known C2 endpoint vhs[.]delrosal[.]net as shown in WHOIS Lookup information [4][5].

WHOIS Look records of the C2 endpoint vhs[.]delrosal[.]net.
Figure 1: WHOIS Look records of the C2 endpoint vhs[.]delrosal[.]net.
 Earliest observed transaction record for blackice[.]sol on public ledgers.
Figure 2: Earliest observed transaction record for blackice[.]sol on public ledgers.

Subsequent instructions found within the transactions contained strings such as “CNAME= vhs[.]delrosal[.]net”, indicating attempts to direct the device toward the malicious endpoint. A more recent transaction recorded on January 28 included strings such as “hxxps://96.9.125[.]243/i;code=302”, suggesting an effort to change C2 endpoints. Darktrace observed multiple alerts triggered for these endpoints across affected devices.

Similar blockchain‑related endpoints, such as “tumama.hns[.]to”, were also observed in C2 activities. The hns[.]to service allows web browsers to access websites registered on Handshake, a decentralized blockchain‑based framework designed to replace centralized authorities and domain registries for top‑level domains. This shift toward decentralized, blockchain‑based infrastructure likely reflects increased efforts by attackers to evade detection.

In outgoing connections to these malicious endpoints across affected networks, Darktrace / NETWORK recognized that the activity was 100% rare and anomalous for both the devices and the wider networks, likely indicative of malicious beaconing, regardless of the underlying trusted infrastructure. In addition to generating multiple model alerts to capture this malicious activity across affected networks, Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst was able to compile these separate events into broader incidents that summarized the entire attack chain, allowing customers’ security teams to investigate and remediate more efficiently. Moreover, in customer environments where Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability was enabled, Darktrace took swift action to contain the attack by blocking beaconing connections to the malicious endpoints, even when those endpoints were associated with seemingly trustworthy services.

Conclusion

Attacks targeting trusted relationships continue to be a popular strategy among threat actors. Activities linked to trusted or widely deployed software are often unintentionally whitelisted by existing security solutions and gateways. Darktrace observed multiple devices becoming impacted within a very short period, likely because tools such as antivirus software are typically mass‑deployed across numerous endpoints. As a result, a single compromised delivery mechanism can greatly expand the attack surface.

Attackers are also becoming increasingly creative in developing resilient C2 infrastructure and exploiting legitimate services to evade detection. Defenders are therefore encouraged to closely monitor anomalous connections and file downloads. Darktrace’s ability to detect unusual activity amidst ever‑changing tactics and indicators of compromise (IoCs) helps organizations maintain a proactive and resilient defense posture against emerging threats.

Credit to Joanna Ng (Associate Principal Cybersecurity Analyst) and Min Kim (Associate Principal Cybersecurity Analyst) and Tara Gould (Malware Researcher Lead)

Edited by Ryan Traill (Content Manager)

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections

  • Anomalous File::Zip or Gzip from Rare External Location
  • Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Self-Signed SSL
  • Anomalous Connection / Rare External SSL Self-Signed
  • Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Expired SSL
  • Anomalous Server Activity / Anomalous External Activity from Critical Network Device

List of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

  • vhs[.]delrosal[.]net – C2 server
  • tumama[.]hns[.]to – C2 server
  • blackice.sol-domain[.]org – C2 server
  • 96.9.125[.]243 – C2 Server

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • T1071.001 - Command and Control: Web Protocols
  • T1588.001 - Resource Development
  • T1102.001 - Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver
  • T1195 – Supple Chain Compromise

References

[1] https://www.morphisec.com/blog/critical-escan-threat-bulletin/

[2] https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/escan-confirms-update-server-breached-to-push-malicious-update/

[3] hxxps://download1.mwti.net/documents/Advisory/eScan_Security_Advisory_2026[.]pdf

[4] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/delrosal.net

[5] hxxps://explorer.solana[.]com/address/2wFAbYHNw4ewBHBJzmDgDhCXYoFjJnpbdmeWjZvevaVv

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About the author
Joanna Ng
Associate Principal Analyst
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