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September 18, 2024

FortiClient EMS Exploited: Attack Chain & Post Exploitation Tactics

Read about the methods used to exploit FortiClient EMS and the critical post-exploitation tactics that affect cybersecurity defenses.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Emily Megan Lim
Cyber Analyst
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18
Sep 2024

Cyber attacks on internet-facing systems

In the first half of 2024, the Darktrace Threat Research team observed multiple campaigns of threat actors targeting vulnerabilities in internet-facing systems, including Ivanti CS/PS appliances, Palo Alto firewall devices, and TeamCity on-premises.

These systems, which are exposed to the internet, are often targeted by threat actors to gain initial access to a network. They are constantly being scanned for vulnerabilities, known or unknown, by opportunistic actors hoping to exploit gaps in security. Unfortunately, this exposure remains a significant blind spot for many security teams, as monitoring edge infrastructure can be particularly challenging due to its distributed nature and the sheer volume of external traffic it processes.

In this blog, we discuss a vulnerability that was exploited in Fortinet’s FortiClient Endpoint Management Server (EMS) and the post-exploitation activity that Darktrace observed across multiple customer environments.

What is FortiClient EMS?

FortiClient is typically used for endpoint security, providing features such as virtual private networks (VPN), malware protection, and web filtering. The FortiClient EMS is a centralized platform used by administrators to enforce security policies and manage endpoint compliance. As endpoints are remote and distributed across various locations, the EMS needs to be accessible over the internet.

However, being exposed to the internet presents significant security risks, and exploiting vulnerabilities in the system may give an attacker unauthorized access. From there, they could conduct further malicious activities such as reconnaissance, establishing command-and-control (C2), moving laterally across the network, and accessing sensitive data.

CVE-2023-48788

CVE-2023-48788 is a critical SQL injection vulnerability in FortiClient EMS that can allow an attacker to gain unauthorized access to the system. It stems from improper neutralization of special elements used in SQL commands, which allows attackers to exploit the system through specially crafted requests, potentially leading to Remote Code Execution (RCE) [1]. This critical vulnerability was given a CVSS score of 9.8 and can be exploited without authentication.

The affected versions of FortiClient EMS include:

  • FortiClient EMS 7.2.0 to 7.2.2 (fixed in 7.2.3)
  • FortiClient EMS 7.0.1 to 7.0.10 (fixed in 7.0.11)

The vulnerability was publicly disclosed on March 12, 2024, and an exploit proof of concept was released by Horizon3.ai on March 21 [2]. Starting from March 24, almost two weeks after the initial disclosure, Darktrace began to observe at least six instances where the FortiClient EMS vulnerability had likely been exploited on customer networks. Seemingly exploited devices in multiple customer environments were observed performing anomalous activities, including the installation of Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tools, which was also reported by other security vendors around the same time [3].

Darktrace’s Coverage

Initial Access

To understand how the vulnerability can be exploited to gain initial access, we first need to explain some components of the FortiClient EMS:

  • The service FmcDaemon.exe is used for communication between the EMS and enrolled endpoint clients. It listens on port 8013 for incoming client connections.
  • Incoming requests are then sent to FCTDas.exe, which translates requests from other server components into SQL requests. This service interacts with the Microsoft SQL database.
  • Endpoint clients communicate with the FmcDaemon on the server on port 8013 by default.

Therefore, an SQL injection attack can be performed by crafting a malicious payload and sending it over port 8013 to the server. To carry out RCE, an attacker may send further SQL statements to enable and use the xp_cmdshell functionality of the Microsoft SQL server [2].

Shortly before post-exploitation activity began, Darktrace had observed incoming connections to some of the FortiClient EMS devices over port 8013 from the external IPs 77.246.103[.]110, 88.130.150[.]101, and 45.155.141[.]219. This likely represented the threat actors sending an SQL injection payload over port 8013 to the EMS device to validate the exploit.

Establish C2

After exploiting the vulnerability and gaining access to an EMS device on one customer network, two additional devices were seen with HTTP POST requests to 77.246.103[.]110 and 212.113.106[.]100 with a new PowerShell user agent.

Interestingly, the IP 212.113.106[.]100 has been observed in various other campaigns where threat actors have also targeted internet-facing systems and exploited other vulnerabilities. Open-source intelligence (OSINT) suggests that this indicator of compromise (IoC) is related to the Sliver C2 framework and has been used by threat actors such as APT28 (Fancy Bear) and APT29 (Cozy Bear) [4].

Unusual file downloads were also observed on four devices, including:

  • “SETUP.MSI” from 212.32.243[.]25 and 89.149.200[.]91 with a cURL user agent
  • “setup.msi” from 212.113.106[.]100 with a Windows Installer user agent
  • “run.zip” from 95.181.173[.]172 with a PowerShell user agent

The .msi files would typically contain the RMM tools Atera or ScreenConnect [5]. By installing RMM tools for C2, attackers can leverage their wide range of functionalities to carry out various tasks, such as file transfers, without the need to install additional tools. As RMM tools are designed to maintain a stable connection to remote systems, they may also allow the attackers to ensure persistent access to the compromised systems.

A scan of the endpoint 95.181.173[.]172 shows various other files such as “RunSchedulerTask.ps1” and “anydesk.exe” being hosted.

Screenshot of the endpoint 95.181.173[.]172 hosting various files [6].
Figure 1: Screenshot of the endpoint 95.181.173[.]172 hosting various files [6].

Shortly after these unusual file downloads, many of the devices were also seen with usage of RMM tools such as Splashtop, Atera, and AnyDesk. The devices were seen connecting to the following endpoints:

  • *[.]relay.splashtop[.]com
  • agent-api[.]atera[.]com
  • api[.]playanext[.]com with user agent AnyDesk/8.0.9

RMM tools have a wide range of legitimate capabilities that allow IT administrators to remotely manage endpoints. However, they can also be repurposed for malicious activities, allowing threat actors to maintain persistent access to systems, execute commands remotely, and even exfiltrate data. As the use of RMM tools can be legitimate, they offer threat actors a way to perform malicious activities while blending into normal business operations, which could evade detection by human analysts or traditional security tools.

One device was also seen making repeated SSL connections to a self-signed endpoint “azure-documents[.]com” (104.168.140[.]84) and further HTTP POSTs to “serv1[.]api[.]9hits[.]com/we/session” (128.199.207[.]131). Although the contents of these connections were encrypted, they were likely additional infrastructure used for C2 in addition to the RMM tools that were used. Self-signed certificates may also be used by an attacker to encrypt C2 communications.

Internal Reconnaissance

Following the exploit, two of the compromised devices then started to conduct internal reconnaissance activity. The following figure shows a spike in the number of internal connections made by one of the compromised devices on the customer’s environment, which typically indicates a network scan.

Advanced Search results of internal connections made an affected device.
Figure 2: Advanced Search results of internal connections made an affected device.

Reconnaissance tools such as Advanced Port Scanner (“www[.]advanced-port-scanner[.]com”) and Nmap were also seen being used by one of the devices to conduct scanning activities. Nmap is a network scanning tool commonly used by security teams for legitimate purposes like network diagnostics and vulnerability scanning. However, it can also be abused by threat actors to perform network reconnaissance, a technique known as Living off the Land (LotL). This not only reduces the need for custom or external tools but also reduces the risk of exposure, as the use of a legitimate tool in the network is unlikely to raise suspicion.

Privilege Escalation

In another affected customer network, the threat actor’s attempt to escalate their privileges was also observed, as a FortiClient EMS device was seen with an unusually large number of SMB/NTLM login failures, indicative of brute force activity. This attempt was successful, and the device was later seen authenticating with the credential “administrator”.

Figure 3: Advanced Search results of NTLM (top) and SMB (bottom) login failures.

Lateral Movement

After escalating privileges, attempts to move laterally throughout the same network were seen. One device was seen transferring the file “PSEXESVC.exe” to another device over SMB. This file is associated with PsExec, a command-line tool that allows for remote execution on other systems.

The threat actor was also observed leveraging the DCE-RPC protocol to move laterally within the network. Devices were seen with activity such as an increase in new RPC services, unusual requests to the SVCCTL endpoint, and the execution of WMI commands. The DCE-RPC protocol is typically used to facilitate communication between services on different systems and can allow one system to request services or execute commands on another.

These are further examples of LotL techniques used by threat actors exploiting CVE-2023-48788, as PsExec and the DCE-RPC protocol are often also used for legitimate administrative operations.

Accomplish Mission

In most cases, the threat actor’s end goal was not clearly observed. However, Darktrace did detect one instance where an unusually large volume of data had been uploaded to “put[.]io”, a cloud storage service, indicating that the end goal of the threat actor had been to steal potentially sensitive data.

In a recent investigation of a Medusa ransomware incident that took place in July 2024, Darktrace’s Threat Research team found that initial access to the environment had likely been gained through a FortiClient EMS device. An incoming connection from 209.15.71[.]121 over port 8013 was seen, suggesting that CVE-2023-48788 had been exploited. The device had been compromised almost three weeks before the ransomware was actually deployed, eventually resulting in the encryption of files.

Mitigating risk with proactive exposure management and real-time detection

Threat actors have continued to exploit unpatched vulnerabilities in internet-facing systems to gain initial access to a network. This highlights the importance of addressing and patching vulnerabilities as soon as they are disclosed and a fix is released. However, due to the rapid nature of exploitation, this may not always be enough. Furthermore, threat actors may even be exploiting vulnerabilities that are not yet publicly known.

As the end goals for a threat actor can differ – from data exfiltration to deploying ransomware – the post-exploitation behavior can also vary from actor to actor. However, AI security tools such as Darktrace / NETWORK can help identify and alert for post-exploitation behavior based on abnormal activity seen in the network environment.

Despite CVE-2023-48788 having been publicly disclosed and fixed in March, it appears that multiple threat actors, such as the Medusa ransomware group, have continued to exploit the vulnerability on unpatched systems. With new vulnerabilities being disclosed almost every other day, security teams may find it challenging continuously patch their systems.

As such, Darktrace / Proactive Exposure Management could also alleviate the workload of security teams by helping them identify and prioritize the most critical vulnerabilities in their network.

Insights from Darktrace’s First 6: Half-year threat report for 2024

First 6: half year threat report darktrace screenshot

Darktrace’s First 6: Half-Year Threat Report 2024 highlights the latest attack trends and key threats observed by the Darktrace Threat Research team in the first six months of 2024.

  • Focuses on anomaly detection and behavioral analysis to identify threats
  • Maps mitigated cases to known, publicly attributed threats for deeper context
  • Offers guidance on improving security posture to defend against persistent threats

Appendices

Credit to Emily Megan Lim (Cyber Security Analyst) and Ryan Traill (Threat Content Lead)

References

[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-48788

[2] https://www.horizon3.ai/attack-research/attack-blogs/cve-2023-48788-fortinet-forticlientems-sql-injection-deep-dive/

[3] https://redcanary.com/blog/threat-intelligence/cve-2023-48788/

[4] https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/teamcity-intrusion-saga-apt29-suspected-exploiting-cve-2023-42793

[5] https://redcanary.com/blog/threat-intelligence/cve-2023-48788/

[6] https://urlscan.io/result/3678b9e2-ad61-4719-bcef-b19cadcdd929/

List of IoCs

IoC - Type - Description + Confidence

  • 212.32.243[.]25/SETUP.MSI - URL - Payload
  • 89.149.200[.]9/SETUP.MSI - URL - Payload
  • 212.113.106[.]100/setup.msi - URL - Payload
  • 95.181.173[.]172/run.zip - URL - Payload
  • serv1[.]api[.]9hits[.]com - Domain - Likely C2 endpoint
  • 128.199.207[.]131 - IP - Likely C2 endpoint
  • azure-documents[.]com - Domain - C2 endpoint
  • 104.168.140[.]84 - IP - C2 endpoint
  • 77.246.103[.]110 - IP - Likely C2 endpoint
  • 212.113.106[.]100 - IP - C2 endpoint

Darktrace Model Detections

Anomalous Connection / Callback on Web Facing Device

Anomalous Connection / Multiple HTTP POSTs to Rare Hostname

Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname

Anomalous Connection / Posting HTTP to IP Without Hostname

Anomalous Connection / Powershell to Rare External

Anomalous Connection / Rare External SSL Self-Signed

Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Self-Signed SSL

Anomalous Server Activity / Rare External from Server

Anomalous Server Activity / New User Agent from Internet Facing System

Anomalous Server Activity / Server Activity on New Non-Standard Port - External

Compliance / Remote Management Tool On Server

Device / New User Agent

Device / New PowerShell User Agent

Device / Attack and Recon Tools

Device / ICMP Address Scan

Device / Network Range Scan

Device / Network Scan

Device / RDP Scan

Device / Suspicious SMB Scanning Activity

Anomalous Connection / Multiple SMB Admin Session

Anomalous Connection / New or Uncommon Service Control

Anomalous Connection / Unusual Admin SMB Session

Device / Increase in New RPC Services

Device / Multiple Lateral Movement Breaches

Device / New or Uncommon WMI Activity

Device / New or Unusual Remote Command Execution

Device / SMB Lateral Movement

Device / Possible SMB/NTLM Brute Force

Unusual Activity / Successful Admin Brute-Force Activity

User / New Admin Credentials on Server

Unusual Activity / Enhanced Unusual External Data Transfer

Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data Transfer

Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data to New Endpoint

Device / Large Number of Model Breaches

Device / Large Number of Model Breaches from Critical Network Device

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Tactic – ID: Technique

Initial Access – T1190: Exploit Public-Facing Application

Resource Development – T1587.003: Develop Capabilities: Digital Certificates

Resource Development – T1608.003: Stage Capabilities: Install Digital Certificate

Command and Control – T1071.001: Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols

Command and Control – T1219: Remote Access Software

Execution – T1059.001: Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

Reconnaissance – T1595: Active Scanning

Reconnaissance – T1590.005: Gather Victim Network Information: IP Addresses

Discovery – T1046: Network Service Discovery

Credential Access – T1110: Brute Force

Defense Evasion,Initial Access,Persistence,Privilege Escalation – T1078: Valid Accounts

Lateral Movement – T1021.002: Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares

Lateral Movement – T1021.003: Remote Services: Distributed Component Object Model

Execution – T1569.002: System Services: Service Execution

Execution – T1047: Windows Management Instrumentation

Exfiltration – T1041: Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

Exfiltration – T1567.002: Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Emily Megan Lim
Cyber Analyst

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June 16, 2025

Tracking CVE-2025-31324: Darktrace’s detection of SAP Netweaver exploitation before and after disclosure 

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Introduction: Exploiting SAP platforms

Global enterprises depend extensively on SAP platforms, such as SAP NetWeaver and Visual Composer, to run critical business processes worldwide. These systems; however, are increasingly appealing targets for well-resourced adversaries:

What is CVE-2025-31324?

CVE-2025-31324 affects SAP’s NetWeaver Visual Composer, a web-based software modeling tool. SAP NetWeaver is an application server and development platform that runs and connects SAP and non-SAP applications across different technologies [2]. It is commonly used by process specialists to develop application components without coding in government agencies, large enterprises, and by critical infrastructure operators [4].

CVE-2025-31324 affects SAP’s Netweaver Visual Composer Framework 7.1x (all SPS) and above [4]. The vulnerability in a Java Servlet (/irj/servlet_jsp) would enable an unauthorized actor to upload arbitrary files to the /developmentserver/metadatauploader endpoint, potentially resulting in remote code execution (RCE) and full system compromise [3]. The issue stems from an improper authentication and authorization check in the SAP NetWeaver Application Server Java systems [4].

What is the severity rating of CVE-2025-31324?

The vulnerability, first disclosed on April 24, 2025, carries the highest severity rating (CVSS v3 score: 10.0) and could allow remote attackers to upload malicious files without requiring authentication [1][5]. Although SAP released a workaround on April 8, many organizations are hesitant to take their business-critical SAP NetWeaver systems offline, leaving them exposed to potential exploitation [2].

How is CVE-2025-31324 exploited?

The vulnerability is exploitable by sending specifically crafted GET, POST, or HEAD HTTP requests to the /developmentserver/metadatauploader URL using either HTTP or HTTPS. Attackers have been seen uploading malicious files (.jsp, .java, or .class files to paths containing “\irj\servlet_jsp\irj\”), most of them being web shells, to publicly accessible SAP NetWeaver systems.

External researchers observed reconnaissance activity targeting this vulnerability in late January 2025, followed by a surge in exploitation attempts in February. The first confirmed compromise was reported in March [4].

Multiple threat actors have reportedly targeted the vulnerability, including Chinese Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) groups Chaya_004 [7], UNC5221, UNC5174, and CL-STA-0048 [8], as well as ransomware groups like RansomEXX, also known as Storm-2460, BianLian [4] or Qilin [6] (the latter two share the same indicators of  compromise (IoCs)).

Following the initial workaround published on April 8, SAP released a security update addressing CVE-2025-31324 and subsequently issued a patch on May 13 (Security Note 3604119) to resolve the root cause of the vulnerability [4].

Darktrace’s coverage of CVE-2025-31324 exploitation

Darktrace has observed activity indicative of threat actors exploiting CVE-2025-31324, including one instance detected before the vulnerability was publicly disclosed.

In April 2025, the Darktrace Threat Research team investigated activity related to the CVE-2025-31324 on SAP devices and identified two cases suggesting active exploitation of the vulnerability. One case was detected prior to the public disclosure of the vulnerability, and the other just two days after it was published.

Early detection of CVE 2025-31324 by Darktrace

Timeline of events for an internet-facing system, believed to be a SAP device, exhibiting activity indicative of CVE-2025-31324 exploitation.
Figure 1: Timeline of events for an internet-facing system, believed to be a SAP device, exhibiting activity indicative of CVE-2025-31324 exploitation.

On April 18, six days prior to the public disclosure of CVE-2025-31324, Darktrace began to detect unusual activity on a device belonging to a logistics organization in the Europe, the Middle East and Africa (EMEA) region. Multiple IoCs observed during this incident have since been linked via OSINT to the exploitation of CVE-2025-31324. Notably, however, this reporting was not available at the time of detection, highlighting Darktrace’s ability to detect threats agnostically, without relying on threat intelligence.

The device was observed making  domain name resolution request for the Out-of-Band Application Security Testing (OAST) domain cvvr9gl9namk9u955tsgaxy3upyezhnm6.oast[.]online. OAST is often used by security teams to test if exploitable vulnerabilities exist in a web application but can similarly be used by threat actors for the same purpose [9].

Four days later, on April 22, Darktrace observed the same device, an internet-facing system believed to be a SAP device, downloading multiple executable (.exe) files from several Amazon Simple Storage Service (S3). Darktrace’s Threat Research team later found these files to be associated with the KrustyLoader  malware [23][24][25].

KrustyLoader is known to be associated with the Chinese threat actor UNC5221, also known as UTA0178, which has been reported to aggressively target devices exposed to the internet [10] [14] [15]. It is an initial-stage malware which downloads and launches a second-stage payload – Sliver C2. Sliver is a similar tool to Cobalt Strike (an open-source post-exploitation toolkit). It is used for command-and-control (C2) connections [11][12]13]. After its successful download, KrustyLoader deletes itself to evade detection.  It has been reported that multiple Chinese APT groups have deployed KrustyLoader on SAP Netweaver systems post-compromise [8].

The actors behind KrustyLoader have also been associated with the exploitation of zero-day vulnerabilities in other enterprise systems, including Ivanti devices [12]. Notably, in this case, one of the Amazon S3 domains observed (abode-dashboard-media.s3.ap-south-1.amazonaws[.]com ) had previously been investigated by Darktrace’s Threat Research team as part of their investigation into Ivanti Connect Secure (CS) and Policy Secure (PS) appliances.

In addition to the download of known malicious files, Darktrace also detected new IoCs, including several executable files that could not be attributed to any known malware families or previous attacks, and for which no corresponding OSINT reporting was available.

Post-CVE publication detection

Exploit Validation

Between April 27 and 29, Darktrace observed unusual activity from an SAP device on the network of a manufacturing customer in EMEA.

Figure 2: Darktrace / NETWORK’s detection of an SAP device performing a large volume of suspicious activity between April 27 and April 29.

The device was observed making DNS requests for OAST domains (e.g. aaaaaaaa.d06qqn7pu5a6u25tv9q08p5xhbjzw33ge.oast[.]online and aaaaaaaaaaa.d07j2htekalm3139uk2gowmxuhapkijtp.oast[.]pro), suggesting that a threat actor was testing for exploit validation [9].

Darktrace / NETWORK’s detection of a SAP device making suspicious domain name resolution requests for multiple OAST domains.
Figure 3: Darktrace / NETWORK’s detection of a SAP device making suspicious domain name resolution requests for multiple OAST domains.

Privilege escalation tool download attempt

One day later, Darktrace observed the same device attempting to download an executable file from hxxp://23.95.123[.]5:666/xmrigCCall/s.exe (SHA-1 file hash: e007edd4688c5f94a714fee036590a11684d6a3a).

Darktrace / NETWORK identified the user agents Microsoft-CryptoAPI/10.0 and CertUtil URL Agent during the connections to 23.95.123[.]5. The connections were made over port 666, which is not typically used for HTTP connections.

Multiple open-source intelligence (OSINT) vendors have identified the executable file as either JuicyPotato or SweetPotato, both Windows privilege escalation tools[16][17][18][19]. The file hash and the unusual external endpoint have been associated with the Chinese APT group Gelsemium in the past, however, many threat actors are known to leverage this tool in their attacks [20] [21].

Figure 4: Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst’s detection of a SAP device downloading a suspicious executable file from hxxp://23.95.123[.]5:666/xmrigCCall/s.exe on April 28, 2025.

Darktrace deemed this activity highly suspicious and triggered an Enhanced Monitoring model alert, a high-priority security model designed to detect activity likely indicative of compromise. As the customer was subscribed to the Managed Threat Detection service, Darktrace’s Security Operations Centre (SOC) promptly investigated the alert and notified the customer for swift remediation. Additionally, Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability automatically blocked connections to the suspicious IP, 23.95.123[.]5, effectively containing the compromise in its early stages.

Actions taken by Darktrace’s Autonomous Response to block connections to the suspicious external endpoint 23.95.123[.]5. This event log shows that the connections to 23.95.123[.]5 were made over a rare destination port for the HTTP protocol and that new user agents were used during the connections.
Figure 5: Actions taken by Darktrace’s Autonomous Response to block connections to the suspicious external endpoint 23.95.123[.]5. This event log shows that the connections to 23.95.123[.]5 were made over a rare destination port for the HTTP protocol and that new user agents were used during the connections.

Conclusion

The exploitation of CVE-2025-31324 to compromise SAP NetWeaver systems highlights the persistent threat posed by vulnerabilities in public-facing assets. In this case, threat actors leveraged the flaw to gain an initial foothold, followed by attempts to deploy malware linked to groups affiliated with China [8][20].

Crucially, Darktrace demonstrated its ability to detect and respond to emerging threats even before they are publicly disclosed. Six days prior to the public disclosure of CVE-2025-31324, Darktrace detected unusual activity on a device believed to be a SAP system, which ultimately represented an early detection of the CVE. This detection was made possible through Darktrace’s behavioral analysis and anomaly detection, allowing it to recognize unexpected deviations in device behavior without relying on signatures, rules or known IoCs. Combined with its Autonomous Response capability, this allowed for immediate containment of suspicious activity, giving security teams valuable time to investigate and mitigate the threat.

Credit to Signe Zaharka (Principal Cyber Analyst), Emily Megan Lim, (Senior Cyber Analyst) and Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Appendices

List of IoCs

23.95.123[.]5:666/xmrigCCall/s.exe - URL- JuicyPotato/SweetPotato - high confidence

29274ca90e6dcf5ae4762739fcbadf01- MD5 file hash - JuicyPotato/SweetPotato - high confidence

e007edd4688c5f94a714fee036590a11684d6a3a - SHA-1 file hash - JuicyPotato/SweetPotato -high confidence

3268f269371a81dbdce8c4eedffd8817c1ec2eadec9ba4ab043cb779c2f8a5d2 - SHA-256 file hash - JuicyPotato/SweetPotato -high confidence

abode-dashboard-media.s3.ap-south-1.amazonaws[.]com/nVW2lsYsYnv58 - URL- high confidence

applr-malbbal.s3.ap-northeast-2.amazonaws[.]com/7p3ow2ZH - URL- high confidence

applr-malbbal.s3.ap-northeast-2.amazonaws[.]com/UUTICMm - URL- KrustyLoader - high confidence

beansdeals-static.s3.amazonaws[.]com/UsjKy - URL- high confidence

brandnav-cms-storage.s3.amazonaws[.]com/3S1kc - URL- KrustyLoader - high confidence

bringthenoiseappnew.s3.amazonaws[.]com/pp79zE - URL- KrustyLoader - high confidence

f662135bdd8bf792a941ea222e8a1330 - MD5 file hash- KrustyLoader - high confidence

fa645f33c0e3a98436a0161b19342f78683dbd9d - SHA-1 file hash- KrustyLoader - high confidence

1d26fff4232bc64f9ab3c2b09281d932dd6afb84a24f32d772d3f7bc23d99c60 - SHA-256 file hash- KrustyLoader - high confidence

6900e844f887321f22dd606a6f2925ef - MD5 file hash- KrustyLoader - high confidence

da23dab4851df3ef7f6e5952a2fc9a6a57ab6983 - SHA-1 file hash- KrustyLoader - high confidence

1544d9392eedf7ae4205dd45ad54ec67e5ce831d2c61875806ce4c86412a4344 - SHA-256 file hash- KrustyLoader - high confidence

83a797e5b47ce6e89440c47f6e33fa08 - MD5 file hash - high confidence

a29e8f030db8990c432020441c91e4b74d4a4e16 - SHA-1 file hash - high confidence

72afde58a1bed7697c0aa7fa8b4e3b03 - MD5 file hash- high confidence

fe931adc0531fd1cb600af0c01f307da3314c5c9 - SHA-1 file hash- high confidence

b8e56de3792dbd0f4239b54cfaad7ece3bd42affa4fbbdd7668492de548b5df8 - SHA-256 file hash- KrustyLoader - high confidence

17d65a9d8d40375b5b939b60f21eb06eb17054fc - SHA-1 file hash- KrustyLoader - high confidence

8c8681e805e0ae7a7d1a609efc000c84 - MD5 file hash- KrustyLoader - high confidence

29274ca90e6dcf5ae4762739fcbadf01 - MD5 file hash- KrustyLoader - high confidence

Darktrace Model Detections

Anomalous Connection / CertUtil Requesting Non Certificate

Anomalous Connection / CertUtil to Rare Destination

Anomalous Connection / Powershell to Rare External

Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location

Anomalous File / Multiple EXE from Rare External Locations

Anomalous File / Internet Facing System File Download

Anomalous File / Masqueraded File Transfer (Enhanced Monitoring)

Anomalous Server Activity / New User Agent from Internet Facing System

Compliance / CertUtil External Connection

Compromise / High Priority Tunnelling to Bin Services (Enhanced Monitoring)

Compromise / Possible Tunnelling to Bin Services

Device / Initial Attack Chain Activity (Enhanced Monitoring)

Device / Suspicious Domain

Device / Internet Facing Device with High Priority Alert

Device / Large Number of Model Alerts

Device / Large Number of Model Alerts from Critical Network Device (Enhanced Monitoring)

Device / New PowerShell User Agent

Device / New User Agent

Autonomous Response Model Alerts

Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious File Block

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Controlled and Model Alert

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Enhanced Monitoring from Server Block

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Significant Server Anomaly Block

Antigena/ Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious File Block

Antigena/ Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious File Pattern of Life Block

Antigena/ Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Alerts Over Time Block

Antigena/ Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Controlled and Model Alert

Antigena/ Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Enhanced Monitoring from Server Block

Antigena/ Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Significant Server Anomaly Block

Cyber AI Analyst Incidents

Possible HTTP Command and Control

Suspicious File Download

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Malware - RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT - T1588.001

PowerShell - EXECUTION - T1059.001

Drive-by Compromise - INITIAL ACCESS - T1189

Ingress Tool Transfer - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1105

Application Layer Protocol - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1071

Exploitation of Remote Services - LATERAL MOVEMENT - T1210

Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol - EXFILTRATION - T1048.003

References

1. https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-31324

2. https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/over-1-200-sap-netweaver-servers-vulnerable-to-actively-exploited-flaw/

3. https://reliaquest.com/blog/threat-spotlight-reliaquest-uncovers-vulnerability-behind-sap-netweaver-compromise/

4. https://onapsis.com/blog/active-exploitation-of-sap-vulnerability-cve-2025-31324/

5. https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/sap-fixes-suspected-netweaver-zero-day-exploited-in-attacks/

6. https://op-c.net/blog/sap-cve-2025-31324-qilin-breach/

7. https://www.forescout.com/blog/threat-analysis-sap-vulnerability-exploited-in-the-wild-by-chinese-threat-actor/

8. https://blog.eclecticiq.com/china-nexus-nation-state-actors-exploit-sap-netweaver-cve-2025-31324-to-target-critical-infrastructures

9. https://portswigger.net/burp/application-security-testing/oast

10. https://www.picussecurity.com/resource/blog/unc5221-cve-2025-22457-ivanti-connect-secure  

11. https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/elf.krustyloader

12. https://www.broadcom.com/support/security-center/protection-bulletin/krustyloader-backdoor

13. https://labs.withsecure.com/publications/new-krustyloader-variant-dropped-via-screenconnect-exploit

14. https://blog.eclecticiq.com/china-nexus-threat-actor-actively-exploiting-ivanti-endpoint-manager-mobile-cve-2025-4428-vulnerability

15. https://thehackernews.com/2024/01/chinese-hackers-exploiting-critical-vpn.html

16. https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/3268f269371a81dbdce8c4eedffd8817c1ec2eadec9ba4ab043cb779c2f8a5d2

17. https://bazaar.abuse.ch/sample/3268f269371a81dbdce8c4eedffd8817c1ec2eadec9ba4ab043cb779c2f8a5d2/

18. https://www.fortinet.com/content/dam/fortinet/assets/analyst-reports/report-juicypotato-hacking-tool-discovered.pdf

19. https://www.manageengine.com/log-management/correlation-rules/detecting-sweetpotato.html

20. https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/rare-possible-gelsemium-attack-targets-se-asia/

21. https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/in/pdf/2023/10/kpmg-ctip-gelsemium-apt-31-oct-2023.pdf

22. https://securityaffairs.com/177522/hacking/experts-warn-of-a-second-wave-of-attacks-targeting-sap-netweaver-bug-cve-2025-31324.html

23. https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/b8e56de3792dbd0f4239b54cfaad7ece3bd42affa4fbbdd7668492de548b5df8

24. https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/1d26fff4232bc64f9ab3c2b09281d932dd6afb84a24f32d772d3f7bc23d99c60/detection

25. https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/1544d9392eedf7ae4205dd45ad54ec67e5ce831d2c61875806ce4c86412a4344/detection

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About the author
Signe Zaharka
Senior Cyber Security Analyst

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June 12, 2025

Breaking Silos: Why Unified Security is Critical in Hybrid World

laptop with statistics on itDefault blog imageDefault blog image

Hybrid environments demand end-to-end visibility to stop modern attacks

Hybrid environments are a dominant trend in enterprise technology, but they continue to present unique issues to the defenders tasked with securing them. By 2026, Gartner predicts that 75% of organizations will adopt hybrid cloud strategies [1]. At the same time, only 23% of organizations report full visibility across cloud environments [2].

That means a strong majority of organizations do not have comprehensive visibility across both their on-premises and cloud networks. As a result, organizations are facing major challenges in achieving visibility and security in hybrid environments. These silos and fragmented security postures become a major problem when considering how attacks can move between different domains, exploiting the gaps.

For example, an attack may start with a phishing email, leading to the compromise of a cloud-based application identity and then moving between the cloud and network to exfiltrate data. Some attack types inherently involve multiple domains, like lateral movement and supply chain attacks, which target both on-premises and cloud networks.

Given this, unified visibility is essential for security teams to reduce blind spots and detect threats across the entire attack surface.

Risks of fragmented visibility

Silos arise due to separate teams and tools managing on-premises and cloud environments. Many teams have a hand in cloud security, with some common ones including security, infrastructure, DevOps, compliance, and end users, and these teams can all use different tools. This fragmentation increases the likelihood of inconsistent policies, duplicate alerts, and missed threats. And that’s just within the cloud, not even considering the additional defenses involved with network security.

Without a unified security strategy, gaps between these infrastructures and the teams which manage them can leave organizations vulnerable to cyber-attacks. The lack of visibility between on-premises and cloud environments contributes to missed threats and delayed incident response. In fact, breaches involving stolen or compromised credentials take an average of 292 to identify and contain [3]. That’s almost ten months.

The risk of fragmented visibility runs especially high as companies undergo cloud migrations. As organizations transition to cloud environments, they still have much of their data in on-premises networks, meaning that maintaining visibility across both on-premises and cloud environments is essential for securing critical assets and ensuring seamless operations.

Unified visibility is the solution

Unified visibility is achieved by having a single-pane-of-glass view to monitor both on-premises and cloud environments. This type of view brings many benefits, including streamlined detection, faster response times, and reduced complexity.

This can only be accomplished through integrations or interactions between the teams and tools involved with both on-premises security and cloud security.

AI-driven platforms, like Darktrace, are especially well equipped to enable the real-time monitoring and insights needed to sustain unified visibility. This is because they can handle the large amounts of data and data types.

Darktrace accomplishes this by plugging into an organization’s infrastructure so the AI can ingest and analyze data and its interactions within the environment to form an understanding of the organization’s normal behavior, right down to the granular details of specific users and devices. The system continually revises its understanding about what is normal based on evolving evidence.

This dynamic understanding of normal means that the AI engine can identify, with a high degree of precision, events or behaviors that are both anomalous and unlikely to be benign. This helps reduce noise while surfacing real threats, across cloud and on-prem environments without manual tuning.

In this way, given its versatile AI-based, platform approach, Darktrace empowers security teams with real-time monitoring and insights across both the network and cloud.

Unified visibility in the modern threat landscape

As part of the Darktrace ActiveAI Security Platform™, Darktrace / CLOUD works continuously across public, private, hybrid, and multi-cloud deployments. With real-time Cloud Asset Enumeration and Dynamic Architecture Modeling, Darktrace / CLOUD generates up-to-date architecture diagrams, giving SecOps and DevOps teams a unified view of cloud infrastructures.

It is always on the lookout for changes, driven by user and service activity. For example, unusual user activity can significantly raise the asset’s score, prompting Darktrace’s AI to update its architectural view and keep a living record of the cloud’s ever-changing landscape, providing near real-time insights into what’s happening.

This continuous architectural awareness ensures that security teams have a real-time understanding of cloud behavior and not just a static snapshot.

Darktrace / CLOUD’s unified view of AWS and Azure cloud posture and compliance over time.
Figure 1. Darktrace / CLOUD’s unified view of AWS and Azure cloud posture and compliance over time.

With this dynamic cloud visibility and monitoring, Darktrace / CLOUD can help unify and secure environments.

Real world example: Remote access supply chain attacks

Sectop Remote Access Trojan (RAT) malware, also known as ‘ArchClient2,’ is a .NET RAT that contains information stealing capabilities and allows threat actors to monitor and control targeted computers. It is commonly distributed through drive-by downloads of illegitimate software via malvertizing.

Darktrace has been able to detect and respond to Sectop RAT attacks using unified visibility and platform-wide coverage. In one such example, Darktrace observed one device making various suspicious connections to unusual endpoints, likely in an attempt to receive C2 information, perform beaconing activity, and exfiltrate data to the cloud.

This type of supply chain attack can jump from the network to the cloud, so a unified view of both environments helps shorten detection and response times, therefore mitigating potential impact. Darktrace’s ability to detect these cross-domain behaviors stems from its AI-driven, platform-native visibility.

Conclusion

Organizations need unified visibility to secure complex, hybrid environments effectively against threats and attacks. To achieve this type of comprehensive visibility, the gaps between legacy security tools across on-premises and cloud networks can be bridged with platform tools that use AI to boost data analysis for highly accurate behavioral prediction and anomaly detection.

Read more about the latest trends in cloud security in the blog “Protecting Your Hybrid Cloud: The Future of Cloud Security in 2025 and Beyond.”

References:

1. Gartner, May 22, 2023, “10 Strategic Data and Analytics Predictions Through 2028

2. Cloud Security Alliance, February 14, 2024, “Cloud Security Alliance Survey Finds 77% of Respondents Feel Unprepared to Deal with Security Threats

3. IBM, “Cost of a Data Breach Report 2024

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About the author
Pallavi Singh
Product Marketing Manager, OT Security & Compliance
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