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August 7, 2023

Detection of an Evasive Credential Harvester | IPFS Phishing

Discover the emerging trend of malicious actors abusing the Interplanetary File System (IPFS) file storage protocol in phishing campaigns. Learn more here!
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Lena Yu
Cyber Security Analyst
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07
Aug 2023

IPFS Phishing Attacks

Phishing attacks continue to be one of the most common methods of infiltration utilized by threat actors and they represent a significant threat to an organization’s digital estate. As phishing campaigns typically leverage social engineering methods to evade security tools and manipulate users into following links, downloading files, or divulging confidential information. It is a relatively low effort but high-yield type of cyber-attack.

That said, in recent years security teams have become increasingly savvy to these efforts. Attackers are having to adapt and come up with novel ways to carry out their phishing campaigns. Recently, Darktrace has observed a rise in phishing attacks attempting to abuse the InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) in campaigns that are able to dynamically adapt depending on the target, making it extremely difficult for security vendors to detect and investigate.

What is a IPFS?

IPFS is a file storage protocol a peer-to-peer (P2P) network used for storing and sharing resources in a distributed file system [1]. It is also a file storage system similar in nature to other centralized file storage services like Dropbox and Google Drive.

File storage systems, like IPFS, are often abused by malicious actors, as they allow attackers to easily host their own content without maintaining infrastructure themselves. However, as these file storage systems often have legitimate usages, blocking everything related to file storages may cause unwanted problems and affect normal business operations. Thus, the challenge lies in differentiating between legitimate and malicious usage.

While centralized, web-based file storage services use a Client-Server model and typically deliver files over HTTP, IPFS uses a Peer-to-Peer model for storing and sharing files, as shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1: (a) shows the Client-Server model that centralized, web-based file storage services use. The resource is available on the server, and the clients access the resource from the server. (b) shows the Peer-to-Peer model that IPFS use. The resources are available on the peers.

To verify the authenticity and integrity of files, IPFS utilizes cryptographic hashes.

A cryptographic hash value is generated using a file’s content upon upload to IPFS. This is used to generate the Content Identifier (CID). IPFS uses Content Addressing as opposed to Location Addressing, and this CID is used to point to a resource in IPFS [4].

When a computer running IPFS requires a particular file, it asks the connected peers if they have the file with a specific hash. If a peer has the file with the matching hash, it will provide it to the requesting computer [1][6].

Taking down content on IPFS is much more difficult compared to centralized file storage hosts, as content is stored on several nodes without a centralized entity, as shown in Figure 2. To take down content from IPFS, it must be removed from all the nodes. Thus, IPFS is prone to being abused for malicious purposes.

Figure 2: When the resource is unavailable on the server for (a), all the clients are unable to access the resource. When the resource is unavailable on one of the peers for (b), the resources are still available on the other peers.

The domains used in these IPFS phishing links are gateways that enable an HTTPS URL to access resources within the distributed IPFS file system.

There are two types of IPFS links, the Path Gateway and Subdomain Gateway [1].

Path Gateways have a fixed domain/host and identifies the IPFS resource through a resource-identifying string in the path. The Path Gateway has the following structure:

•       https://<gateway-host>.tld/ipfs/<CID>/path/to/resource

•       https://<gateway-host>.tld/ipns/<dnslink/ipnsid>/path/to/resource

On the other hand, Subdomain Gateways have a resource-identifying string in the subdomain. Subdomain Gateways have the following structure:

•       https://<cidv1b32>.ipfs.<gateway-host>.tld/path/to/resource

One gateway domain serves the same role as any other, which means attackers can easily change the gateways that are used.

Thus, these link domains involved in these attacks can be much more variable than the ones in traditional file storage attacks, where a centralized service with a single domain is used (e.g., Dropbox, Google Docs), making detecting the malicious use of IPFS extremely challenging for traditional security vendors. Through its anomaly-based approach to threat detection, Darktrace/Email™ is consistently able to identify such tactics and respond to them, preventing malicious actors from abusing file storage systems life IPFS.

IPFS Campaign Details

In several recent examples of IPFS abuse that Darktrace detected on a customer’s network, the apparent end goal was to harvest user credentials. Stolen credentials can be exploited by threat actors to further their attacks on organizations by escalating their privileges within the network, or even sold on the dark web.

Darktrace detected multiple IPFS links sent in malicious emails that contained the victim’s email address. Based on the domain in this email address, users would then be redirected to a fake login page that uses their organizations’ webpage visuals and branding to convince targets to enter their login details, unknowingly compromising their accounts in the process.

Figure 3: The credential harvester changes visuals depending on the victim’s email address specified in the URL.

These IPFS credential harvesting sites use various techniques to evade detection the detection of traditional security tools and prevent further analysis, such as obfuscation by Percent Encoding and Base64 Encoding the code.

There are also other mechanisms put into place to hinder investigation by security teams. For example, some IPFS credential harvester sites investigated by Darktrace did not allow right clicking and certain keystrokes, as a means to make post-attack analysis more difficult.

Figure 4: The code shows that it attempts to prevent certain keystrokes.

In the campaign highlighted in this blog, the following IPFS link was observed:

hxxps://ipfs[.]io/ipfs/QmfDDxLWoLiqFURX6dUZcsHxVBP1ZnM21H5jXGs1ffNxtP?filename=at ob.html#<EmailAddress>

This uses a Path Gateway, as it identifies the IPFS resource through a resource-identifying string in the path. The CID is QmfDDxLWoLiqFURX6dUZcsHxVBP1ZnM21H5jXGs1ffNxtP in this case.

It makes a GET request to image[.]thum[.]io and logo[.]clearbit[.]com as shown in Figure 5. The image[.]thum[.]io is a Free Website Screenshot Generator, that provides real-time screenshot of websites [2]. The logo[.]clearbit[.]com is used to lookup company logos using the domain [3]. These visuals are integrated into the credential harvester site. Figure 6 shows the domain name being extracted from the victim’s email address and used to obtain the visuals.

Figure 5: The GET requests to image[.]thum[.]io and logo[.]clearbit[.].
Figure 6: The code shows that it utilizes the domain name from the victim’s email address to obtain the visuals from logo.clearbit[.]com and image[.]thum.io.

The code reveals the credential POST endpoint as shown in Figure 16. When credentials are submitted, it makes a POST request to this endpoint as shown in Figure 7.

Figure 7: The credential POST endpoint can be seen inside the code.
Figure 8: The Outlook credential harvester will redirect to the real Outlook page when wrong credentials are submitted multiple times.

From the IPFS link alone, it is difficult to determine whether it leads to a malicious endpoint, however Darktrace has consistently identified emails containing these IPFS credential harvesting links as phishing attempts.

Darktrace Coverage

During one case of IPFS abuse detected by Darktrace in March 2023, a threat actor sent malicious emails with the subject “Renew Your E-mail Password” to 55 different recipients at. The sender appeared to be the organization’s administrator and used their internal domain.

Figure 9: Darktrace/Email’s detection of the “Renew Your E-mail Password” emails from “administrator”. These were all sent at 2023.03.21 02:39 UTC.

However, Darktrace recognized that the email did not pass Sender Policy Framework (SPF), and therefore it could not be validated as being sent from the organization’s domain. Darktrace also detected that the email contained a link to “ipfs.io, the official IPFS gateway. This was identified as a spoofing and phishing attempt by Darktrace/Email.

Figure 10: The Darktrace/Email overview tab shows the Anomaly Indicators, History, Association, and Validation information of this sender. It contained a link to “ipfs.io”, and did not pass SPF.

Following the successful identification of the malicious emails, Darktrace RESPOND™ took immediate autonomous action to prevent them from leading to potentially damaging network compromise. For email-based threats, Darktrace RESPOND is able to carry out numerous actions to stop malicious emails and reduce the risk of compromise. In response to this specific incident, RESPOND took multiple preventative actions (as seen in Figure 11), including include lock link, an action that prevents access to URLs deemed as suspicious, send to junk, an action that automatically places emails in the recipient’s junk folder, and hold message, the most severe RESPOND action that prevents malicious emails from reaching the recipients inbox at all.

Figure 11: The Darktrace/Email model tab shows all the models that triggered on the email and the associated RESPOND actions.
Figure 12: The ipfs.io link used in this email contains the recipient’s email address, and has a CID of QmfDDxLWoLiqFURX6dUZcsHxVBP1ZnM21H5jXGs1ffNxtP. It has a Darktrace Domain Rarity Score of 100
Figure 13: The IPFS credential harvester that uses the organization’s website’s visuals.

Further investigation revealed that the IPFS link contained the recipients’ email address, and when clicked led to a credential harvester that utilized the same visuals and branding as the customer’s website.

Concluding Thoughts

Ultimately, despite the various tactics employed threat actors to evade the detection of traditional security tools, Darktrace was able to successfully detect and mitigate these often very fruitful phishing attacks that attempted to abuse the IPFS file storage system.

As file storage platforms like IPFS do have legitimate business uses, blocking traffic related to file storage is likely to negatively impact the day-to-day operations of an organization. The challenge security teams face is to differentiate between malicious and legitimate uses of such services, and only act on malicious cases. As such, it is more important than ever for organizations to have an effective anomaly detection tool in place that is able to identify emerging threats without relying on rules, signatures or previously observed indicators of compromise (IoC).

By leveraging its Self-Learning AI, Darktrace understands what represents expected activity on customer networks and can recognize subtle deviations from expected behavior, that may be indicative of compromise. Then, using its autonomous response capabilities, Darktrace RESPOND is able to instantly and autonomously take action against emerging threats to stop them at the earliest possible stage.

Credit to Ben Atkins, Senior Model Developer for their contribution to this blog.

Appendices

Example IOCs

Type: URL

IOC: hxxps://ipfs[.]io/ipfs/QmfDDxLWoLi qFURX6dUZcsHxVBP1ZnM21H5jXGs

1ffNxtP?filename=atob.html#<Email Address>

Description: Path Gateway link

Type: URL

IOC: hxxps://bafybeibisyerwlu46re6rxrfw doo2ubvucw7yu6zjcfjmn7rqbwcix2 mku.ipfs[.]dweb.link/webn cpmk.htm?bafybeigh77sqswniy74nzyklybstfpkxhsqhpf3qt26nwnh4wf2vv gbdaybafybeigh77sqswniy74nzyklybstfpkxhsqhpf3qt26nwnh4wf2vvgbda y#<EmailAddress>

Description: Subdomain Gateway link

Relevant Darktrace DETECT Models

•       Spoof / Internal Domain from Unexpected Source + New Unknown Link

•       Link / High Risk Link + Low Sender Association

•       Link / New Correspondent Classified Link

•       Link / Watched Link Type

•       Proximity / Phishing + New activity

•       Proximity / Phishing + New Address Known Domain

•       Spoof / Internal Domain from Unexpected Source + High Risk Link

References

[1]    https://docs.ipfs.tech/

[2]    https://www.thum.io/

[3]    https://clearbit.com/logo

[4]    https://filebase.com/blog/ipfs-content-addressing-explained/

[5]    https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/the-attack-of-the-chameleon-phishing-page/

[6]    https://wiki.ipfsblox.com/

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Lena Yu
Cyber Security Analyst

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November 26, 2025

CastleLoader & CastleRAT: Behind TAG150’s Modular Malware Delivery System

CastleLoader & CastleRAT: Behind TAG150’s Modular Malware Delivery SystemDefault blog imageDefault blog image

What is TAG-150?

TAG-150, a relatively new Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) operator, has been active since March 2025, demonstrating rapid development and an expansive, evolving infrastructure designed to support its malicious operations. The group employs two custom malware families, CastleLoader and CastleRAT, to compromise target systems, with a primary focus on the United States [1]. TAG-150’s infrastructure included numerous victim-facing components, such as IP addresses and domains functioning as command-and-control (C2) servers associated with malware families like SecTopRAT and WarmCookie, in addition to CastleLoader and CastleRAT [2].

As of May 2025, CastleLoader alone had infected a reported 469 devices, underscoring the scale and sophistication of TAG-150’s campaign [1].

What are CastleLoader and CastleRAT?

CastleLoader is a loader malware, primarily designed to download and install additional malware, enabling chain infections across compromised systems [3]. TAG-150 employs a technique known as ClickFix, which uses deceptive domains that mimic document verification systems or browser update notifications to trick victims into executing malicious scripts. Furthermore, CastleLoader leverages fake GitHub repositories that impersonate legitimate tools as a distribution method, luring unsuspecting users into downloading and installing malware on their devices [4].

CastleRAT, meanwhile, is a remote access trojan (RAT) that serves as one of the primary payloads delivered by CastleLoader. Once deployed, CastleRAT grants attackers extensive control over the compromised system, enabling capabilities such as keylogging, screen capturing, and remote shell access.

TAG-150 leverages CastleLoader as its initial delivery mechanism, with CastleRAT acting as the main payload. This two-stage attack strategy enhances the resilience and effectiveness of their operations by separating the initial infection vector from the final payload deployment.

How are they deployed?

Castleloader uses code-obfuscation methods such as dead-code insertion and packing to hinder both static and dynamic analysis. After the payload is unpacked, it connects to its command-and-control server to retrieve and running additional, targeted components.

Its modular architecture enables it to function both as a delivery mechanism and a staging utility, allowing threat actors to decouple the initial infection from payload deployment. CastleLoader typically delivers its payloads as Portable Executables (PEs) containing embedded shellcode. This shellcode activates the loader’s core module, which then connects to the C2 server to retrieve and execute the next-stage malware.[6]

Following this, attackers deploy the ClickFix technique, impersonating legitimate software distribution platforms like Google Meet or browser update notifications. These deceptive sites trick victims into copying and executing PowerShell commands, thereby initiating the infection kill chain. [1]

When a user clicks on a spoofed Cloudflare “Verification Stepprompt, a background request is sent to a PHP script on the distribution domain (e.g., /s.php?an=0). The server’s response is then automatically copied to the user’s clipboard using the ‘unsecuredCopyToClipboard()’ function. [7].

The Python-based variant of CastleRAT, known as “PyNightShade,” has been engineered with stealth in mind, showing minimal detection across antivirus platforms [2]. As illustrated in Figure 1, PyNightShade communicates with the geolocation API service ip-api[.]com, demonstrating both request and response behavior

Packet Capture (PCAP) of PyNightShade, the Python-based variant of CastleRAT, communicating with the geolocation API service ip-api[.]com.
Figure 1: Packet Capture (PCAP) of PyNightShade, the Python-based variant of CastleRAT, communicating with the geolocation API service ip-api[.]com.

Darktrace Coverage

In mid-2025, Darktrace observed a range of anomalous activities across its customer base that appeared linked to CastleLoader, including the example below from a US based organization.

The activity began on June 26, when a device on the customer’s network was observed connecting to the IP address 173.44.141[.]89, a previously unseen IP for this network along with the use of multiple user agents, which was also rare for the user.  It was later determined that the IP address was a known indicator of compromise (IoC) associated with TAG-150’s CastleRAT and CastleLoader operations [2][5].

Figure 2: Darktrace’s detection of a device making unusual connections to the malicious endpoint 173.44.141[.]89.

The device was observed downloading two scripts from this endpoint, namely ‘/service/download/data_5x.bin’ and ‘/service/download/data_6x.bin’, which have both been linked to CastleLoader infections by open-source intelligence (OSINT) [8]. The archives contains embedded shellcode, which enables attackers to execute arbitrary code directly in memory, bypassing disk writes and making detection by endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools significantly more difficult [2].

 Darktrace’s detection of two scripts from the malicious endpoint.
Figure 3: Darktrace’s detection of two scripts from the malicious endpoint.

In addition to this, the affected device exhibited a high volume of internal connections to a broad range of endpoints, indicating potential scanning activity. Such behavior is often associated with reconnaissance efforts aimed at mapping internal infrastructure.

Darktrace / NETWORK correlated these behaviors and generated an Enhanced Monitoring model, a high-fidelity security model designed to detect activity consistent with the early stages of an attack. These high-priority models are continuously monitored and triaged by Darktrace’s Security Operations Center (SOC) as part of the Managed Threat Detection and Managed Detection & Response services, ensuring that subscribed customers are promptly alerted to emerging threats.

Darktrace detected an unusual ZIP file download alongside the anomalous script, followed by internal connectivity. This activity was correlated under an Enhanced Monitoring model.
Figure 4: Darktrace detected an unusual ZIP file download alongside the anomalous script, followed by internal connectivity. This activity was correlated under an Enhanced Monitoring model.

Darktrace Autonomous Response

Fortunately, Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability was fully configured, enabling it to take immediate action against the offending device by blocking any further connections external to the malicious endpoint, 173.44.141[.]89. Additionally, Darktrace enforced a ‘group pattern of life’ on the device, restricting its behavior to match other devices in its peer group, ensuring it could not deviate from expected activity, while also blocking connections over 443, shutting down any unwanted internal scanning.

Figure 5: Actions performed by Darktrace’s Autonomous Response to contain the ongoing attack.

Conclusion

The rise of the MaaS ecosystem, coupled with attackers’ growing ability to customize tools and techniques for specific targets, is making intrusion prevention increasingly challenging for security teams. Many threat actors now leverage modular toolkits, dynamic infrastructure, and tailored payloads to evade static defenses and exploit even minor visibility gaps. In this instance, Darktrace demonstrated its capability to counter these evolving tactics by identifying early-stage attack chain behaviors such as network scanning and the initial infection attempt. Autonomous Response then blocked the CastleLoader IP delivering the malicious ZIP payload, halting the attack before escalation and protecting the organization from a potentially damaging multi-stage compromise

Credit to Ahmed Gardezi (Cyber Analyst) Tyler Rhea (Senior Cyber Analyst)
Edited by Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections

  • Anomalous Connection / Unusual Internal Connections
  • Anomalous File / Zip or Gzip from Rare External Location
  • Anomalous File / Script from Rare External Location
  • Initial Attack Chain Activity (Enhanced Monitoring Model)

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • T15588.001 - Resource Development – Malware
  • TG1599 – Defence Evasion – Network Boundary Bridging
  • T1046 – Discovery – Network Service Scanning
  • T1189 – Initial Access

List of IoCs
IoC - Type - Description + Confidence

  • 173.44.141[.]89 – IP – CastleLoader C2 Infrastructure
  • 173.44.141[.]89/service/download/data_5x.bin – URI – CastleLoader Script
  • 173.44.141[.]89/service/download/data_6x.bin – URI  - CastleLoader Script
  • wsc.zip – ZIP file – Possible Payload

References

[1] - https://blog.polyswarm.io/castleloader

[2] - https://www.recordedfuture.com/research/from-castleloader-to-castlerat-tag-150-advances-operations

[3] - https://www.pcrisk.com/removal-guides/34160-castleloader-malware

[4] - https://www.scworld.com/brief/malware-loader-castleloader-targets-devices-via-fake-github-clickfix-phishing

[5] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/173.44.141.89/community

[6] https://thehackernews.com/2025/07/castleloader-malware-infects-469.html

[7] https://www.cryptika.com/new-castleloader-attack-using-cloudflare-themed-clickfix-technique-to-infect-windows-computers/

[8] https://www.cryptika.com/castlebot-malware-as-a-service-deploys-range-of-payloads-linked-to-ransomware-attacks/

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November 20, 2025

Managing OT Remote Access with Zero Trust Control & AI Driven Detection

managing OT remote access with zero trust control and ai driven detectionDefault blog imageDefault blog image

The shift toward IT-OT convergence

Recently, industrial environments have become more connected and dependent on external collaboration. As a result, truly air-gapped OT systems have become less of a reality, especially when working with OEM-managed assets, legacy equipment requiring remote diagnostics, or third-party integrators who routinely connect in.

This convergence, whether it’s driven by digital transformation mandates or operational efficiency goals, are making OT environments more connected, more automated, and more intertwined with IT systems. While this convergence opens new possibilities, it also exposes the environment to risks that traditional OT architectures were never designed to withstand.

The modernization gap and why visibility alone isn’t enough

The push toward modernization has introduced new technology into industrial environments, creating convergence between IT and OT environments, and resulting in a lack of visibility. However, regaining that visibility is just a starting point. Visibility only tells you what is connected, not how access should be governed. And this is where the divide between IT and OT becomes unavoidable.

Security strategies that work well in IT often fall short in OT, where even small missteps can lead to environmental risk, safety incidents, or costly disruptions. Add in mounting regulatory pressure to enforce secure access, enforce segmentation, and demonstrate accountability, and it becomes clear: visibility alone is no longer sufficient. What industrial environments need now is precision. They need control. And they need to implement both without interrupting operations. All this requires identity-based access controls, real-time session oversight, and continuous behavioral detection.

The risk of unmonitored remote access

This risk becomes most evident during critical moments, such as when an OEM needs urgent access to troubleshoot a malfunctioning asset.

Under that time pressure, access is often provisioned quickly with minimal verification, bypassing established processes. Once inside, there’s little to no real-time oversight of user actions whether they’re executing commands, changing configurations, or moving laterally across the network. These actions typically go unlogged or unnoticed until something breaks. At that point, teams are stuck piecing together fragmented logs or post-incident forensics, with no clear line of accountability.  

In environments where uptime is critical and safety is non-negotiable, this level of uncertainty simply isn’t sustainable.

The visibility gap: Who’s doing what, and when?

The fundamental issue we encounter is the disconnect between who has access and what they are doing with it.  

Traditional access management tools may validate credentials and restrict entry points, but they rarely provide real-time visibility into in-session activity. Even fewer can distinguish between expected vendor behavior and subtle signs of compromise, misuse or misconfiguration.  

As a result, OT and security teams are often left blind to the most critical part of the puzzle, intent and behavior.

Closing the gaps with zero trust controls and AI‑driven detection

Managing remote access in OT is no longer just about granting a connection, it’s about enforcing strict access parameters while continuously monitoring for abnormal behavior. This requires a two-pronged approach: precision access control, and intelligent, real-time detection.

Zero Trust access controls provide the foundation. By enforcing identity-based, just-in-time permissions, OT environments can ensure that vendors and remote users only access the systems they’re explicitly authorized to interact with, and only for the time they need. These controls should be granular enough to limit access down to specific devices, commands, or functions. By applying these principles consistently across the Purdue Model, organizations can eliminate reliance on catch-all VPN tunnels, jump servers, and brittle firewall exceptions that expose the environment to excess risk.

Access control is only one part of the equation

Darktrace / OT complements zero trust controls with continuous, AI-driven behavioral detection. Rather than relying on static rules or pre-defined signatures, Darktrace uses Self-Learning AI to build a live, evolving understanding of what’s “normal” in the environment, across every device, protocol, and user. This enables real-time detection of subtle misconfigurations, credential misuse, or lateral movement as they happen, not after the fact.

By correlating user identity and session activity with behavioral analytics, Darktrace gives organizations the full picture: who accessed which system, what actions they performed, how those actions compared to historical norms, and whether any deviations occurred. It eliminates guesswork around remote access sessions and replaces it with clear, contextual insight.

Importantly, Darktrace distinguishes between operational noise and true cyber-relevant anomalies. Unlike other tools that lump everything, from CVE alerts to routine activity, into a single stream, Darktrace separates legitimate remote access behavior from potential misuse or abuse. This means organizations can both audit access from a compliance standpoint and be confident that if a session is ever exploited, the misuse will be surfaced as a high-fidelity, cyber-relevant alert. This approach serves as a compensating control, ensuring that even if access is overextended or misused, the behavior is still visible and actionable.

If a session deviates from learned baselines, such as an unusual command sequence, new lateral movement path, or activity outside of scheduled hours, Darktrace can flag it immediately. These insights can be used to trigger manual investigation or automated enforcement actions, such as access revocation or session isolation, depending on policy.

This layered approach enables real-time decision-making, supports uninterrupted operations, and delivers complete accountability for all remote activity, without slowing down critical work or disrupting industrial workflows.

Where Zero Trust Access Meets AI‑Driven Oversight:

  • Granular Access Enforcement: Role-based, just-in-time access that aligns with Zero Trust principles and meets compliance expectations.
  • Context-Enriched Threat Detection: Self-Learning AI detects anomalous OT behavior in real time and ties threats to access events and user activity.
  • Automated Session Oversight: Behavioral anomalies can trigger alerting or automated controls, reducing time-to-contain while preserving uptime.
  • Full Visibility Across Purdue Layers: Correlated data connects remote access events with device-level behavior, spanning IT and OT layers.
  • Scalable, Passive Monitoring: Passive behavioral learning enables coverage across legacy systems and air-gapped environments, no signatures, agents, or intrusive scans required.

Complete security without compromise

We no longer have to choose between operational agility and security control, or between visibility and simplicity. A Zero Trust approach, reinforced by real-time AI detection, enables secure remote access that is both permission-aware and behavior-aware, tailored to the realities of industrial operations and scalable across diverse environments.

Because when it comes to protecting critical infrastructure, access without detection is a risk and detection without access control is incomplete.

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About the author
Pallavi Singh
Product Marketing Manager, OT Security & Compliance
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