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June 12, 2024

Meeten Malware: A Cross-Platform Threat to Crypto Wallets on macOS and Windows

Cado Security Labs (now part of Darktrace) identified a "Meeten" campaign deploying a cross-platform (macOS/Windows) infostealer called Realst. Threat actors create fake Web3 companies with AI-generated content and social media to trick targets into downloading malicious meeting applications.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Tara Gould
Malware Research Lead
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12
Jun 2024

Introduction: Meeten malware

Researchers from Cado Security Labs (now part of Darktrace) have identified a new sophisticated scam targeting people who work in Web3. The campaign includes cryptostealer Realst that has both macOS and Windows variants, and has been active for around four months. Research shows that the threat actors behind the malware have set up fake companies using AI to make them increase legitimacy. The company, which is currently going by the name “Meetio”, has cycled through various names over the past few months. In order to appear as a legitimate company, the threat actors created a website with AI-generated content, along with social media accounts. The company reaches out to targets to set up a video call, prompting the user to download the meeting application from the website, which is Realst info stealer. 

Meeten

Screenshot of fake company homepage
Figure 1: Fake company homepage

“Meeten” is the application that is attempting to scam users into downloading an information stealer. The company regularly changes names, and has also gone by Clusee[.]com, Cuesee, Meeten[.]gg, Meeten[.]us, Meetone[.]gg and is currently going by the name Meetio. In order to gain credibility, the threat actors set up full company websites, with AI-generated blog and product content and social media accounts including Twitter and Medium.

Based on public reports from targets (withheld from this post for privacy), the scam is conducted in multiple ways. In one reported instance, a user was contacted on Telegram by someone they knew who wanted to discuss a business opportunity and to schedule a call. However, the Telegram account was created to impersonate a contact of the target. Even more interestingly, the scammer sent an investment presentation from the target’s company to him, indicating a sophisticated and targeted scam. Other reports of targeted users report being on calls related to Web3 work, downloading the software and having their cryptocurrency stolen.

After initial contact, the target would be directed to the Meeten website to download the product. In addition to hosting information stealers, the Meeten websites contain Javascript to steal cryptocurrency that is stored in web browsers, even before installing any malware. 

Script
Figure 2: Script

Technical analysis

macOS version

Name: CallCSSetup.pkg

Meeten downloads page
Figure 3: Downloads page on Meeten

Once the victim is directed to the “Meeten” website, the downloads page offers macOS or Windows/Linux. In this iteration of the website, all download links lead to the macOS version. The package file contains a 64-bit binary named “fastquery”, however other versions of the malware are distributed as a DMG with a multi-arch binary. The binary is written in Rust, with the main functionality being information stealing. 

When opened, two error messages appear. The first one states “Cannot connect to the server. Please reinstall or use a VPN.” with a continue button. Osascript, the macOS command-line tool for running AppleScript and JavaScript is used to prompt the user for their password, as commonly seen in macOS malware. [1]

Pop up
Figure 4: Popup that requests users password
Code
Figure 5

The malware iterates through various data stores, grabs sensitive information, creates a folder where the data is stored, and then exfiltrates the data as a zip. 

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Folders
Figure 6: Folders and files created by Meeten

Realst Stealer looks for and exfiltrates if available:

  • Telegram credentials
  • Banking card details
  • Keychain credentials
  • Browser cookies and autofill credentials from Google Chrome, Opera, Brave, Microsoft Edge, Arc, CocCoc and Vivaldi
  • Ledger Wallets
  • Trezor Wallets

The data is sent to 139[.]162[.]179.170:8080/new_analytics with “log_id”, “anal_data” and “archive”. This contains the zip data to be exfiltrated along with analytics that include build name, build version, with system information. 

System information
Figure 7: System information that is sent as a log

Build information is also sent to 139[.]162[.]179.170:8080/opened along with metrics sent to /metrics. Following the data exfiltration, the created temporary directories are removed from the system. 

Windows version

Name: MeetenApp.exe

Meeten Setup Install
Figure 8: Meeten Setup install

While analyzing the macOS version of Meeten, Cado Security Labs identified a Windows version of the malware. The binary, “MeetenApp.exe” is a Nullsoft Scriptable Installer System (NSIS) file, with a legitimate signature from “Brys Software” that has likely been stolen.

Digital signature details
Figure 9: Digital Signature of Meeten

After extracting the files from the installer, there are two folders $PLUGINDIR and $R0. Inside $PLUGINDIR is a 7zip archive named “app-64” that contains resources, assets, binaries and an app.asar file, indicating this is an Electron application. Electron applications are built on the Electron framework that is used to develop cross-platform desktop applications with web languages such as Javascript. App.asar files are used by Electron runtime, and is a virtual file system containing application code, assets, and dependencies.

File structure
Figure 10: Electron application meeten structure
Meeten's app .asar file
Figure 11: Structure of Meeten's App.asar file
package.json
Figure 12: Package.json

After extracting the contents of app.asar, we can see the main script points to index.js containing:

"use strict"; 
require("./bytecode-loader.cjs"); 
require("./index.jsc"); 

Both of these are Bytenode Compiled Javascript files. Bytenode is a tool that compiles JavaScript code into V8 bytecode, allowing the execution of JavaScript without exposing the source code. The bytecode is a low-level representation of the JavaScript code that can be executed by the V8 JavaScript engine which powers Node.js. Since the Javascript is compiled, reverse engineering of the files is more difficult, and less likely to be detected by security tools. 

While the file is compiled, there is still some information we can see as plain text. Similarly to the macOS version, a log with system information is sent to a remote server. A secondary password protected archive , “AdditionalFilesForMeet.zip” is retrieved from deliverynetwork[.]observer into a temporary directory “temp03241242”.

URL
Figure 13

From AdditionalFilesForMeet.zip is a binary named “MicrosoftRuntimeComponentsX86.exe” This binary gathers system information including HWID, geo IP, hostname, OS, users, cores, RAM, disk size and running processes. 

Exfiltrated system information
Figure 14: System information exfiltrated by Meeten

This data is sent to 172[.]104.133.212/opened, along with the build version of Meeten. 

Data
Figure 15

An additional payload is retrieved “UpdateMC.zip” from “deliverynetwork[.]observer/qfast” into AppData/Local/Temp. The archive file extracts to UpdateMC.exe. 

UpdateMC

UpdateMC.exe is a Rust-based binary, with similar functionality to the macOS version. The stealer searches in various data stores to collect and exfiltrate sensitive data as a zip. Meeten has the ability to steal data from:

  • Telegram credentials
  • Banking card details
  • Browser cookies, history and autofill credentials from Google Chrome, Opera, Brave, Microsoft Edge, Arc, CocCoc and Vivaldi
  • Ledger Wallets
  • Trezor Wallets
  • Phantom Wallets
  • Binance Wallets

The data is stored inside a folder named after the users’ HWID inside AppData/Local/Temp directory before being exfiltrated to 172[.]104.133.212. 

Domains.txt
Figure 16

For persistence, a registry key is added to HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run to ensure that the stealer is run each time the machine is started. 

Code
Figure 17: Disassembled code where 0xFFFFFFFF80000001 = HKEY_CURRENT_USER
Code
Figure 18: Meeten uses RegSetValueExW call to set registry key
Computer folder
Figure 19

Key takeaways 

This blog highlights a sophisticated campaign that uses AI to social engineer victims into downloading low detected malware that has the ability to steal financial information. Although the use of malicious Electron applications is relatively new, there has been an increase of threat actors creating malware with Electron applications. [2] As Electron apps become increasingly common, users must remain vigilant by verifying sources, implementing strict security practices, and monitoring for suspicious activity.

While much of the recent focus has been on the potential of AI to create malware, threat actors are increasingly using AI to generate content for their campaigns. Using AI enables threat actors to quickly create realistic website content that adds legitimacy to their scams, and makes it more difficult to detect suspicious websites. This shift shows how AI can be used as a powerful tool in social engineering. As a result, users need to exercise caution when being approached about business opportunities, especially through Telegram. Even if the contact appears to be an existing contact, it is important to verify the account and always be diligent when opening links. 

Indicators of compromise (IoCs)

http://172[.]104.133.212:8880/new_analytics

http://172[.]104.133.212:8880/opened

http://172[.]104.133.212:8880/metrics

http://172[.]104.133.212:8880/sede

139[.]162[.]179.170:8080

deliverynetwork[.]observer/qfast/UpdateMC.zip

deliverynetwork[.]observer/qfast/AdditionalFilesForMeet.zip

www[.]meeten.us

www[.]meetio.one

www[.]meetone.gg

www[.]clusee.com

199[.]247.4.86

File / md5

CallCSSetup.pkg  9b2d4837572fb53663fffece9415ec5a  

Meeten.exe  6a925b71afa41d72e4a7d01034e8501b  

UpdateMC.exe  209af36bb119a5e070bad479d73498f7  

MicrosoftRuntimeComponentsX64.exe d74a885545ec5c0143a172047094ed59  

CluseeApp.pkg 09b7650d8b4a6d8c8fbb855d6626e25d

MITRE ATT&CK

Technique name / ID

T1204  User Execution  

T1555.001  Credentials From Password Stores: Keychain  

T1555.003 Credentials From Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers  

T1539  Steal Web Session Cookie  

T1217 Browser Information Discovery  

T1082  System Information Discovery  

T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery  

T1033  System Owner/User Discovery  

T1005 Data from Local System

T1074  Local Data Staging  

T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols  

T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel  

T1657 Financial Theft  

T1070.004 File Deletion  

T1553.001 Subvert Trust Controls: Gatekeeper Bypass  

T1553.002  Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing  

T1547.001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Folder  

T1497.001  Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks  

T1058.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Powershell  

T1016 Network Configuration Discovery  

T1007 System Service Discovery

References

  1. https://www.darktrace.com/blog/from-the-depths-analyzing-the-cthulhu-stealer-malware-for-macos
  2. https://research.checkpoint.com/2022/new-malware-capable-of-controlling-social-media-accounts-infects-5000-machines-and-is-actively-being-distributed-via-gaming-applications-on-microsofts-official-store/  
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Tara Gould
Malware Research Lead

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November 18, 2026

Microsoft Perception, Agentic Insiders and the Role of Behavioral Security

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This week at Ignite, Microsoft announced that Microsoft Perception is generally available. It is a significant milestone for the industry, and one we welcome as a Microsoft partner. Microsoft is putting an architectural bet at the center of its security strategy: AI has changed the speed of cyber, and defense must change with it.

At Darktrace, we’ve long held the same view, so it’s encouraging to see a partner of Microsoft’s scale articulate it so clearly and bring it to market.

Security gets a team of agents

Perception is Microsoft’s agentic security system. It orchestrates red, blue, and green team agents through playbooks in a closed loop: red agents simulate attacks, blue agents detect, triage and investigate, and green agents fix and remediate. Rather than adding another assistant to the SOC, it creates coordinated teams of agents that share context. Security teams set the guardrails and approve high-impact actions.

Microsoft frames this as a three-layer cyber stack: signals, sensors and actuators; a context layer; and agents, harness and models on top. Together with partner sources, the foundation produces more than 165 trillion signals per day.  

The announcement also makes a second point that matters just as much. Microsoft is treating AI agents themselves as a new insider-risk category. In its words, “Agents are the new insiders.” They work at machine speed, around the clock, with broad access to data, apps, tools and other agents, and like any insider they can make mistakes, be manipulated or be compromised. New capabilities such as Dynamic Agent Risk (now in preview) and dynamic Conditional Access controls are designed to assess and contain that risk as it changes.

Four truths about security in the agentic era

The announcement is built on four ideas, and together they describe the new reality security teams are defending:

  1. Static security can’t keep up. Microsoft validates what many security practitioners have observed; the window between a vulnerability’s discovery and its exploitation is collapsing from months to minutes. Manual triage can’t answer that pace. Autonomous detection and response is now a requirement, not simply a “nice to have”.
  2. Agents must be treated as insiders. The question for security teams is no longer only “who is this user?” but “what is this agent actually doing?” Identity tells you who an agent is. Policy tells you what it is allowed to do. Neither tells you whether its behavior is normal.
  3. Security is moving from signatures to behavior and context. Dynamic Agent Risk looks across identity, data, endpoint, cloud and network signals and asks whether an agent’s actions are drifting from the intent of its task. That is behavioral thinking, and it is philosophically close to the Adaptive AI approach Darktrace has pioneered.
  4. Machine-speed attacks demand machine-speed response. Humans set the objectives and guardrails. Autonomous systems do the work inside them, both detecting and acting. Microsoft’s design has agents investigate, recommend and, within approved boundaries, act, with security teams setting the limits. At this pace, the gap between knowing something is wrong and doing something about it has to close to seconds.

The opportunity: where control plane meets behavioral context

Perception is an extraordinary control plane for agentic security. The question for security leaders is how to make it even more effective in the environments they actually run.

Real enterprises are heterogeneous. They run AWS and Google Cloud alongside Azure, and OT, IoT and third-party identity alongside Entra. Increasingly they also run AI agents and MCP-connected systems that no single vendor’s telemetry fully covers. Microsoft’s architecture recognizes this, with more than 500 connectors into the wider ecosystem.

That is where Darktrace’s role is distinct. The challenge isn’t signal volume, where Microsoft’s scale is unmatched. It’s deeply understanding what is normal for a specific organization, across every system, identity and agent in it. Together, we deliver two complementary layers:

  • Microsoft brings global intelligence and orchestration. It tells you what is known, what it means and what to do about it.
  • Darktrace brings organization-specific behavioral context. It tells you what is unusual here, right now, across the organizations AI, people and infrastructure, even if it has never been seen before.

The difference shows up in the numbers. A large enterprise generates billions of signals. Darktrace turns them into thousands of incidents, narrows those to hundreds of AI-led investigations, and surfaces as few as 20 that merit a human’s attention. For an agentic SOC, that kind of evaluated, prioritized input makes agents faster, not busier.

As enterprises deploy more agents, the hard problem becomes behavior that is technically permitted but unusual, manipulated or inconsistent with the agent’s purpose. Consider an agent that normally reads Salesforce records during US business hours and suddenly starts enumerating SharePoint and opening unusual outbound connections. Each step may use valid access and approved tools, so identity and policy checks can all pass. Spotting it requires knowing the behavior is abnormal for this agent, in this environment, right now.

That is why one principle in Microsoft’s AI Transparency Initiative matters so much: organizations should be able to see what their AI accesses and does, and independently verify those actions.  

  • Identity and permissions answer “should this agent be allowed to do this?”
  • Behavioral defense answers “even though it is allowed, is what it’s doing normal?”

Deterministic controls around non-deterministic AI are the right foundation, and continuously learned baselines are how organizations can verify those controls are working. ‍

What to look for in an agentic SOC architecture

As organizations adopt platforms like Perception, we’d encourage them to look for three capabilities:

  1. Behavioral context in the control plane. Agents work best with high-confidence signals rather than thousands of raw alerts: here is the behavior that materially deviates from this organization’s learned normal.
  2. ‍Behavioral reasoning on demand. During an investigation, agents should be able to ask what changed around a given identity, device or agent in the last 24 hours, and get a clear answer. ‍
  3. Autonomous, coordinated response across the stack. Response should be as fast as the threat without being reckless: acting immediately when confidence is high, constraining or reversing actions when it isn’t, and keeping a human in the loop when it matters. Within policy and human-approval guardrails, it should target the abnormal behavior rather than the whole business process and span identity, endpoint and the wider environment.

These are the areas where we’re focused, and where we look forward to working with Microsoft and the broader ecosystem.

Response is where speed is won or lost

In the AI era, detection and investigation only matter if action follows quickly. Perception brings agentic orchestration to that problem, with security teams setting the guardrails and approving high-impact steps. Autonomous response from Darktrace takes a complementary approach: it responds on behavioral deviation, in a way that is proportionate and targeted. It can interrupt activity that is abnormal for that specific device, identity or agent while leaving normal business activity running.

The two approaches fit together naturally. Behavioral signals can tell an orchestration layer that something has changed and how confident the system is. Orchestrated playbooks can then coordinate wider containment across identity, endpoint and cloud, within the policies customers define.

The bigger picture

The industry’s architecture is converging on identity, policy, telemetry, behavior, autonomous reasoning and machine-speed response. Microsoft is building formidable pieces of that picture, especially identity, policy, telemetry and orchestration.

Behavior is the layer Darktrace is built to provide: an independent intelligence that continuously learns how humans, machines and AI agents normally act, detects the moment reality departs from intent, and can respond to that deviation in a targeted, proportionate way that keeps normal business running. When attacks move at machine speed, understanding what is abnormal and acting on it quickly have to go together.

Perception brings together what Microsoft knows and orchestrates the response across its stack. Darktrace helps organizations understand what is normal for them and act on what isn’t. Customers building their agentic security strategy will need both.

Congratulations to our partners at Microsoft on this milestone. We look forward to helping customers secure the agentic era together.

Learn more about Darktrace Behavioral Defense.

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About the author
Kellie Regan
Director, Product Marketing - Cloud Security

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November 18, 2026

Agentic attacks in the wild: Inside three ARTEX investigations

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Key insights

·       Darktrace observed activity in several customer environments involving infrastructure and behaviors associated with reported ARTEX-enabled campaigns, including activity linked to China-nexus espionage and financially motivated attacks.

·       In the higher-confidence cases, known infrastructure appeared alongside beaconing, unusual TLS, reconnaissance, tunneling, script retrieval, SMB activity and external data transfer. One Azure case had no observed network command and control at all, only key listing and application identity activity.

·       ARTEX is now used by actors with different objectives. Identifying the framework can help locate relevant activity, while the behavior around the affected system provides the stronger evidence for understanding compromise and attribution.

‍

Introduction

Attackers have moved beyond using AI for phishing and are running agentic frameworks; open-source tools like ARTEX, CAIRN, PentAGI and Hexstrike that let AI agents scan, exploit and move through an environment with little human input [1]. ARTEX has moved quickly from an offensive security project into live intrusion activity. Since at least August 2026, the framework has been associated with espionage, financially motivated attacks and opportunistic campaigns across government, financial services, technology, defense, telecommunications and other sectors. The FBI has documented ARTEX activity spanning reconnaissance, exploitation, credential abuse, lateral movement, collection, command and control, and exfiltration [2].

Darktrace has observed activity in customer environments that overlaps with infrastructure, tooling and behaviors reported in several of these campaigns. The cases below highlight how those intrusions appeared on the network, including the activity visible before an analyst can determine which actor or framework may be responsible.

ARTEX as part of the attacker workflow

ARTEX is an open-source, multi-agent offensive security platform that converts high-level objectives into actions carried out by specialized agents [2]. Operators have used it to automate activity across the attack lifecycle, including scanning, exploitation, credential activity and post-compromise operations. Some reported intrusions moved from initial targeting to privileged access in under three hours [2].

The framework is now associated with actors pursuing different objectives and using different post-exploitation tooling. The original public repository was removed in October 2026, but archived copies and localized versions remain available. For defenders, ARTEX is more useful as context for an investigation than as an attribution shortcut.

Darktrace observations show the same point at network level. Infrastructure linked to reported ARTEX campaigns appeared alongside beaconing, tunneling, unusual TLS, reconnaissance, file retrieval and lateral activity.

Case 1: Espionage-linked activity

Darktrace observed activity associated with BLOODALCHEMY command-and-control (C2) infrastructure in two customer environments. In one environment, five devices communicated with nginxmysql[.]com and 45.153.126[.]223 between October 23 and November 2. Both indicators had previously been linked to China-nexus espionage activity involving ARTEX [4].

The connections were accompanied by suspicious beaconing, repeated successful connections and unusual self-signed TLS. One system began making suspicious TLS connections to nginxmysql[.]com on October 23. Beaconing followed on October 24, and SMB scanning appeared later in the sequence. Other affected systems subsequently communicated with previously unseen external endpoints.

Prior to the observed C2, Darktrace detected curl requests retrieving executable and script content including /systemd, /wazuh, linux_amd64, u.sh and q.sh. Related telemetry included DRSGetNCChanges activity consistent with DCSync, LDAP enumeration, DNS zone transfers, network scanning, certificate downloads and SMB writes involving start.bat.

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Figure 1: Darktrace investigation showing suspicious network activity associated with infrastructure linked to reported ARTEX activity.

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Figure 2: Darktrace detection showing anomalous self-signed TLS activity during the espionage-linked investigation.

‍

BLOODALCHEMY has been reported in more than one China-nexus cluster [5]. SoftEther infrastructure observed in one environment provided another point of correlation with reported VAPOR PANDA tradecraft. The moderate-confidence assessment tying this to a Chinese nexus threat actor is based on infrastructure, victim context, tradecraft behavior that followed the initial connection, and public reporting.

Case 2: Financial-sector activity

In early November, Darktrace observed activity in two financial-sector environments that overlap with reported ARTEX infrastructure. On November 5, a server connected to 213.111.150[.]145:8099 and downloaded wisp-agent, associated with WISP C2 activity.

Figure 3: Darktrace's Real-Time AI Analyst investigation showing a server making repeated HTTP requests, using a curl user agent, to a rare external endpoint on port 8099.

‍

In a second environment, a device attempted connections to 85.11.167[.]52 on November 1 and 2. The connections occurred alongside beaconing to new and rare destinations, anomalous TLS, possible tunneling and unusual package downloads.

The device also communicated with temp[.]sh, ssh.localhost[.]run, localhost[.]run, termbin[.]com, pastebin[.]com and GitHub-hosted release infrastructure. The sequence showed potential tooling retrieval, C2, tunneling and use of external services capable of staging or moving data.

Figure 4: Darktrace investigation showing connections to new and rare external destinations during the financial-sector activity.

‍

Case 3: Credential collection in Azure

On October 20, Darktrace observed a sweep of credential collection in a customer’s Azure environment that is consistent with ARTEX use. The intrusion began with connections to the virtual network from 43.98.196[.]73 (Alibaba Cloud). Open-source scanning data associates the address with ARTEX.

A compromised user identity made requests to the Azure Resource Manager API, though how it was compromised is unknown. The requests listed keys and secrets across API Management, web and function apps, Cognitive Services, Event Hubs, storage accounts and a managed Kubernetes cluster. With those credentials the attacker compromised multiple application identities. The attacker then used the application identities and the user identity to retrieve more credentials, change firewall and security rules and run scripts on virtual machines. Microsoft Defender alerts showed attempted execution of scripts related to Mimikatz and Impacket.

In a cloud environment, such privileged and enumerative operations are potentially indistinguishable from legitimate administrative actions. Consequently, the sequence and context of such operations signified more than any specific API call. There was no C2 traffic to match, and listing keys and using application identities are also what administrators and automation do. A compromised user, credential retrieval across several Azure services, new application identities, more credential collection and changes to security controls only made sense together, and by then access was spreading through the cloud environment.

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Figure 5: Darktrace Advanced Search showing Azure AD operation names associated with the activity.

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Figure 6: Darktrace Advanced Search showing the Azure Resource Manager action used to execute scripts.
Figure 7: Darktrace Device Event log window showing the triggered models related to the suspicious Azure activity.

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Shared tooling weakens attribution signals

The three cases looked different on the network: BLOODALCHEMY infrastructure and espionage-consistent tradecraft, WISP infrastructure in financial-sector systems, and Azure identity and control-plane activity with no C2 at all.

Shared tooling has complicated attribution for years, and ARTEX adds to it because the framework carries out more of the attack, so reconnaissance, exploitation attempts and some post-compromise activity can look the same whoever set the objective. Attribution still needs infrastructure, malware, victimology, timing and the sequence of behavior inside the environment, and an ARTEX link is one input to that. Moreover, the behavior and the agent will still be shaped by the biases, preferences, and tradecraft of its operators.

At its core, ARTEX’s planner and worker agents identify and record facts, while exploring intents. However, the way the Large Language Model (LLM) chooses its next steps toward an objective is shaped fundamentally by the skills and tools available in its context. This includes its starting context, as well as various possible Model Context Protocol (MCP) plugins and user-injected context (e.g. user input mid-operation). Operators still have preferred tradecraft, and this preference shapes the pathways the harness will provide to the LLM in context prompts. Even on the same platform, customization based on operator preferences and goals will remain a key facet of campaign and actor identification.

Detection and response

Across the Darktrace cases, the stronger signals came from behavior after the connection: beaconing, abnormal TLS, reconnaissance, unusual authentication, tunneling, script retrieval, SMB activity and outbound transfer. Automated activity also produced compressed bursts of requests, sequential enumeration and repeated attempts with small changes.

With agentic tools reaching privileged access in under three hours, analysts may have only a short window to connect scanning or authentication activity to credential changes, new administrative access, tooling retrieval or lateral movement. Keeping network, identity and cloud telemetry together shows what happened before and after the first match, and whether a connection was noise or an intrusion moving toward privileged access.

In some of these cases, Darktrace's Autonomous Response took or recommended action against the activity, including blocking internal connectivity over specified ports, inhibiting outbound connections with likely C2 endpoints, and/or disabling SaaS/IaaS user accounts. While many of these recommended actions required human confirmation due to deployment configuration preferences, had these actions been applied autonomously at the time of alert, the scope of activity would have been limited, thereby giving analysts time to investigate and respond.

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Figure 8: Autonomous Response blocking suspicious firewall modification activity.

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Figure 9: Autonomous Response summary for affected cloud users during the intrusion.

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Figure 10: Autonomous Response taking action against unusual lateral movement activity on an affected device.

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Figure 12: Autonomous Response summary for affected network users during the time of the intrusion.

ARTEX won’t be the last of these frameworks. The next ones will come with new capabilities and defaults, but an intrusion still must interact with the target environment, and that shows up in how systems, identities and applications behave even after the indicator has aged out. The harder intrusions to catch will have no infrastructure to match, just ordinary API calls and legitimate identities. Detecting those depends on knowing what normal looks like for each identity and device. Containing abnormal activity at machine speed can stop an intrusion progressing while analysts establish impact and its extent. Autonomous Response does not replace that human analysis, but rather augments defender teams' capabilities by extending the window for investigation.

‍

Credit to Nathaniel Jones (SVP, Global Threat Intelligence), Eugene Chua (Principal Analyst), Sam Lister (Senior Security Researcher), Adam Potter (Associate Principal Cyber Analyst), Daniel Levy (Threat Hunting Data Scientist)

Edited by Ryan Traill (Content Manager)

Appendices

Darktrace model detections

·       Anomalous Connection / Multiple HTTP POSTs to Rare Hostname

·       Anomalous Connection / Rare External SSL Self-Signed

·       Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Self-Signed SSL

·       Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Successful Connections

·       Compromise / Suspicious Beaconing Behaviour

·       Compromise / Agent Beacon to New Endpoint

·       Compromise / Beacon to Young Endpoint

·       Compromise / SSL Beaconing to Rare Destination

·       Compromise / Suspicious TLS Beaconing To Rare External

·       Compromise / Possible Tunnelling to Bin Services

·       Device / Anomalous Github Download

·       Device / Anomalous Package Download

·       Device / Initial Attack Chain Activity

Indicators of compromise (IoCs)

nginxmysql[.]com

45.153.126[.]223

213.111.150[.]145

wisp-agent

85.11.167[.]52

43.98.196[.]73

192.121.47[.]20

www[.]ddduuuppp[.]com

89.46.234[.]50

sqlserver-sqlite[.]com

199.19.95[.]66

graphics-hook-filter64.dll

graphics-hook_config.bin

References

1.      Google. GTIG AI Threat Tracker - https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/agentic-threat-activity-crosses-a-significant-threshold

2.      Federal Bureau of Investigation, Threat Overview of ARTEX Autonomous Penetration Testing Framework, FLASH-20261113-001, 13 November 2026: https://www.ic3.gov/CSA/2026/261113.pdf

3.      Microsoft Security Blog, Storm-0940 Uses ARTEX Agentic AI in ConnectWise Supply Chain Compromise: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/10/21/storm-0940-uses-artex-agentic-ai-connectwise-supply-chain-compromise/

4.      CrowdStrike, VAPOR PANDA Uses ARTEX to Scale Global Campaign: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/blog/vapor-panda-uses-artex-to-scale-global-campaign/

5.      Bitdefender, SilkParasite: Tracking a China-Nexus APT Across Central Asia: https://www.bitdefender.com/en-us/blog/businessinsights/silkparasite-tracking-china-nexus-apt-across-central-asia

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About the author
Nathaniel Jones
SVP, Global Threat Intelligence
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