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May 8, 2025

Anomaly-Based Threat Hunting: Darktrace's Approach in Action

This blog outlines Darktrace's model-based anomaly detection and how security teams can leverage custom models for targeted threat hunts. Recently, Darktrace's Threat Research team applied this method in their report, "AI & Cybersecurity: The State of Cyber in UK and US Energy Sectors."
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Nathaniel Jones
VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO
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08
May 2025

What is threat hunting?

Threat hunting in cybersecurity involves proactively and iteratively searching through networks and datasets to detect threats that evade existing automated security solutions. It is an important component of a strong cybersecurity posture.

There are several frameworks that Darktrace analysts use to guide how threat hunting is carried out, some of which are:

  • MITRE Attack
  • Tactics, Techniques, Procedures (TTPs)
  • Diamond Model for Intrusion Analysis
  • Adversary, Infrastructure, Victims, Capabilities
  • Threat Hunt Model – Six Steps
  • Purpose, Scope, Equip, Plan, Execute, Feedback
  • Pyramid of Pain

These frameworks are important in baselining how to run a threat hunt. There are also a combination of different methods that allow defenders diversity– regardless of whether it is a proactive or reactive threat hunt. Some of these are:

  • Hypothesis-based threat hunting
  • Analytics-driven threat hunting
  • Automated/machine learning hunting
  • Indicator of Compromise (IoC) hunting
  • Victim-based threat hunting

Threat hunting with Darktrace

At its core, Darktrace relies on anomaly-based detection methods. It combines various machine learning types that allows it to characterize what constitutes ‘normal’, based on the analysis of many different measures of a device or actor’s behavior. Those types of learning are then curated into what are called models.

Darktrace models leverage anomaly detection and integrate outputs from Darktrace Deep Packet Inspection, telemetry inputs, and additional modules, creating tailored activity detection.

This dynamic understanding allows Darktrace to identify, with a high degree of precision, events or behaviors that are both anomalous and unlikely to be benign.  On top of machine learning models for detection, there is also the ability to change and create models showcasing the tool’s diversity. The Model Editor allows security teams to specify values, priorities, thresholds, and actions they want to detect. That means a team can create custom detection models based on specific use cases or business requirements. Teams can also increase the priority of existing detections based on their own risk assessments to their environment.

This level of dexterity is particularly useful when conducting a threat hunt. As described above, and in previous ‘Inside the SOC’ blogs such a threat hunt can be on a specific threat actor, specific sector, or a  hypothesis-based threat hunt combined with ‘experimenting’ with some of Darktrace’s models.

Conducting a threat hunt in the energy sector with experimental models

In Darktrace’s recent Threat Research report “AI & Cybersecurity: The state of cyber in UK and US energy sectors” Darktrace’s Threat Research team crafted hypothesis-driven threat hunts, building experimental models and investigating existing models to test them and detect malicious activity across Darktrace customers in the energy sector.

For one of the hunts, which hypothesised utilization of PerfectData software and multi-factor authentication (MFA) bypass to compromise user accounts and destruct data, an experimental model was created to detect a Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) user performing activity relating to 'PerfectData Software’, known to allow a threat actor to exfiltrate whole mailboxes as a PST file. Experimental model alerts caused by this anomalous activity were analyzed, in conjunction with existing SaaS and email-related models that would indicate a multi-stage attack in line with the hypothesis.

Whilst hunting, Darktrace researchers found multiple model alerts for this experimental model associated with PerfectData software usage, within energy sector customers, including an oil and gas investment company, as well as other sectors. Upon further investigation, it was also found that in June 2024, a malicious actor had targeted a renewable energy infrastructure provider via a PerfectData Software attack and demonstrated intent to conduct an Operational Technology (OT) attack.

The actor logged into Azure AD from a rare US IP address. They then granted Consent to ‘eM Client’ from the same IP. Shortly after, the actor granted ‘AddServicePrincipal’ via Azure to PerfectData Software. Two days later, the actor created a  new email rule from a London IP to move emails to an RSS Feed Folder, stop processing rules, and mark emails as read. They then accessed mail items in the “\Sent” folder from a malicious IP belonging to anonymization network,  Private Internet Access Virtual Private Network (PIA VPN) [1]. The actor then conducted mass email deletions, deleting multiple instances of emails with subject “[Name] shared "[Company Name] Proposal" With You” from the  “\Sent folder”. The emails’ subject suggests the email likely contains a link to file storage for phishing purposes. The mass deletion likely represented an attempt to obfuscate a potential outbound phishing email campaign.

The Darktrace Model Alert that triggered for the mass deletes of the likely phishing email containing a file storage link.
Figure 1: The Darktrace Model Alert that triggered for the mass deletes of the likely phishing email containing a file storage link.

A month later, the same user was observed downloading mass mLog CSV files related to proprietary and Operational Technology information. In September, three months after the initial attack, another mass download of operational files occurred by this actor, pertaining to operating instructions and measurements, The observed patience and specific file downloads seemingly demonstrated an intent to conduct or research possible OT attack vectors. An attack on OT could have significant impacts including operational downtime, reputational damage, and harm to everyday operations. Darktrace alerted the impacted customer once findings were verified, and subsequent actions were taken by the internal security team to prevent further malicious activity.

Conclusion

Harnessing the power of different tools in a security stack is a key element to cyber defense. The above hypothesis-based threat hunt and custom demonstrated intent to conduct an experimental model creation demonstrates different threat hunting approaches, how Darktrace’s approach can be operationalized, and that proactive threat hunting can be a valuable complement to traditional security controls and is essential for organizations facing increasingly complex threat landscapes.

Credit to Nathaniel Jones (VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO at Darktrace) and Zoe Tilsiter (EMEA Consultancy Lead)

References

  1. https://spur.us/context/191.96.106.219

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Nathaniel Jones
VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO

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February 26, 2026

What the Darktrace Annual Threat Report 2026 Means for Security Leaders

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The challenge for today’s CISOs

At the broadest level, the defining characteristic of cybersecurity in 2026 is the sheer pace of change shaping the environments we protect. Organizations are operating in ecosystems that are larger, more interconnected, and more automated than ever before – spanning cloud platforms, distributed identities, AI-driven systems, and continuous digital workflows.  

The velocity of this expansion has outstripped the slower, predictable patterns security teams once relied on. What used to be a stable backdrop is now a living, shifting landscape where technology, risk, and business operations evolve simultaneously. From this vantage point, the central challenge for security leaders isn’t reacting to individual threats, but maintaining strategic control and clarity as the entire environment accelerates around them.

Strategic takeaways from the Annual Threat Report

The Darktrace Annual Threat Report 2026 reinforces a reality every CISO feels: the center of gravity isn’t the perimeter, vulnerability management, or malware, but trust abused via identity. For example, our analysis found that nearly 70% of incidents in the Americas region begin with stolen or misused accounts, reflecting the global shift toward identity‑led intrusions.

Mass adoption of AI agents, cloud-native applications, and machine decision-making means CISOs now oversee systems that act on their own. This creates an entirely new responsibility: ensuring those systems remain safe, predictable, and aligned to business intent, even under adversarial pressure.

Attackers increasingly exploit trust boundaries, not firewalls – leveraging cloud entitlements, SaaS identity transitions, supply-chain connectivity, and automation frameworks. The rise of non-human identities intensifies this: credentials, tokens, and agent permissions now form the backbone of operational risk.

Boards are now evaluating CISOs on business continuity, operational recovery, and whether AI systems and cloud workloads can fail safely without cascading or causing catastrophic impact.

In this environment, detection accuracy, autonomous response, and blast radius minimization matter far more than traditional control coverage or policy checklists.

Every organization will face setbacks; resilience is measured by how quickly security teams can rise, respond, and resume momentum. In 2026, success will belong to those that adapt fastest.

Managing business security in the age of AI

CISO accountability in 2026 has expanded far beyond controls and tooling. Whether we asked for it or not, we now own outcomes tied to business resilience, AI trust, cloud assurance, and continuous availability. The role is less about certainty and more about recovering control in an environment that keeps accelerating.

Every major 2026 initiative – AI agents, third-party risk, cloud, or comms protection – connects to a single board-level question: Are we still in control as complexity and automation scale faster than humans?

Attackers are not just getting more sophisticated; they are becoming more automated. AI changes the economics of attack, lowering cost and increasing speed. That asymmetry is what CISOs are being measured against.

CISOs are no longer evaluated on tool coverage, but on the ability to assure outcomes – trust in AI adoption, resilience across cloud and identity, and being able to respond to unknown and unforeseen threats.

Boards are now explicitly asking whether we can defend against AI-driven threats. No one can predict every new behavior – survival depends on detecting malicious deviations from normal fast and responding autonomously.  

Agents introduce decision-making at machine speed. Governance, CI/CD scanning, posture management, red teaming, and runtime detection are no longer differentiators but the baseline.

Cloud security is no longer architectural, it is operational. Identity, control planes, and SaaS exposure now sit firmly with the CISO.

AI-speed threats already reshaping security in 2026

We’re already seeing clear examples of how quickly the threat landscape has shifted in 2026. Darktrace’s work on React2Shell exposed just how unforgiving the new tempo is: a honeypot stood up with an exposed React was hit in under two minutes. There was no recon phase, no gradual probing – just immediate, automated exploitation the moment the code appeared publicly. Exposure now equals compromise unless defenses can detect, interpret, and act at machine speed. Traditional operational rhythms simply don’t map to this reality.

We’re also facing the first wave of AI-authored malware, where LLMs generate code that mutates on demand. This removes the historic friction from the attacker side: no skill barrier, no time cost, no limit on iteration. Malware families can regenerate themselves, shift structure, and evade static controls without a human operator behind the keyboard. This forces CISOs to treat adversarial automation as a core operational risk and ensure that autonomous systems inside the business remain predictable under pressure.

The CVE-2026-1731 BeyondTrust exploitation wave reinforced the same pattern. The gap between disclosure and active, global exploitation compressed into hours. Automated scanning, automated payload deployment, coordinated exploitation campaigns, all spinning up faster than most organizations can push an emergency patch through change control. The vulnerability-to-exploit window has effectively collapsed, making runtime visibility, anomaly detection, and autonomous containment far more consequential than patching speed alone.

These cases aren’t edge scenarios; they represent the emerging norm. Complexity and automation have outpaced human-scale processes, and attackers are weaponizing that asymmetry.  

The real differentiator for CISOs in 2026 is less about knowing everything and more about knowing immediately when something shifts – and having systems that can respond at the same speed.

[related-resource]

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About the author
Mike Beck
Global CISO

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February 19, 2026

CVE-2026-1731: How Darktrace Sees the BeyondTrust Exploitation Wave Unfolding

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Note: Darktrace's Threat Research team is publishing now to help defenders. We will continue updating this blog as our investigations unfold.

Background

On February 6, 2026, the Identity & Access Management solution BeyondTrust announced patches for a vulnerability, CVE-2026-1731, which enables unauthenticated remote code execution using specially crafted requests.  This vulnerability affects BeyondTrust Remote Support (RS) and particular older versions of Privileged Remote Access (PRA) [1].

A Proof of Concept (PoC) exploit for this vulnerability was released publicly on February 10, and open-source intelligence (OSINT) reported exploitation attempts within 24 hours [2].

Previous intrusions against Beyond Trust technology have been cited as being affiliated with nation-state attacks, including a 2024 breach targeting the U.S. Treasury Department. This incident led to subsequent emergency directives from  the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and later showed attackers had chained previously unknown vulnerabilities to achieve their goals [3].

Additionally, there appears to be infrastructure overlap with React2Shell mass exploitation previously observed by Darktrace, with command-and-control (C2) domain  avg.domaininfo[.]top seen in potential post-exploitation activity for BeyondTrust, as well as in a React2Shell exploitation case involving possible EtherRAT deployment.

Darktrace Detections

Darktrace’s Threat Research team has identified highly anomalous activity across several customers that may relate to exploitation of BeyondTrust since February 10, 2026. Observed activities include:

Outbound connections and DNS requests for endpoints associated with Out-of-Band Application Security Testing; these services are commonly abused by threat actors for exploit validation.  Associated Darktrace models include:

  • Compromise / Possible Tunnelling to Bin Services

Suspicious executable file downloads. Associated Darktrace models include:

  • Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location

Outbound beaconing to rare domains. Associated Darktrace models include:

  • Compromise / Agent Beacon (Medium Period)
  • Compromise / Agent Beacon (Long Period)
  • Compromise / Sustained TCP Beaconing Activity To Rare Endpoint
  • Compromise / Beacon to Young Endpoint
  • Anomalous Server Activity / Rare External from Server
  • Compromise / SSL Beaconing to Rare Destination

Unusual cryptocurrency mining activity. Associated Darktrace models include:

  • Compromise / Monero Mining
  • Compromise / High Priority Crypto Currency Mining

And model alerts for:

  • Compromise / Rare Domain Pointing to Internal IP

IT Defenders: As part of best practices, we highly recommend employing an automated containment solution in your environment. For Darktrace customers, please ensure that Autonomous Response is configured correctly. More guidance regarding this activity and suggested actions can be found in the Darktrace Customer Portal.  

Appendices

Potential indicators of post-exploitation behavior:

·      217.76.57[.]78 – IP address - Likely C2 server

·      hXXp://217.76.57[.]78:8009/index.js - URL -  Likely payload

·      b6a15e1f2f3e1f651a5ad4a18ce39d411d385ac7  - SHA1 - Likely payload

·      195.154.119[.]194 – IP address – Likely C2 server

·      hXXp://195.154.119[.]194/index.js - URL – Likely payload

·      avg.domaininfo[.]top – Hostname – Likely C2 server

·      104.234.174[.]5 – IP address - Possible C2 server

·      35da45aeca4701764eb49185b11ef23432f7162a – SHA1 – Possible payload

·      hXXp://134.122.13[.]34:8979/c - URL – Possible payload

·      134.122.13[.]34 – IP address – Possible C2 server

·      28df16894a6732919c650cc5a3de94e434a81d80 - SHA1 - Possible payload

References:

1.        https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-1731

2.        https://www.securityweek.com/beyondtrust-vulnerability-targeted-by-hackers-within-24-hours-of-poc-release/

3.        https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-cve-2026-1731-critical-unauthenticated-remote-code-execution-rce-beyondtrust-remote-support-rs-privileged-remote-access-pra/

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About the author
Emma Foulger
Global Threat Research Operations Lead
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