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November 9, 2023

Using Darktrace for Threat Hunting

Read about effective threat hunting techniques with Darktrace, focusing on identifying vulnerabilities and improving your security measures.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Brianna Luong (Leddy)
Sr. Technical Alliances Manager
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09
Nov 2023

What is Threat Hunting?

Threat Hunting is a technique to identify adversaries within an organization that go undetected by traditional security tools.

While a traditional, reactive approach to cyber security often involves automated alerts received and investigated by a security team, threat hunting takes a proactive approach to seek out potential threats and vulnerabilities before they escalate into full-blown security incidents. The benefits of hunting include identifying hidden threats, reducing the dwell time of attackers, and enhancing overall detection and response capabilities.

Threat Hunting Methodology

There are many different methodologies and frameworks for threat hunting, including the Pyramid of Pain, the Sqrrl Hunting Loop, and the MITRE ATT&CK Framework.  While there is not one gold standard on how to conduct threat hunts, the typical process can be broken down into several key steps:

Planning and Hypothesis Creation: Define the scope and objective of the threat hunt. Identify potential targets and predict activity that might be taking place.

Data Collection: Refining data collection methods and gathering data from various sources, including logs, network traffic, and endpoint data.

Data Processing: Data that has been collected needs to be processed to generate information.

Data Analysis: Processed data can then be analyzed for anomalies, indicators of compromise (IoCs), or patterns of suspicious behavior.

Threat Identification: Based on the analysis, threat hunters may identify potential threats or security incidents.

Response: Taking action to mitigate or eradicate identified threats if any.

Documentation and Dissemination: It is important to record any findings or actions taken during the threat hunting process to serve as lessons learned for future reference. Additionally, any new threats or tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) discovered may be shared with the cyber threat intelligence team or the wider community.

Building a Threat Hunting Program

For organizations looking to implement threat hunting as part of their cyber security program, they will need both a data collection source and human analysts as threat hunters.

Data collection and analysis may often be performed through existing security tools including SIEM systems, Network Traffic Analysis tools, endpoint agents, and system logs. On the human side, experienced threat hunters may be hired into an organization, or existing SOC analysts may be upskilled to perform threat hunts.

Leveraging AI security tools such as Darktrace can help to lower the bar in building a threat hunting program, both in analysis of the data and in assisting humans in their investigations.

Threat Hunting in Darktrace

To illustrate the benefits of leveraging Darktrace in threat hunting, we can walk through an example hunt following the key steps outlined above.

Planning and Hypothesis Creation

The initial hypothesis used in defining the scope of a threat hunt can come from several sources: threat intelligence feeds, the threat hunter’s own experience, or an anomaly detection that has been highlighted by Darktrace.

In this case, let’s imagine that this hunt is focused on a recent campaign by an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT). Threat intel has provided known file hashes, Command and Control (C2) IP addresses and domains, and MITRE techniques used by the attacker. The goal is to determine whether any indicators of this threat are present in the organization’s environment.

Data Collection and Data Processing

Darktrace can be deployed to cover an organization’s entire digital estate, including passive network traffic monitoring, cloud environments, and SaaS applications. Self-Learning AI is applied to the raw data to learn normal patterns of life for a specific environment and to highlight deviations from normal that might represent a threat. This data gives threat hunters a starting point in analyzing logs, meta-data, and anomaly detections.

Data Analysis

In the data analysis phase, threat hunters can use the Darktrace platform to search for the IoCs and TTPs identified during planning.

When searching for IoCs such as IP addresses or domain names, hunters can query the environment through the Omnisearch bar in the Darktrace Threat Visualizer. This search can provide a summary of all devices or users contacting a suspicious endpoint. From here the hunters can quickly pivot to identify surrounding activity from the source device.

Figure 1: Search for twitter[.]com (now known as X) as a potential indicator of compromise

Alternately, Darktrace Advanced Search can be used to search for these IoCs, but it also supports queries for file hashes or more advanced searches based on ports, protocols, data volumes, etc.

Figure 2: Advanced Search query for connections on port 3389 lasting longer than 60 seconds

While searching for known suspicious domains and IP addresses is straightforward, the real strength of Darktrace lies in the ability to highlight deviations from a device’s ‘normal’ pattern of life. Darktrace has many built-in behavioral models designed to detect common adversary TTPs, all mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK Framework.

In the context of our threat hunt, we know that our target APT uses the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) to move laterally within a compromised network, specifically leveraging MITRE technique T1021.001. As each Darktrace model is mapped to MITRE, the threat hunter can search and find specific detection models that may be of interest, in this case the model ‘Anomalous Connection / Unusual Internal Remote Desktop’. From here they can view any devices that may have triggered this model, indicating possible attacker activity.

Figure 3: MITRE Mapping details in the Darktrace Model Editor

Threat hunters can also search more widely for any detections within a specific MITRE tactic through filters found on the Darktrace Threat Tray.

Figure 4: Search for the Lateral Movement MITRE Tactic on the model breach threat tray

Threat Identification

Once a threat hunter has identified connections, model breaches, or anomalies during the analysis phase, they can begin to conduct further investigation to determine if this may represent a security incident.

Threat hunters can use Darktrace to perform deeper analysis through generating packet captures, visualizing surrounding network traffic, and utilizing features like the VirusTotal lookup to consult open-source intelligence (OSINT).

Another powerful tool to augment the hunter’s investigation is the Darktrace Cyber AI Analyst, which assists human teams in the investigation and correlation of behaviors to identify threats. Cyber AI Analyst automatically launches an initial triage of every model breach in the Darktrace platform, but threat hunters can also leverage manual investigations to gain additional context on their findings.

For example, say that an unusual RDP connection of interest was identified through Advanced Search. The hunter can pivot back to the Threat Visualizer and launch an AI Analyst investigation for the source device at the time of the connection. The resulting investigation may provide the hunter with additional suspicious behavior observed around that time, without the need for manual log analysis.

Figure 5: Manual Cyber AI Analyst investigations

Response

If a threat is detected within Darktrace and confirmed by the threat hunter, Darktrace's Autonomous Response can be leveraged to take either autonomous or manual action to contain the threat. This provides the security team with additional time to conduct further investigation, pull forensics, and remediate the threat. This process can be further supported through the bespoke, AI-generated playbooks offered by Darktrace / Incident Readiness & Recovery, allowing an efficient recovery back to normal.

Figure 6: Example of a manual RESPOND action used to block suspicious connectivity on port 3389 to contain possible lateral movement

Documentation and Dissemination

An important final step is to document the threat hunting process and use the results to better improve automated security alerting and response. In Darktrace, reporting can be generated through the Cyber AI Analyst, Advanced Search exports, and model breach details to support documentation.

To improve existing alerting through Darktrace, this may mean creating a new detection model or increasing the priority of existing detections to ensure that these are escalated to the security team in the future. The Darktrace model editor provides users with full visibility into models and allows the creation of custom detections based on use cases or business requirements.

Figure 7: The Darktrace Model Editor showing the Breach Logic configuration

Conclusions

Proactive threat hunting is an important part of a cyber security approach to identify hidden threats, reduce dwell time, and improve incident response. Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI provides a powerful tool for identifying attacker TTPs and augmenting human threat hunters in their process. Utilizing the Darktrace platform, threat hunters can significantly reduce the time required to complete their hunts and mitigate identified threats.

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Get the latest insights on emerging cyber threats

Attackers are adapting, are you ready? This report explores the latest trends shaping the cybersecurity landscape and what defenders need to know

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Brianna Luong (Leddy)
Sr. Technical Alliances Manager

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May 18, 2026

AI Insider Threats: How Generative AI is Changing Insider Risk

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How generative AI changes insider behavior

AI systems, especially generative platforms such as chatbots, are designed for engagement with humans. They are equipped with extraordinary human-like responses that can both confirm, and inflate, human ideas and ideology; offering an appealing cognitive partnership between machine and human.  When considering this against the threat posed by insiders, the type of diverse engagement offered by AI can greatly increase the speed of an insider event, and can facilitate new attack platforms to carry out insider acts.  

This article offers analysis on how to consider this new paradigm of insider risk, and outlines key governance principles for CISOs, CSOs and SOC managers to manage the threats inherent with AI-powered insider risk.

What is an insider threat?

There are many industry or government definitions of what constitutes insider threat. At its heart, it relates to the harm created when trusted access to sensitive information, assets or personnel is abused bywith malicious intent, or through negligent activities.  

Traditional methodologies to manage insider threat have relied on two main concepts: assurance of individuals with access to sensitive assets, and a layered defense system to monitor for any breach of vulnerability. This is often done both before, and after access has been granted.  In the pre-access state, assurance is gained through security or recruitment checks. Once access is granted, controls such as privileged access, and zero-trust architecture offer defensive layers.

How does AI change the insider threat paradigm?

While these two concepts remain central to the management of insider threats, the introduction of AI offers three key new aspects that will re-shape the paradigm:.  

AI can act as a cognitive amplifier, influencing and affecting the motivations that can lead to insider-related activity. This is especially relevant for the deliberate insider - someone who is considering an act of insider harm. These individuals can now turn to AI systems to validate their thinking, provide unique insights, and, crucially, offer encouragement to act. With generative systems hard-wired to engage and agree with users, this can turn a helpful AI system into a dangerous AI hype machine for those with harmful insider intent.  

AI can act as an operational enabler. AI can now develop and increase the range of tools needed to carry out insider acts. New social engineering platforms such as vishing and deepfakes give adversaries a new edge to create insider harm. AI can generate solutions and operational platforms at increasing speeds; often without the need for human subject matter expertise to execute the activities. As one bar for advanced AI capabilities continues to be raised, the bar needed to make use of those platforms has become significantly lower.

AI can act as a semi-autonomous insider, particularly when agentic AI systems or non-human identities are provided broad levels of autonomy; creating a vector of insider acts with little-to-no human oversight or control. As AI agents assume many of the orchestration layers once reserved for humans, they do so without some of the restricted permissions that generally bind service accounts. With broad levels of accessibility and authority, these non-human identities (NHIs) can themselves become targets of insider intent.  Commonly, this refers to the increasing risks of prompt injection, poisoning, or other types of embedded bias. In many ways, this mirrors the risks of social engineering traditionally faced by humans. Even without deliberate or malicious efforts to corrupt them, AI systems and AI agents can carry out unintended actions; creating vulnerabilities and opportunities for insider harm.

How to defend against AI-powered insider threats

The increasing attack surfaces created or facilitated by AI is a growing concern.  In Darktrace’s own AI cybersecurity research, the risks introduced, and acknowledged, through the proliferation of AI tools and systems continues to outstrip traditional policies and governance guardrails. 22% of respondents in the survey cited ‘insider misuse aided by generative AI’ as a major threat concern.  And yet, in the same survey, only 37% of all respondents have formal policies in place to manage the safe and responsible use of AI.  This draws a significant and worrying delta between the known risks and threat concerns, and the ability (and resources) to mitigate them.

What can CISOs and SOC leaders do to protect their organization from AI insider threats?  

Given the rapid adaptation, adoption, and scale of AI systems, implementing the right levels of AI governance is non-negotiable. Getting the correct balance between AI-driven productivity gains and careful compliance will lead to long-term benefits. Adapting traditional insider threat structures to account for newer risks posed through the use of AI will be crucial. And understanding the value of AI systems that add to your cybersecurity resilience rather than imperil it will be essential.

For those responsible for the security and protection of their business assets and data holdings, the way AI has changed the paradigm of insider threats can seem daunting.  Adopting strong, and suitable AI governance can become difficult to introduce due to the volume and complexity of systems needed to be monitored. As well as traditional insider threat mitigations such as user monitoring, access controls and active management, the speed and autonomy of some AI systems need different, as well as additional layers of control.  

How Darktrace helps protect against AI-powered insider threats

Darktrace has demonstrated that, through platforms such as our proprietary Cyber AI Analyst, and our latest product Darktrace / SECURE AI, there are ways AI systems can be self-learning, self-critical and resilient to unpredictable AI behavior whilst still offering impressive returns; complementing traditional SOC and CISO strategies to combat insider threat.  

With / SECURE AI, some of the ephemeral risks drawn through AI use can be more easily governed.  Specifically, the ability to monitor conversational prompts (which can both affect AI outputs as well as highlight potential attempts at manipulation of AI; raising early flags of insider intent); the real-time observation of AI usage and development (highlighting potential blind-spots between AI development and deployment); shadow AI detection (surfacing unapproved tools and agents across your IT stack) and; the ability to know which identities (human or non-human) have permission access. All these features build on the existing foundations of strong insider threat management structures.  

How to take a defense-in-depth approach to AI-powered insider threats

Even without these tools, there are four key areas where robust, more effective controls can mitigate AI-powered insider threat.  Each of the below offers a defencce-in-depth approach: layering acknowledgement and understanding of an insider vector with controls that can bolster your defenses.  

Identity and access controls

Having a clear understanding of the entities that can access your sensitive information, assets and personnel is the first step in understanding the landscape in which insider harm can occur.  AI has shown that it is not just flesh and bone operators who can administer insider threats; Non-Human Identities (such as agentic AI systems) can operate with autonomy and freedom if they have the right credentials. By treating NHIs in the same way as human operators (rather than helpful machine-based tools), and adding similar mitigation and management controls, you can protect both your business, and your business-based identities from insider-related attention.

Visibility and shadow AI detection

Configuring AI systems carefully, as well as maintaining internal monitoring, can help identify ‘shadow AI’ usage; defined as the use of unsanctioned AI tools within the workplace1 (this topic was researched in Darktrace’s own paper on "How to secure AI in the enterprise". The adoption of shadow AI could be the result of deliberate preference, or ‘shortcutting’; where individuals use systems and models they are familiar with, even if unsanctioned. As well as some performance risks inherent with the use of shadow AI (such as data leakage and unwanted actions), it could also be a dangerous precursor for insider-related harm (either through deliberate attempts to subvert regular monitoring, or by opening vulnerabilities through unpatched or unaccredited tooling).

Prompt and Output Guardrails

The ability to introduce guardrails for AI systems offers something of a traditional “perimeter protection” layer in AI defense architecture; checking prompts and outputs against known threat vectors, or insider threat methodologies. Alone, such traditional guardrails offer limited assurance.  But, if tied with behavior-centric threat detection, and an enforcement system that deters both malicious and accidental insider activities, this would offer considerable defense- in- depth containment.  

Forensic logging and incident readiness response

The need for detection, data capture, forensics, and investigation are inherent elements of any good insider threat strategy. To fully understand the extent or scope of any suspected insider activity (such as understanding if it was deliberate, targeted, or likely to occur again), this rich vein of analysis could prove invaluable.  As the nature of business increasingly turns ephemeral; with assets secured in remote containers, information parsed through temporary or cloud-based architecture, and access nodes distributed beyond the immediate visibility of internal security teams, the development of AI governance through containment, detection, and enforcement will grow ever more important.

Enabling these controls can offer visibility and supervision over some of the often-expressed risks about AI management. With the right kind of data analytics, and with appropriate human oversight for high-risk actions, it can illuminate the core concerns expressed through a new paradigm of AI-powered insider threats by:

  • Ensuring deliberately mis-configured AI systems are exposed through regular monitoring.
  • Highlighting changes in systems-based activity that might indicate harmful insider actions; whether malicious or accidental.
  • Promoting a secure-by-design process that discourages and deters insider-related ambitions.
  • Ensuring the control plane for identity-based access spans humans, NHIs and AI models, and:
  • Offering positive containment strategies that will help curate the extent of AI control, and minimize unwanted activities.

Why insider threat remains a human challenge

At its root, and however it has been configured, AI is still an algorithmic tool; something designed to automate, process and manage computational functions at machine speed, and boost productivity.  Even with the best cybersecurity defenses in place, the success of an insider threat management program will still depend on the ability of human operators to identify, triage, and manage the insider threat attack surface.  

AI governance policies, human-in-the-loop break points, and automated monitoring functions will not guard against acts of insider harm unless there is intention to manage this proactively, and through a strong culture of how to guard against abuses of trust and responsibility.

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Jason Lusted
AI Governance Advisor

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May 14, 2026

Chinese APT Campaign Targets Entities with Updated FDMTP Backdoor

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Darktrace have identified activity consistent with Chinese-nexus operations, a Twill Typhoon-linked campaign targeting customer environments, primarily within the Asia-Pacific & Japan (APJ) region

Beginning in late September 2025, multiple affected hosts were observed making requests to domains impersonating content delivery networks (CDNs), including infrastructure masquerading as Yahoo- and Apple-affiliated services. Across these cases, Darktrace identified a consistent behavioral execution pattern: the retrieval of legitimate binaries alongside malicious Dynamic Link Libraries (DLLs), enabling sideloading and execution of a modular .NET-based Remote Access Trojan (RAT) framework.

The activity aligns with patterns described in Darktrace’s previous Chinese-nexus operations report, Crimson Echo. In this case, observed modular intrusion chains built on legitimate software, and staged payload delivery. Threat actors retrieve legitimate binaries alongside configuration files and malicious DLLs to enable sideloading of a .NET-based RAT.

Observed Campaign

Across cases, the same ordered sequence appears: retrieval of a legitimate executable, (2) retrieval of a matching .config file, (3) retrieval of the malicious

DLL, (4) repeated DLL downloads over time, and (5) command-and-control (C2) communication. The .config file retrieves a malicious binary, while the legitimate binary provides a legitimate process to run it in.

Darktrace assesses with moderate confidence that this activity aligns with publicly reported Twill Typhoon tradecraft. The observed use of FDMTP, DLL sideloading, and overlapping infrastructure is consistent with previously observed operations, though not unique to a single actor. While initial access was not directly observed, previous Twill Typhoon campaigns have typically involved spear-phishing.

What Darktrace Observed

Since late September 2025, Darktrace has observed multiple customer environments making HTTP GET requests to infrastructure presenting as “CDN” endpoints for well-known platforms (including Yahoo and Apple lookalikes). Across cases, the affected hosts retrieved legitimate executables, then matching .config files (same base filename), then DLLs intended for sideloading. The sequencing of a legitimate binary + configuration + DLL  has been previously observed in campaigns linked to China-nexus threat actors.

In several cases, affected hosts also issued outbound requests to a /GetCluster endpoint, including the protocol=Dotnet-Tcpdmtp parameter. This activity was repeatedly followed by retrieval of DLL content that was subsequently used for search-order hijacking within legitimate processes.

In the September–October 2025 cases, Darktrace alerting commonly surfaced early-stage registration and C2 setup behaviors, followed by retrieval of a DLL (e.g., Client.dll) from the same external host, sometimes repeatedly over multiple days, consistent with establishing and maintaining the execution chain.

In April 2026, a finance-sector endpoint initiated a series of GET requests to yahoo-cdn[.]it[.]com, first fetching legitimate binaries (including vshost.exe and dfsvc.exe), then repeatedly retrieving associated configuration and DLL components (including dfsvc.exe.config and dnscfg.dll) over an 11-day window. The use of both Visual Studio hosting and OneClick (dfsvc.exe) paths are used to ensure the malware can run in the targeted environment.

Technical Analysis

Initial staging and execution

While the initial access method is unknown, Darktrace security researchers identified multiple archives containing the malware.

A representative example includes a ZIP archive (“test.zip”) containing:

  • A legitimate executable: biz_render.exe (Sogou Pinyin IME)
  • A malicious DLL: browser_host.dll

Contained within the zip archive named “test.zip” is the legitimate binary “biz_render.exe”, a popular Chinese Input Method Editor (IME) Sogou Pinyin.

Alongside the legitimate binary is a malicious DLL named “browser_host.dll”. As the legitimate binary loads a legitimate DLL named “browser_host.dll” via LoadLibraryExW, the malicious DLL has been named the same to sideload the malicious DLL into biz_render.exe. By supplying a malicious DLL with an identical name, the actor hijacks execution flow, enabling the payload to execute within a trusted process.

Figure 1: Biz_render.exe loading browser_host.dll.

The legitimate binary invokes the function GetBrowserManagerInstance from the sideloaded “browser_host.dll”, which then performs XOR-based decryption of embedded strings (key 0x90) to resolve and dynamically load mscoree.dll.

The DLL uses the Windows Common Language Runtime (CLR) to execute managed .NET code inside the process rather than relying solely on native binaries. During execution, the loader loads a payload directly into memory as .NET assemblies, enabling an in-memory execution.

C2 Registration

A GET request is made to:

GET /GetCluster?protocol=DotNet-TcpDmtp&tag={0}&uid={1}

with the custom header:

Verify_Token: Dmtp

This returns Base64-encoded and gzip-compressed IP addresses used for subsequent communication.

Figure 2: Decoded IPs.

Staged payload retrieval

Subsequent activity includes retrieval of multiple components from yahoo-cdn.it[.]com. The following GET requests are made:

/dfsvc.exe

/dnscfg.dll

/dfsvc.exe.config

/vhost.exe

/Microsoft.VisualStudio.HostingProcess.Utilities.Sync.dll

/config.etl

ClickOnce and AppDomain hijacking

Dfsvc.exe is the legitimate Windows ClickOnce Engine, part of the .NET framework used for updating ClickOnce Applications. Accompanying dfsvc.exe is a legitimate dfsvc.exe.config file that is used to store configuration data for the application. However, in this instance the malware has replaced the legitimate dfsvc.exe.config with the one retrieved from the server in: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319.

Additionally, vhost.exe the legitimate Visual Studio hosting process is retrieved from the server, along with “Microsoft.VisualStudio.HostingProcess.Utilities.Sync.dll” and “config.etl”. The DLL is used to decrypt the AES encrypted payload in config.etl and load it. The encrypted payload is dnscfg.dll, which can be loaded into vshost instead of dfsvc, and may be used if the environment does not support .NET.

Figure 3: ClickOnce configuration.

The malicious configuration disables logging, forces the application to load dnscfg.dll from the remote server, and uses a custom AppDomainManager to ensure the DLL is executed during initialization of dfsvc.exe. To ensure persistence, a scheduled task is added for %APPDATA%\Local\Microsoft\WindowsApps\dfsvc.exe.

Core payload

The DLL dnscfg.dll is a .NET binary named Client.TcpDmtp.dll. The payload is a heavily obfuscated backdoor that generates its logic at runtime and communicates with the command and control (C2) over custom TCP, DMTP (Duplex Message Transport Protocol) and appears to be an updated version of FDMTP to version 3.2.5.1

Figure 4: InitializeNewDomain.

The payload:

  • Uses cluster-based resolution (GetHostFromCluster)
  • Implements token validation
  • Enters a persistent execution loop (LoopMessage)
  • Supports structured remote tasking over DMTP

Once connected, the malware enters a persistent loop (LoopMessage), enabling it to receive commands from the remote server.

Figure 5: DMTP Connect function.

Rather than referencing values directly, they are retrieved through containers that are resolved at runtime. String values are stored in an encrypted byte array (_0) and decrypted by a custom XOR-based string decryption routine (dcsoft). The lower 16 bits of the provided key are XORed with 0xA61D (42525) to derive the initial XOR key, while subsequent bits define the string length and offset into the encrypted byte array. Each character is reconstructed from two encrypted bytes and XORed with the incrementing key value, producing the plaintext string used by the payload.

Figure 6: Decrypted strings.

Embedded in the resources section are multiple compressed binaries, the majority of which are library files. The only exceptions are client.core.dll and client.dmtpframe.dll.

Figure 7: Resources.

Modular framework and plugins

The payload embeds multiple compressed libraries, notably:

  • client.core.dll
  • client.dmtpframe.dll

Client.core.dll is a core library used for system profiling, C2 communication and plugin execution. The implant has the functionality to retrieve information including antivirus products, domain name, HWID, CLR version, administrator status, hardware details, network details, operating system, and user.

Figure 8: Client.Core.Info functions.

Additionally, the component is responsible for loading plugins, with support for both binary and JSON-based plugin execution. This allows plugins to receive commands and parameters in different formats depending on the task being performed.

The framework handles details such as plugin hashes, method names, task identifiers, caller tracking, and argument processing, allowing plugins to be executed consistently within the environment. In addition to execution management, the library also provides plugins with access to common runtime functionality such as logging, communication, and process handling.

Figure 9: Client.core functions.

client.dmtpframe.dll handles:

  • DMTP communication
  • Heartbeats and reconnection
  • Plugin persistence via registry:

HKCU\Software\Microsoft\IME\{id}

Client.dmtpframe.dll is built on the TouchSocket DMTP networking library and continues to manage the remote plugins. The DLL implements remote communication features including heartbeat maintenance, reconnection handling, RPC-style messaging, SSL support, and token-based verification. The DLL also has the ability to add plugins to the registry under HKCU/Software/Microsoft/IME/{id} for persistence.

Plugins observed

While the full set of plugins remains unknown, researchers were able to identify four plugins, including:

  • Persist.WpTask.dll - used to create, remove and trigger scheduled Windows tasks remotely.
  • Persist.registry.dll - used to manage registry persistence with the ability to create, and delete registry values, along with hidden persistence keys.
  • Persist.extra.dll - used to load and persist the main framework.
  • Assist.dll - used to remotely retrieve files or commands, as well as manipulate system processes.
Figure 10: Plugins stored in IME registry.
Figure 11: Obfuscated script in plugin resources.

Persist.extra.dll is a module that is used to load a script “setup.log” to load and persist the main framework. Stored within the resources section of the binary is an obfuscated script that creates a .NET COM object that is added to the registry key HKCU\Software\Classes\TypeLib\ {9E175B61-F52A-11D8-B9A5-505054503030} \1.0\1\Win64 for persistence. After deobfuscating this script, another DLL is revealed named “WindowsBase.dll”.

Figure 12: Registry entry for script.

The binary checks in with icloud-cdn[.]net every five minutes, retrieves a version string, downloads an encrypted payload named checksum.bin, saves it locally as C:\ProgramData\USOShared\Logs\checksum.etl, decrypts it with AES using the hardcoded key POt_L[Bsh0=+@0a., and loads the decrypted assembly directly from memory via Assembly.Load(byte[]). The version.txt file acts as an update marker so it only re-downloads when the remote version changes, while the mutex prevents duplicate instances.

Figure 13: USOShared/Logs.

Checksum.etl is decrypted with AES and loaded into memory, loading another .NET DLL named “Client.dll”. This binary is the same as “dnscfg.dll” mentioned at the start and allows the threat actors to update the main framework based on the version.

Conclusion

Across cases, Darktrace consistently observed the following sequence:

  • Retrieval of legitimate executables
  • Retrieval of DLLs for sideloading
  • C2 registration via /GetCluster

This approach is consistent with broader China-nexus tradecraft. As outlined in Darktrace’s Crimson Echo report, the stable feature of this activity is behavioral. Infrastructure rotates and payloads can change, but the execution model persists. For defenders, the implication is straightforward: detection anchored to individual indicators will degrade quickly. Detection anchored to a behavioral sequence offer a far more durable approach.

Credit to Tara Gould (Malware Research Lead), Adam Potter (Senior Cyber Analyst), Emma Foulger (Global Threat Research Operations Lead), Nathaniel Jones (VP, Security & AI Strategy)

Edited by Ryan Traill (Content Manager)


Appendices

A detailed list of detection models and triggered indicators is provided alongside IoCs.

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

Test.zip - fc3959ebd35286a82c662dc81ca658cb

Dnscfg.dll - b2c8f1402d336963478f4c5bc36c961a

Client.TcpDmtp.dll - c52b4a16d93a44376f0407f1c06e0b

Browser_host.dll - c17f39d25def01d5c87615388925f45a

Client.DmtpFrame.dll - 482cc72e01dfa54f30efe4fefde5422d

Persist.Extra - 162F69FE29EB7DE12B684E979A446131

Persist.Registry - 067FBAD4D6905D6E13FDC19964C1EA52

Assist - 2CD781AB63A00CE5302ED844CFBECC27

Persist.WpTask - DF3437C88866C060B00468055E6FA146

Microsoft.VisualStudio.HostingProcess.Utilities.Sync.dll - c650a624455c5222906b60aac7e57d48

www.icloud-cdn[.]net

www.yahoo-cdn.it[.]com

154.223.58[.]142[AP8] [EF9]

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

T1106 – Native API

T1053.005 - Scheduled Task

T1546.16 - Component Object Model Hijacking

T1547.001 - Registry Run Keys

T1511.001 - Dynamic Link Library Injection

T1622 – Debugger Evasion

T1140 – Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

T1574.001 - Hijack Execution Flow: DLL

T1620 – Reflective Code Loading

T1082 – System Information Discovery

T1007 – System Service Discovery

T1030 – System Owner/User Discovery

T1071.001 - Web Protocols

T1027.007 - Dynamic API Resolution

T1095 – Non-Application Layer Protocol

Darktrace Model Alerts

·      Compromise / Beaconing Activity To External Rare

·      Compromise / HTTP Beaconing to Rare Destination

·      Anomalous File / Script from Rare External Location

·      Compromise / Sustained SSL or HTTP Increase

·      Compromise / Agent Beacon to New Endpoint

·      Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location

·      Anomalous File / Multiple EXE from Rare External Locations

·      Compromise / Quick and Regular Windows HTTP Beaconing

·      Compromise / High Volume of Connections with Beacon Score

·      Anomalous File / Anomalous Octet Stream (No User Agent)

·      Compromise / Repeating Connections Over 4 Days

·      Device / Large Number of Model Alerts

·      Anomalous Connection / Multiple Connections to New External TCP Port

·      Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Failed Connections

·      Anomalous Connection / Multiple Failed Connections to Rare Endpoint

·      Device / Increased External Connectivity

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About the author
Tara Gould
Malware Research Lead
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