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August 5, 2020

Guarding Against Threats Beyond IT

We explore insights from a vast customer database, exposing the widespread adoption of ICS protocols within IT settings.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
David Masson
VP, Field CISO
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05
Aug 2020

Key takeaways

  • Multiple well-known ICS attacks have been successful by gaining an initial foothold into the IT network, such as EKANS, Black Energy, and Havex
  • Stage One of the ICS Cyber Kill Chain is network reconnaissance, and so IT/OT network segregation is critical
  • Darktrace finds that many organizations’ networks have at least some level of IT/OT convergence
  • Visibility across ICS infrastructure, actions, and commands provides a better picture into potentially malicious internal activity

IT & OT Convergence Threats

Shipping, manufacturing, and other forms of heavy industry are seeing an ever-increasing convergence of IT and OT systems with the growth in Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT). At the same time, it remains critical to segment IT from OT networks, as the lack of segmentation could provide a malicious actor – either a hacker or rogue insider – easy access to pivot into the OT network.

High-profile attack campaigns such as Havex or Black Energy show traditional network security monitoring tools can be insufficient in preventing these intrusions. After the initial compromise, these ICS attacks progressed from IT to OT systems, showing that the convergence of IT and OT in cyber-physical ecosystems calls for technology that can understand how these two systems interact.

More recently, analysis of the EKANS ransomware revealed that attackers are attempting to use malware to actively disrupt OT as well as IT networks. The attack contained ICS processes on its ‘kill list,’ which allowed it to halt global manufacturing for large organizations like Honda.

More often than not, a lack of visibility is a major challenge in protecting critical ICS assets. Security specialists benefit when they have visibility over unusual or unexpected connections, or more crucially, when ICS commands are being sent by malicious actors attempting to perform industrial sabotage.

Investigation details

Darktrace analysts investigated the use of industrial protocols in the enterprise environments of various customers. The industries ranged from banking to government, retail to food manufacturing and beyond, and included companies with Industrial Control Systems that leverage Darktrace to defend their corporate networks.

In some cases, the security teams may not have been aware of IT/OT convergence within their enterprise environments. In other cases, the IT team may be aware of the ICS segments, but do not see them as a security priority because it does not fall directly within their remit.

The results revealed that hundreds of companies are using OT protocols in their enterprise environments, which suggests that IT/OT systems are not properly segmented. Specifically, Darktrace detected over 6,500 suspected instances of ICS protocol use across 1,000 environments. Note that this data was collected anonymously, only keeping track of the industry for analysis purposes.

Figure 1: A chart showing the percentage of ICS protocol use in enterprise environments

The ICS protocol which was detected the most was BacNet, seen in approximately 75% of instances. BacNet is used in Building Management Systems, so it is not surprising that it is widely used across multiple industries and within corporate networks. It is likely the security teams are aware that their BMS is part of the enterprise network, but may not appreciate how its use of the BacNet OT protocol increases the attack surface for the business and can be a blind spot for security teams.

Core ICS protocols

Darktrace also detected ‘core’ ICS protocols, Modbus and CIP (Common Industrial Protocol). These are normally associated with traditional ICS industries such as manufacturing, oil and gas, robotics, and utilities, and provides further evidence of IT/OT convergence.

This increased IT/OT convergence creates new blind spots on the network and sets up new pathways to disruption. This offers opportunities for attackers, and the public are now increasingly aware of attacks that have pivoted from IT into OT.

Improper segmentation between IT and OT systems can lead to highly unusual connections to ICS protocols. This can be seen in our recent analysis of industrial sabotage, with the timeline of the attack’s main events presented below.

Figure 2: A timeline showing the events of an incident of industrial sabotage

This is just one example of an attack that began in IT systems before affecting OT. More high-profile attacks that follow this pattern are presented below:

EKANS ransomware

The recent EKANS attack involved a strain of ransomware with close links to the MEGACORTEX variant, which gained infamy following an attack on Honda’s global operations in June 2020. Like many ransomware variants, EKANS encrypts files in IT systems and demands ransom in order to unlock the infected machines. However, the malware also has the ability to kill ICS processes on infected hosts. Notably, it is the first public example of ransomware that can target ICS operations.

Havex

Havex utilized multiple attack vectors, including spear phishing, trojans, and infected vendor websites, often known as a ‘watering hole attack’. It targeted IT systems, Internet-connected workstations, or a combination of the two. With Havex, attackers leveraged lateral movement techniques to pivot into Level 3 of ICS networks. The attack’s motive was data exfiltration to a C2 server, likely as part of a government-backed espionage campaign.

Black Energy 3

Black Energy 3 favored macro-embedded MS Office documents delivered via spear phishing emails as attack vectors. Older variants of Black Energy targeted vulnerabilities in ICS HMIs (Human Machine Interfaces) which were connected to the Internet. The attack’s motive was industrial sabotage and is what was used against the Ukrainian electric grid in 2015, leading to power outages for over 225,000 civilians and requiring a switch to manual operations as substations were taken offline.

Lessons learned

Each of the attack campaigns detailed above was in some way enabled by IT/OT convergence. Attackers still favor targeting IT networks with their initial attack vectors, as IT networks have significantly more interaction with the Internet through emails, and various other interconnected technologies. Poor network segmentation allows attackers easy access to OT systems once an IT network has been compromised.

In all of these ICS cyber-attacks, devices deviated from their normal patterns of life at one or more points in the cyber kill chain. Indicators of compromise can include anything from new external connections, to network reconnaissance using active scanning, to lateral movement using privileged credentials, ICS reprogram commands, or ICS discovery requests. With proper enterprise-wide visibility, across both IT and OT systems, and security tools that are able to detect these deviations, a security team would be alerted to these compromises before an attacker could carry out their objectives.

Ultimately, visibility is crucial for cyber defenders to protect industrial property and processes. Darktrace/OT enables many Industrial Model Detections, a selection of which are listed below:

  • Anomalous IT to ICS Connection
  • Multiple Failed Connections to OT Device
  • Multiple New Action Commands
  • Uncommon ICS Reprogram
  • Suspicious Network Scanning Activity
  • Unusual Broadcast from ICS PLC
  • Unusual Admin RDP Session

It is clear that attackers continue to exploit increasing IT/OT convergence to carry out industrial sabotage. Still, as revealed by our analysis of our customer base, many organizations continue to unknowingly use ICS protocols in their corporate environments, both increasing their attack surface and creating dangerous blind spots. A new, holistic approach to cyber defense is needed – one that can reveal this convergence of IT and OT, provide visibility, and detect deviations indicative of emerging cyber-attacks against critical systems.

Thanks to Darktrace analyst Oakley Cox for his insights on the above investigation.

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
David Masson
VP, Field CISO

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November 18, 2026

Darktrace qualifies for NATO’s Cybersecurity Dynamic Marketplace

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Darktrace has been selected to join NATO’s Cybersecurity Dynamic Marketplace (CSDM), an initiative designed to give NATO faster, more flexible access to cybersecurity technology and services in support of its missions.  

Established by the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA), the marketplace brings together qualified suppliers whose technical capabilities have been reviewed, helping NATO match specialist expertise to project needs and respond more quickly to changing operational priorities.

Qualified across all eight cybersecurity categories

The program’s first phase, known as Lot 1, covers eight cybersecurity categories. Suppliers can qualify in individual categories; Darktrace has qualified to compete for future work across all eight:

  • Identity, Credential and Access Management
  • Endpoint Protection and Platforms
  • Network and Perimeter Security
  • Cloud Security
  • Threat Detection and Analytics Platforms
  • Vulnerability and Exposure Management
  • Digital Forensics and Evidence Platforms
  • Professional Services

Darktrace’s qualification across all eight categories reflects the breadth of our technology and services.

Supporting government and defense organizations

Nation-state attacks, compromised suppliers, the rapid exploitation of security weaknesses and attackers’ growing use of AI are increasing pressure on public-sector organizations. At the same time, agencies are adopting cloud services, connecting the technology that runs physical operations, and introducing automation and AI. Security teams must manage these changes while keeping essential operations running and sensitive information secure.

Protecting these environments requires an understanding of how people, AI and connected systems interact, and the ability to recognize when their activity creates risk. Threats can span several systems, making it essential for security teams to connect related activity and respond quickly.

The Darktrace Behavioral Defense Platform™ supports this approach through unified visibility, continuous behavioral monitoring and autonomous response across AI, people and infrastructure.

At its core, Darktrace’s Adaptive AI™ continuously learns how each organization behaves, building a unique understanding of its people, AI agents and connected systems. This enables the platform to help identify activity that does not belong, connect related behavior across the organization, and investigate and respond to threats autonomously in real time, helping prevent disruption to essential operations.

Our selection builds on work to meet government security requirements internationally. Darktrace recently completed an independent assessment under Australia’s InfoSec Registered Assessors Program (IRAP) for Darktrace / NETWORK™ and Darktrace / OT™ against the Australian Government’s Information Security Manual PROTECTED-level controls. In the United States, Darktrace Federal continues to deliver the Darktrace technology to Department of War, Department of State, and Federal civilian organizations via its on-premises and FedRAMP CLASS D (High) Authorization platforms.

Together, these achievements demonstrate Darktrace’s ability to meet rigorous public-sector security requirements and reinforce its position as a trusted provider of mission-critical cybersecurity technology for government environments.

Meet us at NATO Edge 2026

Darktrace representatives will attend NATO Edge 2026, NCIA’s flagship technology event, in İzmir, Türkiye, from 17 to 19 November. We look forward to meeting government, military, and industry partners to discuss their cybersecurity priorities and how we can support them.

To learn more about the Darktrace Behavioral Defense Platform, visit the platform hub.

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November 17, 2026

GTA VI Cyber Threats: Fake downloads, ransomware and account hijacking

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Key findings

  • Darktrace detected GTA VI-themed suspicious activity across organizations in multiple sectors ahead of the game’s release, showing how malicious gaming content can reach corporate environments outside the gaming industry.
  • Twelve Darktrace customer environments connected to gta6demo[.]asia, a domain that public threat research has associated with a fake GTA VI demo used to distribute the Vidar infostealer. Seven of the twelve communicated with infrastructure associated with AS56322 ServerAstra Kft as part of this connectivity.
  • Darktrace investigated ransomware activity at two European games companies. One incident involved DireWolf ransomware alongside reported data exfiltration. A separate Qilin incident included Active Directory reconnaissance, new administrative credentials, possible lateral movement and substantial cloud-storage transfers before ransomware deployment.
  • Another incident on a gaming organization involved a SaaS account hijack in which a compromised account authenticated from unusual IP addresses, created a new privileged account and subsequently sent a high volume of suspected malicious email. An administrative account later authenticated from rare endpoints.‍
  • Darktrace's new report highlights how threat actors continue to weaponize launch hype to breach corporate networks and target gaming infrastructure following the guilty plea of hacker Arion Kurtaj. These findings demonstrate that global enterprises remain actively exposed to franchise-related social engineering and exploitation attempts.

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GTA VI gives criminals an audience

Grand Theft Auto VI arrives on November 19 with the kind of attention few entertainment releases command [1]. Before launch, that interest is already being exploited by sites offering supposed demos and downloads.

During September and October 2026, Darktrace detected devices across multiple customer environments connecting to GTA VI-themed sites associated with suspicious activity. The organizations involved were spread across EMEA and the Americas and included Manufacturing, Finance, and Public administration and defense sectors.

Darktrace has also investigated multiple incidents affecting gaming organizations including ransomware and a SaaS account hijack. Those investigations show a separate side of the threat: attackers operating inside corporate infrastructure and accounts, sometimes well before the eventual impact becomes apparent.

Following a fake GTA VI download

On October 7, 2026, Darktrace detected a device making suspicious DNS requests for gta6-play[.]ru, an unofficial Russian-language GTA VI site that had also been flagged as likely malicious in open-source intelligence (OSINT).

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Figure 1: A screenshot of the suspicious endpoint gta6-play[.]ru .

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Figure 2: A screenshot of a “Download Studio” endpoint led to on gta6-play[.]ru.

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The site advertised a GTA VI download. The site led to a separate “Download Studio” page offering a Windows executable. Analysis found the file was packaged using InstallMate, a commercial installation framework, with an embedded .tsuarch section containing a compressed tiz3 archive.


Further examination identified functionality designed to inspect the environment in which the installer was running. This included checking registry entries for installed software and disk devices, enumerating network adapters, inspecting MAC addresses, and searching for running processes and window titles.


The installer also searched for processes associated with virtualization, debugging, and network analysis, including VMware and VirtualBox components, alongside debugging and monitoring utilities such as OllyDbg, WinDbg, Process Hacker, Process Monitor, Wireshark and Fiddler.

The presence of those checks did not prove that the executable was malicious. The installer contained functionality capable of extracting embedded files, but the investigation did not establish that it was being used to deploy a malicious payload. No definitive malicious payload or command-and-control infrastructure was identified. The software appeared to be InstallRex, which is classified by several security vendors as a potentially unwanted program.

That is still a useful finding; A user looking for GTA VI content could move from an unofficial gaming site to an executable that inspected the local environment, including checking for software commonly used by security researchers.

A second GTA VI lure appeared across twelve organizations

During September 2026, Darktrace alerted on HTTP connections to gta6demo[.]asia across twelve customer environments. Seven of the twelve communicated with infrastructure associated with AS56322 ServerAstra Kft as part of this connectivity.

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Figure 3: An example model alert generated due to a suspicious connection to gta6demo[.]asia.

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In a case affecting a UK-based customer, Darktrace’s Real-Time AI Analyst further investigated connections to gta6demo[.]asia and generated an incident due to the highly suspicious nature of the behavior.

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Figure 4: A Real-Time AI Analyst incident highlighting the suspicious activity for further investigation

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Public threat research has associated gta6demo[.]asia with a campaign advertising a fake GTA VI demo. Users clicking "Play Now" were reportedly directed towards an executable containing the Vidar infostealer [2].

There is a practical difference between this activity and an attack against a games company. The users encountering GTA VI-themed infrastructure can work anywhere. Darktrace saw the activity across several sectors outside Gaming, including Finance, Manufacturing, and Public administration and defense.

A major game release can therefore create security exposure well beyond its publisher. A search for a demo or unofficial download on a corporate device is enough to bring gaming-themed infrastructure into an enterprise environment.

Ransomware operators inside the gaming industry

The attacks Darktrace observed against Gaming companies themselves show different patterns.

In August 2026, Darktrace threat research identified possible malicious activity at a European game developer. Ransomware was ultimately deployed and data was exfiltrated, with the DireWolf ransomware group claiming responsibility.

Darktrace observed suspicious file downloads and beaconing from several devices to rare endpoints alongside Monero cryptocurrency mining, Active Directory and network reconnaissance, unusual administrative RDP connections, activity associated with data staging and HTTP-based exfiltration.

Much of the intrusion was therefore visible before ransomware appeared; the environment was already showing evidence of ingress tooling, external command-and-control communications (C2), reconnaissance, unusual administrative access and data movement.

A separate investigation in December 2025 provides a closer view of this pre-ransomware activity. A European games company was targeted by Qilin ransomware with Darktrace observing scanning and LDAP searches involving userAccountControl, which can expose information useful for identifying accounts and Service Principal Names within Active Directory.

New administrative credentials then appeared on a Domain Controller and the Domain Controller also generated scanning, anomalous RPC, SMB, and SSH activity, and NetShareEnum activity through srvsvc. Elsewhere in the environment, long Remote Desktop sessions and SMB enumeration appeared consistent with lateral movement.

Several devices also transferred data to cloud storage services including WebDrive and Amazon Web Services (AWS). In some cases, large downloads preceded subsequent uploads. Darktrace observed the transfer pattern, although the available telemetry does not establish that every transfer represented attacker-controlled exfiltration.

The activity preceding the Qilin deployment included Active Directory reconnaissance, privileged credential use, network and share enumeration, unusual remote access and significant data movement. Each appeared before ransomware became the defining feature of the incident.

SaaS hijacking shifts the attacker evidence

A separate investigation in May 2026 involved the hijacking of a SaaS account at a Gaming organization.

The compromised account authenticated from several IP addresses that were unusual for the organization. It then performed suspicious SaaS group administration, including creating a new privileged account. The account subsequently sent a high volume of emails assessed as likely malicious spam and potentially intended to compromise additional users.

The following day, an administrative SaaS account authenticated from rare endpoints, raising the possibility that further privileged access had been obtained.

The activity presented a different detection problem from the ransomware cases. Authentication from rare infrastructure, administrative changes, creation of a privileged account and subsequent email activity provided the strongest indications that a legitimate identity had been compromised.

For a Gaming company using hosted platforms for development, communication and business operations, a compromised account with the right permissions can provide considerable access without requiring the attacker to reproduce a conventional network intrusion.

Detecting the intrusion before impact

The ransomware investigations show why encryption should not be the first point at which an incident comes into focus. Darktrace observed LDAP and Active Directory-related reconnaissance, new privileged credentials, unusual Domain Controller activity, remote sessions, network enumeration and abnormal data movement before ransomware deployment.

The SaaS case produced different evidence: authentication from rare infrastructure, unexpected administrative changes and activity performed through a compromised account. GTA VI-themed activity required another approach again, following users through unofficial sites and redirects and examining the software offered for download.

GTA VI has put gaming back into the headlines ahead of its November release. The security activity around it is already visible beyond the games industry, while ransomware and account-compromise investigations show attackers operating inside gaming companies through very different routes.

For defenders, those routes leave evidence before the incident reaches its most damaging stage. The practical work is in recognizing those changes early enough to investigate them.

Credit to Gemma Stubberfield (Cyber Analyst), Ahmed Gardezi (Senior Cyber Analyst), Tara Gould (Malware Research Lead), Nathaniel Jones (SVP, Global Threat Intelligence)

References:

1.        https://www.rockstargames.com/VI

2.     https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/threat-intel/2026/08/fake-gta-6-extended-look-and-demo-sites-deliver-an-infostealer

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About the author
Gemma Stubberfield
Cyber Analyst
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