Blog
/
OT
/
May 19, 2026

Data Center Security: Improving Visibility and Threat Detection Across IT, OT, and IoT

Modern data centers now operate as highly interconnected IT, OT, and IoT environments, creating new cybersecurity risks that traditional siloed security tools struggle to detect. This blog explores how IT/OT convergence expands the attack surface, why visibility gaps emerge, and how behavioral AI-driven security helps organizations detect and contain threats before operational disruption occurs.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Daniel Simonds
Director of Operational Technology
data center scurityDefault blog image
19
May 2026

What is data center cybersecurity?

Much of the conversation surrounding the data center boom has focused on power generation, cooling efficiency and water resources, construction, and compute capacity. In addition, cybersecurity has quietly become one of the most critical operational concerns as modern data centers are becoming some of the most operationally complex networked environments.

The more connected data center environments become, the larger and more dynamic their attack surface grows. What makes data center security particularly challenging is that they no longer resemble traditional enterprise IT environments alone. Instead, they operate like critical infrastructure facilities

Challenges of securing data centers

What makes these environments complicated is that the technologies responsible for keeping them operational: power distribution, cooling systems, airflow management, environmental controls, surveillance, and physical access management, all rely heavily on Operational Technology (OT), Industrial IoT (IIoT), and IoT systems alongside traditional IT infrastructure.

Programmable logic controllers (PLCs), building management systems (BMS), energy management systems (EMS), surveillance cameras, access control platforms, virtualization infrastructure, engineering workstations, contractor laptops, and cloud-connected orchestration systems now coexist within the same environment. Many are connected through routable networks, managed remotely, and accessed by 3rd party OEMs or System Integrators.

Why modern data center infrastructure faces increasing cyber risk

The challenge is not simply that there are more devices. It is that these IT, OT and IOT systems and devices are now deeply interconnected in ways that blur the boundaries between operational and enterprise infrastructure.

OT systems responsible for cooling and power distribution communicate alongside enterprise IT infrastructure. IoT devices used for physical security sit adjacent to cloud-connected management platforms. Third-party vendors and contractors frequently require remote access to maintain operations and optimize performance. AI-driven automation platforms increasingly orchestrate workflows across multiple environments simultaneously.

Every additional connection improves efficiency and scalability, but every additional connection also creates new relationships between systems that adversaries may exploit.

How IT, OT, and IoT convergence expands the data center attack surface

Historically in critical infrastructure environments enterprise IT, and OT or industrial control systems ICS, have been often separated by a DMZ.

That separation has steadily disappeared in pursuit of efficiency and access to valuable data that lives within the OT networks such as how many widgets were produced today. This conceptually is commonly referred to as “IT OT convergence.”

Modern data centers increasingly depend on interconnected systems operating across multiple domains simultaneously and face a similar reality when it comes to IT OT convergence.  

This convergence creates efficiency and visibility benefits, but it also introduces structural security challenges that traditional approaches struggle to address.

Many of the OT systems were never originally designed with modern cybersecurity requirements in mind. OT devices often prioritize uptime and operational continuity over security controls. IoT and OT devices may have limited security hardening, are inconsistently patched, or insecure default configurations. Third-party connectivity introduces external dependencies that organizations do not fully control.

As environments converge the attack surface changes and grows, attackers may exploit weaker systems positioned adjacent to critical operations for initial access. For example, a compromised IoT device may provide access into broader infrastructure, or an exposed remote management interface may enable lateral movement into OT systems.  

For defenders, rather than forcing segmentation where it’s not possible, focus oversight and monitoring across interconnected systems and how this activity might create operational risk, gaining visibility across these systems will ensure better awareness of and protection across the cracks in your systems attackers look to exploit.

Why traditional data center security tools create visibility gaps

Many organizations still secure IT, OT, and IoT environments through separate tools, teams, and workflows. Historically, this made sense. The environments themselves were more isolated, and the operational priorities were different.

But convergence changes the nature of detection and response.

Modern attacks increasingly move across domains as lateral movement and discovery techniques are pervasive amongst all the most well-known attacks to have disrupted OT. Adversaries may gain access through phishing or credential compromise, establish persistence in IT systems, pivot into operational infrastructure, exploit unmanaged IoT devices, and move laterally across cloud-connected environments.

Viewed independently, many of these signals may appear low priority or disconnected.

An anomalous login attempt, unusual device communication, changes in network traffic patterns, or abnormal behavior from an industrial controller may not appear significant on their own. The problem emerges when these activities are part of a broader attack chain unfolding across multiple systems simultaneously.

Siloed security models struggle to correlate this activity effectively because they lack shared operational context. Security teams may see isolated indicators while missing the relationships between them.

This creates a fundamental visibility problem that has discursive effects across security teams, leading to analyst overload, tedious alert investigations, and slower response times.

The issue is not simply detecting threats faster. It is understanding how activity across IT, OT, IoT, cloud, and remote access systems relate to one another in real time before operational disruption occurs.

Security measures to safeguard modern data center infrastructure

Rule-based systems, predefined indicators, and signature-driven approaches remain useful for identifying known threats, but they are less effective at identifying subtle behavioral deviations, novel attack paths, insider activity, 3rd party supply chain exploitation or attacks that move across operational domains.  

Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI approach is designed to operate across converged IT, OT, IoT, and cloud environments. Using multiple layers of AI models, Darktrace solutions come together to achieve behavioral prediction, real-time threat detection and response, and incident investigation, all while empowering your security team with visibility and control.

Because the models are environment-specific, they can adapt across highly diverse infrastructure including operational technology, physical security systems, enterprise IT, cloud workloads, and third-party connectivity.

This enables organizations to build a more unified understanding of activity across the data center.

Unified visibility across interconnected environments

Darktrace provides visibility across IT, OT, IoT, and cloud systems through a centralized platform. Security teams and data center operators can maintain live asset inventories, monitor data flows, identify vulnerable or end-of-life systems, and better understand how interconnected infrastructure communicates across the environment.

This becomes increasingly important in environments where unmanaged devices, transient contractor systems, and third-party connectivity continuously alter operational conditions.

Threat detection, investigation, and response

Darktrace applies multiple AI models to identify anomalous activity that may indicate known threats, novel attacks, insider activity, or cross-domain compromise.

By understanding how devices and systems normally behave within the environment, Darktrace can identify subtle deviations that may otherwise remain undetected in siloed environments.

Its autonomous response capabilities can also help contain threats during their early stages before they escalate into operational disruption. Meanwhile, Cyber AI Analyst provides explainable AI-driven investigations that help security teams understand the relationships between events, systems, and users involved in potential incidents.

Proactive risk identification

As data center environments continue to evolve, organizations increasingly need to understand not only active threats, but also where structural weaknesses may exist across interconnected systems.

Through capabilities such as attack path modeling and behavioral risk analysis, Darktrace helps organizations prioritize remediation efforts and identify areas where operational exposure may increase over time.

This supports a more proactive security posture in environments where operational continuity is critical.

Securing the future of interconnected infrastructure

As data centers continue to scale in size, complexity, and operational importance, their reliance on interconnected IT, OT, IoT, cloud, and AI-driven systems will only deepen.

The challenge organizations face is no longer simply protecting individual devices or isolated environments. It is understanding how risk emerges across interconnected systems operating together and detecting threats to these systems in real time.

This is ultimately what makes modern data center security different from traditional enterprise security models. The operational dependencies are broader, the environments are more heterogeneous, and the consequences of disruption and intent of adversaries are more like those in the critical infrastructure space.

Securing these environments therefore requires more than fragmented visibility across disconnected tools. Organizations increasingly need unified approaches capable of understanding relationships across systems, detecting threats early, and responding before operational disruption spreads across critical infrastructure.

As the infrastructure powering the digital economy continues to evolve, cybersecurity resilience will become increasingly inseparable from operational resilience itself.

‍

[related-resource]

Learn more about Darktrace / OT

Revolutionize your OT risk management, detection, and response with the most comprehensive solution purpose built for critical infrastructure.

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Daniel Simonds
Director of Operational Technology

More in this series

No items found.

Blog

/

AI

/

October 26, 2026

PHP Vulnerabilities, ARTEX and the Growing Role of AI in Cyber Attacks

Default blog imageDefault blog image

The disclosure of CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619 placed immediate pressure on organizations running PHP. Both vulnerabilities can allow unauthenticated remote code execution, including in products and appliances where PHP is embedded, and updates depend on third-party vendors [1].

Early guidance focused on patching internet-facing systems and monitoring for behavior associated with successful exploitation, including unexpected command execution, Webroot changes and outbound connections from PHP servers.

Darktrace observed widespread scanning across monitored environments involving hundreds of distinct source IP addresses that public reporting has associated with activity targeting the PHP vulnerabilities. The volume of scanning was significantly greater than the evidence available for successful exploitation. For analysts, that distinction is important. Scanning demonstrates interest in exposed infrastructure; establishing compromise requires evidence of subsequent behavior on the targeted system, including command execution, file modification or unexpected outbound communication.

PHP is not an isolated example. Imperva subsequently demonstrated remote code execution against a vulnerable Node.js build through malicious Brotli data, reproducing execution through compressed HTTP responses and configured request parsers. The same inputs were rejected by the patched runtime. Imperva linked its Node2Shell and PHP2Shell research to the increasing speed of vulnerability discovery and exploit development. [2]

While Darktrace has not observed direct evidence of CVE-2026-109618 or CVE-2026-109619 exploitation, on October 21st we observed a six-month high in detections consistent with zero-day exploitation activity, representing a 64% increase compared to historic data. This increase has not been confirmed as related to the PHP vulnerabilities. Darktrace’s behavioral approach is designed to detect anomalous activity without relying solely on rules written for a specific exploit. Comparable increases were observed around the Log4j disclosure and other globally significant vulnerability disclosures.

AI-assisted vulnerability research

The PHP disclosure arrives as AI systems have become more capable at vulnerability research [3]. OpenAI launched Daybreak in June 2026, combining GPT-5.5-Cyber, Codex Security and partnerships with security researchers and software maintainers. OpenAI says its models have been applied to discovering and generating patches for vulnerabilities in browsers, network infrastructure, FreeBSD and the Linux kernel. Darktrace joined the OpenAI Daybreak Cyber Partner Program in June to explore how OpenAI's cyber capabilities could be integrated within Darktrace products and services [4][10].

OpenAI reported in August that Codex Security Cloud had analyzed more than 30 million commits across more than 30,000 codebases. According to OpenAI, Cloudflare uses models accessed through Daybreak to investigate customer-authorized code and combines findings with live traffic and security signals to assess whether affected routes are active or receiving suspicious traffic, with proposed mitigations and patches remaining subject to customer review [5][6].

Faster discovery still leaves defenders with the work of locating affected software, testing fixes and completing remediation. The PHP case shows that gap clearly, particularly when vulnerable runtimes are embedded inside other products.

Enterprise agents as an attack surface

Darktrace Signal Labs has also examined how a trusted enterprise agent could be abused after an attacker has already obtained access to an environment. In a controlled simulation, researchers demonstrated that, in that post-compromise scenario, the Claude platform’s memory stores feature could be abused to establish a live C2 channel between an external operator and internal Claude Code agents. The external operator was able to dynamically assign network discovery, credential access, and data exfiltration tasks to the agents via this C2 channel. Detection of the agents’ activities relied on the correlation of process creation and network traffic activity from agent harness processes, alongside behavioral analysis to identify deviations from expected behavior. Darktrace has not claimed it observed this memory-store command-and-control technique in operational attacks [7].

AI-assisted attacks in Japan

Evidence from Japan indicates AI being used for vulnerability scanning and attacks outside controlled research. On 21 October, JPCERT/CC published findings from an investigation into recent unauthorized access incidents affecting organizations in Japan. JPCERT/CC states that it confirmed attackers had used AI to scan for known vulnerabilities and conduct attacks through APIs. According to JPCERT/CC, its examination of attack infrastructure found evidence of Android application analysis, API discovery and testing for weaknesses including server-side request forgery, and the infrastructure also targeted services intended for users outside Japan [8].

JPCERT/CC does not identify ARTEX by name in that publication. The named ARTEX attribution comes from separate investigations, including Microsoft's analysis of Storm-0940.

AI in offensive operations

Microsoft describes ARTEX as an open-source, multi-agent penetration-testing system capable of automating activity with limited human interaction. Microsoft reported that Storm-0940, which it assesses to be a China state-aligned actor active since 2021, used ARTEX against hundreds of organizations, and Microsoft attributed the ConnectWise supply-chain compromise [9].

Microsoft observed ARTEX accelerating scanning, reconnaissance, password spraying and OAuth application abuse. Several ARTEX-driven operations reached privileged cloud access less than three hours after initial targeting. Following the ConnectWise compromise, Storm-0940 attempted to authenticate to more than 2,250 tenants at rates of up to 2,900 attempts per minute [9].

Darktrace Threat Research found activity in its own telemetry involving infrastructure later associated with the campaign. On 13 October, Darktrace recorded failed authentication activity involving 144.172.64[.]128, one of the addresses Microsoft later identified as performing sign-ins and Microsoft Graph activity in ConnectWise customer environments. Darktrace analysis identified 65 failed authentication attempts in around 20 minutes.

Figure 1: Darktrace Advanced Search showing failed authentication events involving 144.172.64[.]128 on 13 October 2026, (customer-identifying information redacted).

The telemetry establishes repeated failed authentication from infrastructure later associated with the campaign. It does not establish ARTEX execution or successful compromise. At the time of observation, Microsoft's later attribution was unavailable. Analysts therefore had the behavior itself: repeated failed authentication from the same source over a short period, together with any related identity, application or network activity inside the environment.

Microsoft documented a wider password-spray campaign against 327 accounts across eight organizations between 10 and 14 October. It recorded more than 151,000 failed logons, including more than 111,000 on 11 October, but no successful authentication, token issuance, Graph call or directory change from that campaign. Microsoft also reported that most Storm-0940 targeting was unsuccessful [9].

Where the actor progressed beyond authentication, Microsoft observed service-principal sign-ins followed by Graph and directory operations. Activity included reconnaissance, application credential changes and attempts to modify privileges. Microsoft recommends correlating service-principal sign-ins with Graph activity, directory changes and resource access [9].

Behavior before attribution

The PHP and ARTEX cases begin with different information. PHP defenders knew which software required urgent remediation but initially had limited information about exploitation. Process execution, file modification and outbound communication could still provide evidence of compromise.

The PHP and ARTEX observations also illustrate the difference between volume and impact. Darktrace observed broad scanning around the PHP disclosure, while the ARTEX-associated infrastructure produced concentrated authentication activity. Neither observation independently demonstrates compromise and in each case examining the behavior that follows the initial interaction is the investigative clue.

The Darktrace ARTEX-related observation began with authentication behavior. Microsoft publicly attributed the source infrastructure eight days later. That attribution added context, but it did not change what had originally been recorded in the environment.

AI is now present at several points in this cycle. Daybreak applies models to vulnerability discovery and remediation. Darktrace Signal Labs demonstrated how a trusted enterprise agent could be co-opted in a controlled environment. JPCERT/CC confirmed AI-assisted vulnerability scanning and API attacks in recent incidents. Microsoft documented ARTEX being used by Storm-0940 in active operations [4][7][8][9].

Microsoft's findings also show why scale and impact must be assessed separately. One ARTEX-associated campaign produced more than 151,000 failed logons without successful access, while other operations reached privileged cloud access in less than three hours. Security teams have to distinguish high-volume attempts from activity that progresses through authentication, privilege changes and resource access.

The evidence required to assess these cases remains familiar: authentication records, process execution, application and directory changes, file activity and network communication. AI can increase the rate at which those behaviors occur. Defenders still need to establish their sequence and impact.

Credit to Emma Foulger, Sam Lister, Dylan Evans, Moishe Tajtelbaum

References

[1] NCSC-NL, php2shell vulnerabilities (CVE-2026-109618, CVE-2026-109619), 21 October 2026. https://github.com/NCSC-NL/php2shell

[2] Imperva, https://www.imperva.com/blog/node2shell-from-brotli-data-to-remote-code-execution/

[3] Cyber Security Agency of Singapore, https://www.csa.gov.sg/alerts-and-advisories/alerts/al-2026-151/

[4] OpenAI, Daybreak: Tools for securing every organization in the world, 22 June 2026. https://openai.com/index/daybreak-securing-the-world/

[5] OpenAI Developers, Scaling cyber defenders with Daybreak, 21 August 2026. https://developers.openai.com/blog/scaling-cyber-defenders-with-daybreak

[6] OpenAI, Cloudflare links vulnerability discovery to defense with OpenAI, 21 October 2026. https://openai.com/index/cloudflare-cyber/

[7] Darktrace Signal Labs, Shared Memories as a Covert C2 Channel, draft research supplied for review.

[8] JPCERT/CC, Recent AI-Assisted Cyber Attacks in Japan: Investigating Attack Infrastructure and Techniques, 21 October 2026. https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2026/10/web_api_attacks.html

[9] Microsoft Security Research and Microsoft Threat Intelligence, AI-driven, large-scale nation-state campaign using ARTEX enables supply chain compromise, 21 October 2026. https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/10/21/storm-0940-uses-artex-agentic-ai-connectwise-supply-chain-compromise/

[10] Darktrace, Advancing the Use of Frontier AI in Cybersecurity: Darktrace Joins the OpenAI Daybreak Cyber Partner Program to Explore Defensive AI Integrations, 22 June 2026. https://www.darktrace.com/blog/advancing-the-use-of-frontier-ai-in-cybersecurity-darktrace-joins-the-openai-daybreak-cyber-partner-program-to-explore-defensive-ai-integrations

Continue reading
About the author
Nathaniel Jones
SVP, Global Threat Intelligence

Blog

/

OT

/

October 23, 2026

Beyond the Fridge: Exposed Industrial Control Systems

Default blog imageDefault blog image

Introduction

In October 2026, hundreds of supermarkets across France were reportedly affected by a cyberattack targeting their refrigeration systems. According to public reports, the attackers gained access to internet-connected controllers and modified their settings, forcing refrigeration units into high and extremely low temperatures and causing significant disruption. Total losses have been reported to reach several million euros.

The incident drew attention to the security of industrial refrigeration systems, particularly older devices with exposed management interfaces and known vulnerabilities.

The exact details of how the attackers gained access have not been confirmed, however it is speculated that the public-facing web server could be accessed with the username “admin” and password being the current date. Researchers from Claroty’s Team82 identified a vulnerability in Danfoss AK-SM 8xxA Series in 2025, “CVE-2025-41450", allowing for administrative access using a time-based “code-of-the-day" for authentication [1].

Default credentials, outdated firmware and publicly accessible administrative interfaces have been an issue for years. And yet these systems continue to appear in internet scans and require little sophistication to gain admin access. A simple search of internet-connected devices shows a range of exposed devices from Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) and remote gateways, to, yes, more fridges.

Darktrace malware researchers identified hundreds of IoT and OT devices publicly exposed on the internet, many of which are configured with no authentication, weak credentials, or default credentials. As shown in Figure 1, an exposed Copeland XWEB web interface, used to manage Dixell equipment, including refrigerators, can provide the ability to remotely control connected devices.

‍

Figure 1: Copeland XWEB interface used to control systems including refrigerators and air conditioning.

However, it’s not only fridges; web management interfaces for industrial controls are also publicly accessible, often protected only by weak credentials. Figure 2 shows an example of a publicly exposed WAGO interface. The WAGO management interface is a configuration and administration panel for controllers. Through it, a logged-in user can view device details and diagnostics, manage user accounts and passwords, update firmware, back up or restore the full configuration, set the clock, and manage SD card storage. While it typically doesn’t manage switch outputs or read live process values, someone with access could still disrupt operation by changing network or Modbus settings, loading bad firmware or configurations, or by resetting passwords and enabling insecure services.

‍

Figure 2: WAGO Management interface.

‍

The issue extends beyond management interfaces. During our research, we identified publicly accessible web interfaces belonging to PLCs, including Rockwell Automation Allen-Bradley devices. In each case, the risk arises from how the devices have been deployed and configured, not from a flaw in the vendors’ products.

‍

Figure 3: Web interface for Allen-Bradley CompactLogix controller.

‍

Figure 3 shows the web interface of an Allen-Bradley CompactLogix controller. Unlike the previous examples, this interface provides a view into the controller's operation, including running tasks, network connections, memory usage and diagnostic information. Rockwell Automation's CompactLogix controllers are commonly used to automate industrial processes, from manufacturing and packaging lines to water treatment and material handling systems. Depending on their configuration, these controllers can operate motors, pumps, valves and other physical equipment.

Although in this example the interface shown does not provide direct control over the PLC's logic, it exposes information about the model, firmware, network layout, and connections, which is useful reconnaissance for a bigger attack.

The concern is not necessarily that every exposed interface allows an attacker to immediately manipulate industrial processes. However, these devices are accessible from the public internet in the first place, providing information about systems that may be responsible for controlling physical equipment.

The attacks on refrigeration systems in France highlight the consequences of poorly secured industrial devices. As demonstrated throughout this research, publicly accessible management interfaces are not limited to refrigeration controllers but extend to PLCs and other systems used to manage industrial equipment.

Finding these devices requires little effort. Internet scanners make it possible to identify publicly exposed interfaces quickly, and in some cases these interfaces rely on publicly documented default credentials or have no authentication at all. As attackers increasingly use AI tools, such attacks may be identified and carried out faster and at a greater scale.

The consequences of this access depend on the device and the functionality exposed. While some interfaces provide little more than diagnostic information, others allow users to modify configurations, disrupt communications, or change settings that affect physical equipment. In industrial environments, this can result in operational downtime, damaged equipment and financial losses.

Weak passwords, default credentials and exposed administrative interfaces are not new security issues. Yet their continued presence on internet-connected industrial systems demonstrates how easily preventable weaknesses can leave physical operations vulnerable to attack.

Exposed devices often come from third-party suppliers and contractors, who frequently install refrigeration controllers, gateways and PLCs without the organization ever being aware they are connected to the internet. Asset visibility remains an important foundation, but organizations should assume that some unknown assets and services will exist. Effective security therefore also depends on continuous monitoring, anomaly detection, network segmentation and rapid response, so that risky exposure and unusual activity can be identified and addressed before it becomes disruptive.

Darktrace helps security teams gain visibility across IT and OT and respond to risks: https://www.darktrace.com/products/operational-technology.

Copeland, Dixell, WAGO, Rockwell Automation, Allen-Bradley and CompactLogix are trademarks of their respective owners. Their use here is for identification only and does not imply any affiliation with or endorsement by those owners.

References

1.        https://claroty.com/team82/research/freeze-the-controller-defrost-the-food-uncovering-vulnerabilities-in-danfoss-refrigeration-controllers

‍

Continue reading
About the author
Tara Gould
Malware Research Lead
Your data. Our AI.
Elevate your network security with Darktrace AI