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November 13, 2024

Tactics Behind the Royal and Blacksuit Ransomware

Delve into the complexities of the Royal and Blacksuit ransomware strains and their implications for cybersecurity in today’s digital landscape.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Signe Zaharka
Principal Cyber Analyst
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13
Nov 2024

What is BlackSuit Ransomware?

Since late 2023, Darktrace has detected BlackSuit ransomware infiltrating multiple customer networks in the US. This ransomware has targeted a wide range of industries, including arts, entertainment, real estate, public administration, defense, and social security.

Emerging in May 2023, BlackSuit is believed to be a spinoff of Royal ransomware due to similarities in code and Conti, and most likely consists of Russian and Eastern European hackers [1]. Recorded Future reported that the ransomware had affected 95 organizations worldwide, though the actual number is likely much higher [2]. While BlackSuit does not appear to focus on any particular sector, it has targeted multiple organizations in the healthcare, education, IT, government, retail and manufacturing industries [3]. Employing double extortion tactics, BlackSuit not only encrypts files but also steals sensitive data to leverage ransom payments.

BlackSuit has demanded over USD 500 million in ransoms, with the highest individual demand reaching USD 60 million [4]. Notable targets include CDK Global, Japanese media conglomerate Kadokawa, multiple educational institutions, Octapharma Plasma, and the government of Brazil [5][6][7][8].

Darktrace’s Coverage of BlackSuit Ransomware Attack

Case 1, November 2023

The earliest attack on a Darktrace customer by BlackSuit was detected at the start of November 2023. The unusual network activity began on a weekend—a time commonly chosen by ransomware groups to increase their chances of success, as many security teams operate with reduced staff. Darktrace identified indicators of the attackers’ presence on the network for almost two weeks, during which a total of 15 devices exhibited suspicious behavior.

The attack commenced with unusual internal SMB (Server Message Block) connections using a compromised service account. An internal device uploaded an executable (zzza.exe) to a domain controller (DC) and shortly after, wrote a script (socks5.ps1) to another device. According to a Cybersecurity Advisory from the CISA (Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, US), the script file was a PowerShell reverse proxy [9].

Approximately an hour and a half later, the device to which the script was written exhibited uncommon WMI (Windows Management Instrumentation) activity. Two hours after receiving the executable file, the DC was observed making an outgoing NTLM request, using PowerShell to remotely execute commands, distributing differently named executable files (<PART OF THE CUSTOMER’S NAME>.exe), and controlling services on other devices.

Eighteen hours after the start of the unusual activity, Darktrace detected another device making repeated connections to “mystuff.bublup[.]com”, which the aforementioned CISA Advisory identifies as a domain used by BlackSuit for data exfiltration [9].

About ten minutes after the suspicious executables were distributed across the network, and less than 24 hours after the start of the unusual activity, file encryption began. A total of ten devices were seen appending the “.blacksuit” extension to files saved on other devices using SMB, as well as writing ransom notes (readme.blacksuit.txt). The file encryption lasted less than 20 minutes.

 An example of the contents of a BlackSuit ransom note being written over SMB.
Figure 1: An example of the contents of a BlackSuit ransom note being written over SMB.

During this compromise, external connections to endpoints related to ConnectWise’s ScreenConnect remote management tool were also seen from multiple servers, suggesting that the tool was likely being abused for command-and-control (C2) activity. Darktrace identified anomalous connectivity associated with ScreenConnect was seen up to 11 days after the start of the attack.

10 days after the start of the compromise, an account belonging to a manager was detected adding “.blacksuit” extensions to the customer’s Software-a-Service (SaaS) resources while connecting from 173.251.109[.]106. Six minutes after file encryption began, Darktrace flagged the unusual activity and recommended a block. However, since Autonomous Response mode was not enabled, the customer’s security team needed to manually confirm the action. Consequently, suspicious activity continued for about a week after the initial encryption. This included disabling authentication on the account and an unusual Teams session initiated from the suspicious external endpoint 216.151.180[.]147.

Case 2, February 2024

Another BlackSuit compromise occurred at the start of February 2024, when Darktrace identified approximately 50 devices exhibiting ransomware-related activity in another US customer’s environment. Further investigation revealed that a significant number of additional devices had also been compromised. These devices were outside Darktrace’s purview to the customer’s specific deployment configuration. The threat actors managed to exfiltrate around 4 TB of data.

Initial access to the network was gained via a virtual private network (VPN) compromise in January 2024, when suspicious connections from a Romanian IP address were detected. According to CISA, the BlackSuit group often utilizes the services of initial access brokers (IAB)—actors who specialize in infiltrating networks, such as through VPNs, and then selling that unauthorized access to other threat actors [9]. Other initial access vectors include phishing emails, RDP (Remote Desktop Protocol) compromise, and exploitation of vulnerable public-facing applications.

Similar to the first case, the file encryption began at the end of the working week. During this phase of the attack, affected devices were observed encrypting files on other internal devices using two compromised administrator accounts. The encryption activity lasted for approximately six and a half hours. Multiple alerts were sent to the customer from Darktrace’s Security Operations Centre (SOC) team, who began reviewing the activity within four minutes of the start of the file encryption.

Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst clustering together multiple events related to unusual activity on the network, including file encryption over SMB by BlackSuit.
Figure 2: Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst clustering together multiple events related to unusual activity on the network, including file encryption over SMB by BlackSuit.
Figure 3: A spike in model alerts on the day when file encryption by BlackSuit was observed in the network.

In this case, the threat actor utilized SystemBC proxy malware for command and control (C2). A domain controller (DC) was seen connecting to 137.220.61[.]94 on the same day the file encryption took place. The DC was also observed connecting to a ProxyScrape domain around the same time, which is related to the SOCKS5 protocol used by SystemBC. During this compromise, RDP, SSH, and SMB were used for lateral movement within the network.

Figure 4: A Cyber AI Analyst investigation alerting to a device on the VPN subnet making suspicious internal SSH connections due to malicious actors moving laterally within the network.

Signs of threat actors potentially being on the network were observed as early as two days prior to the file encryption. This included unusual internal network scanning via multiple protocols (ICMP, SMB, RDP, etc.), credential brute-forcing, SMB access failures, and anonymous SMBv1 sessions. These activities were traced to IP addresses belonging to two desktop devices in the VPN subnet associated with two regular employee user accounts. Threat actors were seemingly able to exploit at least one of these accounts due to LDAP legacy policies being in place on the customer’s environment.

A Cyber AI Analyst incident summary alerting to a device on the VPN subnet conducting internal reconnaissance.
Figure 5: A Cyber AI Analyst incident summary alerting to a device on the VPN subnet conducting internal reconnaissance.
Examples of the proposed Darktrace Autonomous Response actions on the day BlackSuit initiated file encryption.
Figure 6: Examples of the proposed Darktrace Autonomous Response actions on the day BlackSuit initiated file encryption.

Case 3, August 2024

The most recently observed BlackSuit compromise occurred in August 2024, when a device was observed attempting to brute-force the credentials of an IT administrator. This activity continued for 11 days.

Once the admin’s account was successfully compromised, network scanning, unusual WMI, and SAMR (Security Account Manager Remote protocol) activity followed. A spike in the use of this account was detected on a Sunday—once again, the attackers seemingly targeting the weekend—when the account was used by nearly 50 different devices.

The compromised admin’s account was exploited for data gathering via SMB, resulting in the movement of 200 GB of data between internal devices in preparation for exfiltration. The files were then archived using the naming convention “*.part<number>.rar”.

Around the same time, Darktrace observed data transfers from 19 internal devices to “bublup-media-production.s3.amazonaws[.]com,” totaling just over 200 GB—the same volume of data gathered internally. Connections to other Bublup domains were also detected. The internal data download and external data transfer activity took approximately 8-9 hours.

Unfortunately, Darktrace was not configured in Autonomous Response mode at the time of the attack, meaning any mitigative actions to stop the data gathering or exfiltration required human confirmation.  

One of the compromised devices was seen sending 80 GB of data to bublup-media-production.s3.amazonaws[.]com within a span of 4 hours.
Figure 7: One of the compromised devices was seen sending 80 GB of data to bublup-media-production.s3.amazonaws[.]com within a span of 4 hours.

Once the information was stolen, the threat actor moved on to the final stage of the attack—file encryption. Five internal devices, using either the compromised admin account or connecting via anonymous SMBv1 sessions, were seen encrypting files and writing ransom notes to five other devices on the network. The attempts at file encryption continued for around two hours, but Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability was able to block the activity and prevent the attack from escalating.

Conclusion

The persistent and evolving threat posed by ransomware like BlackSuit underscores the critical importance of robust cybersecurity measures across all sectors. Since its emergence in 2023, BlackSuit has demonstrated a sophisticated approach to infiltrating networks, leveraging double extortion tactics, and demanding substantial ransoms. The cases highlighted above illustrate the varied methods and persistence of BlackSuit attackers, from exploiting VPN vulnerabilities to abusing remote management tools and targeting off-hours to maximize impact.

Although many similar connection patterns, such as the abuse of Bublup services for data exfiltration or the use of SOCKS5 proxies for C2, were observed during cases investigated by Darktrace, BlackSuit actors are highly sophisticated and tailors their attacks to each target organization. The consequences of a successful attack can be highly disruptive, and remediation efforts can be time-consuming and costly. This includes taking the entire network offline while responding to the incident, restoring encrypted files from backups (if available), dealing with damage to the organization’s reputation, and potential lawsuits.

These BlackSuit ransomware incidents emphasize the need for continuous vigilance, timely updates to security protocols, and the adoption of autonomous response technologies to swiftly counteract such attacks. As ransomware tactics continue to evolve, organizations must remain agile and informed to protect their critical assets and data. By learning from these incidents and enhancing their cybersecurity frameworks, organizations can better defend against the relentless threat of ransomware and ensure the resilience of their operations in an increasingly digital world.

Credit to Signe Zaharka (Principal Cyber Analyst) and Adam Potter (Senior Cyber Analyst)

Insights from Darktrace’s First 6: Half-year threat report for 2024

First 6: half year threat report darktrace screenshot

Darktrace’s First 6: Half-Year Threat Report 2024 highlights the latest attack trends and key threats observed by the Darktrace Threat Research team in the first six months of 2024.

  • Focuses on anomaly detection and behavioral analysis to identify threats
  • Maps mitigated cases to known, publicly attributed threats for deeper context
  • Offers guidance on improving security posture to defend against persistent threats

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections

Anomalous Connection / Data Sent to Rare Domain

Anomalous Connection / High Volume of New or Uncommon Service Control

Anomalous Connection / New or Uncommon Service Control

Anomalous Connection / Rare WinRM Outgoing

Anomalous Connection / SMB Enumeration

Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Activity On High Risk Device

Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Read Write Ratio

Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Read Write Ratio and Unusual SMB

Anomalous Connection / Sustained MIME Type Conversion

Anomalous Connection / Uncommon 1 GiB Outbound

Anomalous Connection / Unusual Admin SMB Session

Anomalous File / Internal / Additional Extension Appended to SMB File

Anomalous File / Internal / Executable Uploaded to DC

Anomalous File / Internal / Unusual SMB Script Write

Anomalous Server Activity / Anomalous External Activity from Critical Network Device

Anomalous Server Activity / Outgoing from Server

Anomalous Server Activity / Rare External from Server

Anomalous Server Activity / Write to Network Accessible WebRoot

Compliance / Outgoing NTLM Request from DC

Compliance / Remote Management Tool On Server

Compliance / SMB Drive Write

Compromise / Beacon to Young Endpoint

Compromise / Beaconing Activity To External Rare

Compromise / Ransomware / Possible Ransom Note Read

Compromise / Ransomware / Possible Ransom Note Write

Compromise / Ransomware / SMB Reads then Writes with Additional Extensions

Compromise / Ransomware / Suspicious SMB Activity

Device / Anomalous RDP Followed By Multiple Model Breaches

Device / EXE Files Distributed to Multiple Devices

Device / Internet Facing Device with High Priority Alert

Device / Large Number of Model Breaches

Device / Large Number of Model Breaches from Critical Network Device

Device / Multiple Lateral Movement Model Breaches

Device / Network Scan

Device / New or Uncommon WMI Activity

Device / New or Unusual Remote Command Execution

Device / New User Agent To Internal Server

Device / SMB Lateral Movement

Device / SMB Session Brute Force (Admin)

Device / Suspicious SMB Scanning Activity

Device / Unusual LDAP Query For Domain Admins

SaaS / Access / Teams Activity from Rare Endpoint

SaaS / Resource / SaaS Resources With Additional Extensions

SaaS / Unusual Activity / Disabled Strong Authentication

SaaS / Unusual Activity / Multiple Unusual SaaS Activity Scores

SaaS / Unusual Activity / Unusual SaaS Activity Score

SaaS / Unusual Activity / Unusual Volume of SaaS Modifications

Unusual Activity / Anomalous SMB Delete Volume

Unusual Activity / Anomalous SMB Move & Write

Unusual Activity / High Volume Client Data Transfer

Unusual Activity / High Volume Server Data Transfer

Unusual Activity / Internal Data Transfer

Unusual Activity / SMB Access Failures

Unusual Activity / Sustained Anomalous SMB Activity

Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data to New Endpoint

User / New Admin Credentials on Client

User / New Admin Credentials on Server

User/ Kerberos Password Bruteforce

Autonomous Response Models

Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena File then New Outbound Block

Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Ransomware Block

Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious Activity Block

Antigena / Network / External Threat / SMB Ratio Antigena Block

Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena Internal Anomalous File Activity

Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena Internal Data Transfer Block

Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena Large Data Volume Outbound Block

Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena Network Scan Block

Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena Unusual Privileged User Activities Block

Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena Unusual Privileged User Activities Pattern of Life Block

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Breaches Over Time Block

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Controlled and Model Breach

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Enhanced Monitoring from Client Block

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Enhanced Monitoring from Server Block

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Significant Anomaly from Client Block

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Significant Server Anomaly Block

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Repeated Antigena Breaches

Antigena / SaaS / Antigena Unusual Activity Block

List of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

IoC - Type - Description + Confidence

.blacksuit - File extension – When encrypting the files, this extension is appended to the filename – High

readme.blacksuit.txt – ransom note - A file demanding cryptocurrency payment in exchange for decrypting the victim's files and not leaking the stolen data – High

mystuff.bublup[.]com, bublup-media-production.s3.amazonaws[.]com – data exfiltration domains related to an organization and project management app that has document sharing functionality – High

137.220.61[.]94:4001 – SystemBC C2 related IP address (this tool is often used by other ransomware groups as well) - Medium

173.251.109[.]106 – IP address seen during a SaaS BlackSuit compromise (during file encryption) – Medium

216.151.180[.]147 – IP address seen during a SaaS BlackSuit compromise (during an unusual Teams session) - Medium

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Tactic - Technqiue

Account Manipulation - PERSISTENCE - T1098

Alarm Suppression - INHIBIT RESPONSE FUNCTION - T0878

Application Layer Protocol - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1071

Automated Collection - COLLECTION - T1119

Block Command Message - INHIBIT RESPONSE FUNCTION - T0803

Block Reporting Message - INHIBIT RESPONSE FUNCTION - T0804

Browser Extensions - PERSISTENCE - T1176

Brute Force I/O - IMPAIR PROCESS CONTROL - T0806

Brute Force - CREDENTIAL ACCESS - T1110

Client Configurations - RECONNAISSANCE - T1592.004 - T1592

Cloud Accounts - DEFENSE EVASION, PERSISTENCE, PRIVILEGE ESCALATION, INITIAL ACCESS - T1078.004 - T1078

Data Destruction - IMPACT - T1485

Data Destruction - INHIBIT RESPONSE FUNCTION - T0809

Data Encrypted for Impact - IMPACT - T1486

Data from Cloud Storage Object - COLLECTION - T1530

Data Staged - COLLECTION - T1074

Domain Groups - DISCOVERY - T1069.002 - T1069

Email Collection - COLLECTION - T1114

Exfiltration Over C2 Channel - EXFILTRATION - T1041

Exfiltration to Cloud Storage - EXFILTRATION - T1567.002 - T1567

Exploit Public - Facing Application - INITIAL ACCESS - T1190

Exploitation for Privilege Escalation - PRIVILEGE ESCALATION - T0890

Exploitation of Remote Services - LATERAL MOVEMENT - T1210

File and Directory Discovery - DISCOVERY - T1083

File Deletion - DEFENSE EVASION - T1070.004 - T1070

IP Addresses - RECONNAISSANCE - T1590.005 - T1590

Lateral Tool Transfer - LATERAL MOVEMENT - T1570

LLMNR/NBT - NS Poisoning and SMB Relay - CREDENTIAL ACCESS, COLLECTION - T1557.001 - T1557

Modify Alarm Settings - INHIBIT RESPONSE FUNCTION - T0838

Modify Control Logic - IMPAIR PROCESS CONTROL, INHIBIT RESPONSE FUNCTION - T0833

Modify Parameter - IMPAIR PROCESS CONTROL - T0836

Network Service Scanning - DISCOVERY - T1046

Network Share Discovery - DISCOVERY - T1135

Pass the Hash - DEFENSE EVASION, LATERAL MOVEMENT - T1550.002 - T1550

RDP Hijacking - LATERAL MOVEMENT - T1563.002 - T1563

Remote Access Software - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1219

Remote Desktop Protocol - LATERAL MOVEMENT - T1021.001 - T1021

Remote System Discovery - DISCOVERY - T1018

Rename System Utilities - DEFENSE EVASION - T1036.003 - T1036

Scanning IP Blocks - RECONNAISSANCE - T1595.001 - T1595

Scheduled Transfer - EXFILTRATION - T1029

Service Execution - EXECUTION - T1569.002 - T1569

Service Stop - IMPACT - T1489

SMB/Windows Admin Shares - LATERAL MOVEMENT - T1021.002 - T1021

Stored Data Manipulation - IMPACT - T1565.001 - T1565

Taint Shared Content - LATERAL MOVEMENT - T1080

Valid Accounts - DEFENSE EVASION, PERSISTENCE, PRIVILEGE ESCALATION, INITIAL ACCESS - T1078

Vulnerability Scanning - RECONNAISSANCE - T1595.002 - T1595

Web Protocols - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1071.001 - T1071

Web Services - RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT - T1583.006 - T1583

Web Shell - PERSISTENCE - T1505.003 - T1505

Windows Management Instrumentation - EXECUTION - T1047

Windows Remote Management - LATERAL MOVEMENT - T1021.006 - T1021

References

1.     https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/23/e/investigating-blacksuit-ransomwares-similarities-to-royal.html

2.     https://www.reuters.com/technology/cybersecurity/blacksuit-hacker-behind-cdk-global-attack-hitting-us-car-dealers-2024-06-27/

3.     https://www.sentinelone.com/anthology/blacksuit/

4.     https://thehackernews.com/2024/08/fbi-and-cisa-warn-of-blacksuit.html

5.     https://www.techtarget.com/whatis/feature/The-CDK-Global-outage-Explaining-how-it-happened

6.     https://therecord.media/japanese-media-kadokawa-investigating-cyber

7.     https://therecord.media/plasma-donation-company-cyberattack-blacksuit

8.     https://thecyberexpress.com/government-of-brazil-cyberattack-by-blacksuit/

9.     https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-061a

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Signe Zaharka
Principal Cyber Analyst

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September 9, 2025

The benefits of bringing together network and email security

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In many organizations, network and email security operate in isolation. Each solution is tasked with defending its respective environment, even though both are facing the same advanced, multi-domain threats.  

This siloed approach overlooks a critical reality: email remains the most common vector for initiating cyber-attacks, while the network is the primary stage on which those attacks progress. Without direct integration between these two domains, organizations risk leaving blind spots that adversaries can exploit.  

A modern security strategy needs to unify email and network defenses, not just in name, but in how they share intelligence, conduct investigations, and coordinate response actions. Let’s take a look at how this joined-up approach delivers measurable technical, operational, and commercial benefits.

Technical advantages

Pre-alert intelligence: Gathering data before the threat strikes

Most security tools start working when something goes wrong – an unusual login, a flagged attachment, a confirmed compromise. But by then, attackers may already be a step ahead.

By unifying network and email security under a single AI platform (like the Darktrace Active AI Security Platform), you can analyze patterns across both environments in real time, even when there are no alerts. This ongoing monitoring builds a behavioral understanding of every user, device, and domain in your ecosystem.

That means when an email arrives from a suspicious domain, the system already knows whether that domain has appeared on your network before – and whether its behavior has been unusual. Likewise, when new network activity involves a domain first spotted in an email, it’s instantly placed in the right context.

This intelligence isn’t built on signatures or after-the-fact compromise indicators – it’s built on live behavioral baselines, giving your defenses the ability to flag threats before damage is done.

Alert-related intelligence: Connecting the dots in real time

Once an alert does fire, speed and context matter. The Darktrace Cyber AI Analyst can automatically investigate across both environments, piecing together network and email evidence into a single, cohesive incident.

Instead of leaving analysts to sift through fragmented logs, the AI links events like a phishing email to suspicious lateral movement on the recipient’s device, keeping the full attack chain intact. Investigations that might take hours – or even days – can be completed in minutes, with far fewer false positives to wade through.

This is more than a time-saver. It ensures defenders maintain visibility after the first sign of compromise, following the attacker as they pivot into network infrastructure, cloud services, or other targets. That cross-environment continuity is impossible to achieve with disconnected point solutions or siloed workflows.

Operational advantages

Streamlining SecOps across teams

In many organizations, email security is managed by IT, while network defense belongs to the SOC. The result? Critical information is scattered between tools and teams, creating blind spots just when you need clarity.

When email and network data flow into a single platform, everyone is working from the same source of truth. SOC analysts gain immediate visibility into email threats without opening another console or sending a request to another department. The IT team benefits from the SOC’s deeper investigative context.

The outcome is more than convenience: it’s faster, more informed decision-making across the board.

Reducing time-to-meaning and enabling faster response

A unified platform removes the need to manually correlate alerts between tools, reducing time-to-meaning for every incident. Built-in AI correlation instantly ties together related events, guiding analysts toward coordinated responses with higher confidence.

Instead of relying on manual SIEM rules or pre-built SOAR playbooks, the platform connects the dots in real time, and can even trigger autonomous response actions across both environments simultaneously. This ensures attacks are stopped before they can escalate, regardless of where they begin.

Commercial advantages

While purchasing “best-of-breed" for all your different tools might sound appealing, it often leads to a patchwork of solutions with overlapping costs and gaps in coverage. However good a “best-in-breed" email security solution might be in the email realm, it won't be truly effective without visibility across domains and an AI analyst piecing intelligence together. That’s why we think “best-in-suite" is the only “best-in-breed" approach that works – choosing a high-quality platform ensures that every new capability strengthens the whole system.  

On top of that, security budgets are under constant pressure. Managing separate vendors for email and network defense means juggling multiple contracts, negotiating different SLAs, and stitching together different support models.

With a single provider for both, procurement and vendor management become far simpler. You deal with one account team, one support channel, and one unified strategy for both environments. If you choose to layer on managed services, you get consistent expertise across your whole security footprint.

Even more importantly, an integrated AI platform sets the stage for growth. Once email and network are under the same roof, adding coverage for other attack surfaces – like cloud or identity – is straightforward. You’re building on the same architecture, not bolting on new point solutions that create more complexity.

Check out the white paper, The Modern Security Stack: Why Your NDR and Email Security Solutions Need to Work Together, to explore these benefits in more depth, with real-world examples and practical steps for unifying your defenses.

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About the author
Mikey Anderson
Product Marketing Manager, Network Detection & Response

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September 9, 2025

Unpacking the Salesloft Incident: Insights from Darktrace Observations

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Introduction

On August 26, 2025, Google Threat intelligence Group released a report detailing a widespread data theft campaign targeting the sales automation platform Salesloft, via compromised OAuth tokens used by the third-party Drift AI chat agent [1][2].  The attack has been attributed to the threat actor UNC6395 by Google Threat Intelligence and Mandiant [1].

The attack is believed to have begun in early August 2025 and continued through until mid-August 2025 [1], with the threat actor exporting significant volumes of data from multiple Salesforce instances [1]. Then sifting through this data for anything that could be used to compromise the victim’s environments such as access keys, tokens or passwords. This had led to Google Threat Intelligence Group assessing that the primary intent of the threat actor is credential harvesting, and later reporting that it was aware of in excess of 700 potentially impacted organizations [3].

Salesloft previously stated that, based on currently available data, customers that do not integrate with Salesforce are unaffected by this campaign [2]. However, on August 28, Google Threat Intelligence Group announced that “Based on new information identified by GTIG, the scope of this compromise is not exclusive to the Salesforce integration with Salesloft Drift and impacts other integrations” [2]. Google Threat Intelligence has since advised that any and all authentication tokens stored in or connected to the Drift platform be treated as potentially compromised [1].

This campaign demonstrates how attackers are increasingly exploiting trusted Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) integrations as a pathway into enterprise environment.

By abusing these integrations, threat actors were able to exfiltrate sensitive business data at scale, bypassing traditional security controls. Rather than relying on malware or obvious intrusion techniques, the adversaries leveraged legitimate credentials and API traffic that resembled legitimate Salesforce activity to achieve their goals. This type of activity is far harder to detect with conventional security tools, since it blends in with the daily noise of business operations.

The incident underscores the escalating significance of autonomous coverage within SaaS and third-party ecosystems. As businesses increasingly depend on interconnected platforms, visibility gaps become evident that cannot be managed by conventional perimeter and endpoint defenses.

By developing a behavioral comprehension of each organization's distinct use of cloud services, anomalies can be detected, such as logins from unexpected locations, unusually high volumes of API requests, or unusual document activity. These indications serve as an early alert system, even when intruders use legitimate tokens or accounts, enabling security teams to step in before extensive data exfiltration takes place

What happened?

The campaign is believed to have started on August 8, 2025, with malicious activity continuing until at least August 18. The threat actor, tracked as UNC6395, gained access via compromised OAuth tokens associated with Salesloft Drift integrations into Salesforce [1]. Once tokens were obtained, the attackers were able to issue large volumes of Salesforce API requests, exfiltrating sensitive customer and business data.

Initial Intrusion

The attackers first established access by abusing OAuth and refresh tokens from the Drift integration. These tokens gave them persistent access into Salesforce environments without requiring further authentication [1]. To expand their foothold, the threat actor also made use of TruffleHog [4], an open-source secrets scanner, to hunt for additional exposed credentials. Logs later revealed anomalous IAM updates, including unusual UpdateAccessKey activity, which suggested attempts to ensure long-term persistence and control within compromised accounts.

Internal Reconnaissance & Data Exfiltration

Once inside, the adversaries began exploring the Salesforce environments. They ran queries designed to pull sensitive data fields, focusing on objects such as Cases, Accounts, Users, and Opportunities [1]. At the same time, the attackers sifted through this information to identify secrets that could enable access to other systems, including AWS keys and Snowflake credentials [4]. This phase demonstrated the opportunistic nature of the campaign, with the actors looking for any data that could be repurposed for further compromise.

Lateral Movement

Salesloft and Mandiant investigations revealed that the threat actor also created at least one new user account in early September. Although follow-up activity linked to this account was limited, the creation itself suggested a persistence mechanism designed to survive remediation efforts. By maintaining a separate identity, the attackers ensured they could regain access even if their stolen OAuth tokens were revoked.

Accomplishing the mission

The data taken from Salesforce environments included valuable business records, which attackers used to harvest credentials and identify high-value targets. According to Mandiant, once the data was exfiltrated, the actors actively sifted through it to locate sensitive information that could be leveraged in future intrusions [1]. In response, Salesforce and Salesloft revoked OAuth tokens associated with Drift integrations on August 20 [1], a containment measure aimed at cutting off the attackers’ primary access channel and preventing further abuse.

How did the attack bypass the rest of the security stack?

The campaign effectively bypassed security measures by using legitimate credentials and OAuth tokens through the Salesloft Drift integration. This rendered traditional security defenses like endpoint protection and firewalls ineffective, as the activity appeared non-malicious [1]. The attackers blended into normal operations by using common user agents and making queries through the Salesforce API, which made their activity resemble legitimate integrations and scripts. This allowed them to operate undetected in the SaaS environment, exploiting the trust in third-party connections and highlighting the limitations of traditional detection controls.

Darktrace Coverage

Anomalous activities have been identified across multiple Darktrace deployments that appear associated with this campaign. This included two cases on customers based within the United States who had a Salesforce integration, where the pattern of activities was notably similar.

On August 17, Darktrace observed an account belonging to one of these customers logging in from the rare endpoint 208.68.36[.]90, while the user was seen active from another location. This IP is a known indicator of compromise (IoC) reported by open-source intelligence (OSINT) for the campaign [2].

Cyber AI Analyst Incident summarizing the suspicious login seen for the account.
Figure 1: Cyber AI Analyst Incident summarizing the suspicious login seen for the account.

The login event was associated with the application Drift, further connecting the events to this campaign.

Advanced Search logs showing the Application used to login.
Figure 2: Advanced Search logs showing the Application used to login.

Following the login, the actor initiated a high volume of Salesforce API requests using methods such as GET, POST, and DELETE. The GET requests targeted endpoints like /services/data/v57.0/query and /services/data/v57.0/sobjects/Case/describe, where the former is used to retrieve records based on a specific criterion, while the latter provides metadata for the Case object, including field names and data types [5,6].

Subsequently, a POST request to /services/data/v57.0/jobs/query was observed, likely to initiate a Bulk API query job for extracting large volumes of data from the Ingest Job endpoint [7,8].

Finally, a DELETE request to remove an ingestion job batch, possibly an attempt to obscure traces of prior data access or manipulation.

A case on another US-based customer took place a day later, on August 18. This again began with an account logging in from the rare IP 208.68.36[.]90 involving the application Drift. This was followed by Salesforce GET requests targeting the same endpoints as seen in the previous case, and then a POST to the Ingest Job endpoint and finally a DELETE request, all occurring within one minute of the initial suspicious login.

The chain of anomalous behaviors, including a suspicious login and delete request, resulted in Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability suggesting a ‘Disable user’ action. However, the customer’s deployment configuration required manual confirmation for the action to take effect.

An example model alert for the user, triggered due to an anomalous API DELETE request.
Figure 3: An example model alert for the user, triggered due to an anomalous API DELETE request.
Figure 4: Model Alert Event Log showing various model alerts for the account that ultimately led to an Autonomous Response model being triggered.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this incident underscores the escalating risks of SaaS supply chain attacks, where third-party integrations can become avenues for attacks. It demonstrates how adversaries can exploit legitimate OAuth tokens and API traffic to circumvent traditional defenses. This emphasizes the necessity for constant monitoring of SaaS and cloud activity, beyond just endpoints and networks, while also reinforcing the significance of applying least privilege access and routinely reviewing OAuth permissions in cloud environments. Furthermore, it provides a wider perspective into the evolution of the threat landscape, shifting towards credential and token abuse as opposed to malware-driven compromise.

Credit to Emma Foulger (Global Threat Research Operations Lead), Calum Hall (Technical Content Researcher), Signe Zaharka (Principal Cyber Analyst), Min Kim (Senior Cyber Analyst), Nahisha Nobregas (Senior Cyber Analyst), Priya Thapa (Cyber Analyst)

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections

·      SaaS / Access / Unusual External Source for SaaS Credential Use

·      SaaS / Compromise / Login From Rare Endpoint While User Is Active

·      SaaS / Compliance / Anomalous Salesforce API Event

·      SaaS / Unusual Activity / Multiple Unusual SaaS Activities

·      Antigena / SaaS / Antigena Unusual Activity Block

·      Antigena / SaaS / Antigena Suspicious Source Activity Block

Customers should consider integrating Salesforce with Darktrace where possible. These integrations allow better visibility and correlation to spot unusual behavior and possible threats.

IoC List

(IoC – Type)

·      208.68.36[.]90 – IP Address

References

1.     https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/data-theft-salesforce-instances-via-salesloft-drift

2.     https://trust.salesloft.com/?uid=Drift+Security+Update%3ASalesforce+Integrations+%283%3A30PM+ET%29

3.     https://thehackernews.com/2025/08/salesloft-oauth-breach-via-drift-ai.html

4.     https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/threat-brief-compromised-salesforce-instances/

5.     https://developer.salesforce.com/docs/atlas.en-us.api_rest.meta/api_rest/resources_query.htm

6.     https://developer.salesforce.com/docs/atlas.en-us.api_rest.meta/api_rest/resources_sobject_describe.htm

7.     https://developer.salesforce.com/docs/atlas.en-us.api_asynch.meta/api_asynch/get_job_info.htm

8.     https://developer.salesforce.com/docs/atlas.en-us.api_asynch.meta/api_asynch/query_create_job.htm

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About the author
Emma Foulger
Global Threat Research Operations Lead
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