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November 13, 2024

Tactics Behind the Royal and Blacksuit Ransomware

Delve into the complexities of the Royal and Blacksuit ransomware strains and their implications for cybersecurity in today’s digital landscape.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Signe Zaharka
Principal Cyber Analyst
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13
Nov 2024

What is BlackSuit Ransomware?

Since late 2023, Darktrace has detected BlackSuit ransomware infiltrating multiple customer networks in the US. This ransomware has targeted a wide range of industries, including arts, entertainment, real estate, public administration, defense, and social security.

Emerging in May 2023, BlackSuit is believed to be a spinoff of Royal ransomware due to similarities in code and Conti, and most likely consists of Russian and Eastern European hackers [1]. Recorded Future reported that the ransomware had affected 95 organizations worldwide, though the actual number is likely much higher [2]. While BlackSuit does not appear to focus on any particular sector, it has targeted multiple organizations in the healthcare, education, IT, government, retail and manufacturing industries [3]. Employing double extortion tactics, BlackSuit not only encrypts files but also steals sensitive data to leverage ransom payments.

BlackSuit has demanded over USD 500 million in ransoms, with the highest individual demand reaching USD 60 million [4]. Notable targets include CDK Global, Japanese media conglomerate Kadokawa, multiple educational institutions, Octapharma Plasma, and the government of Brazil [5][6][7][8].

Darktrace’s Coverage of BlackSuit Ransomware Attack

Case 1, November 2023

The earliest attack on a Darktrace customer by BlackSuit was detected at the start of November 2023. The unusual network activity began on a weekend—a time commonly chosen by ransomware groups to increase their chances of success, as many security teams operate with reduced staff. Darktrace identified indicators of the attackers’ presence on the network for almost two weeks, during which a total of 15 devices exhibited suspicious behavior.

The attack commenced with unusual internal SMB (Server Message Block) connections using a compromised service account. An internal device uploaded an executable (zzza.exe) to a domain controller (DC) and shortly after, wrote a script (socks5.ps1) to another device. According to a Cybersecurity Advisory from the CISA (Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, US), the script file was a PowerShell reverse proxy [9].

Approximately an hour and a half later, the device to which the script was written exhibited uncommon WMI (Windows Management Instrumentation) activity. Two hours after receiving the executable file, the DC was observed making an outgoing NTLM request, using PowerShell to remotely execute commands, distributing differently named executable files (<PART OF THE CUSTOMER’S NAME>.exe), and controlling services on other devices.

Eighteen hours after the start of the unusual activity, Darktrace detected another device making repeated connections to “mystuff.bublup[.]com”, which the aforementioned CISA Advisory identifies as a domain used by BlackSuit for data exfiltration [9].

About ten minutes after the suspicious executables were distributed across the network, and less than 24 hours after the start of the unusual activity, file encryption began. A total of ten devices were seen appending the “.blacksuit” extension to files saved on other devices using SMB, as well as writing ransom notes (readme.blacksuit.txt). The file encryption lasted less than 20 minutes.

 An example of the contents of a BlackSuit ransom note being written over SMB.
Figure 1: An example of the contents of a BlackSuit ransom note being written over SMB.

During this compromise, external connections to endpoints related to ConnectWise’s ScreenConnect remote management tool were also seen from multiple servers, suggesting that the tool was likely being abused for command-and-control (C2) activity. Darktrace identified anomalous connectivity associated with ScreenConnect was seen up to 11 days after the start of the attack.

10 days after the start of the compromise, an account belonging to a manager was detected adding “.blacksuit” extensions to the customer’s Software-a-Service (SaaS) resources while connecting from 173.251.109[.]106. Six minutes after file encryption began, Darktrace flagged the unusual activity and recommended a block. However, since Autonomous Response mode was not enabled, the customer’s security team needed to manually confirm the action. Consequently, suspicious activity continued for about a week after the initial encryption. This included disabling authentication on the account and an unusual Teams session initiated from the suspicious external endpoint 216.151.180[.]147.

Case 2, February 2024

Another BlackSuit compromise occurred at the start of February 2024, when Darktrace identified approximately 50 devices exhibiting ransomware-related activity in another US customer’s environment. Further investigation revealed that a significant number of additional devices had also been compromised. These devices were outside Darktrace’s purview to the customer’s specific deployment configuration. The threat actors managed to exfiltrate around 4 TB of data.

Initial access to the network was gained via a virtual private network (VPN) compromise in January 2024, when suspicious connections from a Romanian IP address were detected. According to CISA, the BlackSuit group often utilizes the services of initial access brokers (IAB)—actors who specialize in infiltrating networks, such as through VPNs, and then selling that unauthorized access to other threat actors [9]. Other initial access vectors include phishing emails, RDP (Remote Desktop Protocol) compromise, and exploitation of vulnerable public-facing applications.

Similar to the first case, the file encryption began at the end of the working week. During this phase of the attack, affected devices were observed encrypting files on other internal devices using two compromised administrator accounts. The encryption activity lasted for approximately six and a half hours. Multiple alerts were sent to the customer from Darktrace’s Security Operations Centre (SOC) team, who began reviewing the activity within four minutes of the start of the file encryption.

Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst clustering together multiple events related to unusual activity on the network, including file encryption over SMB by BlackSuit.
Figure 2: Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst clustering together multiple events related to unusual activity on the network, including file encryption over SMB by BlackSuit.
Figure 3: A spike in model alerts on the day when file encryption by BlackSuit was observed in the network.

In this case, the threat actor utilized SystemBC proxy malware for command and control (C2). A domain controller (DC) was seen connecting to 137.220.61[.]94 on the same day the file encryption took place. The DC was also observed connecting to a ProxyScrape domain around the same time, which is related to the SOCKS5 protocol used by SystemBC. During this compromise, RDP, SSH, and SMB were used for lateral movement within the network.

Figure 4: A Cyber AI Analyst investigation alerting to a device on the VPN subnet making suspicious internal SSH connections due to malicious actors moving laterally within the network.

Signs of threat actors potentially being on the network were observed as early as two days prior to the file encryption. This included unusual internal network scanning via multiple protocols (ICMP, SMB, RDP, etc.), credential brute-forcing, SMB access failures, and anonymous SMBv1 sessions. These activities were traced to IP addresses belonging to two desktop devices in the VPN subnet associated with two regular employee user accounts. Threat actors were seemingly able to exploit at least one of these accounts due to LDAP legacy policies being in place on the customer’s environment.

A Cyber AI Analyst incident summary alerting to a device on the VPN subnet conducting internal reconnaissance.
Figure 5: A Cyber AI Analyst incident summary alerting to a device on the VPN subnet conducting internal reconnaissance.
Examples of the proposed Darktrace Autonomous Response actions on the day BlackSuit initiated file encryption.
Figure 6: Examples of the proposed Darktrace Autonomous Response actions on the day BlackSuit initiated file encryption.

Case 3, August 2024

The most recently observed BlackSuit compromise occurred in August 2024, when a device was observed attempting to brute-force the credentials of an IT administrator. This activity continued for 11 days.

Once the admin’s account was successfully compromised, network scanning, unusual WMI, and SAMR (Security Account Manager Remote protocol) activity followed. A spike in the use of this account was detected on a Sunday—once again, the attackers seemingly targeting the weekend—when the account was used by nearly 50 different devices.

The compromised admin’s account was exploited for data gathering via SMB, resulting in the movement of 200 GB of data between internal devices in preparation for exfiltration. The files were then archived using the naming convention “*.part<number>.rar”.

Around the same time, Darktrace observed data transfers from 19 internal devices to “bublup-media-production.s3.amazonaws[.]com,” totaling just over 200 GB—the same volume of data gathered internally. Connections to other Bublup domains were also detected. The internal data download and external data transfer activity took approximately 8-9 hours.

Unfortunately, Darktrace was not configured in Autonomous Response mode at the time of the attack, meaning any mitigative actions to stop the data gathering or exfiltration required human confirmation.  

One of the compromised devices was seen sending 80 GB of data to bublup-media-production.s3.amazonaws[.]com within a span of 4 hours.
Figure 7: One of the compromised devices was seen sending 80 GB of data to bublup-media-production.s3.amazonaws[.]com within a span of 4 hours.

Once the information was stolen, the threat actor moved on to the final stage of the attack—file encryption. Five internal devices, using either the compromised admin account or connecting via anonymous SMBv1 sessions, were seen encrypting files and writing ransom notes to five other devices on the network. The attempts at file encryption continued for around two hours, but Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability was able to block the activity and prevent the attack from escalating.

Conclusion

The persistent and evolving threat posed by ransomware like BlackSuit underscores the critical importance of robust cybersecurity measures across all sectors. Since its emergence in 2023, BlackSuit has demonstrated a sophisticated approach to infiltrating networks, leveraging double extortion tactics, and demanding substantial ransoms. The cases highlighted above illustrate the varied methods and persistence of BlackSuit attackers, from exploiting VPN vulnerabilities to abusing remote management tools and targeting off-hours to maximize impact.

Although many similar connection patterns, such as the abuse of Bublup services for data exfiltration or the use of SOCKS5 proxies for C2, were observed during cases investigated by Darktrace, BlackSuit actors are highly sophisticated and tailors their attacks to each target organization. The consequences of a successful attack can be highly disruptive, and remediation efforts can be time-consuming and costly. This includes taking the entire network offline while responding to the incident, restoring encrypted files from backups (if available), dealing with damage to the organization’s reputation, and potential lawsuits.

These BlackSuit ransomware incidents emphasize the need for continuous vigilance, timely updates to security protocols, and the adoption of autonomous response technologies to swiftly counteract such attacks. As ransomware tactics continue to evolve, organizations must remain agile and informed to protect their critical assets and data. By learning from these incidents and enhancing their cybersecurity frameworks, organizations can better defend against the relentless threat of ransomware and ensure the resilience of their operations in an increasingly digital world.

Credit to Signe Zaharka (Principal Cyber Analyst) and Adam Potter (Senior Cyber Analyst)

Insights from Darktrace’s First 6: Half-year threat report for 2024

First 6: half year threat report darktrace screenshot

Darktrace’s First 6: Half-Year Threat Report 2024 highlights the latest attack trends and key threats observed by the Darktrace Threat Research team in the first six months of 2024.

  • Focuses on anomaly detection and behavioral analysis to identify threats
  • Maps mitigated cases to known, publicly attributed threats for deeper context
  • Offers guidance on improving security posture to defend against persistent threats

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections

Anomalous Connection / Data Sent to Rare Domain

Anomalous Connection / High Volume of New or Uncommon Service Control

Anomalous Connection / New or Uncommon Service Control

Anomalous Connection / Rare WinRM Outgoing

Anomalous Connection / SMB Enumeration

Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Activity On High Risk Device

Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Read Write Ratio

Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Read Write Ratio and Unusual SMB

Anomalous Connection / Sustained MIME Type Conversion

Anomalous Connection / Uncommon 1 GiB Outbound

Anomalous Connection / Unusual Admin SMB Session

Anomalous File / Internal / Additional Extension Appended to SMB File

Anomalous File / Internal / Executable Uploaded to DC

Anomalous File / Internal / Unusual SMB Script Write

Anomalous Server Activity / Anomalous External Activity from Critical Network Device

Anomalous Server Activity / Outgoing from Server

Anomalous Server Activity / Rare External from Server

Anomalous Server Activity / Write to Network Accessible WebRoot

Compliance / Outgoing NTLM Request from DC

Compliance / Remote Management Tool On Server

Compliance / SMB Drive Write

Compromise / Beacon to Young Endpoint

Compromise / Beaconing Activity To External Rare

Compromise / Ransomware / Possible Ransom Note Read

Compromise / Ransomware / Possible Ransom Note Write

Compromise / Ransomware / SMB Reads then Writes with Additional Extensions

Compromise / Ransomware / Suspicious SMB Activity

Device / Anomalous RDP Followed By Multiple Model Breaches

Device / EXE Files Distributed to Multiple Devices

Device / Internet Facing Device with High Priority Alert

Device / Large Number of Model Breaches

Device / Large Number of Model Breaches from Critical Network Device

Device / Multiple Lateral Movement Model Breaches

Device / Network Scan

Device / New or Uncommon WMI Activity

Device / New or Unusual Remote Command Execution

Device / New User Agent To Internal Server

Device / SMB Lateral Movement

Device / SMB Session Brute Force (Admin)

Device / Suspicious SMB Scanning Activity

Device / Unusual LDAP Query For Domain Admins

SaaS / Access / Teams Activity from Rare Endpoint

SaaS / Resource / SaaS Resources With Additional Extensions

SaaS / Unusual Activity / Disabled Strong Authentication

SaaS / Unusual Activity / Multiple Unusual SaaS Activity Scores

SaaS / Unusual Activity / Unusual SaaS Activity Score

SaaS / Unusual Activity / Unusual Volume of SaaS Modifications

Unusual Activity / Anomalous SMB Delete Volume

Unusual Activity / Anomalous SMB Move & Write

Unusual Activity / High Volume Client Data Transfer

Unusual Activity / High Volume Server Data Transfer

Unusual Activity / Internal Data Transfer

Unusual Activity / SMB Access Failures

Unusual Activity / Sustained Anomalous SMB Activity

Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data to New Endpoint

User / New Admin Credentials on Client

User / New Admin Credentials on Server

User/ Kerberos Password Bruteforce

Autonomous Response Models

Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena File then New Outbound Block

Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Ransomware Block

Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious Activity Block

Antigena / Network / External Threat / SMB Ratio Antigena Block

Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena Internal Anomalous File Activity

Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena Internal Data Transfer Block

Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena Large Data Volume Outbound Block

Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena Network Scan Block

Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena Unusual Privileged User Activities Block

Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena Unusual Privileged User Activities Pattern of Life Block

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Breaches Over Time Block

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Controlled and Model Breach

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Enhanced Monitoring from Client Block

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Enhanced Monitoring from Server Block

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Significant Anomaly from Client Block

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Significant Server Anomaly Block

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Repeated Antigena Breaches

Antigena / SaaS / Antigena Unusual Activity Block

List of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

IoC - Type - Description + Confidence

.blacksuit - File extension – When encrypting the files, this extension is appended to the filename – High

readme.blacksuit.txt – ransom note - A file demanding cryptocurrency payment in exchange for decrypting the victim's files and not leaking the stolen data – High

mystuff.bublup[.]com, bublup-media-production.s3.amazonaws[.]com – data exfiltration domains related to an organization and project management app that has document sharing functionality – High

137.220.61[.]94:4001 – SystemBC C2 related IP address (this tool is often used by other ransomware groups as well) - Medium

173.251.109[.]106 – IP address seen during a SaaS BlackSuit compromise (during file encryption) – Medium

216.151.180[.]147 – IP address seen during a SaaS BlackSuit compromise (during an unusual Teams session) - Medium

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Tactic - Technqiue

Account Manipulation - PERSISTENCE - T1098

Alarm Suppression - INHIBIT RESPONSE FUNCTION - T0878

Application Layer Protocol - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1071

Automated Collection - COLLECTION - T1119

Block Command Message - INHIBIT RESPONSE FUNCTION - T0803

Block Reporting Message - INHIBIT RESPONSE FUNCTION - T0804

Browser Extensions - PERSISTENCE - T1176

Brute Force I/O - IMPAIR PROCESS CONTROL - T0806

Brute Force - CREDENTIAL ACCESS - T1110

Client Configurations - RECONNAISSANCE - T1592.004 - T1592

Cloud Accounts - DEFENSE EVASION, PERSISTENCE, PRIVILEGE ESCALATION, INITIAL ACCESS - T1078.004 - T1078

Data Destruction - IMPACT - T1485

Data Destruction - INHIBIT RESPONSE FUNCTION - T0809

Data Encrypted for Impact - IMPACT - T1486

Data from Cloud Storage Object - COLLECTION - T1530

Data Staged - COLLECTION - T1074

Domain Groups - DISCOVERY - T1069.002 - T1069

Email Collection - COLLECTION - T1114

Exfiltration Over C2 Channel - EXFILTRATION - T1041

Exfiltration to Cloud Storage - EXFILTRATION - T1567.002 - T1567

Exploit Public - Facing Application - INITIAL ACCESS - T1190

Exploitation for Privilege Escalation - PRIVILEGE ESCALATION - T0890

Exploitation of Remote Services - LATERAL MOVEMENT - T1210

File and Directory Discovery - DISCOVERY - T1083

File Deletion - DEFENSE EVASION - T1070.004 - T1070

IP Addresses - RECONNAISSANCE - T1590.005 - T1590

Lateral Tool Transfer - LATERAL MOVEMENT - T1570

LLMNR/NBT - NS Poisoning and SMB Relay - CREDENTIAL ACCESS, COLLECTION - T1557.001 - T1557

Modify Alarm Settings - INHIBIT RESPONSE FUNCTION - T0838

Modify Control Logic - IMPAIR PROCESS CONTROL, INHIBIT RESPONSE FUNCTION - T0833

Modify Parameter - IMPAIR PROCESS CONTROL - T0836

Network Service Scanning - DISCOVERY - T1046

Network Share Discovery - DISCOVERY - T1135

Pass the Hash - DEFENSE EVASION, LATERAL MOVEMENT - T1550.002 - T1550

RDP Hijacking - LATERAL MOVEMENT - T1563.002 - T1563

Remote Access Software - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1219

Remote Desktop Protocol - LATERAL MOVEMENT - T1021.001 - T1021

Remote System Discovery - DISCOVERY - T1018

Rename System Utilities - DEFENSE EVASION - T1036.003 - T1036

Scanning IP Blocks - RECONNAISSANCE - T1595.001 - T1595

Scheduled Transfer - EXFILTRATION - T1029

Service Execution - EXECUTION - T1569.002 - T1569

Service Stop - IMPACT - T1489

SMB/Windows Admin Shares - LATERAL MOVEMENT - T1021.002 - T1021

Stored Data Manipulation - IMPACT - T1565.001 - T1565

Taint Shared Content - LATERAL MOVEMENT - T1080

Valid Accounts - DEFENSE EVASION, PERSISTENCE, PRIVILEGE ESCALATION, INITIAL ACCESS - T1078

Vulnerability Scanning - RECONNAISSANCE - T1595.002 - T1595

Web Protocols - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1071.001 - T1071

Web Services - RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT - T1583.006 - T1583

Web Shell - PERSISTENCE - T1505.003 - T1505

Windows Management Instrumentation - EXECUTION - T1047

Windows Remote Management - LATERAL MOVEMENT - T1021.006 - T1021

References

1.     https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/23/e/investigating-blacksuit-ransomwares-similarities-to-royal.html

2.     https://www.reuters.com/technology/cybersecurity/blacksuit-hacker-behind-cdk-global-attack-hitting-us-car-dealers-2024-06-27/

3.     https://www.sentinelone.com/anthology/blacksuit/

4.     https://thehackernews.com/2024/08/fbi-and-cisa-warn-of-blacksuit.html

5.     https://www.techtarget.com/whatis/feature/The-CDK-Global-outage-Explaining-how-it-happened

6.     https://therecord.media/japanese-media-kadokawa-investigating-cyber

7.     https://therecord.media/plasma-donation-company-cyberattack-blacksuit

8.     https://thecyberexpress.com/government-of-brazil-cyberattack-by-blacksuit/

9.     https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-061a

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Signe Zaharka
Principal Cyber Analyst

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October 14, 2025

Inside Akira’s SonicWall Campaign: Darktrace’s Detection and Response

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Introduction: Background on Akira SonicWall campaign

Between July and August 2025, security teams worldwide observed a surge in Akira ransomware incidents involving SonicWall SSL VPN devices [1]. Initially believed to be the result of an unknown zero-day vulnerability, SonicWall later released an advisory announcing that the activity was strongly linked to a previously disclosed vulnerability, CVE-2024-40766, first identified over a year earlier [2].

On August 20, 2025, Darktrace observed unusual activity on the network of a customer in the US. Darktrace detected a range of suspicious activity, including network scanning and reconnaissance, lateral movement, privilege escalation, and data exfiltration. One of the compromised devices was later identified as a SonicWall virtual private network (VPN) server, suggesting that the incident was part of the broader Akira ransomware campaign targeting SonicWall technology.

As the customer was subscribed to the Managed Detection and Response (MDR) service, Darktrace’s Security Operations Centre (SOC) team was able to rapidly triage critical alerts, restrict the activity of affected devices, and notify the customer of the threat. As a result, the impact of the attack was limited - approximately 2 GiB of data had been observed leaving the network, but any further escalation of malicious activity was stopped.

Threat Overview

CVE-2024-40766 and other misconfigurations

CVE-2024-40766 is an improper access control vulnerability in SonicWall’s SonicOS, affecting Gen 5, Gen 6, and Gen 7 devices running SonicOS version 7.0.1 5035 and earlier [3]. The vulnerability was disclosed on August 23, 2024, with a patch released the same day. Shortly after, it was reported to be exploited in the wild by Akira ransomware affiliates and others [4].

Almost a year later, the same vulnerability is being actively targeted again by the Akira ransomware group. In addition to exploiting unpatched devices affected by CVE-2024-40766, security researchers have identified three other risks potentially being leveraged by the group [5]:

*The Virtual Office Portal can be used to initially set up MFA/TOTP configurations for SSLVPN users.

Thus, even if SonicWall devices were patched, threat actors could still target them for initial access by reusing previously stolen credentials and exploiting other misconfigurations.

Akira Ransomware

Akira ransomware was first observed in the wild in March 2023 and has since become one of the most prolific ransomware strains across the threat landscape [6]. The group operates under a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) model and frequently uses double extortion tactics, pressuring victims to pay not only to decrypt files but also to prevent the public release of sensitive exfiltrated data.

The ransomware initially targeted Windows systems, but a Linux variant was later observed targeting VMware ESXi virtual machines [7]. In 2024, it was assessed that Akira would continue to target ESXi hypervisors, making attacks highly disruptive due to the central role of virtualisation in large-scale cloud deployments. Encrypting the ESXi file system enables rapid and widespread encryption with minimal lateral movement or credential theft. The lack of comprehensive security protections on many ESXi hypervisors also makes them an attractive target for ransomware operators [8].

Victimology

Akira is known to target organizations across multiple sectors, most notably those in manufacturing, education, and healthcare. These targets span multiple geographic regions, including North America, Latin America, Europe and Asia-Pacific [9].

Geographical distribution of organization’s affected by Akira ransomware in 2025 [9].
Figure 1: Geographical distribution of organization’s affected by Akira ransomware in 2025 [9].

Common Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) [7][10]

Initial Access
Targets remote access services such as RDP and VPN through vulnerability exploitation or stolen credentials.

Reconnaissance
Uses network scanning tools like SoftPerfect and Advanced IP Scanner to map the environment and identify targets.

Lateral Movement
Moves laterally using legitimate administrative tools, typically via RDP.

Persistence
Employs techniques such as Kerberoasting and pass-the-hash, and tools like Mimikatz to extract credentials. Known to create new domain accounts to maintain access.

Command and Control
Utilizes remote access tools including AnyDesk, RustDesk, Ngrok, and Cloudflare Tunnel.

Exfiltration
Uses tools such as FileZilla, WinRAR, WinSCP, and Rclone. Data is exfiltrated via protocols like FTP and SFTP, or through cloud storage services such as Mega.

Darktrace’s Coverage of Akira ransomware

Reconnaissance

Darktrace first detected of unusual network activity around 05:10 UTC, when a desktop device was observed performing a network scan and making an unusual number of DCE-RPC requests to the endpoint mapper (epmapper) service. Network scans are typically used to identify open ports, while querying the epmapper service can reveal exposed RPC services on the network.

Multiple other devices were also later seen with similar reconnaissance activity, and use of the Advanced IP Scanner tool, indicated by connections to the domain advanced-ip-scanner[.]com.

Lateral movement

Shortly after the initial reconnaissance, the same desktop device exhibited unusual use of administrative tools. Darktrace observed the user agent “Ruby WinRM Client” and the URI “/wsman” as the device initiated a rare outbound Windows Remote Management (WinRM) connection to two domain controllers (REDACTED-dc1 and REDACTED-dc2). WinRM is a Microsoft service that uses the WS-Management (WSMan) protocol to enable remote management and control of network devices.

Darktrace also observed the desktop device connecting to an ESXi device (REDACTED-esxi1) via RDP using an LDAP service credential, likely with administrative privileges.

Credential access

At around 06:26 UTC, the desktop device was seen fetching an Active Directory certificate from the domain controller (REDACTED-dc1) by making a DCE-RPC request to the ICertPassage service. Shortly after, the device made a Kerberos login using the administrative credential.

Figure 3: Darktrace’s detection of the of anomalous certificate download and subsequent Kerberos login.

Further investigation into the device’s event logs revealed a chain of connections that Darktrace’s researchers believe demonstrates a credential access technique known as “UnPAC the hash.”

This method begins with pre-authentication using Kerberos’ Public Key Cryptography for Initial Authentication (PKINIT), allowing the client to use an X.509 certificate to obtain a Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) from the Key Distribution Center (KDC) instead of a password.

The next stage involves User-to-User (U2U) authentication when requesting a Service Ticket (ST) from the KDC. Within Darktrace's visibility of this traffic, U2U was indicated by the client and service principal names within the ST request being identical. Because PKINIT was used earlier, the returned ST contains the NTLM hash of the credential, which can then be extracted and abused for lateral movement or privilege escalation [11].

Flowchart of Kerberos PKINIT pre-authentication and U2U authentication [12].
Figure 4: Flowchart of Kerberos PKINIT pre-authentication and U2U authentication [12]
Figure 5: Device event log showing the Kerberos Login and Kerberos Ticket events

Analysis of the desktop device’s event logs revealed a repeated sequence of suspicious activity across multiple credentials. Each sequence included a DCE-RPC ICertPassage request to download a certificate, followed by a Kerberos login event indicating PKINIT pre-authentication, and then a Kerberos ticket event consistent with User-to-User (U2U) authentication.

Darktrace identified this pattern as highly unusual. Cyber AI Analyst determined that the device used at least 15 different credentials for Kerberos logins over the course of the attack.

By compromising multiple credentials, the threat actor likely aimed to escalate privileges and facilitate further malicious activity, including lateral movement. One of the credentials obtained via the “UnPAC the hash” technique was later observed being used in an RDP session to the domain controller (REDACTED-dc2).

C2 / Additional tooling

At 06:44 UTC, the domain controller (REDACTED-dc2) was observed initiating a connection to temp[.]sh, a temporary cloud hosting service. Open-source intelligence (OSINT) reporting indicates that this service is commonly used by threat actors to host and distribute malicious payloads, including ransomware [13].

Shortly afterward, the ESXi device was observed downloading an executable named “vmwaretools” from the rare external endpoint 137.184.243[.]69, using the user agent “Wget.” The repeated outbound connections to this IP suggest potential command-and-control (C2) activity.

Cyber AI Analyst investigation into the suspicious file download and suspected C2 activity between the ESXI device and the external endpoint 137.184.243[.]69.
Figure 6: Cyber AI Analyst investigation into the suspicious file download and suspected C2 activity between the ESXI device and the external endpoint 137.184.243[.]69.
Packet capture (PCAP) of connections between the ESXi device and 137.184.243[.]69.
Figure 7: Packet capture (PCAP) of connections between the ESXi device and 137.184.243[.]69.

Data exfiltration

The first signs of data exfiltration were observed at around 7:00 UTC. Both the domain controller (REDACTED-dc2) and a likely SonicWall VPN device were seen uploading approximately 2 GB of data via SSH to the rare external endpoint 66.165.243[.]39 (AS29802 HVC-AS). OSINT sources have since identified this IP as an indicator of compromise (IoC) associated with the Akira ransomware group, known to use it for data exfiltration [14].

Cyber AI Analyst incident view highlighting multiple unusual events across several devices on August 20. Notably, it includes the “Unusual External Data Transfer” event, which corresponds to the anomalous 2 GB data upload to the known Akira-associated endpoint 66.165.243[.]39.
Figure 8: Cyber AI Analyst incident view highlighting multiple unusual events across several devices on August 20. Notably, it includes the “Unusual External Data Transfer” event, which corresponds to the anomalous 2 GB data upload to the known Akira-associated endpoint 66.165.243[.]39.

Cyber AI Analyst

Throughout the course of the attack, Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst autonomously investigated the anomalous activity as it unfolded and correlated related events into a single, cohesive incident. Rather than treating each alert as isolated, Cyber AI Analyst linked them together to reveal the broader narrative of compromise. This holistic view enabled the customer to understand the full scope of the attack, including all associated activities and affected assets that might otherwise have been dismissed as unrelated.

Overview of Cyber AI Analyst’s investigation, correlating all related internal and external security events across affected devices into a single pane of glass.
Figure 9: Overview of Cyber AI Analyst’s investigation, correlating all related internal and external security events across affected devices into a single pane of glass.

Containing the attack

In response to the multiple anomalous activities observed across the network, Darktrace's Autonomous Response initiated targeted mitigation actions to contain the attack. These included:

  • Blocking connections to known malicious or rare external endpoints, such as 137.184.243[.]69, 66.165.243[.]39, and advanced-ip-scanner[.]com.
  • Blocking internal traffic to sensitive ports, including 88 (Kerberos), 3389 (RDP), and 49339 (DCE-RPC), to disrupt lateral movement and credential abuse.
  • Enforcing a block on all outgoing connections from affected devices to contain potential data exfiltration and C2 activity.
Autonomous Response actions taken by Darktrace on an affected device, including the blocking of malicious external endpoints and internal service ports.
Figure 10: Autonomous Response actions taken by Darktrace on an affected device, including the blocking of malicious external endpoints and internal service ports.

Managed Detection and Response

As this customer was an MDR subscriber, multiple Enhanced Monitoring alerts—high-fidelity models designed to detect activity indicative of compromise—were triggered across the network. These alerts prompted immediate investigation by Darktrace’s SOC team.

Upon determining that the activity was likely linked to an Akira ransomware attack, Darktrace analysts swiftly acted to contain the threat. At around 08:05 UTC, devices suspected of being compromised were quarantined, and the customer was promptly notified, enabling them to begin their own remediation procedures without delay.

A wider campaign?

Darktrace’s SOC and Threat Research teams identified at least three additional incidents likely linked to the same campaign. All targeted organizations were based in the US, spanning various industries, and each have indications of using SonicWall VPN, indicating it had likely been targeted for initial access.

Across these incidents, similar patterns emerged. In each case, a suspicious executable named “vmwaretools” was downloaded from the endpoint 85.239.52[.]96 using the user agent “Wget”, bearing some resemblance to the file downloads seen in the incident described here. Data exfiltration was also observed via SSH to the endpoints 107.155.69[.]42 and 107.155.93[.]154, both of which belong to the same ASN also seen in the incident described in this blog: S29802 HVC-AS. Notably, 107.155.93[.]154 has been reported in OSINT as an indicator associated with Akira ransomware activity [15]. Further recent Akira ransomware cases have been observed involving SonicWall VPN, where no similar executable file downloads were observed, but SSH exfiltration to the same ASN was. These overlapping and non-overlapping TTPs may reflect the blurring lines between different affiliates operating under the same RaaS.

Lessons from the campaign

This campaign by Akira ransomware actors underscores the critical importance of maintaining up-to-date patching practices. Threat actors continue to exploit previously disclosed vulnerabilities, not just zero-days, highlighting the need for ongoing vigilance even after patches are released. It also demonstrates how misconfigurations and overlooked weaknesses can be leveraged for initial access or privilege escalation, even in otherwise well-maintained environments.

Darktrace’s observations further reveal that ransomware actors are increasingly relying on legitimate administrative tools, such as WinRM, to blend in with normal network activity and evade detection. In addition to previously documented Kerberos-based credential access techniques like Kerberoasting and pass-the-hash, this campaign featured the use of UnPAC the hash to extract NTLM hashes via PKINIT and U2U authentication for lateral movement or privilege escalation.

Credit to Emily Megan Lim (Senior Cyber Analyst), Vivek Rajan (Senior Cyber Analyst), Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead), and Sam Lister (Specialist Security Researcher)

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections

Anomalous Connection / Active Remote Desktop Tunnel

Anomalous Connection / Data Sent to Rare Domain

Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname

Anomalous Connection / Possible Data Staging and External Upload

Anomalous Connection / Rare WinRM Incoming

Anomalous Connection / Rare WinRM Outgoing

Anomalous Connection / Uncommon 1 GiB Outbound

Anomalous Connection / Unusual Admin RDP Session

Anomalous Connection / Unusual Incoming Long Remote Desktop Session

Anomalous Connection / Unusual Incoming Long SSH Session

Anomalous Connection / Unusual Long SSH Session

Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location

Anomalous Server Activity / Anomalous External Activity from Critical Network Device

Anomalous Server Activity / Outgoing from Server

Anomalous Server Activity / Rare External from Server

Compliance / Default Credential Usage

Compliance / High Priority Compliance Model Alert

Compliance / Outgoing NTLM Request from DC

Compliance / SSH to Rare External Destination

Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Successful Connections

Compromise / Sustained TCP Beaconing Activity To Rare Endpoint

Device / Anomalous Certificate Download Activity

Device / Anomalous SSH Followed By Multiple Model Alerts

Device / Anonymous NTLM Logins

Device / Attack and Recon Tools

Device / ICMP Address Scan

Device / Large Number of Model Alerts

Device / Network Range Scan

Device / Network Scan

Device / New User Agent To Internal Server

Device / Possible SMB/NTLM Brute Force

Device / Possible SMB/NTLM Reconnaissance

Device / RDP Scan

Device / Reverse DNS Sweep

Device / Suspicious SMB Scanning Activity

Device / UDP Enumeration

Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data to New Endpoint

Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data Transfer

User / Multiple Uncommon New Credentials on Device

User / New Admin Credentials on Client

User / New Admin Credentials on Server

Enhanced Monitoring Models

Compromise / Anomalous Certificate Download and Kerberos Login

Device / Initial Attack Chain Activity

Device / Large Number of Model Alerts from Critical Network Device

Device / Multiple Lateral Movement Model Alerts

Device / Suspicious Network Scan Activity

Unusual Activity / Enhanced Unusual External Data Transfer

Antigena/Autonomous Response Models

Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena File then New Outbound Block

Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious Activity Block

Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious File Block

Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena Large Data Volume Outbound Block

Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena Network Scan Block

Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena Unusual Privileged User Activities Block

Antigena / Network / Manual / Quarantine Device

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Alerts Over Time Block

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Controlled and Model Alert

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Enhanced Monitoring from Client Block

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Enhanced Monitoring from Server Block

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Significant Anomaly from Client Block

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Significant Server Anomaly Block

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Repeated Antigena Alerts

List of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

·      66.165.243[.]39 – IP Address – Data exfiltration endpoint

·      107.155.69[.]42 – IP Address – Probable data exfiltration endpoint

·      107.155.93[.]154 – IP Address – Likely Data exfiltration endpoint

·      137.184.126[.]86 – IP Address – Possible C2 endpoint

·      85.239.52[.]96 – IP Address – Likely C2 endpoint

·      hxxp://85.239.52[.]96:8000/vmwarecli  – URL – File download

·      hxxp://137.184.126[.]86:8080/vmwaretools – URL – File download

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Initial Access – T1190 – Exploit Public-Facing Application

Reconnaissance – T1590.002 – Gather Victim Network Information: DNS

Reconnaissance – T1590.005 – Gather Victim Network Information: IP Addresses

Reconnaissance – T1592.004 – Gather Victim Host Information: Client Configurations

Reconnaissance – T1595 – Active Scanning

Discovery – T1018 – Remote System Discovery

Discovery – T1046 – Network Service Discovery

Discovery – T1083 – File and Directory Discovery

Discovery – T1135 – Network Share Discovery

Lateral Movement – T1021.001 – Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol

Lateral Movement – T1021.004 – Remote Services: SSH

Lateral Movement – T1021.006 – Remote Services: Windows Remote Management

Lateral Movement – T1550.002 – Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Hash

Lateral Movement – T1550.003 – Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Ticket

Credential Access – T1110.001 – Brute Force: Password Guessing

Credential Access – T1649 – Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates

Persistence, Privilege Escalation – T1078 – Valid Accounts

Resource Development – T1588.001 – Obtain Capabilities: Malware

Command and Control – T1071.001 – Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols

Command and Control – T1105 – Ingress Tool Transfer

Command and Control – T1573 – Encrypted Channel

Collection – T1074 – Data Staged

Exfiltration – T1041 – Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

Exfiltration – T1048 – Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol

References

[1] https://thehackernews.com/2025/08/sonicwall-investigating-potential-ssl.html

[2] https://www.sonicwall.com/support/notices/gen-7-and-newer-sonicwall-firewalls-sslvpn-recent-threat-activity/250804095336430

[3] https://psirt.global.sonicwall.com/vuln-detail/SNWLID-2024-0015

[4] https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/arctic-wolf-observes-akira-ransomware-campaign-targeting-sonicwall-sslvpn-accounts/

[5] https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/dr-akira-ransomware-group-utilizing-sonicwall-devices-for-initial-access/

[6] https://www.ic3.gov/AnnualReport/Reports/2024_IC3Report.pdf

[7] https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa24-109a

[8] https://blog.talosintelligence.com/akira-ransomware-continues-to-evolve/

[9] https://www.ransomware.live/map?year=2025&q=akira

[10] https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1024/
[11] https://labs.lares.com/fear-kerberos-pt2/#UNPAC

[12] https://www.thehacker.recipes/ad/movement/kerberos/unpac-the-hash

[13] https://www.s-rminform.com/latest-thinking/derailing-akira-cyber-threat-intelligence)

[14] https://fieldeffect.com/blog/update-akira-ransomware-group-targets-sonicwall-vpn-appliances

[15] https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/arctic-wolf-observes-july-2025-uptick-in-akira-ransomware-activity-targeting-sonicwall-ssl-vpn/

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September 30, 2025

Out of Character: Detecting Vendor Compromise and Trusted Relationship Abuse with Darktrace

vendor email compromiseDefault blog imageDefault blog image

What is Vendor Email Compromise?

Vendor Email Compromise (VEC) refers to an attack where actors breach a third-party provider to exploit their access, relationships, or systems for malicious purposes. The initially compromised entities are often the target’s existing partners, though this can extend to any organization or individual the target is likely to trust.

It sits at the intersection of supply chain attacks and business email compromise (BEC), blending technical exploitation with trust-based deception. Attackers often infiltrate existing conversations, leveraging AI to mimic tone and avoid common spelling and grammar pitfalls. Malicious content is typically hosted on otherwise reputable file sharing platforms, meaning any shared links initially seem harmless.

While techniques to achieve initial access may have evolved, the goals remain familiar. Threat actors harvest credentials, launch subsequent phishing campaigns, attempt to redirect invoice payments for financial gain, and exfiltrate sensitive corporate data.

Why traditional defenses fall short

These subtle and sophisticated email attacks pose unique challenges for defenders. Few busy people would treat an ongoing conversation with a trusted contact with the same level of suspicion as an email from the CEO requesting ‘URGENT ASSISTANCE!’ Unfortunately, many traditional secure email gateways (SEGs) struggle with this too. Detecting an out-of-character email, when it does not obviously appear out of character, is a complex challenge. It’s hardly surprising, then, that 83% of organizations have experienced a security incident involving third-party vendors [1].  

This article explores how Darktrace detected four different vendor compromise campaigns for a single customer, within a two-week period in 2025.  Darktrace / EMAIL successfully identified the subtle indicators that these seemingly benign emails from trusted senders were, in fact, malicious. Due to the configuration of Darktrace / EMAIL in this customer’s environment, it was unable to take action against the malicious emails. However, if fully enabled to take Autonomous Response, it would have held all offending emails identified.

How does Darktrace detect vendor compromise?

The answer lies at the core of how Darktrace operates: anomaly detection. Rather than relying on known malicious rules or signatures, Darktrace learns what ‘normal’ looks like for an environment, then looks for anomalies across a wide range of metrics. Despite the resourcefulness of the threat actors involved in this case, Darktrace identified many anomalies across these campaigns.

Different campaigns, common traits

A wide variety of approaches was observed. Individuals, shared mailboxes and external contractors were all targeted. Two emails originated from compromised current vendors, while two came from unknown compromised organizations - one in an associated industry. The sender organizations were either familiar or, at the very least, professional in appearance, with no unusual alphanumeric strings or suspicious top-level domains (TLDs). Subject line, such as “New Approved Statement From [REDACTED]” and “[REDACTED] - Proposal Document” appeared unremarkable and were not designed to provoke heightened emotions like typical social engineering or BEC attempts.

All emails had been given a Microsoft Spam Confidence Level of 1, indicating Microsoft did not consider them to be spam or malicious [2]. They also passed authentication checks (including SPF, and in some cases DKIM and DMARC), meaning they appeared to originate from an authentic source for the sender domain and had not been tampered with in transit.  

All observed phishing emails contained a link hosted on a legitimate and commonly used file-sharing site. These sites were often convincingly themed, frequently featuring the name of a trusted vendor either on the page or within the URL, to appear authentic and avoid raising suspicion. However, these links served only as the initial step in a more complex, multi-stage phishing process.

A legitimate file sharing site used in phishing emails to host a secondary malicious link.
Figure 1: A legitimate file sharing site used in phishing emails to host a secondary malicious link.
Another example of a legitimate file sharing endpoint sent in a phishing email and used to host a malicious link.
Figure 2: Another example of a legitimate file sharing endpoint sent in a phishing email and used to host a malicious link.

If followed, the recipient would be redirected, sometimes via CAPTCHA, to fake Microsoft login pages designed to capturing credentials, namely http://pub-ac94c05b39aa4f75ad1df88d384932b8.r2[.]dev/offline[.]html and https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws[.]com/s3cure0line-0365cql0.19db86c3-b2b9-44cc-b339-36da233a3be2ml0qin/s3cccql0.19db86c3-b2b9-44cc-b339-36da233a3be2%26l0qn[.]html#.

The latter made use of homoglyphs to deceive the user, with a link referencing ‘s3cure0line’, rather than ‘secureonline’. Post-incident investigation using open-source intelligence (OSINT) confirmed that the domains were linked to malicious phishing endpoints [3] [4].

Fake Microsoft login page designed to harvest credentials.
Figure 3: Fake Microsoft login page designed to harvest credentials.
Phishing kit with likely AI-generated image, designed to harvest user credentials. The URL uses ‘s3cure0line’ instead of ‘secureonline’, a subtle misspelling intended to deceive users.
Figure 4: Phishing kit with likely AI-generated image, designed to harvest user credentials. The URL uses ‘s3cure0line’ instead of ‘secureonline’, a subtle misspelling intended to deceive users.

Darktrace Anomaly Detection

Some senders were unknown to the network, with no previous outbound or inbound emails. Some had sent the email to multiple undisclosed recipients using BCC, an unusual behavior for a new sender.  

Where the sender organization was an existing vendor, Darktrace recognized out-of-character behavior, in this case it was the first time a link to a particular file-sharing site had been shared. Often the links themselves exhibited anomalies, either being unusually prominent or hidden altogether - masked by text or a clickable image.

Crucially, Darktrace / EMAIL is able to identify malicious links at the time of processing the emails, without needing to visit the URLs or analyze the destination endpoints, meaning even the most convincing phishing pages cannot evade detection – meaning even the most convincing phishing emails cannot evade detection. This sets it apart from many competitors who rely on crawling the endpoints present in emails. This, among other things, risks disruption to user experience, such as unsubscribing them from emails, for instance.

Darktrace was also able to determine that the malicious emails originated from a compromised mailbox, using a series of behavioral and contextual metrics to make the identification. Upon analysis of the emails, Darktrace autonomously assigned several contextual tags to highlight their concerning elements, indicating that the messages contained phishing links, were likely sent from a compromised account, and originated from a known correspondent exhibiting out-of-character behavior.

A summary of the anomalous email, confirming that it contained a highly suspicious link.
Figure 5: Tags assigned to offending emails by Darktrace / EMAIL.

Figure 6: A summary of the anomalous email, confirming that it contained a highly suspicious link.

Out-of-character behavior caught in real-time

In another customer environment around the same time Darktrace / EMAIL detected multiple emails with carefully crafted, contextually appropriate subject lines sent from an established correspondent being sent to 30 different recipients. In many cases, the attacker hijacked existing threads and inserted their malicious emails into an ongoing conversation in an effort to blend in and avoid detection. As in the previous, the attacker leveraged a well-known service, this time ClickFunnels, to host a document containing another malicious link. Once again, they were assigned a Microsoft Spam Confidence Level of 1, indicating that they were not considered malicious.

The legitimate ClickFunnels page used to host a malicious phishing link.
Figure 7: The legitimate ClickFunnels page used to host a malicious phishing link.

This time, however, the customer had Darktrace / EMAIL fully enabled to take Autonomous Response against suspicious emails. As a result, when Darktrace detected the out-of-character behavior, specifically, the sharing of a link to a previously unused file-sharing domain, and identified the likely malicious intent of the message, it held the email, preventing it from reaching recipients’ inboxes and effectively shutting down the attack.

Figure 8: Darktrace / EMAIL’s detection of malicious emails inserted into an existing thread.*

*To preserve anonymity, all real customer names, email addresses, and other identifying details have been redacted and replaced with fictitious placeholders.

Legitimate messages in the conversation were assigned an Anomaly Score of 0, while the newly inserted malicious emails identified and were flagged with the maximum score of 100.

Key takeaways for defenders

Phishing remains big business, and as the landscape evolves, today’s campaigns often look very different from earlier versions. As with network-based attacks, threat actors are increasingly leveraging legitimate tools and exploiting trusted relationships to carry out their malicious goals, often staying under the radar of security teams and traditional email defenses.

As attackers continue to exploit trusted relationships between organizations and their third-party associates, security teams must remain vigilant to unexpected or suspicious email activity. Protecting the digital estate requires an email solution capable of identifying malicious characteristics, even when they originate from otherwise trusted senders.

Credit to Jennifer Beckett (Cyber Analyst), Patrick Anjos (Senior Cyber Analyst), Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead), Kiri Addison (Director of Product)

Appendices

IoC - Type - Description + Confidence  

- http://pub-ac94c05b39aa4f75ad1df88d384932b8.r2[.]dev/offline[.]html#p – fake Microsoft login page

- https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws[.]com/s3cure0line-0365cql0.19db86c3-b2b9-44cc-b339-36da233a3be2ml0qin/s3cccql0.19db86c3-b2b9-44cc-b339-36da233a3be2%26l0qn[.]html# - link to domain used in homoglyph attack

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping  

Tactic – Technique – Sub-Technique  

Initial Access - Phishing – (T1566)  

References

1.     https://gitnux.org/third-party-risk-statistics/

2.     https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/anti-spam-spam-confidence-level-scl-about

3.     https://www.virustotal.com/gui/url/5df9aae8f78445a590f674d7b64c69630c1473c294ce5337d73732c03ab7fca2/detection

4.     https://www.virustotal.com/gui/url/695d0d173d1bd4755eb79952704e3f2f2b87d1a08e2ec660b98a4cc65f6b2577/details

The content provided in this blog is published by Darktrace for general informational purposes only and reflects our understanding of cybersecurity topics, trends, incidents, and developments at the time of publication. While we strive to ensure accuracy and relevance, the information is provided “as is” without any representations or warranties, express or implied. Darktrace makes no guarantees regarding the completeness, accuracy, reliability, or timeliness of any information presented and expressly disclaims all warranties.

Nothing in this blog constitutes legal, technical, or professional advice, and readers should consult qualified professionals before acting on any information contained herein. Any references to third-party organizations, technologies, threat actors, or incidents are for informational purposes only and do not imply affiliation, endorsement, or recommendation.

Darktrace, its affiliates, employees, or agents shall not be held liable for any loss, damage, or harm arising from the use of or reliance on the information in this blog.

The cybersecurity landscape evolves rapidly, and blog content may become outdated or superseded. We reserve the right to update, modify, or remove any content

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