Offensive Security Tools
As organizations globally seek to for ways to bolster their digital defenses and safeguard their networks against ever-changing cyber threats, security teams are increasingly adopting offensive security tools to simulate cyber-attacks and assess the security posture of their networks. These legitimate tools, however, can sometimes be exploited by real threat actors and used as genuine actor vectors.
What is Sliver C2?
Sliver C2 is a legitimate open-source command-and-control (C2) framework that was released in 2020 by the security organization Bishop Fox. Silver C2 was originally intended for security teams and penetration testers to perform security tests on their digital environments [1] [2] [5]. In recent years, however, the Sliver C2 framework has become a popular alternative to Cobalt Strike and Metasploit for many attackers and Advanced Persistence Threat (APT) groups who adopt this C2 framework for unsolicited and ill-intentioned activities.
The use of Sliver C2 has been observed in conjunction with various strains of Rust-based malware, such as KrustyLoader, to provide backdoors enabling lines of communication between attackers and their malicious C2 severs [6]. It is unsurprising, then, that it has also been leveraged to exploit zero-day vulnerabilities, including critical vulnerabilities in the Ivanti Connect Secure and Policy Secure services.
In early 2024, Darktrace observed the malicious use of Sliver C2 during an investigation into post-exploitation activity on customer networks affected by the Ivanti vulnerabilities. Fortunately for affected customers, Darktrace DETECT™ was able to recognize the suspicious network-based connectivity that emerged alongside Sliver C2 usage and promptly brought it to the attention of customer security teams for remediation.
How does Silver C2 work?
Given its open-source nature, the Sliver C2 framework is extremely easy to access and download and is designed to support multiple operating systems (OS), including MacOS, Windows, and Linux [4].
Sliver C2 generates implants (aptly referred to as ‘slivers’) that operate on a client-server architecture [1]. An implant contains malicious code used to remotely control a targeted device [5]. Once a ‘sliver’ is deployed on a compromised device, a line of communication is established between the target device and the central C2 server. These connections can then be managed over Mutual TLS (mTLS), WireGuard, HTTP(S), or DNS [1] [4]. Sliver C2 has a wide-range of features, which include dynamic code generation, compile-time obfuscation, multiplayer-mode, staged and stageless payloads, procedurally generated C2 over HTTP(S) and DNS canary blue team detection [4].
Why Do Attackers Use Sliver C2?
Amidst the multitude of reasons why malicious actors opt for Sliver C2 over its counterparts, one stands out: its relative obscurity. This lack of widespread recognition means that security teams may overlook the threat, failing to actively search for it within their networks [3] [5].
Although the presence of Sliver C2 activity could be representative of authorized and expected penetration testing behavior, it could also be indicative of a threat actor attempting to communicate with its malicious infrastructure, so it is crucial for organizations and their security teams to identify such activity at the earliest possible stage.
Darktrace’s Coverage of Sliver C2 Activity
Darktrace’s anomaly-based approach to threat detection means that it does not explicitly attempt to attribute or distinguish between specific C2 infrastructures. Despite this, Darktrace was able to connect Sliver C2 usage to phases of an ongoing attack chain related to the exploitation of zero-day vulnerabilities in Ivanti Connect Secure VPN appliances in January 2024.
Around the time that the zero-day Ivanti vulnerabilities were disclosed, Darktrace detected an internal server on one customer network deviating from its expected pattern of activity. The device was observed making regular connections to endpoints associated with Pulse Secure Cloud Licensing, indicating it was an Ivanti server. It was observed connecting to a string of anomalous hostnames, including ‘cmjk3d071amc01fu9e10ae5rt9jaatj6b.oast[.]live’ and ‘cmjft14b13vpn5vf9i90xdu6akt5k3pnx.oast[.]pro’, via HTTP using the user agent ‘curl/7.19.7 (i686-redhat-linux-gnu) libcurl/7.63.0 OpenSSL/1.0.2n zlib/1.2.7’.
Darktrace further identified that the URI requested during these connections was ‘/’ and the top-level domains (TLDs) of the endpoints in question were known Out-of-band Application Security Testing (OAST) server provider domains, namely ‘oast[.]live’ and ‘oast[.]pro’. OAST is a testing method that is used to verify the security posture of an application by testing it for vulnerabilities from outside of the network [7]. This activity triggered the DETECT model ‘Compromise / Possible Tunnelling to Bin Services’, which breaches when a device is observed sending DNS requests for, or connecting to, ‘request bin’ services. Malicious actors often abuse such services to tunnel data via DNS or HTTP requests. In this specific incident, only two connections were observed, and the total volume of data transferred was relatively low (2,302 bytes transferred externally). It is likely that the connections to OAST servers represented malicious actors testing whether target devices were vulnerable to the Ivanti exploits.
The device proceeded to make several SSL connections to the IP address 103.13.28[.]40, using the destination port 53, which is typically reserved for DNS requests. Darktrace recognized that this activity was unusual as the offending device had never previously been observed using port 53 for SSL connections.
Further investigation into the suspicious IP address revealed that it had been flagged as malicious by multiple open-source intelligence (OSINT) vendors [8]. In addition, OSINT sources also identified that the JARM fingerprint of the service running on this IP and port (00000000000000000043d43d00043de2a97eabb398317329f027c66e4c1b01) was linked to the Sliver C2 framework and the mTLS protocol it is known to use [4] [5].
An Additional Example of Darktrace’s Detection of Sliver C2
However, it was not just during the January 2024 exploitation of Ivanti services that Darktrace observed cases of Sliver C2 usages across its customer base. In March 2023, for example, Darktrace detected devices on multiple customer accounts making beaconing connections to malicious endpoints linked to Sliver C2 infrastructure, including 18.234.7[.]23 [10] [11] [12] [13].
Darktrace identified that the observed connections to this endpoint contained the unusual URI ‘/NIS-[REDACTED]’ which contained 125 characters, including numbers, lower and upper case letters, and special characters like “_”, “/”, and “-“, as well as various other URIs which suggested attempted data exfiltration:
‘/upload/api.html?c=[REDACTED] &fp=[REDACTED]’
- ‘/samples.html?mx=[REDACTED] &s=[REDACTED]’
- ‘/actions/samples.html?l=[REDACTED] &tc=[REDACTED]’
- ‘/api.html?gf=[REDACTED] &x=[REDACTED]’
- ‘/samples.html?c=[REDACTED] &zo=[REDACTED]’
This anomalous external connectivity was carried out through multiple destination ports, including the key ports 443 and 8888.
Darktrace additionally observed devices on affected customer networks performing TLS beaconing to the IP address 44.202.135[.]229 with the JA3 hash 19e29534fd49dd27d09234e639c4057e. According to OSINT sources, this JA3 hash is associated with the Golang TLS cipher suites in which the Sliver framework is developed [14].
Conclusion
Despite its relative novelty in the threat landscape and its lesser-known status compared to other C2 frameworks, Darktrace has demonstrated its ability effectively detect malicious use of Sliver C2 across numerous customer environments. This included instances where attackers exploited vulnerabilities in the Ivanti Connect Secure and Policy Secure services.
While human security teams may lack awareness of this framework, and traditional rules and signatured-based security tools might not be fully equipped and updated to detect Sliver C2 activity, Darktrace’s Self Learning AI understands its customer networks, users, and devices. As such, Darktrace is adept at identifying subtle deviations in device behavior that could indicate network compromise, including connections to new or unusual external locations, regardless of whether attackers use established or novel C2 frameworks, providing organizations with a sliver of hope in an ever-evolving threat landscape.
Credit to Natalia Sánchez Rocafort, Cyber Security Analyst, Paul Jennings, Principal Analyst Consultant
Appendices
DETECT Model Coverage
- Compromise / Repeating Connections Over 4 Days
- Anomalous Connection / Application Protocol on Uncommon Port
- Anomalous Server Activity / Server Activity on New Non-Standard Port
- Compromise / Sustained TCP Beaconing Activity To Rare Endpoint
- Compromise / Quick and Regular Windows HTTP Beaconing
- Compromise / High Volume of Connections with Beacon Score
- Anomalous Connection / Multiple Failed Connections to Rare Endpoint
- Compromise / Slow Beaconing Activity To External Rare
- Compromise / HTTP Beaconing to Rare Destination
- Compromise / Sustained SSL or HTTP Increase
- Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Failed Connections
- Compromise / SSL or HTTP Beacon
- Compromise / Possible Malware HTTP Comms
- Compromise / Possible Tunnelling to Bin Services
- Anomalous Connection / Low and Slow Exfiltration to IP
- Device / New User Agent
- Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname
- Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location
- Anomalous File / Numeric File Download
- Anomalous Connection / Powershell to Rare External
- Anomalous Server Activity / New Internet Facing System
List of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)
18.234.7[.]23 - Destination IP - Likely C2 Server
103.13.28[.]40 - Destination IP - Likely C2 Server
44.202.135[.]229 - Destination IP - Likely C2 Server
References
[1] https://bishopfox.com/tools/sliver
[2] https://vk9-sec.com/how-to-set-up-use-c2-sliver/
[3] https://www.scmagazine.com/brief/sliver-c2-framework-gaining-traction-among-threat-actors
[4] https://github[.]com/BishopFox/sliver
[5] https://www.cybereason.com/blog/sliver-c2-leveraged-by-many-threat-actors
[6] https://securityaffairs.com/158393/malware/ivanti-connect-secure-vpn-deliver-krustyloader.html
[7] https://www.xenonstack.com/insights/out-of-band-application-security-testing
[8] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/103.13.28.40/detection
[9] https://threatfox.abuse.ch/browse.php?search=ioc%3A107.174.78.227
[10] https://threatfox.abuse.ch/ioc/1074576/
[11] https://threatfox.abuse.ch/ioc/1093887/
[12] https://threatfox.abuse.ch/ioc/846889/
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![The process line referencing weiss.neighb0rrol1[.]ru, as observed by Darktrace / ENDPOINT.](https://cdn.prod.website-files.com/626ff4d25aca2edf4325ff97/697c82e78da2d2ce709ae48c_unknown.png)
![Example of a fake CAPTCHA on the compromised site www.allstarsuae[.]com.](https://cdn.prod.website-files.com/626ff4d25aca2edf4325ff97/697c8366f0bb2cc1b6d45b83_unknown.png)
![JavaScript hosted on the compromised site www.allstaruae[.]com.](https://cdn.prod.website-files.com/626ff4d25aca2edf4325ff97/697c86643749feb018e9c675_161%208361%2C.png)
![Darktrace’s detection of the POST request to bsc-testnet.drpc[.]org.](https://cdn.prod.website-files.com/626ff4d25aca2edf4325ff97/697c86886decd09446e998af_unknown.png)
