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October 29, 2017

New Botnet Utilizes IoT Drawing Pads for Attacks

Discover how a new botnet is utilizing IoT drawing pads for reflection attacks. Stay informed on evolving cyber security threats with Darktrace experts.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Justin Fier
SVP, Red Team Operations
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29
Oct 2017

Earlier this year, Darktrace detected a new botnet engaged in a large-scale reflection and amplification attack targeting organizations around the world, including several governmental bodies. This attack is more pertinent than ever in light of potentially new, bigger, and more sophisticated IoT hacks, in the likes of the recently reported ‘Reaper Botnet’, we can increasingly expect to see in 2018.

This new type of botnet we detected earlier this year wasn’t using desktop computers to power its attacks – like Srizbi did when it was sending out 60 billion spam emails per day – and its methodology was distinct from Mirai – which uses DRVs and routers to generate DNS DDoS attacks with speeds of up to 1Tbps.

Instead, this new botnet was commandeering an unlikely assortment of devices made up of, among other things, IoT drawing pads. It contained far fewer devices than typical botnets, but through reflection and amplification techniques using SNMP, it was attempting to launch a powerful denial-of-service attack.

The threat began in a familiar fashion. An architectural firm introduced smart drawing into their network pads without alerting the IT team, and their internal security controls had no way of identifying the vulnerable devices. As such, the devices’ user credentials were never changed from the factory defaults.

Those credentials, along with their public string for SNMP authentication, were publicly available on Shodan, which also revealed that the devices had open ports for HTTP, HTTPS, Telnet, and SIP.

Darktrace detected the vulnerability when hundreds of external IP addresses from around the world made several thousand of SNMP connections to the devices over UDP port 161. Over 99 percent of these connections contained at least one “GetBulkRequest”, an SNMP operation used for the retrieval of large amounts of data.

In response to these requests, the devices issued an exponentially larger number of replies via “GetResponse”, some of which contained as many as 397,000 “GetResponse” objects. In 64 cases, the devices uploaded over 1MB of data.

A sample of this SNMP activity as observed by Darktrace’s AI algorithms:

Figure 1: Anomalous SNMP connections – the request and response are presented as two separate SNMP connections, but we can treat them as the same connection.

Normal network activity for these devices involved very occasional use of “GetBulkRequests” and “GetResponses.” Therefore, these spikes in activity were deemed highly anomalous by Darktrace’s AI algorithms, which had built a deep understanding of normal activity for the devices. By detecting the threat in real time, the security team discovered the threat while it was still in its early stages, and Darktrace’s network visibility provided detailed analytics on the incident.

Figure 2: The number of inbound connections on port 161 to one of the devices on port 161 is shown in orange. External data transfer from port 161 are shown in green. Time, top left, is x-axis value at right-hand origin.

The use of SNMP version 2c and “GetBulkRequests” were telltale signs of a reflection and amplification attack, which use scant resources to generate large attacks. All told, 273.2MiB left the devices on port 161.

The external data transfers on port 80 indicated that the attack went even further, as numerous external devices were attempting to access the devices’ HTTP resources, many of which were administrative PHP files.

A sample of resources that external devices attempted to access via HTTP:

/phpMyAdmin-2.11.1.0/scripts/setup.php
/a_remotecontrol.htm
/phpMyAdmin-3.1.2.0-all-languages/scripts/setup.php
/mysqladmin/scripts.setup.php

Figure 3: The total outbound data from port 161 over the reporting period

Finally, Shodan also revealed that the devices were running an accessible SIP server on port 5060. Packet analysis showed that external devices “dialed” the devices and attempted to place a VoIP – strange behavior on the attacker’s part that remains unexplained.

Figure 4: VoIP call attempts via open SIP protocol

The target IP addresses were likely spoofed. By sending hundreds of “GetBulkRequests” from the spoofed IPs of the target networks, the IoT drawing pads were forced to send back more than 100 times the number of “GetResponses.” This is testament to the power of reflection and amplification attacks. It’s unclear what other devices were used in this attack, but even a small number of IoT devices at the architectural firm were able to generate an alarming amount of traffic.

The target IPs belonged to websites owned by entertainment and design companies, and even governmental bodies. By reporting on the anomalous SNMP requests as soon as they began, the firm’s security team was able to take the drawing pads offline before damage was done.

Had the attack succeeded in sabotaging the target networks, the firm could have been subject to legal action. The company revamped their security policies and made strides to secure all the IoT devices on their network to minimize risk of future incidents.

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Justin Fier
SVP, Red Team Operations

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January 14, 2026

React2Shell Reflections: Cloud Insights, Finance Sector Impacts, and How Threat Actors Moved So Quickly

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Introduction

Last month’s disclosure of CVE 2025-55812, known as React2Shell, provided a reminder of how quickly modern threat actors can operationalize newly disclosed vulnerabilities, particularly in cloud-hosted environments.

The vulnerability was discovered on December 3, 2025, with a patch made available on the same day. Within 30 hours of the patch, a publicly available proof-of-concept emerged that could be used to exploit any vulnerable server. This short timeline meant many systems remained unpatched when attackers began actively exploiting the vulnerability.  

Darktrace researchers rapidly deployed a new honeypot to monitor exploitation of CVE 2025-55812 in the wild.

Within two minutes of deployment, Darktrace observed opportunistic attackers exploiting this unauthenticated remote code execution flaw in React Server Components, leveraging a single crafted request to gain control of exposed Next.js servers. Exploitation quickly progressed from reconnaissance to scripted payload delivery, HTTP beaconing, and cryptomining, underscoring how automation and pre‑positioned infrastructure by threat actors now compress the window between disclosure and active exploitation to mere hours.

For cloud‑native organizations, particularly those in the financial sector, where Darktrace observed the greatest impact, React2Shell highlights the growing disconnect between patch availability and attacker timelines, increasing the likelihood that even short delays in remediation can result in real‑world compromise.

Cloud insights

In contrast to traditional enterprise networks built around layered controls, cloud architectures are often intentionally internet-accessible by default. When vulnerabilities emerge in common application frameworks such as React and Next.js, attackers face minimal friction.  No phishing campaign, no credential theft, and no lateral movement are required; only an exposed service and exploitable condition.

The activity Darktrace observed during the React2shell intrusions reflects techniques that are familiar yet highly effective in cloud-based attacks. Attackers quickly pivot from an exposed internet-facing application to abusing the underlying cloud infrastructure, using automated exploitation to deploy secondary payloads at scale and ultimately act on their objectives, whether monetizing access through cryptomining or to burying themselves deeper in the environment for sustained persistence.

Cloud Case Study

In one incident, opportunistic attackers rapidly exploited an internet-facing Azure virtual machine (VM) running a Next.js application, abusing the React/next.js vulnerability to gain remote command execution within hours of the service becoming exposed. The compromise resulted in the staged deployment of a Go-based remote access trojan (RAT), followed by a series of cryptomining payloads such as XMrig.

Initial Access

Initial access appears to have originated from abused virtual private network (VPN) infrastructure, with the source IP (146.70.192[.]180) later identified as being associated with Surfshark

The IP address above is associated with VPN abuse leveraged for initial exploitation via Surfshark infrastructure.
Figure 1: The IP address above is associated with VPN abuse leveraged for initial exploitation via Surfshark infrastructure.

The use of commercial VPN exit nodes reflects a wider trend of opportunistic attackers leveraging low‑cost infrastructure to gain rapid, anonymous access.

Parent process telemetry later confirmed execution originated from the Next.js server, strongly indicating application-layer compromise rather than SSH brute force, misused credentials, or management-plane abuse.

Payload execution

Shortly after successful exploitation, Darktrace identified a suspicious file and subsequent execution. One of the first payloads retrieved was a binary masquerading as “vim”, a naming convention commonly used to evade casual inspection in Linux environments. This directly ties the payload execution to the compromised Next.js application process, reinforcing the hypothesis of exploit-driven access.

Command-and-Control (C2)

Network flow logs revealed outbound connections back to the same external IP involved in the inbound activity. From a defensive perspective, this pattern is significant as web servers typically receive inbound requests, and any persistent outbound callbacks — especially to the same IP — indicate likely post-exploitation control. In this case, a C2 detection model alert was raised approximately 90 minutes after the first indicators, reflecting the time required for sufficient behavioral evidence to confirm beaconing rather than benign application traffic.

Cryptominers deployment and re-exploitation

Following successful command execution within the compromised Next.js workload, the attackers rapidly transitioned to monetization by deploying cryptomining payloads. Microsoft Defender observed a shell command designed to fetch and execute a binary named “x” via either curl or wget, ensuring successful delivery regardless of which tooling was availability on the Azure VM.

The binary was written to /home/wasiluser/dashboard/x and subsequently executed, with open-source intelligence (OSINT) enrichment strongly suggesting it was a cryptominer consistent with XMRig‑style tooling. Later the same day, additional activity revealed the host downloading a static XMRig binary directly from GitHub and placing it in a hidden cache directory (/home/wasiluser/.cache/.sys/).

The use of trusted infrastructure and legitimate open‑source tooling indicates an opportunistic approach focused on reliability and speed. The repeated deployment of cryptominers strongly suggests re‑exploitation of the same vulnerable web application rather than reliance on traditional persistence mechanisms. This behavior is characteristic of cloud‑focused attacks, where publicly exposed workloads can be repeatedly compromised at scale more easily.

Financial sector spotlight

During the mass exploitation of React2Shell, Darktrace observed targeting by likely North Korean affiliated actors focused on financial organizations in the United Kingdom, Sweden, Spain, Portugal, Nigeria, Kenya, Qatar, and Chile.

The targeting of the financial sector is not unexpected, but the emergence of new Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) tooling, including a Beavertail variant and EtherRat, a previously undocumented Linux implant, highlights the need for updated rules and signatures for organizations that rely on them.

EtherRAT uses Ethereum smart contracts for C2 resolution, polling every 500 milliseconds and employing five persistence mechanisms. It downloads its own Node.js runtime from nodejs[.]org and queries nine Ethereum RPC endpoints in parallel, selecting the majority response to determine its C2 URL. EtherRAT also overlaps with the Contagious Interview campaign, which has targeted blockchain developers since early 2025.

Read more finance‑sector insights in Darktrace’s white paper, The State of Cyber Security in the Finance Sector.

Threat actor behavior and speed

Darktrace’s honeypot was exploited just two minutes after coming online, demonstrating how automated scanning, pre-positioned infrastructure and staging, and C2 infrastructure traced back to “bulletproof” hosting reflects a mature, well‑resourced operational chain.

For financial organizations, particularly those operating cloud‑native platforms, digital asset services, or internet‑facing APIs, this activity demonstrates how rapidly geopolitical threat actors can weaponize newly disclosed vulnerabilities, turning short patching delays into strategic opportunities for long‑term access and financial gain. This underscores the need for a behavioral-anomaly-led security posture.

Credit to Nathaniel Jones (VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO)

Edited by Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Appendices

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

146.70.192[.]180 – IP Address – Endpoint Associated with Surfshark

References

https://www.darktrace.com/resources/the-state-of-cybersecurity-in-the-finance-sector

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About the author
Nathaniel Jones
VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO

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January 13, 2026

Runtime Is Where Cloud Security Really Counts: The Importance of Detection, Forensics and Real-Time Architecture Awareness

runtime, cloud security, cnaapDefault blog imageDefault blog image

Introduction: Shifting focus from prevention to runtime

Cloud security has spent the last decade focused on prevention; tightening configurations, scanning for vulnerabilities, and enforcing best practices through Cloud Native Application Protection Platforms (CNAPP). These capabilities remain essential, but they are not where cloud attacks happen.

Attacks happen at runtime: the dynamic, ephemeral, constantly changing execution layer where applications run, permissions are granted, identities act, and workloads communicate. This is also the layer where defenders traditionally have the least visibility and the least time to respond.

Today’s threat landscape demands a fundamental shift. Reducing cloud risk now requires moving beyond static posture and CNAPP only approaches and embracing realtime behavioral detection across workloads and identities, paired with the ability to automatically preserve forensic evidence. Defenders need a continuous, real-time understanding of what “normal” looks like in their cloud environments, and AI capable of processing massive data streams to surface deviations that signal emerging attacker behavior.

Runtime: The layer where attacks happen

Runtime is the cloud in motion — containers starting and stopping, serverless functions being called, IAM roles being assumed, workloads auto scaling, and data flowing across hundreds of services. It’s also where attackers:

  • Weaponize stolen credentials
  • Escalate privileges
  • Pivot programmatically
  • Deploy malicious compute
  • Manipulate or exfiltrate data

The challenge is complex: runtime evidence is ephemeral. Containers vanish; critical process data disappears in seconds. By the time a human analyst begins investigating, the detail required to understand and respond to the alert, often is already gone. This volatility makes runtime the hardest layer to monitor, and the most important one to secure.

What Darktrace / CLOUD Brings to Runtime Defence

Darktrace / CLOUD is purpose-built for the cloud execution layer. It unifies the capabilities required to detect, contain, and understand attacks as they unfold, not hours or days later. Four elements define its value:

1. Behavioral, real-time detection

The platform learns normal activity across cloud services, identities, workloads, and data flows, then surfaces anomalies that signify real attacker behavior, even when no signature exists.

2. Automated forensic level artifact collection

The moment Darktrace detects a threat, it can automatically capture volatile forensic evidence; disk state, memory, logs, and process context, including from ephemeral resources. This preserves the truth of what happened before workloads terminate and evidence disappears.

3. AI-led investigation

Cyber AI Analyst assembles cloud behaviors into a coherent incident story, correlating identity activity, network flows, and Cloud workload behavior. Analysts no longer need to pivot across dashboards or reconstruct timelines manually.

4. Live architectural awareness

Darktrace continuously maps your cloud environment as it operates; including services, identities, connectivity, and data pathways. This real-time visibility makes anomalies clearer and investigations dramatically faster.

Together, these capabilities form a runtime-first security model.

Why CNAPP alone isn’t enough

CNAPP platforms excel at pre deployment checks all the way down to developer workstations, identifying misconfigurations, concerning permission combinations, vulnerable images, and risky infrastructure choices. But CNAPP’s breadth is also its limitation. CNAPP is about posture. Runtime defense is about behavior.

CNAPP tells you what could go wrong; runtime detection highlights what is going wrong right now.

It cannot preserve ephemeral evidence, correlate active behaviors across domains, or contain unfolding attacks with the precision and speed required during a real incident. Prevention remains essential, but prevention alone cannot stop an attacker who is already operating inside your cloud environment.

Real-world AWS Scenario: Why Runtime Monitoring Wins

A recent incident detected by Darktrace / CLOUD highlights how cloud compromises unfold, and why runtime visibility is non-negotiable. Each step below reflects detections that occur only when monitoring behavior in real time.

1. External Credential Use

Detection: Unusual external source for credential use: An attacker logs into a cloud account from a never-before-seen location, the earliest sign of account takeover.

2. AWS CLI Pivot

Detection: Unusual CLI activity: The attacker switches to programmatic access, issuing commands from a suspicious host to gain automation and stealth.

3. Credential Manipulation

Detection: Rare password reset: They reset or assign new passwords to establish persistence and bypass existing security controls.

4. Cloud Reconnaissance

Detection: Burst of resource discovery: The attacker enumerates buckets, roles, and services to map high value assets and plan next steps.

5. Privilege Escalation

Detection: Anomalous IAM update: Unauthorized policy updates or role changes grant the attacker elevated access or a backdoor.

6. Malicious Compute Deployment

Detection: Unusual EC2/Lambda/ECS creation: The attacker deploys compute resources for mining, lateral movement, or staging further tools.

7. Data Access or Tampering

Detection: Unusual S3 modifications: They alter S3 permissions or objects, often a prelude to data exfiltration or corruption.

Only some of these actions would appear in a posture scan, crucially after the fact.
Every one of these runtime detections is visible only through real-time behavioral monitoring while the attack is in progress.

The future of cloud security Is runtime-first

Cloud defense can no longer revolve solely around prevention. Modern attacks unfold in runtime, across a fast-changing mesh of workloads, services, and — critically — identities. To reduce risk, organizations must be able to detect, understand, and contain malicious activity as it happens, before ephemeral evidence disappears and before attacker's pivot across identity layers.

Darktrace / CLOUD delivers this shift by turning runtime, the most volatile and consequential layer in the cloud, into a fully defensible control point through unified visibility across behavior, workloads, and identities. It does this by providing:

  • Real-time behavior detection across workloads and identity activity
  • Autonomous response actions for rapid containment
  • Automated forensic level artifact preservation the moment events occur
  • AI-driven investigation that separates weak signals from true attacker patterns
  • Live cloud environment insight to understand context and impact instantly

Cloud security must evolve from securing what might go wrong to continuously understanding what is happening; in runtime, across identities, and at the speed attackers operate. Unifying runtime and identity visibility is how defenders regain the advantage.

[related-resource]

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About the author
Adam Stevens
Senior Director of Product, Cloud | Darktrace
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