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June 15, 2026

Hola VPN Abuse: From Proxy Traffic to Malware and Cryptomining

Darktrace’s analysis of Hola VPN-related activity across multiple environments reveals how peer-to-peer proxy functionality can enable malware delivery, command-and-control traffic, and cryptomining. Darktrace data highlights consistent patterns, suspicious downloads from rare endpoints, and post-compromise behavior, demonstrating how seemingly benign software can obscure threats and facilitate further malicious activity.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Min Kim
Cyber Security Analyst
hola vpn malware cryptominingDefault blog image
15
Jun 2026

Introduction

In enterprise environments, non-compliant software traffic can introduce unexpected exposure by creating unmanaged paths for outbound connectivity. Hola VPN is a notable example because of its peer-to-peer design, which can effectively turn user devices into routing or exit nodes for other parties’ traffic, shifting the risk profile from that of a traditional virtual private network (VPN) to something closer to a distributed proxy.

As a result, the appearance of Hola-related activity, whether from prior installation or unintended background connections, should be treated with caution.  Such activity may provide a foothold for malicious behavior, including lateral movement or command-and-control communication.

This blog explores how Hola-associated activity appeared as part of broader patterns of suspicious behavior observed across the Darktrace customer base.

The campaign

In February and March 2026, Darktrace observed similar anomalous activity across multiple customer environments, with affected devices showing consistent behavioral patterns. These included connections to multiple *.hola[.]org endpoints using Hola-related user agents, suggesting interaction with Hola infrastructure rather than isolated or incidental traffic.

Following these connections, affected customer environments showed downloads of suspicious executable files from rare external endpoints 188.241.219[.]55 and 184.241.218[.]111. Both endpoints have been flagged as potentially malicious by open-source intelligence (OSINT) [1][2].

These downloads were conducted using consistent user agents across impacted customers, specifically ‘Hola svc_js_win32/1.249.408’ and ‘Hola svc_js_win32/1.251.389’, suggesting a possible association with Hola-related activity.

Notably, this pattern aligns with recent reporting that, in some cases, Hola distributed an undeclared executable component, me[.]exe, which was later assessed to be a likely Monero-mining binary introduced via a compromised delivery pipeline [3].

Case Study 1

Darktrace first observed a new device on January 19, 2026, within a customer environment based in the Europe, Middle East, and Africa (EMEA) region. On the same day it appeared on the network, the device communicated with multiple pieces of Hola VPN-linked infrastructure before downloading a binary from a hola[.]org subdomain.

Cyber AI Analyst investigation highlighting Hola VPN service activity potentially associated with subsequent HTTP command-and-control (C2) connections.
Figure 1: Cyber AI Analyst investigation highlighting Hola VPN service activity potentially associated with subsequent HTTP command-and-control (C2) connections.

Subsequent Darktrace telemetry revealed a recurring pattern of activity from the day the device was first observed through to March 4, 2026. During this period, the device repeatedly issued HTTP GET requests to the URI /bwfile?size=1048576, each returning a 200 OK response, indicating successful file retrieval.

This behavior was accompanied by a POST request to /bwfile, followed by an additional GET request for a significantly larger file at /bwfile?size=26214400, suggesting a deliberate and structured file transfer pattern.

Notably, the binary download activity was not tied to a single static host. Instead, it was observed across multiple URLs that changed over time while remaining within the same hola[.]org domain. This pattern suggests the use of rotating or distributed delivery infrastructure rather than a fixed endpoint.

Variation in URLs over time within the same hola[.]org domain, indicating the use of dynamically changing endpoints.
Figure 2: Variation in URLs over time within the same hola[.]org domain, indicating the use of dynamically changing endpoints.

Across these events, the activity was consistently associated with the user agent Hola svc_js_win32/1.249.408, further linking the traffic to Hola-related service components. Amid these persistent and unusual connections, on February 22, Darktrace observed the device connecting to 188.241.219[.]55/proxy-peer-windows-amd64[.]exe, resulting in the download of an executable file.

 File transfer event showing the download of an executable  from the rare external endpoint 188.241.219[.]55.
Figure 3: File transfer event showing the download of an executable  from the rare external endpoint 188.241.219[.]55.

Based on its file hash, the downloaded file was assessed as a likely Trojan downloader [4], with import hash (imphash) values showing similarities to samples linked to Vidar, Rhadamanthys, and Stealc according to OSINT [5]. Overall, this sequence of activity suggests that Hola-related connectivity may have been leveraged as part of a broader malware delivery chain.

Darktrace’s Autonomous Response

Due to the highly unusual activity observed, Darktrace Autonomous Response was triggered by the device’s behavior. However, as the customer deployment was configured in “Human Confirmation” mode, manual approval was required before any action could be taken.

Had the deployment been set to “Fully Autonomous” mode, Darktrace would have automatically:

  1. Blocked connections to the associated ports and external endpoints
  2. Prevented all outgoing network connections from the device
  3. Enforced the device’s established ‘pattern of life’, allowing normal activity to continue while restricting any anomalous behavior
Figure 4: Example of a Darktrace Autonomous Response model highlighting the action that would have been taken, demonstrating how the system identifies anomalous behavior and applies targeted containment measures to restrict suspicious network activity.

Case Study 2

While the first case focused on anomalous activity from a newly observed device, Darktrace also identified cases in which devices had already been communicating with Hola-related endpoints prior to the suspected campaign. This may suggest pre-existing Hola usage within the environment, potentially increasing exposure and creating an avenue for subsequent suspicious activity.

One case involved three devices within a customer network based in the Americas (AMS). In this instance, a different payload was identified: me[.]exe, a potentially malicious cryptocurrency miner also referred to as HolaMonitorService[.]exe [6][7]. The downloads were observed from infrastructure similar to that seen in Case 1, including an IP address within the same 188.241.0.0/16 subnet.

Connections to *.hola[.]org, alongside the use of potential Hola-related user agents consistent with those in Case 1, were also identified, further suggesting a link between the observed activity and Hola-associated infrastructure.

Darktrace observed activity indicative of unusual VPN usage on the first affected device on February 2, followed by telemetry suggesting potential Tor usage. This was later followed by the download of me[.]exe on March 10 from 188.241.218[.]111. Notably, this device was the earliest among the three within the deployment to exhibit the presence of the suspicious executable.

Figure 5: Cyber AI Analyst detection highlighting the download of a suspicious executable from a similar external endpoint in a separate deployment.

On March 5, 2026, the second affected device exhibited a slightly different progression, initiating connections to http-test1[.]hola[.]org using the user agent ‘hola_get’. This activity was followed by the download of me[.]exe from the same endpoint on March 13, consistent with the broader pattern of Hola-related downloads observed across the environment.

 Example of Hola VPN-related connectivity observed on the network prior to the suspected campaign, indicating pre-existing usage that may have contributed to subsequent activity.
Figure 6: Example of Hola VPN-related connectivity observed on the network prior to the suspected campaign, indicating pre-existing usage that may have contributed to subsequent activity.

The final affected device within this customer’s network demonstrated a more limited but related pattern, also downloading me[.]exe on March 17 using the same ‘hola_get’ user agent.

While the earlier Hola VPN usage observed across the deployment may not have been directly related to the suspected malware campaign, it may nonetheless have contributed to reduced visibility. The presence of pre-existing Hola-related traffic could have obscured malicious activity, making it more difficult to distinguish legitimate usage from attacker-driven behavior and, in turn, hindering the timely identification of the emerging compromise.

Darktrace’s Autonomous Response

For this deployment, the customer had their Autonomous Response capability configured in “Fully Autonomous” mode, allowing Darktrace to take action without human intervention. As a result, the system was able to autonomously disrupt the activity as soon as relevant events were identified through model detections.

Figure 7: Darktrace Autonomous Response actions taken against suspicious activity linked to Hola VPN.

Suspected cryptomining activity

As previously noted, some of the observed executable payloads appear to be linked to cryptomining malware. Across a subset of affected customer environments, this assessment was further supported by subsequent device activity consistent with Monero mining. Affected devices established follow-on connections to multiple external endpoints aligned with known mining infrastructure, indicating post-download execution.

Considering the broader sequence of activity, this pattern may point to a wider form of abuse in which legitimate VPN-related traffic is used to mask or facilitate malicious behavior following compromise.

On several devices, the download of executable files, including a newly observed peer[.]exe, was followed by alerts indicative of cryptocurrency mining activity. Mining-related credentials such as ‘x’ were observed using the Minergate protocol to communicate with endpoints within the 89.125.255.0/24 subnet and 188.241.218[.]111, the same endpoint involved in earlier download activity. Additional credentials appeared to reflect device-specific CPU identifiers, for example ‘12th Gen Intel(R) Core (TM) i5-1235U’.

Observed mining methods included login, submit, and job, consistent with active participation in a pool-based mining workflow rather than passive or incidental contact. The login method indicates that the host authenticated to the mining service as a worker, job reflects the assignment of computational tasks, and submit shows completed work being returned to the pool [8]. This sequence suggests that affected devices were actively contributing processing resources as part of an unauthorized distributed mining operation.

The presence of unauthorized cryptominers can lead to degraded system performance and reduced device stability. Beyond the immediate resource impact, such activity often serves as an indicator of a broader compromise rather than an isolated issue. This may increase the risk of further malware deployment, persistence mechanisms, and lateral movement, particularly in environments where the initial intrusion has not been fully contained.

Conclusion

Across affected environments, detections such as unusual VPN usage, connections to Hola infrastructure, anomalous HTTP activity, suspicious file downloads, and subsequent cryptomining behavior were linked into a single, evolving incident narrative. This aggregation provided a clearer view of attack progression, enabling security teams to understand not just isolated alerts, but the full sequence of compromise from initial contact through to post-exploitation.

Ultimately, these activities show that the risk posed by non-compliant software such as Hola VPN can extend far beyond simple policy violations. What began as traffic to Hola-related infrastructure was, in multiple cases, followed by behavior suggesting deliberate misuse, including suspicious executable downloads using Hola-related user agents and, in some instances, evidence of active cryptomining. These were not isolated anomalies, but elements of a broader pattern in which seemingly benign proxy or VPN-related communications may have created a pathway for malicious delivery and unauthorized resource exploitation.

The significance of this activity lies not only in the downloads or mining, but in what it reveals about an attacker’s ability to blend malicious operations into traffic associated with software that may already have a foothold in the environment. When unapproved software operates within an enterprise, it can reduce visibility, blur the distinction between legitimate and malicious traffic, and create opportunities to extend compromise in ways that are persistent and difficult to detect. Darktrace’s anomaly-based approach enables these behavioral distinctions to be identified, regardless of whether the device is new or long established within the network.

Credit to Min Kim (Associate Principal Analyst), Priya Thapa (Senior Cyber Analyst)
Edited by Ryan Traill (Content Manager)

Appendices

References

[1] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/188.241.219.55

[2]  https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/188.241.218.111

[3] https://www.sophos.com/en-us/blog/you-do-surprise-me-exe-an-unexpected-executable-in-hola-browser

[4] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/d275abca286cd75af971d0459fdf1df37c7b19c514abafae5d0b04bf42ccfb45/detection

[5] https://bazaar.abuse.ch/sample/d275abca286cd75af971d0459fdf1df37c7b19c514abafae5d0b04bf42ccfb45/

[6] https://any.run/report/4cdeb5df217764a8b6a20d518b76ccb30cbe623365a13d9dcd40900950f1ed99/de3a756a-3101-4369-8922-52c586c939fb

[7] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/e3541caf708c075f0bb22fc68b03acd8457fea7cf0732ea935b1eb016d1c7721/community

[8] https://bitcoinwiki.org/wiki/stratum

Darktrace Model Detections

·      Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location

·      Anomalous File / Multiple EXE from Rare External Locations

·      Compromise / Crypto Currency Mining Activity

·      Compromise / High Priority Crypto Currency Mining (EM)

·      Device / New User Agent

·      Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname

·      Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Controlled and Model Alert

·      Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Alerts Over Time Block

·      Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Tor Block

·      Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena File then New Outbound Block

·      Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious Activity Block

·      Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious File Pattern of Life Block

·      Antigena / Network / External threat / Antigena Suspicious File Block

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

IoC –Type -Description + Confidence

188.241.219[.]55 - IP Address - Malware distribution source

188.241.218[.]111 - IP Address -Malware distribution source

hxxp://188.241.218[.]111:8080/me[.]exe - URI - Malicious payload

hxxp://188.241.219[.]55:9000/proxy-peer-windows-amd64[.]exe - URI - Malicious payload

hxxp://188.241.219[.]55:9000/peer[.]exe - URI - Malicious payload

C8088f3c8bc3542eb1ad78a7cc5306d866c8ac81 - SHA1 - Malicious payload, me[.]exe

b595a6de0f6a18975b29e6f8ebe604956a173478 - SHA1 - Malicious payload, me[.]exe

e9139a2e0839e8b9e5c9787ea936347ae56e5460 - SHA1 - Possible malicious payload

c2e80073e4cafe757d5643bd8fd45f28ad89bff9 - SHA1 - Possible malicious payload

695355eceedcdd337d8fcbd35e6a531cda75b847 - SHA1 - Possible malicious payload

f0b0d8068a1b9ab5d68a8a46842d72b870b292e7 - SHA1 - Possible malicious payload

a21c8b8cabc7670ea45bc175e185a0f9bfcf4733 - SHA1 - Malicious payload, me[.]exe

0353ca44b9f397d8f492db0b2f7a1d00a9e4406a - SHA1 - Possible malicious payload

56824c8a110e35ab303dc27a6c758cd50c36174c - SHA1 - Malicious payload, peer[.]exe

c141fa0fa505fe7f9ad5dd21d9d4d6d411739682 - SHA1 - Malicious payload, peer[.]exe

0417ec988b16f1267065185a6eea98f0bd2e17cd - SHA1 - Possible malicious payload

c54f7eaaeb3e0b528cd2584bdcb3a4b13cc0f8a2 - SHA1 - Malicious payload, peer[.]exe

11c78f15fafd53f8cc5a52b828d7cbf2a99e0b09 - SHA1 - Malicious payload, peer[.]exe

0258bf7dbb0123247db29e8799991140bbdbd9bb - SHA1 - Malicious payload, proxy-peer-windows-amd64[.]exe

b46043a06dd9bbd63e4214d5fbc7fd56e1ff0618 - SHA1 - Possible malicious payload

753afdecd9f5402d004e8e5f768170ae9a468ca5 - SHA1 - Possible malicious payload

8f533c7cb1524b00f7b0311c2ea8603298d6b2ca - SHA1 - Possible malicious payload

3a3bc6a5b4db1a4e961abcb002d26fe9d5e5c349 - SHA1 - Possible malicious payload

897f70eb41d302b045fcb05ed0693675e778ce57 - SHA1 - Possible malicious payload

6ddd5644809606e3dc1e2cc06059c3f5e6176f85 - SHA1 - Malicious payload, proxy-peer-windows-amd64[.]exe

68a94f7cdcaf8853ea99251c1ecc67ae9b32eba8 - SHA1 - Malicious payload, proxy-peer-windows-amd64[.]exe

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

T1659 -Initial Access, Command and Control -Content Injection

T1588.001 -Resource Development -Malware

T1189 -Initial Access -Drive-by Compromise

T1105 -Command and Control -Ingress Tool Transfer

T1657 -Impact -Financial Theft

T1497.001 -Impact -Compute Hijacking

T1496 -Impact -Resource Hijacking

T1210 -Lateral Movement -Exploitation of Remote Services

T1036.012 -Stealth -Browser Fingerprint

T1071.001 -Command and Control -Web Protocols

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Min Kim
Cyber Security Analyst

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October 14, 2026

CikaBika Bot: Inside a Discord RAT

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Key Takeaways

·      Darktrace malware researchers have found an ongoing malware campaign using a document-themed lure containing a malicious LNK file and a PDF with an embedded payload.

·      The Nim based loader deploys a Rust-based remote access trojan (RAT), using a UAC bypass and DLL search-order hijacking technique targeting Microsoft Edge.

·      The RAT uses Discord for C2, creating dedicated channels to manage infected devices and execute commands.

·      CikaBika Bot supports system reconnaissance, remote command execution, screenshot capture, and file transfers.

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Introduction

In a threat landscape where attackers continue to rely on social engineering techniques to deliver malware, legitimate services are increasingly being abused to support malicious operations. Communications platforms like Discord can provide attackers with a ready-made channel for command-and-control (C2), allowing them to manage compromised devices without establishing dedicated infrastructure.

Malware researchers at Darktrace have identified a campaign distributing CikaBika, a Rust-based RAT that uses Discord for C2. The infection chain begins with a disk image and a malicious Windows shortcut. A Nim loader extracts the final payload and attempts to plant it in Microsoft Edge’s installation directory using a PowerShell UAC bypass. Once running, the RAT collects host information, registers the device with Discord, and accepts commands through a dedicated channel.

Technical Analysis

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Figure 1: Contents of Proposition_Projet.img.

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Initial access and PDF payload

The malware is packaged within a disk image named Proposition_Projet.img. Inside are a PDF titled “Presentation_Generale.pdf.pdf” and a Windows shortcut (LNK) disguised as a Word document, “Proposition_Projet_Personnalisable.docx”. The delivery method has not been confirmed; however, the filenames and document-themed lure are consistent with a phishing campaign.

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Figure 2: PowerShell command embedded in the malicious shortcut.


Opening the shortcut launches a hidden PowerShell process while displaying the PDF as a decoy. The French-language document explains how to produce a written summary or contraction of a text. In the background, PowerShell reads the PDF as bytes and uses the value at offset 239 (0x20) as an XOR key to decode an embedded executable. The resulting payload is written to %TEMP%\IfyuUapz.txt and executed using cmd /c.

Nim loader and UAC bypass

“IfyuUapz.txt” is a Nim-based loader that contains two Base64-encoded blobs: a Rust dynamic-link library (DLL)  and a PowerShell deployment script. Both are decoded and written to temporary files, referenced to within the loader as “dllFile” and “copyPs1”. The loader runs the script through a hidden PowerShell process using an encoded command, then attempts to load the DLL using Nim’s loadLib function. If loading fails, it invokes regsvr32.exe and retries.

Figure 3: Silent DLL deployer.

The PowerShell component is responsible for moving the DLL to C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\dbghelp.dll. It first copies the DLL to C:\Windows\Temp\dbghelp.tmp, then modifies HKCU\Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command so that launching computerdefaults.exe can trigger a command to move the staged DLL into the protected Edge directory. This is an attempt to bypass User Account Control (UAC), which depends on the target’s Windows configuration.

The script also compiles a small C# helper that calls ShowWindow to hide windows associated with Windows Settings and ApplicationFrameHost. It launches the bypass helper three times, checks for the presence of the destination DLL, and attempts to delete the temporary scripts, intermediate DLL, and associated registry changes.

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Figure 4: Legitimate msedge.exe function to load the legitimate dbghelp.dll.

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The legitimate msedge.exe has a delay-loaded dependency on dbghelp.dll, and the malicious DLL exports a subset of the functions associated with Microsoft’s debugging library. The attacker appears to be exploiting this dependency through DLL search-order hijacking. However, it does not export every function in Edge’s delay-import table, meaning its compatibility with the host is incomplete. The observed code establishes the intended sideloading route, rather than proving that Edge successfully loaded the planted DLL.

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Rust RAT payload

Figure 5: Discord configuration within the RAT.

The malicious dbghelp.dll (IfyuUapz.txt) is a Rust-based RAT. At startup, the RAT registers the compromised device with Discord and begins collecting information about the host. Its reconnaissance routine gathers system details, runs tasklist to enumerate processes, executes ipconfig to obtain network configuration, and attempts to take a screenshot. The resulting artifacts include tasklist_startup.txt, network_info.txt, and screenshot.png.

Figure 6: Network configuration notification in Discord channel.

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Figure 7: Network configuration output from network_info.txt.

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Discord C2

The RAT uses Discord channels to send commands and report results. The operator can send commands to the device’s channel and receive the resulting output in the same conversation. This gives the attacker an interactive command interface without having to operate and maintain a dedicated C2 server.

Figure 8: Commands available in Discord.

The command set includes !shell for remote command execution; !sysinfo and !info for host details; !isOn for status checks; !tasklist and !ps for process enumeration; and !kill for process termination. File-transfer commands include !upload and !download. Additional strings and command handlers reference screenshots (!src), camera access (!camera), streaming (!stream), and broadcasting (!broadcast).

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Figure 9: Device registration in Discord.

During device registration, the malware retrieves the victim’s public IP address using ipify.com. The registration message records the device ID, hostname, registration time, private and public IP addresses, status, uptime, and the Discord channel assigned to that device.

Operator activity and exfiltration

Figure 10: Powershell commands sent through Discord to exfiltrate data.

Once a device is registered, the attacker can issue commands through its dedicated Discord channel. In the observed activity, the attacker compressed a directory into a ZIP and exfiltrated it using ngrok.

Figure 11: Download command to retrieve a document from the target.

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The operator can also use !download to retrieve files from target. The example above displays a request for a specific document on the victim’s desktop. The requested file is then returned through the device’s Discord channel, giving the attacker a direct way to store and access selected data.

Conclusion

CikaBika Bot demonstrates how attackers continue to rely on social engineering techniques to deliver malware. Although the initial distribution method has not been confirmed, the use of a disk image containing a shortcut disguised as a Word document, alongside a legitimate-looking PDF, suggests the campaign was designed for phishing.

While Nim is less commonly encountered than C in Windows malware, it has increasingly appeared in malicious tooling. In this case, Nim is used to unpack and deploy a Rust-based RAT, adding another layer to the infection chain.

Once installed, CikaBika Bot uses Discord as its C2 platform, allowing the attacker to manage compromised devices, execute commands, and retrieve files without maintaining dedicated C2 infrastructure. The observed use of Discord channels for individual victims, alongside additional data exfiltration through ngrok, shows how legitimate services can be repurposed to support malicious operations.

Credit to Tara Gould (Malware Research Lead)

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

Presentation_Generale.pdf.pdf - eeb52cb95113a131c2c7713c17872da6

Proposition_Projet_Personnalisable.docx.lnk - 62e3e85eca78a0cd7e6669e9f33d936d

dbghelp.dll - c66858718d883bcfb9ce2c19b59f96c9

IfyuUapz.txt - 2deb724a709b0b892248405323350e9b

MITRE ATTACK

T1204.002 – User Execution: Malicious File
T1036.007 – Masquerading: Double File Extension
T1059.001 – PowerShell
T1027 – Obfuscated Files or Information
T1140 – Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
T1548.002 – Bypass User Account Control
T1112 – Modify Registry
T1574.001 – DLL Search Order Hijacking
T1036.005 – Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
T1082 – System Information Discovery
T1016 – System Network Configuration Discovery
T1057 – Process Discovery
T1113 – Screen Capture
T1059.003 – Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell
T1102.002 – Web Service: Bidirectional Communication
T1560.001 – Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility
T1567 – Exfiltration Over Web Service
T1070.004 – Indicator Removal: File Deletion
T1218.010 – Regsvr32
T1005 – Data from Local System
T1074.001 – Data Staged: Local Data Staging
T1041 – Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
T1564.003 – Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window
T1027.013 – Encrypted/Encoded File

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About the author
Tara Gould
Malware Research Lead

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October 5, 2026

AI-Assisted Attacks Still Leave a Behavioral Trace  

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Key Insights

  • Darktrace identified behavioral indicators associated with two campaigns linked to AI-assisted threat activity, highlighting the growing role of AI in modern cyber-attacks.
  • Observed activity involved suspicious WebDAV file transfers, disguised executable downloads, beaconing to rare infrastructure, unusual process execution, and communications with C2 infrastructure linked to active intrusion campaigns.

Introduction

Just as organizations are incorporating AI into their operations to take advantage of its benefits, threat actors are doing the same, creating new challenges for defenders.

Much of the discussion around AI risk has focused on the expanding attack surface created by AI systems within organizations. These systems are often granted privileged access and heightened permissions to carry out their duties, introducing new security risks and unintended consequences.

At the same time, threat actors are learning to leverage AI to enable malicious activities such as vulnerability discovery, exploit creation, and progressing through the Cyber Kill Chain more quickly. By accelerating development, adaptation, and scaling, AI enables attackers to operate more efficiently while making some capabilities more accessible to less skilled operators.

Whether AI is the target or the enabler, the resulting activity still manifests through networks, identities, endpoints and cloud services. Those interactions create observable signals that defenders can investigate, regardless of how the attack was developed.

AI as part of the attacker’s workflow

Darktrace has previously documented how threat actors are increasingly incorporating AI into offensive operations [1]. Two recent investigations from open-source intelligence (OSINT) illustrate this. In both cases, researchers identified the role of AI within malicious operations. Separately, Darktrace detected activity in customer environments that aligned with the infrastructure and techniques reported in those campaigns. These perspectives provide a view of both attacker workflow and operational consequences.

Although AI played different roles in each campaign, it did not remove the need for the attackers to interact with their targets. Payloads still had to be delivered, processes executed, and command-and-control (C2) connections established, creating behavioral anomalies that Darktrace was able to identify.

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Case 1: A Mexican government impersonation campaign with LLM-assisted malware development

Rapid7 reported on a malware delivery operation that used generative AI to assist development, testing, documentation and refinement of attacker infrastructure. Between May and June 2026, Darktrace similarly observed two chains of suspicious activity across customer environments in the Americas that exhibited clear similarities in behavior.

In both cases Darktrace observed:

  • WebDAV communication with onedrive[.]cv·138.124.123[.]87, retrieving a file from the path /Downloads/CURP/
  • Transfer of a masqueraded .scr executable
  • Subsequent communication with google.services[.]ug·77.110.127[.]205 over unusual high ports
  • Additional Darktrace detections correlating the unusual behavior seen spanning payload delivery and C2 communication
  • Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability alerted across multiple stages of the attack

The infrastructure and behavior observed by Darktrace closely aligned with a campaign reported by Rapid7, in which a WebDAV malware delivery environment was exposed. Rapid7 assessed that threat actors had used generative AI to support the development, testing, documentation and refinement of the operation. The observed activity also aligned with reporting on a campaign in which impersonation of Mexico’s government Unique Population Registry Code (CURP) identity-record service led to delivery of PureRAT, a .NET-based information stealer and remote access trojan (RAT) [2]. The infrastructure overlap and consistent behavioural sequence provides strong alignment and offers a view of how an AI-assisted development pipeline ultimately manifested inside target environments.

Case 2: A suspected China-linked intrusion campaign with AI-assisted automation

In July 2026, Hunt.io published research into a suspected China-based intrusion operation targeting government and financial services organizations [3]. Material recovered from exposed attacker infrastructure by Hunt.io indicated that Claude Code and DeepSeek-v4-pro were being used as active components of the attacker’s workflow. According to the research, the models supported activities including attack reasoning, script generation, execution, exploit adaptation, and phishing-page development.

The investigation identified 192.229.115[.]229 and 192.229.115[.]230 as infrastructure associated with suspected TencShell operations and a possible second C2 framework known as Gshell [3].

Darktrace identified likely related activity within a financial services customer environment involving a newly observed laptop running the Windows 11 Pro operating system. Over a six-day period in July, the device made repeated outbound connections to 192.229.115[.]229 over port 8083.

Darktrace recognized the destination was highly rare for the environment, and the connectivity exhibited beaconing characteristics. During the same timeframe, Darktrace also identified suspicious process behavior associated with process chains involving svchost.exe and cmd.exe. The device repeatedly communicated with infrastructure identified in the Hunt.io research while exhibiting beaconing characteristics and suspicious process activity, strengthening the assessment that the activity likely was associated with the same operation.

Unlike many previous examples of AI-assisted cybercrime, the Hunt.io investigation provided rare visibility into how large language models were being incorporated directly into operational workflows rather than being used solely for content generation. Darktrace, meanwhile, observed how activity associated with that operation ultimately manifested inside a target environment, providing a complementary view of its operational impact.

Operational consequences of AI-assisted attacks

These investigations provide two complementary perspectives on AI-assisted cyber operations. OSINT research revealed how AI was incorporated into attacker workflows, while Darktrace observed the resulting activity within customer environments.

Although AI played different roles in each campaign, it did not remove the need for attackers to interact with their targets, deliver payloads, execute processes, and communicate with C2, all of which generated observable signals.

In these cases, Darktrace identified suspicious file delivery, unusual process behavior, beaconing activity, and communication with rare external infrastructure that aligned with campaigns later linked to AI-assisted operations. While AI may influence how attacks are developed, adapted, and scaled, it does not make them operationally invisible.

For defenders, the broader lesson extends beyond these specific campaigns. As AI becomes increasingly embedded within both enterprise operations and attacker workflows, understanding what a model was asked to do is often less important than understanding the actions it ultimately took and the consequences those actions produced. Whether the actor is human, AI-assisted, or increasingly autonomous, activity still manifests through identities, endpoints, applications, cloud services and network infrastructure.

Credit to Angel Arribas Lopez (Associate Principal Cyber Analyst), Emma Foulger (Global Threat Research Operations Lead), Nathaniel Jones, SVP Global Threat Intelligence
Edited by Ryan Traill (Content Manager)

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Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections

Case 1

Anomalous File / Masqueraded File Transfer from New External Endpoint

Anomalous File / Script from Rare External Location

Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location

Anomalous File / Script and EXE from Rare External

Anomalous Connection / Multiple Failed Connections to Rare Endpoint

Anomalous Connection / Rare External SSL Self-Signed

Compromise / New or Repeated to Unusual SSL Port

Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Failed Connections

Device / Initial Attack Chain Activity

Antigena / Network / External Threat::Antigena Suspicious File Block

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly::Antigena Enhanced Monitoring from Client Block

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly::Antigena Controlled and Model Alert

Antigena / Network / External Threat::Antigena File then New Outbound Block

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly::Antigena Significant Anomaly from Client Block

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly::Antigena Alerts Over Time Block

Case 2

Anomalous Connection / Multiple Failed Connections to Rare Endpoint

Compromise / High Volume of Connections with Beacon Score

Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Failed Connections

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Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

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Case 1

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
IoCTypeDescription + Confidence
onedrive[.]cvHostnameLikely C2 server
138.124.123[.]87IP AddressPossible C2 server
hXXp://onedrive[.]cv/Downloads/CURP/ReportFinal.%E2%80%AE%E1%BA%9D%D4%81%EF%BD%90.scrURIPossible payload
google.services[.]ugHostnameLikely C2 server
77.110.127[.]205IP AddressLikely C2 server
google.services[.]ug:57666Hostname + PortLikely C2 communication
google.services[.]ug:57888Hostname + PortLikely C2 communication
google.services[.]ug:56001Hostname + PortLikely C2 communication

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Case 2

IoC Type Description + Confidence
192.229.115[.]229 IP Address Likely C2 communication
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About the author
Angel Arribas Lopez
Associate Principal Cyber Analyst
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