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April 2, 2024

Darktrace's Investigation of Raspberry Robin Worm

Discover how Darktrace is leading the hunt for Raspberry Robin. Explore early insights and strategies in the battle against cyber threats.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Alexandra Sentenac
Cyber Analyst
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02
Apr 2024

Introduction

In the face of increasingly hardened digital infrastructures and skilled security teams, malicious actors are forced to constantly adapt their attack methods, resulting in sophisticated attacks that are designed to evade human detection and bypass traditional network security measures.  

One such example that was recently investigated by Darktrace is Raspberry Robin, a highly evasive worm malware renowned for merging existing and novel techniques, as well as leveraging both physical hardware and software, to establish a foothold within organization’s networks and propagate additional malicious payloads.

What is Raspberry Robin?

Raspberry Robin, also known as ‘QNAP worm’, is a worm malware that was initially discovered at the end of 2023 [1], however, its debut in the threat landscape may have predated this, with Microsoft uncovering malicious artifacts linked to this threat (which it tracks under the name Storm-0856) dating back to 2019 [4]. At the time, little was known regarding Raspberry Robin’s objectives or operators, despite the large number of successful infections worldwide. While the identity of the actors behind Raspberry Robin still remains a mystery, more intelligence has been gathered about the malware and its end goals as it was observed delivering payloads from different malware families.

Who does Raspberry Robin target?

While it was initially reported that Raspberry Robin primarily targeted the technology and manufacturing industries, researchers discovered that the malware had actually targeted multiple sectors [3] [4]. Darktrace’s own investigations echoed this, with Raspberry Robin infections observed across various industries, including public administration, finance, manufacturing, retail education and transportation.

How does Raspberry Robin work?

Initially, it appeared that Raspberry Robin's access to compromised networks had not been utilized to deliver final-stage malware payloads, nor to steal corporate data. This uncertainty led researchers to question whether the actors involved were merely “cybercriminals playing around” or more serious threats [3]. This lack of additional exploitation was indeed peculiar, considering that attackers could easily escalate their attacks, given Raspberry Robin’s ability to bypass User Account Control using legitimate Windows tools [4].

However, at the end of July 2022, some clarity emerged regarding the operators' end goals. Microsoft researchers revealed that the access provided by Raspberry Robin was being utilized by an access broker tracked as DEV-0206 to distribute the FakeUpdates malware downloader [2]. Researchers further discovered malicious activity associated with Evil Corp TTPs (i.e., DEV-0243) [5] and payloads from the Fauppod malware family leveraging Raspberry Robin’s access [8]. This indicates that Raspberry Robin may, in fact, be an initial access broker, utilizing its presence on hundreds of infected networks to distribute additional payloads for paying malware operators. Thus far, Raspberry Robin has been observed distributing payloads linked to FIN11, Clop Gang, BumbleBee, IcedID, and TrueBot on compromised networks [12].

Raspberry Robin’s Continued Evolution

Since it first appeared in the wild, Raspberry Robin has evolved from "being a widely distributed worm with no observed post-infection actions [...] to one of the largest malware distribution platforms currently active" [8]. The fact that Raspberry Robin has become such a prevalent threat is likely due to the continual addition of new features and evasion capabilities to their malware [6] [7].  

Since its emergence, the malware has “changed its communication method and lateral movement” [6] in order to evade signature detections based on threat intelligence and previous versions. Endpoint security vendors commonly describe it as heavily obfuscated malware, employing multiple layers of evasion techniques to hinder detection and analysis. These include for example dropping a fake payload when analyzed in a sandboxed environment and using mixed-case executing commands, likely to avoid case-sensitive string-based detections.  

In more recent campaigns, Raspberry Robin further appears to have added a new distribution method as it was observed being downloaded from archive files sent as attachments using the messaging service Discord [11]. These attachments contained a legitimate and signed Windows executable, often abused by attackers for side-loading, alongside a malicious dynamic-link library (DLL) containing a Raspberry Robin sample.

Another reason for the recent success of the malware may be found in its use of one-day exploits. According to researchers, Raspberry Robin now utilizes several local privilege escalation exploits that had been recently disclosed, even before a proof of concept had been made available [9] [10]. This led cyber security professionals to believe that operators of the malware may have access to an exploit seller [6]. The use of these exploits enhances Raspberry Robin's detection evasion and persistence capabilities, enabling it to propagate on networks undetected.

Darktrace’s Coverage of Raspberry Robin

Through two separate investigations carried out by Darktrace’s Threat Research team, first in late 2022 and then in November 2023, it became evident that Raspberry Robin was capable of integrating new functionalities and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) into its attacks. Darktrace DETECT™ provided full visibility over the evolving campaign activity, allowing for a comparison of the threat across both investigations. Additionally, if Darktrace RESPOND™ was enabled on affected networks, it was able to quickly mitigate and contain emerging activity during the initial stages, thwarting the further escalation of attacks.

Raspberry Robin Initial Infection

The most prevalent initial infection vector appears to be the introduction of an infected external drive, such as a USB stick, containing a malicious .LNK file (i.e., a Windows shortcut file) disguised as a thumb drive or network share. When clicked, the LNK file automatically launches cmd.exe to execute the malicious file stored on the external drive, and msiexec.exe to connect to a Raspberry Robin command-and-control (C2) endpoint and download the main malware component. The whole process leverages legitimate Windows processes and is therefore less likely to raise any alarms from more traditional security solutions. However, Darktrace DETECT was able to identify the use of Msiexec to connect to a rare endpoint as anomalous in every case investigated.

Little is currently known regarding how the external drives are infected and distributed, but it has been reported that affected USB drives had previously been used for printing at printing and copying shops, suggesting that the infection may have originated from such stores [13].

A method as simple as leaving an infected USB on a desk in a public location can be a highly effective social engineering tactic for attackers. Exploiting both curiosity and goodwill, unsuspecting individuals may innocently plug in a found USB, hoping to identify its owner, unaware that they have unwittingly compromised their device.

As Darktrace primarily operates on the network layer, the insertion of a USB endpoint device would not be within its visibility. Nevertheless, Darktrace did observe several instances wherein multiple Microsoft endpoints were contacted by compromised devices prior to the first connection to a Raspberry Robin domain. For example, connections to the URI '/fwlink/?LinkID=252669&clcid=0x409' were observed in multiple customer environments prior to the first Raspberry Robin external connection. This connectivity seems to be related to Windows attempting to retrieve information about installed hardware, such as a printer, and could also be related to the inserting of an external USB drive.

Figure 1: Device Event Log showing an affected device making connections to Microsoft endpoints, prior to contacting the Raspberry Robin C2 endpoint ‘vqdn[.]net’.
Figure 1: Device Event Log showing an affected device making connections to Microsoft endpoints, prior to contacting the Raspberry Robin C2 endpoint ‘vqdn[.]net’.

Raspberry Robin Command-and-Control Activity

In all cases investigated by Darktrace, compromised devices were detected making HTTP GET connections via the unusual port 8080 to Raspberry Robin C2 endpoints using the new user agent 'Windows Installer'.

The C2 hostnames observed were typically short and matched the regex /[a-zA-Z0-9]{2,4}.[a-zA-Z0-9]{2,6}/, and were hosted on various top-level domains (TLD) such as ‘.rocks’, ‘.pm’, and ‘.wf’. On one customer network, Darktrace observed the download of an MSI file from the Raspberry Robin domain ‘wak[.]rocks’. This package contained a heavily protected malicious DLL file whose purpose was unknown at the time.  

However, in September 2022, external researchers revealed that the main purpose of this DLL was to download further payloads and enable lateral movement, persistence and privilege escalation on compromised devices, as well as exfiltrating sensitive information about the device. As worm infections spread through networks automatically, exfiltrating device data is an essential process for threat actor to keep track of which systems have been infected.

On affected networks investigated by Darktrace, compromised devices were observed making C2 connections that contained sensitive device information, including hostnames and credentials, with additional host information likely found within the data packets [12].

Figure 2: Model Breach Event Log displaying the events that triggered the the ‘New User Agent and Suspicious Request Data’ DETECT model breach.
Figure 2: Model Breach Event Log displaying the events that triggered the the ‘New User Agent and Suspicious Request Data’ DETECT model breach.

As for C2 infrastructure, Raspberry Robin leverages compromised Internet of Things (IoT) devices such as QNAP network attached storage (NAS) systems with hijacked DNS settings [13]. NAS devices are data storage servers that provide access to the files they store from anywhere in the world. These features have been abused by Raspberry Robin operators to distribute their malicious payloads, as any uploaded file could be stored and shared easily using NAS features.

However, Darktrace found that QNAP servers are not the only devices being exploited by Raspberry Robin, with DETECT identifying other IoT devices being used as C2 infrastructure, including a Cerio wireless access point in one example. Darktrace recognized that this connection was new to the environment and deemed it as suspicious, especially as it also used new software and an unusual port for the HTTP protocol (i.e., 8080 rather than 80).

In several instances, Darktrace observed Raspberry Robin utilizing TOR exit notes as backup C2 infrastructure, with compromised devices detected connecting to TOR endpoints.

Figure 3: Raspberry Robin C2 endpoint when viewed in a sandbox environment.
Figure 3: Raspberry Robin C2 endpoint when viewed in a sandbox environment.
Figure 4: Raspberry Robin C2 endpoint when viewed in a sandbox environment.
Figure 4: Raspberry Robin C2 endpoint when viewed in a sandbox environment.

Raspberry Robin in 2022 vs 2023

Despite the numerous updates and advancements made to Raspberry Robin between the investigations carried out in 2022 and 2023, Darktrace’s detection of the malware was largely the same.

DETECT models breached during first investigation at the end of 2022:

  • Device / New User Agent
  • Anomalous Server Activity / New User Agent from Internet Facing System
  • Device / New User Agent and New IP
  • Compromise / Suspicious Request Data
  • Compromise / Uncommon Tor Usage
  • Possible Tor Usage

DETECT models breached during second investigation in late 2023:

  • Device / New User Agent and New IP
  • Device / New User Agent and Suspicious Request Data
  • Device / New User Agent
  • Device / Suspicious Domain
  • Possible Tor Usage

Darktrace’s anomaly-based approach to threat detection enabled it to consistently detect the TTPs and IoCs associated with Raspberry Robin across the two investigations, despite the operator’s efforts to make it stealthier and more difficult to analyze.

In the first investigation in late 2022, Darktrace detected affected devices downloading addition executable (.exe) files following connections to the Raspberry Robin C2 endpoint, including a numeric executable file that appeared to be associated with the Vidar information stealer. Considering the advanced evasion techniques and privilege escalation capabilities of Raspberry Robin, early detection is key to prevent the malware from downloading additional malicious payloads.

In one affected customer environment investigated in late 2023, a total of 12 devices were compromised between mid-September and the end of October. As this particular customer did not have Darktrace RESPOND, the Raspberry Robin infection was able to spread through the network unabated until the customer acted upon Darktrace DETECT’s alerts.

Had Darktrace RESPOND been enabled in autonomous response mode, it would have been able to take immediate action following the first observed connection to a Raspberry Robin C2 endpoint, by blocking connections to the suspicious endpoint and enforcing a device’s normal ‘pattern of life’.

By enforcing a pattern of life on an affected device, RESPOND would prevent it from carrying out any activity that deviates from this learned pattern, including connections to new endpoints using new software as was the case in Figure 5, effectively shutting down the attack in the first instance.

Model Breach Event Log showing RESPOND’s actions against connections to Raspberry Robin C2 endpoints.
Figure 5: Model Breach Event Log showing RESPOND’s actions against connections to Raspberry Robin C2 endpoints.

Conclusion

Raspberry Robin is a highly evasive and adaptable worm known to evolve and change its TTPs on a regular basis in order to remain undetected on target networks for as long as possible. Due to its ability to drop additional malware variants onto compromised devices, it is crucial for organizations and their security teams to detect Raspberry Robin infections at the earliest possible stage to prevent the deployment of potentially disruptive secondary attacks.

Despite its continued evolution, Darktrace's detection of Raspberry Robin remained largely unchanged across the two investigations. Rather than relying on previous IoCs or leveraging existing threat intelligence, Darktrace DETECT’s anomaly-based approach allows it to identify emerging compromises by detecting the subtle deviations in a device’s learned behavior that would typically come with a malware compromise.

By detecting the attacks at an early stage, Darktrace gave its customers full visibility over malicious activity occurring on their networks, empowering them to identify affected devices and remove them from their environments. In cases where Darktrace RESPOND was active, it would have been able to take autonomous follow-up action to halt any C2 communication and prevent the download of any additional malicious payloads.  

Credit to Alexandra Sentenac, Cyber Analyst, Trent Kessler, Senior Cyber Analyst, Victoria Baldie, Director of Incident Management

Appendices

Darktrace DETECT Model Coverage

Device / New User Agent and New IP

Device / New User Agent and Suspicious Request Data

Device / New User Agent

Compromise / Possible Tor Usage

Compromise / Uncommon Tor Usage

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Tactic - Technique

Command & Control - T1090.003 Multi-hop Proxy

Lateral Movement - T1210 Exploitation of remote services

Exfiltration over C2 Data - T1041 Exfiltration over C2 Channel

Data Obfuscation - T1001 Data Obfuscation

Vulnerability Scanning - T1595.002 Vulnerability Scanning

Non-Standard Port - T1571 Non-Standard Port

Persistence - T1176 Browser Extensions

Initial Access - T1189 Drive By Compromise / T1566.002  Spearphishing Link

Collection - T1185 Man in the browser

List of IoCs

IoC - Type - Description + Confidence

vqdn[.]net - Hostname - C2 Server

mwgq[.]net - Hostname - C2 Server

wak[.]rocks - Hostname - C2 Server

o7car[.]com - Hostname - C2 Server

6t[.]nz - Hostname - C2 Server

fcgz[.]net - Hostname - Possible C2 Server

d0[.]wf - Hostname - C2 Server

e0[.]wf - Hostname - C2 Server

c4z[.]pl - Hostname - C2 Server

5g7[.]at - Hostname - C2 Server

5ap[.]nl - Hostname - C2 Server

4aw[.]ro - Hostname - C2 Server

0j[.]wf - Hostname - C2 Server

f0[.]tel - Hostname - C2 Server

h0[.]pm - Hostname - C2 Server

y0[.]pm - Hostname - C2 Server

5qy[.]ro - Hostname - C2 Server

g3[.]rs - Hostname - C2 Server

5qe8[.]com - Hostname - C2 Server

4j[.]pm - Hostname - C2 Server

m0[.]yt - Hostname - C2 Server

zk4[.]me - Hostname - C2 Server

59.15.11[.]49 - IP address - Likely C2 Server

82.124.243[.]57 - IP address - C2 Server

114.32.120[.]11 - IP address - Likely C2 Server

203.186.28[.]189 - IP address - Likely C2 Server

70.124.238[.]72 - IP address - C2 Server

73.6.9[.]83 - IP address - Likely C2 Server

References

[1] https://redcanary.com/blog/raspberry-robin/  

[2] https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/microsoft-links-raspberry-robin-malware-to-evil-corp-attacks/

[3] https://7095517.fs1.hubspotusercontent-na1.net/hubfs/7095517/FLINT%202022-016%20-%20QNAP%20worm_%20who%20benefits%20from%20crime%20(1).pdf

[4] https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/microsoft-finds-raspberry-robin-worm-in-hundreds-of-windows-networks/

[5] https://therecord.media/microsoft-ties-novel-raspberry-robin-malware-to-evil-corp-cybercrime-syndicate

[6] https://securityaffairs.com/158969/malware/raspberry-robin-1-day-exploits.html

[7] https://research.checkpoint.com/2024/raspberry-robin-keeps-riding-the-wave-of-endless-1-days/

[8] https://redmondmag.com/articles/2022/10/28/microsoft-details-threat-actors-leveraging-raspberry-robin-worm.aspx

[9] https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/raspberry-robin-malware-evolves-with-early-access-to-windows-exploits/

[10] https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/raspberry-robin-worm-drops-fake-malware-to-confuse-researchers/

[11] https://thehackernews.com/2024/02/raspberry-robin-malware-upgrades-with.html

[12] https://decoded.avast.io/janvojtesek/raspberry-robins-roshtyak-a-little-lesson-in-trickery/

[13] https://blog.bushidotoken.net/2023/05/raspberry-robin-global-usb-malware.html

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Alexandra Sentenac
Cyber Analyst

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November 18, 2026

Microsoft Perception, Agentic Insiders and the Role of Behavioral Security

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This week at Ignite, Microsoft announced that Microsoft Perception is generally available. It is a significant milestone for the industry, and one we welcome as a Microsoft partner. Microsoft is putting an architectural bet at the center of its security strategy: AI has changed the speed of cyber, and defense must change with it.

At Darktrace, we’ve long held the same view, so it’s encouraging to see a partner of Microsoft’s scale articulate it so clearly and bring it to market.

Security gets a team of agents

Perception is Microsoft’s agentic security system. It orchestrates red, blue, and green team agents through playbooks in a closed loop: red agents simulate attacks, blue agents detect, triage and investigate, and green agents fix and remediate. Rather than adding another assistant to the SOC, it creates coordinated teams of agents that share context. Security teams set the guardrails and approve high-impact actions.

Microsoft frames this as a three-layer cyber stack: signals, sensors and actuators; a context layer; and agents, harness and models on top. Together with partner sources, the foundation produces more than 165 trillion signals per day.  

The announcement also makes a second point that matters just as much. Microsoft is treating AI agents themselves as a new insider-risk category. In its words, “Agents are the new insiders.” They work at machine speed, around the clock, with broad access to data, apps, tools and other agents, and like any insider they can make mistakes, be manipulated or be compromised. New capabilities such as Dynamic Agent Risk (now in preview) and dynamic Conditional Access controls are designed to assess and contain that risk as it changes.

Four truths about security in the agentic era

The announcement is built on four ideas, and together they describe the new reality security teams are defending:

  1. Static security can’t keep up. Microsoft validates what many security practitioners have observed; the window between a vulnerability’s discovery and its exploitation is collapsing from months to minutes. Manual triage can’t answer that pace. Autonomous detection and response is now a requirement, not simply a “nice to have”.
  2. Agents must be treated as insiders. The question for security teams is no longer only “who is this user?” but “what is this agent actually doing?” Identity tells you who an agent is. Policy tells you what it is allowed to do. Neither tells you whether its behavior is normal.
  3. Security is moving from signatures to behavior and context. Dynamic Agent Risk looks across identity, data, endpoint, cloud and network signals and asks whether an agent’s actions are drifting from the intent of its task. That is behavioral thinking, and it is philosophically close to the Adaptive AI approach Darktrace has pioneered.
  4. Machine-speed attacks demand machine-speed response. Humans set the objectives and guardrails. Autonomous systems do the work inside them, both detecting and acting. Microsoft’s design has agents investigate, recommend and, within approved boundaries, act, with security teams setting the limits. At this pace, the gap between knowing something is wrong and doing something about it has to close to seconds.

The opportunity: where control plane meets behavioral context

Perception is an extraordinary control plane for agentic security. The question for security leaders is how to make it even more effective in the environments they actually run.

Real enterprises are heterogeneous. They run AWS and Google Cloud alongside Azure, and OT, IoT and third-party identity alongside Entra. Increasingly they also run AI agents and MCP-connected systems that no single vendor’s telemetry fully covers. Microsoft’s architecture recognizes this, with more than 500 connectors into the wider ecosystem.

That is where Darktrace’s role is distinct. The challenge isn’t signal volume, where Microsoft’s scale is unmatched. It’s deeply understanding what is normal for a specific organization, across every system, identity and agent in it. Together, we deliver two complementary layers:

  • Microsoft brings global intelligence and orchestration. It tells you what is known, what it means and what to do about it.
  • Darktrace brings organization-specific behavioral context. It tells you what is unusual here, right now, across the organizations AI, people and infrastructure, even if it has never been seen before.

The difference shows up in the numbers. A large enterprise generates billions of signals. Darktrace turns them into thousands of incidents, narrows those to hundreds of AI-led investigations, and surfaces as few as 20 that merit a human’s attention. For an agentic SOC, that kind of evaluated, prioritized input makes agents faster, not busier.

As enterprises deploy more agents, the hard problem becomes behavior that is technically permitted but unusual, manipulated or inconsistent with the agent’s purpose. Consider an agent that normally reads Salesforce records during US business hours and suddenly starts enumerating SharePoint and opening unusual outbound connections. Each step may use valid access and approved tools, so identity and policy checks can all pass. Spotting it requires knowing the behavior is abnormal for this agent, in this environment, right now.

That is why one principle in Microsoft’s AI Transparency Initiative matters so much: organizations should be able to see what their AI accesses and does, and independently verify those actions.  

  • Identity and permissions answer “should this agent be allowed to do this?”
  • Behavioral defense answers “even though it is allowed, is what it’s doing normal?”

Deterministic controls around non-deterministic AI are the right foundation, and continuously learned baselines are how organizations can verify those controls are working. ‍

What to look for in an agentic SOC architecture

As organizations adopt platforms like Perception, we’d encourage them to look for three capabilities:

  1. Behavioral context in the control plane. Agents work best with high-confidence signals rather than thousands of raw alerts: here is the behavior that materially deviates from this organization’s learned normal.
  2. ‍Behavioral reasoning on demand. During an investigation, agents should be able to ask what changed around a given identity, device or agent in the last 24 hours, and get a clear answer. ‍
  3. Autonomous, coordinated response across the stack. Response should be as fast as the threat without being reckless: acting immediately when confidence is high, constraining or reversing actions when it isn’t, and keeping a human in the loop when it matters. Within policy and human-approval guardrails, it should target the abnormal behavior rather than the whole business process and span identity, endpoint and the wider environment.

These are the areas where we’re focused, and where we look forward to working with Microsoft and the broader ecosystem.

Response is where speed is won or lost

In the AI era, detection and investigation only matter if action follows quickly. Perception brings agentic orchestration to that problem, with security teams setting the guardrails and approving high-impact steps. Autonomous response from Darktrace takes a complementary approach: it responds on behavioral deviation, in a way that is proportionate and targeted. It can interrupt activity that is abnormal for that specific device, identity or agent while leaving normal business activity running.

The two approaches fit together naturally. Behavioral signals can tell an orchestration layer that something has changed and how confident the system is. Orchestrated playbooks can then coordinate wider containment across identity, endpoint and cloud, within the policies customers define.

The bigger picture

The industry’s architecture is converging on identity, policy, telemetry, behavior, autonomous reasoning and machine-speed response. Microsoft is building formidable pieces of that picture, especially identity, policy, telemetry and orchestration.

Behavior is the layer Darktrace is built to provide: an independent intelligence that continuously learns how humans, machines and AI agents normally act, detects the moment reality departs from intent, and can respond to that deviation in a targeted, proportionate way that keeps normal business running. When attacks move at machine speed, understanding what is abnormal and acting on it quickly have to go together.

Perception brings together what Microsoft knows and orchestrates the response across its stack. Darktrace helps organizations understand what is normal for them and act on what isn’t. Customers building their agentic security strategy will need both.

Congratulations to our partners at Microsoft on this milestone. We look forward to helping customers secure the agentic era together.

Learn more about Darktrace Behavioral Defense.

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November 18, 2026

Agentic attacks in the wild: Inside three ARTEX investigations

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Key insights

·       Darktrace observed activity in several customer environments involving infrastructure and behaviors associated with reported ARTEX-enabled campaigns, including activity linked to China-nexus espionage and financially motivated attacks.

·       In the higher-confidence cases, known infrastructure appeared alongside beaconing, unusual TLS, reconnaissance, tunneling, script retrieval, SMB activity and external data transfer. One Azure case had no observed network command and control at all, only key listing and application identity activity.

·       ARTEX is now used by actors with different objectives. Identifying the framework can help locate relevant activity, while the behavior around the affected system provides the stronger evidence for understanding compromise and attribution.

‍

Introduction

Attackers have moved beyond using AI for phishing and are running agentic frameworks; open-source tools like ARTEX, CAIRN, PentAGI and Hexstrike that let AI agents scan, exploit and move through an environment with little human input [1]. ARTEX has moved quickly from an offensive security project into live intrusion activity. Since at least August 2026, the framework has been associated with espionage, financially motivated attacks and opportunistic campaigns across government, financial services, technology, defense, telecommunications and other sectors. The FBI has documented ARTEX activity spanning reconnaissance, exploitation, credential abuse, lateral movement, collection, command and control, and exfiltration [2].

Darktrace has observed activity in customer environments that overlaps with infrastructure, tooling and behaviors reported in several of these campaigns. The cases below highlight how those intrusions appeared on the network, including the activity visible before an analyst can determine which actor or framework may be responsible.

ARTEX as part of the attacker workflow

ARTEX is an open-source, multi-agent offensive security platform that converts high-level objectives into actions carried out by specialized agents [2]. Operators have used it to automate activity across the attack lifecycle, including scanning, exploitation, credential activity and post-compromise operations. Some reported intrusions moved from initial targeting to privileged access in under three hours [2].

The framework is now associated with actors pursuing different objectives and using different post-exploitation tooling. The original public repository was removed in October 2026, but archived copies and localized versions remain available. For defenders, ARTEX is more useful as context for an investigation than as an attribution shortcut.

Darktrace observations show the same point at network level. Infrastructure linked to reported ARTEX campaigns appeared alongside beaconing, tunneling, unusual TLS, reconnaissance, file retrieval and lateral activity.

Case 1: Espionage-linked activity

Darktrace observed activity associated with BLOODALCHEMY command-and-control (C2) infrastructure in two customer environments. In one environment, five devices communicated with nginxmysql[.]com and 45.153.126[.]223 between October 23 and November 2. Both indicators had previously been linked to China-nexus espionage activity involving ARTEX [4].

The connections were accompanied by suspicious beaconing, repeated successful connections and unusual self-signed TLS. One system began making suspicious TLS connections to nginxmysql[.]com on October 23. Beaconing followed on October 24, and SMB scanning appeared later in the sequence. Other affected systems subsequently communicated with previously unseen external endpoints.

Prior to the observed C2, Darktrace detected curl requests retrieving executable and script content including /systemd, /wazuh, linux_amd64, u.sh and q.sh. Related telemetry included DRSGetNCChanges activity consistent with DCSync, LDAP enumeration, DNS zone transfers, network scanning, certificate downloads and SMB writes involving start.bat.

‍

Figure 1: Darktrace investigation showing suspicious network activity associated with infrastructure linked to reported ARTEX activity.

‍

Figure 2: Darktrace detection showing anomalous self-signed TLS activity during the espionage-linked investigation.

‍

BLOODALCHEMY has been reported in more than one China-nexus cluster [5]. SoftEther infrastructure observed in one environment provided another point of correlation with reported VAPOR PANDA tradecraft. The moderate-confidence assessment tying this to a Chinese nexus threat actor is based on infrastructure, victim context, tradecraft behavior that followed the initial connection, and public reporting.

Case 2: Financial-sector activity

In early November, Darktrace observed activity in two financial-sector environments that overlap with reported ARTEX infrastructure. On November 5, a server connected to 213.111.150[.]145:8099 and downloaded wisp-agent, associated with WISP C2 activity.

‍

In a second environment, a device attempted connections to 85.11.167[.]52 on November 1 and 2. The connections occurred alongside beaconing to new and rare destinations, anomalous TLS, possible tunneling and unusual package downloads.

The device also communicated with temp[.]sh, ssh.localhost[.]run, localhost[.]run, termbin[.]com, pastebin[.]com and GitHub-hosted release infrastructure. The sequence showed potential tooling retrieval, C2, tunneling and use of external services capable of staging or moving data.

Figure 3: Darktrace investigation showing connections to new and rare external destinations during the financial-sector activity.

‍

Case 3: Credential collection in Azure

On October 20, Darktrace observed a sweep of credential collection in a customer’s Azure environment that is consistent with ARTEX use. The intrusion began with connections to the virtual network from 43.98.196[.]73 (Alibaba Cloud). Open-source scanning data associates the address with ARTEX.

A compromised user identity made requests to the Azure Resource Manager API, though how it was compromised is unknown. The requests listed keys and secrets across API Management, web and function apps, Cognitive Services, Event Hubs, storage accounts and a managed Kubernetes cluster. With those credentials the attacker compromised multiple application identities. The attacker then used the application identities and the user identity to retrieve more credentials, change firewall and security rules and run scripts on virtual machines. Microsoft Defender alerts showed attempted execution of scripts related to Mimikatz and Impacket.

In a cloud environment, such privileged and enumerative operations are potentially indistinguishable from legitimate administrative actions. Consequently, the sequence and context of such operations signified more than any specific API call. There was no C2 traffic to match, and listing keys and using application identities are also what administrators and automation do. A compromised user, credential retrieval across several Azure services, new application identities, more credential collection and changes to security controls only made sense together, and by then access was spreading through the cloud environment.

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Figure 4: Darktrace Advanced Search showing Azure AD operation names associated with the activity.

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Figure 5: Darktrace Advanced Search showing the Azure Resource Manager action used to execute scripts.
Figure 6: Darktrace Device Event log window showing the triggered models related to the suspicious Azure activity.

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Shared tooling weakens attribution signals

The three cases looked different on the network: BLOODALCHEMY infrastructure and espionage-consistent tradecraft, WISP infrastructure in financial-sector systems, and Azure identity and control-plane activity with no C2 at all.

Shared tooling has complicated attribution for years, and ARTEX adds to it because the framework carries out more of the attack, so reconnaissance, exploitation attempts and some post-compromise activity can look the same whoever set the objective. Attribution still needs infrastructure, malware, victimology, timing and the sequence of behavior inside the environment, and an ARTEX link is one input to that. Moreover, the behavior and the agent will still be shaped by the biases, preferences, and tradecraft of its operators.

At its core, ARTEX’s planner and worker agents identify and record facts, while exploring intents. However, the way the Large Language Model (LLM) chooses its next steps toward an objective is shaped fundamentally by the skills and tools available in its context. This includes its starting context, as well as various possible Model Context Protocol (MCP) plugins and user-injected context (e.g. user input mid-operation). Operators still have preferred tradecraft, and this preference shapes the pathways the harness will provide to the LLM in context prompts. Even on the same platform, customization based on operator preferences and goals will remain a key facet of campaign and actor identification.

Detection and response

Across the Darktrace cases, the stronger signals came from behavior after the connection: beaconing, abnormal TLS, reconnaissance, unusual authentication, tunneling, script retrieval, SMB activity and outbound transfer. Automated activity also produced compressed bursts of requests, sequential enumeration and repeated attempts with small changes.

With agentic tools reaching privileged access in under three hours, analysts may have only a short window to connect scanning or authentication activity to credential changes, new administrative access, tooling retrieval or lateral movement. Keeping network, identity and cloud telemetry together shows what happened before and after the first match, and whether a connection was noise or an intrusion moving toward privileged access.

In some of these cases, Darktrace's Autonomous Response took or recommended action against the activity, including blocking internal connectivity over specified ports, inhibiting outbound connections with likely C2 endpoints, and/or disabling SaaS/IaaS user accounts. While many of these recommended actions required human confirmation due to deployment configuration preferences, had these actions been applied autonomously at the time of alert, the scope of activity would have been limited, thereby giving analysts time to investigate and respond.

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Figure 7: Autonomous Response blocking suspicious firewall modification activity.

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Figure 8: Autonomous Response summary for affected cloud users during the intrusion.

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Figure 9: Autonomous Response taking action against unusual lateral movement activity on an affected device.

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Figure 10: Autonomous Response summary for affected network users during the time of the intrusion.

ARTEX won’t be the last of these frameworks. The next ones will come with new capabilities and defaults, but an intrusion still must interact with the target environment, and that shows up in how systems, identities and applications behave even after the indicator has aged out. The harder intrusions to catch will have no infrastructure to match, just ordinary API calls and legitimate identities. Detecting those depends on knowing what normal looks like for each identity and device. Containing abnormal activity at machine speed can stop an intrusion progressing while analysts establish impact and its extent. Autonomous Response does not replace that human analysis, but rather augments defender teams' capabilities by extending the window for investigation.

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Credit to Nathaniel Jones (SVP, Global Threat Intelligence), Eugene Chua (Principal Analyst), Sam Lister (Senior Security Researcher), Adam Potter (Associate Principal Cyber Analyst)

Edited by Ryan Traill (Content Manager)

Appendices

Darktrace model detections

·       Anomalous Connection / Multiple HTTP POSTs to Rare Hostname

·       Anomalous Connection / Rare External SSL Self-Signed

·       Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Self-Signed SSL

·       Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Successful Connections

·       Compromise / Suspicious Beaconing Behaviour

·       Compromise / Agent Beacon to New Endpoint

·       Compromise / Beacon to Young Endpoint

·       Compromise / SSL Beaconing to Rare Destination

·       Compromise / Suspicious TLS Beaconing To Rare External

·       Compromise / Possible Tunnelling to Bin Services

·       Device / Anomalous Github Download

·       Device / Anomalous Package Download

·       Device / Initial Attack Chain Activity

Indicators of compromise (IoCs)

nginxmysql[.]com

45.153.126[.]223

213.111.150[.]145

wisp-agent

85.11.167[.]52

43.98.196[.]73

192.121.47[.]20

www[.]ddduuuppp[.]com

89.46.234[.]50

sqlserver-sqlite[.]com

199.19.95[.]66

graphics-hook-filter64.dll

graphics-hook_config.bin

References

1.      Google. GTIG AI Threat Tracker - https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/agentic-threat-activity-crosses-a-significant-threshold

2.      Federal Bureau of Investigation, Threat Overview of ARTEX Autonomous Penetration Testing Framework, FLASH-20261113-001, 13 November 2026: https://www.ic3.gov/CSA/2026/261113.pdf

3.      Microsoft Security Blog, Storm-0940 Uses ARTEX Agentic AI in ConnectWise Supply Chain Compromise: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/10/21/storm-0940-uses-artex-agentic-ai-connectwise-supply-chain-compromise/

4.      CrowdStrike, VAPOR PANDA Uses ARTEX to Scale Global Campaign: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/blog/vapor-panda-uses-artex-to-scale-global-campaign/

5.      Bitdefender, SilkParasite: Tracking a China-Nexus APT Across Central Asia: https://www.bitdefender.com/en-us/blog/businessinsights/silkparasite-tracking-china-nexus-apt-across-central-asia

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About the author
Nathaniel Jones
SVP, Global Threat Intelligence
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