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October 26, 2022

Strategies to Prolong Quantum Ransomware Attacks

Learn more about how Darktrace combats Quantum Ransomware changing strategy for cyberattacks. Explore the power of AI-driven network cyber security!
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Nicole Wong
Cyber Security Analyst
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26
Oct 2022

Within science and engineering, the word ‘quantum’ may spark associations with speed and capability, referencing a superior computer that can perform tasks a classical computer cannot. In cyber security, some may recognize ‘quantum’ in relation to cryptography or, more recently, as the name of a new ransomware group, which achieved network-wide encryption a mere four hours after an initial infection.   

Although this group now has a reputation for carrying out fast and efficient attacks, speed is not their only tactic. In August 2022, Darktrace detected a Quantum Ransomware incident where attackers remained in the victim’s network for almost a month after the initial signs of infection, before detonating ransomware. This was a stark difference to previously reported attacks, demonstrating that as motives change, so do threat actors’ strategies. 

The Quantum Group

Quantum was first identified in August 2021 as the latest of several rebrands of MountLocker ransomware [1]. As part of this rebrand, the extension ‘.quantum’ is appended to filenames that are encrypted and the associated ransom notes are named ‘README_TO_DECRYPT.html’ [2].  

From April 2022, media coverage of this group has increased following a DFIR report detailing an attack that progressed from initial access to domain-wide ransomware within four hours [3]. To put this into perspective, the global median dwell time for ransomware in 2020 and 2021 is 5 days [4]. In the case of Quantum, threat actors gained direct keyboard access to devices merely 2 hours after initial infection. The ransomware was staged on the domain controller around an hour and a half later, and executed 12 minutes after that.   

Quantum’s behaviour bears similarities to other groups, possibly due to their history and recruitment. Several members of the disbanded Conti ransomware group are reported to have joined the Quantum and BumbleBee operations. Security researchers have also identified similarities in the payloads and C2 infrastructure used by these groups [5 & 6].  Notably, these are the IcedID initial payload and Cobalt Strike C2 beacon used in this attack. Darktrace has also observed and prevented IcedID and Cobalt Strike activity from BumbleBee across several customer environments.

The Attack

From 11th July 2022, a device suspected to be patient zero made repeated DNS queries for external hosts that appear to be associated with IcedID C2 traffic [7 & 8]. In several reported cases [9 & 10], this banking trojan is delivered through a phishing email containing a malicious attachment that loads an IcedID DLL. As Darktrace was not deployed in the prospect’s email environment, there was no visibility of the initial access vector, however an example of a phishing campaign containing this payload is presented below. It is also possible that the device was already infected prior to joining the network. 

Figure 1- An example phishing email used to distribute IcedID. If configured, Darktrace/Email would be able to detect that the email was sent from an anomalous sender, was part of a fake reply chain, and had a suspicious attachment containing compressed content of unusual mime type [11].    

 

Figure 2- The DNS queries to endpoints associated with IcedID C2 servers, taken from the infected device’s event log.  Additional DNS queries made to other IcedID C2 servers are in the list of IOCs in the appendices.  The repeated DNS queries are indicative of beaconing.

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It was not until 22nd July that activity was seen which indicated the attack had progressed to the next stage of the kill chain. This contrasts the previously seen attacks where the progression to Cobalt Strike C2 beaconing and reconnaissance and lateral movement occurred within 2 hours of the initial infection [12 & 13]. In this case, patient zero initiated numerous unusual connections to other internal devices using a compromised account, connections that were indicative of reconnaissance using built-in Windows utilities:

·      DNS queries for hostnames in the network

·      SMB writes to IPC$ shares of those hostnames queried, binding to the srvsvc named pipe to enumerate things such as SMB shares and services on a device, client access permissions on network shares and users logged in to a remote session

·      DCE-RPC connections to the endpoint mapper service, which enables identification of the ports assigned to a particular RPC service

These connections were initiated using an existing credential on the device and just like the dwelling time, differed from previously reported Quantum group attacks where discovery actions were spawned and performed automatically by the IcedID process [14]. Figure 3 depicts how Darktrace detected that this activity deviated from the device’s normal behaviour.  

Figure 3- This figure displays the spike in active internal connections initiated by patient zero. The coloured dots represent the Darktrace models that were breached, detecting this unusual reconnaissance and lateral movement activity.

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Four days later, on the 26th of July, patient zero performed SMB writes of DLL and MSI executables to the C$ shares of internal devices including domain controllers, using a privileged credential not previously seen on the patient zero device. The deviation from normal behaviour that this represents is also displayed in Figure 3. Throughout this activity, patient zero made DNS queries for the external Cobalt Strike C2 server shown in Figure 4. Cobalt Strike has often been seen as a secondary payload delivered via IcedID, due to IcedID’s ability to evade detection and deploy large scale campaigns [15]. It is likely that reconnaissance and lateral movement was performed under instructions received by the Cobalt Strike C2 server.   

Figure 4- This figure is taken from Darktrace’s Advanced Search interface, showing a DNS query for a Cobalt Strike C2 server occurring during SMB writes of .dll files and DCE-RPC requests to the epmapper service, demonstrating reconnaissance and lateral movement.

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The SMB writes to domain controllers and usage of a new account suggests that by this stage, the attacker had achieved domain dominance. The attacker also appeared to have had hands-on access to the network via a console; the repetition of the paths ‘programdata\v1.dll’ and ‘ProgramData\v1.dll’, in lower and title case respectively, suggests they were entered manually.  

These DLL files likely contained a copy of the malware that injects into legitimate processes such as winlogon, to perform commands that call out to C2 servers [16]. Shortly after the file transfers, the affected domain controllers were also seen beaconing to external endpoints (‘sezijiru[.]com’ and ‘gedabuyisi[.]com’) that OSINT tools have associated with these DLL files [17 & 18]. Moreover, these SSL connections were made using a default client fingerprint for Cobalt Strike [19], which is consistent with the initial delivery method. To illustrate the beaconing nature of these connections, Figure 5 displays the 4.3 million daily SSL connections to one of the C2 servers during the attack. The 100,000 most recent connections were initiated by 11 unique source IP addresses alone.

Figure 5- The Advanced Search interface, querying for external SSL connections from devices in the network to an external host that appears to be a Cobalt Strike C2 server. 4.3 million connections were made over 8 days, even after the ransomware was eventually detonated on 2022-08-03.


Shortly after the writes, the attack progressed to the penultimate stage. The next day, on the 27th of July, the attackers moved to achieve their first objective: data exfiltration. Data exfiltration is not always performed by the Quantum ransomware gang. Researchers have noted discrepancies between claims of data theft made in their ransom notes versus the lack of data seen leaving the network, although this may have been missed due to covert exfiltration via a Cobalt Strike beacon [20]. 

In contrast, this attack displayed several gigabytes of data leaving internal devices including servers that had previously beaconed to Cobalt Strike C2 servers. This data was transferred overtly via FTP, however the attacker still attempted to conceal the activity using ephemeral ports (FTP in EPSV mode). FTP is an effective method for attackers to exfiltrate large files as it is easy to use, organizations often neglect to monitor outbound usage, and it can be shipped through ports that will not be blocked by traditional firewalls [21].   

Figure 6 displays an example of the FTP data transfer to attacker-controlled infrastructure, in which the destination share appears structured to identify the organization that the data was stolen from, suggesting there may be other victim organizations’ data stored. This suggests that data exfiltration was an intended outcome of this attack. 

Figure 6- This figure is from Darktrace’s Advanced Search interface, displaying some of the data transferred from an internal device to the attacker’s FTP server.

 
Data was continuously exfiltrated until a week later when the final stage of the attack was achieved and Quantum ransomware was detonated. Darktrace detected the following unusual SMB activity initiated from the attacker-created account that is a hallmark for ransomware (see Figure 7 for example log):

·      Symmetric SMB Read to Write ratio, indicative of active encryption

·      Sustained MIME type conversion of files, with the extension ‘.quantum’ appended to filenames

·      SMB writes of a ransom note ‘README_TO_DECRYPT.html’ (see Figure 8 for an example note)

Figure 7- The Model Breach Event Log for a device that had files encrypted by Quantum ransomware, showing the reads and writes of files with ‘.quantum’ appended to encrypted files, and an HTML ransom note left where the files were encrypted.

 

Figure 8- An example of the ransom note left by the Quantum gang, this one is taken from open-sources [22].


The example in Figure 8 mentions that the attacker also possessed large volumes of victim data.  It is likely that the gigabytes of data exfiltrated over FTP were leveraged as blackmail to further extort the victim organization for payment.  

Darktrace Coverage

 

Figure 9- Timeline of Quantum ransomware incident

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If Darktrace/Email was deployed in the prospect’s environment, the initial payload (if delivered through a phishing email) could have been detected and held from the recipient’s inbox. Although DETECT identified anomalous network behaviour at each stage of the attack, since the incident occurred during a trial phase where Darktrace could only detect but not respond, the attack was able to progress through the kill chain. If RESPOND/Network had been configured in the targeted environment, the unusual connections observed during the initial access, C2, reconnaissance and lateral movement stages of the attack could have been blocked. This would have prevented the attackers from delivering the later stage payloads and eventual ransomware into the target network.

It is often thought that a properly implemented backup strategy is sufficient defense against ransomware [23], however as discussed in a previous Darktrace blog, the increasing frequency of double extortion attacks in a world where ‘data is the new oil’ demonstrates that backups alone are not a mitigation for the risk of a ransomware attack [24]. Equally, the lack of preventive defenses in the target’s environment enabled the attacker’s riskier decision to dwell in the network for longer and allowed them to optimize their potential reward. 

Recent crackdowns from law enforcement on ransomware groups have shifted these groups’ approaches to aim for a balance between low risk and significant financial rewards [25]. However, given the Quantum gang only have a 5% market share in Q2 2022, compared to the 13.2% held by LockBit and 16.9% held by BlackCat [26], a riskier strategy may be favourable, as a longer dwell time and double extortion outcome offers a ‘belt and braces’ approach to maximizing the rewards from carrying out this attack. Alternatively, the gaps in-between the attack stages may imply that more than one player was involved in this attack, although this group has not been reported to operate a franchise model before [27]. Whether assisted by others or driving for a risk approach, it is clear that Quantum (like other actors) are continuing to adapt to ensure their financial success. They will continue to be successful until organizations dedicate themselves to ensuring that the proper data protection and network security measures are in place. 

Conclusion 

Ransomware has evolved over time and groups have merged and rebranded. However, this incident of Quantum ransomware demonstrates that regardless of the capability to execute a full attack within hours, prolonging an attack to optimize potential reward by leveraging double extortion tactics is sometimes still the preferred action. The pattern of network activity mirrors the techniques used in other Quantum attacks, however this incident lacked the continuous progression of the group’s attacks reported recently and may represent a change of motives during the process. Knowing that attacker motives can change reinforces the need for organizations to invest in preventative controls- an organization may already be too far down the line if it is executing its backup contingency plans. Darktrace DETECT/Network had visibility over both the early network-based indicators of compromise and the escalation to the later stages of this attack. Had Darktrace also been allowed to respond, this case of Quantum ransomware would also have had a very short dwell time, but a far better outcome for the victim.

Thanks to Steve Robinson for his contributions to this blog.

Appendices

References

[1] https://community.ibm.com/community/user/security/blogs/tristan-reed/2022/07/13/ibm-security-reaqta-vs-quantum-locker-ransomware

 

[2] https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/quantum-ransomware-seen-deployed-in-rapid-network-attacks/

 

[3], [12], [14], [16], [20] https://thedfirreport.com/2022/04/25/quantum-ransomware/

 

[4] https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2022-04/M-Trends%202022%20Executive%20Summary.pdf

 

[5] https://cyware.com/news/over-650-healthcare-organizations-affected-by-the-quantum-ransomware-attack-d0e776bb/

 

[6] https://www.kroll.com/en/insights/publications/cyber/bumblebee-loader-linked-conti-used-in-quantum-locker-attacks

 

[7] https://github.com/pan-unit42/tweets/blob/master/2022-06-28-IOCs-for-TA578-IcedID-Cobalt-Strike-and-DarkVNC.txt 

 

[8] https://github.com/stamparm/maltrail/blob/master/trails/static/malware/icedid.txt

 

[9], [15] https://www.cynet.com/blog/shelob-moonlight-spinning-a-larger-web-from-icedid-to-conti-a-trojan-and-ransomware-collaboration/

 

[10] https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/04/09/investigating-a-unique-form-of-email-delivery-for-icedid-malware/

 

[11] https://twitter.com/0xToxin/status/1564289244084011014

 

[13], [27] https://cybernews.com/security/quantum-ransomware-gang-fast-and-furious/

 

[17] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/gedabuyisi.com/relations

 

[18] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/sezijiru.com/relations.

 

[19] https://github.com/ByteSecLabs/ja3-ja3s-combo/blob/master/master-list.txt 

 

[21] https://www.darkreading.com/perimeter/ftp-hacking-on-the-rise

 

[22] https://www.pcrisk.com/removal-guides/23352-quantum-ransomware

 

[23] https://www.cohesity.com/resource-assets/tip-sheet/5-ways-ransomware-renders-backup-useless-tip-sheet-en.pdf

 

[24] https://www.forbes.com/sites/nishatalagala/2022/03/02/data-as-the-new-oil-is-not-enough-four-principles-for-avoiding-data-fires/ 

 

[25] https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/access-to-hacked-corporate-networks-still-strong-but-sales-fall/

 

[26] https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ransom-payments-fall-as-fewer-victims-choose-to-pay-hackers/ 

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Nicole Wong
Cyber Security Analyst

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November 17, 2026

How Microsoft and Darktrace Secure the AI-Powered Enterprise

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When legitimate activity creates business risk

AI is making information more accessible and enabling autonomous agents to act across enterprise systems. But legitimate access can still result in sensitive-data exposure, unintended actions, or activity that deviates from business expectations.

Microsoft's evolving security strategy recognizes this shift, emphasizing continuous risk assessment, stronger identity protection, and security that adapts as AI systems operate. For enterprises, the challenge is increasingly about recognizing when trusted activity introduces risk, even when existing controls are functioning as intended.

Where global intelligence meets deep business context

Microsoft brings global threat intelligence and comprehensive security capabilities, helping organizations protect identities, data, applications, and infrastructure. Its integrated approach connects security signals, governance, detection, and response across increasingly complex environments.

Darktrace complements these strengths with deep, organization-specific behavioral understanding. Powered by Adaptive AI, Darktrace continuously learns the patterns and relationships unique to each business, developing a Unique Behavioral Profile for each organization that helps distinguish meaningful threats from legitimate activity. By connecting identity, activity, context, and intent, it adds another dimension to security intelligence.

Together, Microsoft and Darktrace combine global intelligence with deeper knowledge of how each customer operates. Through supported integrations, this behavioral context enriches existing Microsoft security workflows, enabling more informed investigations and precise response.

This complementary approach extends across three interconnected areas of enterprise security- AI, People and Infrastructure. From understanding how AI and agents operate to protecting trusted communications and the infrastructure businesses depend on, Darktrace strengthens Microsoft's security capabilities with behavioral insight specific to each organization.

Understanding AI beyond permissions and policies

As AI moves into business-critical operations, security teams need to understand more than which applications and agents are approved. They need visibility into how AI is used, what information it accesses, and whether its actions remain aligned with business intent.

Microsoft provides extensive AI development, governance, and security capabilities. Darktrace / SECURE AI complements these with behavioral analysis across Shadow AI, prompts, agent identities and actions, and development risk. Policy Manager helps evaluate activity against organizational AI policies, while the announced integration with Microsoft Agent 365 is designed to enrich agent risk assessments with organization-specific behavioral signals. Together, these capabilities help organizations scale AI adoption with greater confidence.

Recognizing risk within trusted relationships

Sophisticated threats increasingly exploit established business relationships, familiar communications, and legitimate accounts. A message from a trusted supplier or an action taken through an authorized identity may appear routine until considered against the organization's normal behavior.

Darktrace / EMAIL complements Microsoft's native email, identity, and data protection capabilities by understanding how people and organizations communicate. This enables more precise detection of targeted phishing, business email compromise, account takeover, and data loss, supported by proportionate response. Integrations such as Unified Quarantine within Microsoft Defender for Office 365 bring this additional protection into existing security workflows.

Seeing the bigger picture behind an attack across domains

Threats rarely unfold within a single security domain. Suspicious identity activity, unexpected cloud connections, and unusual network behavior may appear unrelated until the relationships between them reveal a developing attack.

Darktrace / HYBRID NETWORK complements Microsoft's security capabilities with organization-specific behavioral detection across network, cloud, identity, and operational technology. Real-Time AI Analyst, including Cyber AI Analyst, connects related activity into investigated incidents that can be delivered into Microsoft Sentinel, helping security teams accelerate investigations and support targeted containment across the hybrid enterprise.

Turning security intelligence into business confidence

As AI becomes more deeply integrated into business operations, organizations need security that understands not only what technology can access, but how it behaves within their unique environment.

Microsoft and Darktrace bring complementary strengths to that challenge. By connecting global threat intelligence and integrated security capabilities with deep behavioral understanding, the partnership helps organizations recognize emerging risks, respond with greater precision, and strengthen their existing security investments.

The opportunity is to turn security intelligence into meaningful business context, enabling organizations to innovate and operate AI with confidence.

Darktrace named a 2026 Microsoft Partner of the Year Finalist for ISV Innovation

Darktrace has been named a finalist for the 2026 Microsoft Partner of the Year Award in the ISV Innovation category.  

This recognition reflects our collaboration with Microsoft to bring business context to enterprise security. By connecting Microsoft's global threat intelligence and integrated security capabilities with Darktrace's deep behavioral understanding, we help organizations recognize emerging risks and respond with greater precision across AI, People and Infrastructure.

Thank you to Microsoft, our customers, and our teams for their continued collaboration.

Meet Darktrace at Microsoft Ignite and the Microsoft Frontier Tour

Explore how Darktrace and Microsoft are bringing behavioral security to AI, people, and infrastructure.

Join Darktrace at Microsoft Ignite in San Francisco, November 17–19, or connect with our experts as we join the Microsoft Frontier Tour across 21 cities worldwide.

Meet Darktrace at Microsoft Ignite

Connect with Darktrace at the Microsoft Frontier Tour

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November 13, 2026

Introducing Darktrace MCP: Connect your AI assistants to the Darktrace Behavioral Defense Platform

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The Darktrace MCP Server is now generally available to users of the Darktrace Platform Portal. It enables compatible AI assistants to query security data, retrieve Cyber AI Analyst findings, and execute supported actions across actively licensed Darktrace products. Customers can now use these capabilities in their own AI workflows to gather incident context, search telemetry, enrich investigations with information from other services, and carry out triage tasks.

What is MCP?
MCP is an open standard developed by Anthropic that lets AI systems connect to and use enterprise tools and data. Adoption of MCP servers creates an opportunity for SOC teams to move beyond isolated AI experiences toward truly operational AI workflows.

Available capabilities

The server exposes tools for three areas of security work:

  • Incident discovery and threat hunting. Retrieve model alerts and incident groups, search for relevant devices and investigate indicators of compromise. Assistants with access to other services can combine these results with external threat intelligence.
  • Investigation and analysis. Retrieve Cyber AI Analyst incident findings, examine related event data, and enrich the investigation with information from other platforms or external documentation.
  • Triage and workflow actions. Add comments, tags and statuses to alerts and assets, modify supported settings such as trusted domains and subnet details, or trigger a Cyber AI Analyst investigation.

Available capabilities depend on the licensed products connected to the server. The toolset also includes access to Secure AI prompt and shadow AI information, cloud misconfigurations and external exposure information, and Email threat trends and supported management functions.

The following examples show how the server’s discovery, investigation, and action capabilities can be combined within an AI assistant.

Check external threat indicators against your environment

An assistant can use Darktrace MCP alongside external threat intelligence to check whether reported indicators appear in an environment. Darktrace’s tools provide device information and endpoint context; the assistant’s other tools or connected services supply the external intelligence.

In this example, the assistant searched for recent threat reports, selected indicators of compromise (IoCs) to investigate, and checked for devices that had communicated with the reported IP addresses. It then examined endpoint information to put the matches into context.

Relevant Darktrace tools: search_devices, get_endpoint_information, get_model_alerts, get_incident_events

Example prompt: “See what IoCs are appearing in recent threat reports online, identify the most critical one from the last week, and then analyze to see if it exists in my environment.”

AI assistant output using external threat intelligence alongside data retrieved through the Darktrace MCP Server.

Enrich a Cyber AI Analyst investigation

Cyber AI Analyst provides Darktrace’s incident analysis. Through MCP, an assistant can retrieve those findings, explain specific parts of an incident, and bring in related data from other services.

In this example, the assistant examined a Potential AWS Account Hijack investigated by Cyber AI Analyst. It assembled a step-by-step account and raw event timeline, then consulted AWS documentation to add relevant prevention guidance. The assistant brings together the existing Darktrace analysis, supporting events, and external guidance in one response.

Relevant Darktrace tools: get_incident_groups, get_incident_events, get_detailed_events, get_ai_analyst_investigations, advanced_search

Example prompt: “Drill down on the identified potential AWS account hijack. Show me a detailed step-by-step of what happened using data from Cyber AI Analyst, including a raw event timeline, and provide info on how to prevent this from happening again using info from AWS documentation.”

AI assistant output combining Cyber AI Analyst findings and event data with guidance from AWS documentation. Some sensitive content has been redacted.

Work through triage with analyst confirmation

The server’s action tools allow an assistant to support repetitive triage tasks as well as retrieve information. For example, to improve efficiency of a daily triage workflow, an analyst could ask an AI assistant to present untriaged alerts one at a time, summarizing each issue and suggesting a next step for confirmation.

The example below shows the assistant proposing actions such as recording a finding, acknowledging an incident, tagging an asset, or triggering a Cyber AI Analyst investigation for more detail. The analyst chooses how to proceed.

Relevant Darktrace tools: get_model_alerts, update_model_alert, update_incident_group, manage_tags, create_ai_analyst_investigation

Example prompt: “Using the Darktrace MCP server, obtain all un-triaged alerts from the last 3 days and display them one at a time. Provide a summary of the issue, and a suggested triage and immediate response action. I will confirm what action should be performed.”

AI assistant output proposing triage actions using information retrieved through Darktrace MCP and asking the analyst how to proceed. Some sensitive content has been redacted.

Permissions and security considerations

The MCP server provides access to supported capabilities within the products a customer is licensed to use. Connections should follow the principle of least privilege, with access appropriate to the intended workflow.

A read-only connection mode is also available for workflows that do not require changes. This mode hides tools that mutate data; configuration details are provided in the Product Guide.

Some tools can change data or perform actions, including adding or removing asset tags, triggering Cyber AI Analyst investigations, and acting on assets. Consider which capabilities an assistant should be able to use before connecting it and retain human oversight of actions that could cause disruption or unwanted changes.

For further guidance, see:

Seven MCP risks CISOs should consider and how to prepare

Anthropic’s MCP Security Best Practices

Use the interface that suits the task

MCP gives customers another way to work with Darktrace alongside its product interfaces. Users may find that complex investigations requiring visual analysis, or strategic decisions involving impactful actions, are better suited to the graphical interfaces within Darktrace products. They can choose the approach that fits their workflow.

How to start using the Darktrace MCP Server

The Darktrace MCP Server is used to connect a compatible AI assistant to supported tools within your Darktrace deployment. The assistant can retrieve alerts and device information, draw on Cyber AI Analyst findings, and perform permitted actions across your licensed products.

To get started, you will need access to the Darktrace Platform Portal and a compatible AI assistant. Follow the Platform Portal MCP Server guide to find out how to create the required credentials and configure the connection today.

Contact a Darktrace representative to explore how the Darktrace MCP Server can support your security operations.

To learn more about Darktrace can help protect your MCP servers within your broader AI and agent use, discover Darktrace / SECURE AI.

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Appendix: Darktrace MCP available tools

The following tool catalogue reflects the list supplied for this announcement. Available tools depend on the connected products and access. The list may change as tools are added or removed.

ToolProductDescription
get_helpGeneral / MCP ServerReturns orientation info about the Darktrace MCP server: its purpose, tool categories, and documentation.
get_productsGeneral / MCP ServerLists available Darktrace product instances and their instance_id values needed by other tools.
submit_feedbackGeneral / MCP ServerLogs feedback about tool coverage, clarity, or usability for the Darktrace team.
count_devicesThreat VisualizerReturns the total count of devices/assets managed by Darktrace.
search_devicesThreat VisualizerSearches for devices by keyword and returns basic matching device details.
query_devicesThreat VisualizerQueries comprehensive device information using filters like IP, MAC, subnet, or SaaS module.
edit_deviceThreat VisualizerUpdates a device's label, type, priority, or notes.
get_device_activityThreat VisualizerReturns aggregated time-series data of a device's connection/data volume trends over 4 weeks.
get_detailed_eventsThreat VisualizerRetrieves individual low-level events (connections, notices, model breaches, processes) for a device or alert.
get_subnetsThreat VisualizerRetrieves monitored subnets with CIDR, device counts, DHCP status, and traffic stats.
update_subnetThreat VisualizerEdits subnet details such as label, network range, coordinates, and DHCP/exclusion flags.
get_model_alertsThreat VisualizerRetrieves model alerts (breaches) with model info, device details, and triggered components.
get_model_alert_credentialsThreat VisualizerReturns credentials seen on the device that triggered a given model alert.
update_model_alertThreat VisualizerComments on and/or acknowledges a model alert.
get_modelsThreat VisualizerRetrieves detection models with their logic, actions, and configuration.
get_incident_groupsThreat VisualizerRetrieves AI Analyst incident groups with scores, MITRE tactics, devices, and summaries.
get_incident_eventsThreat VisualizerRetrieves AI Analyst incident events with AI summaries, MITRE tactics, and breach details.
update_incident_groupThreat VisualizerComments on and/or acknowledges an AI Analyst incident group.
create_ai_analyst_investigationThreat VisualizerCreates a manual AI Analyst investigation for a device around a specified time.
get_ai_analyst_investigationsThreat VisualizerRetrieves the status and results of manual AI Analyst investigations.
advanced_searchThreat VisualizerExecutes a Lucene-syntax Advanced Search query against Darktrace log data.
get_advanced_search_syntaxThreat VisualizerReturns the full Advanced Search query syntax reference (must be called before querying).
get_response_actions_summaryThreat VisualizerReturns a summary of active and pending Autonomous Response actions and action counts over a time range.
get_endpoint_informationThreat VisualizerLooks up external endpoints (IPs/hostnames) for location, reputation, and connection history.
get_cvesThreat VisualizerRetrieves CVEs detected across assets with severity, scores, and affected devices.
get_system_healthThreat VisualizerReturns comprehensive system health metrics (CPU, memory, disk, licenses, bandwidth).
get_dam_alertsThreat VisualizerRetrieves health alerts from the Darktrace Alert Management system.
get_module_statusesThreat VisualizerRetrieves the status of Darktrace modules, optionally filtered to failing ones.
get_tagsThreat VisualizerRetrieves device tags and optionally the devices/credentials they are applied to.
manage_tagsThreat VisualizerCreates, deletes, applies, or removes tags on devices or credentials.
get_trusted_domainsThreat VisualizerRetrieves domains marked as trusted.
manage_trusted_domainsThreat VisualizerAdds or removes a trusted domain entry.
get_watched_domainsThreat VisualizerRetrieves watched domains monitored for suspicious activity.
manage_watched_domainsThreat VisualizerAdds or removes watched domain entries.
get_workflow_integration_ticketsThreat VisualizerRetrieves third-party platform tickets created by Workflow Integrations for Darktrace events.
get_cloud_accountsDarktrace / HYBRID NETWORKRetrieves cloud deployment accounts and their monitoring/compliance statuses.
get_cloud_architecturesDarktrace / HYBRID NETWORKRetrieves cloud architectures with risk breakdown, cost, and asset counts.
get_cloud_assetsDarktrace / HYBRID NETWORKRetrieves cloud assets with type, service, region, and attached/associated assets.
get_cloud_asset_filtersDarktrace / HYBRID NETWORKReturns available filter fields and operators for querying cloud assets.
get_cloud_misconfiguration_alertsDarktrace / HYBRID NETWORKRetrieves cloud security misconfiguration alerts grouped by rule.
get_cloud_misconfigured_assetsDarktrace / HYBRID NETWORKRetrieves the assets affected by a specific cloud misconfiguration rule.
get_cloud_rule_informationDarktrace / HYBRID NETWORKReturns detailed rationale, remediation, and compliance mappings for a cloud security rule.
get_emailDarktrace / EMAILRetrieves detailed information about a specific email by UUID.
search_emailsDarktrace / EMAILSearches for emails using filters and a time range.
get_email_search_filtersDarktrace / EMAILReturns available email search filter definitions and values.
action_emailDarktrace / EMAILPerforms an action (hold, release, approve/reject release) on an email for specific recipients.
analyse_email_linkDarktrace / EMAILAnalyzes a URL found in an email, returning classification tags and analysis metrics.
get_email_overviewDarktrace / EMAILReturns an aggregated email dashboard overview (threats, actions, campaigns, etc.).
get_email_listsDarktrace / EMAILRetrieves email lists and their entries.
manage_email_listsDarktrace / EMAILAdds or edits email lists, and adds or removes entries within an email list.
get_email_addin_recordsDarktrace / EMAILRetrieves Inbox Analysis or Misdirected Email add-in records.
get_email_audit_logsDarktrace / EMAILRetrieves EMAIL system audit log events for a time range.
get_email_audit_log_event_typesDarktrace / EMAILReturns available audit log event types for filtering.
get_secure_ai_overviewDarktrace / SECURE AIReturns a dashboard overview of Secure AI activity (anomaly scores, sessions, prompt categories).
get_secure_ai_sessionsDarktrace / SECURE AIRetrieves monitored generative-AI sessions with risk levels and anomaly scores.
get_secure_ai_promptsDarktrace / SECURE AIRetrieves individual prompts for a Secure AI session with anomaly/risk classifications.
get_secure_ai_usersDarktrace / SECURE AIRetrieves users interacting with generative-AI apps, with risk scores and session counts.
get_secure_ai_eventsDarktrace / SECURE AIRetrieves raw events ingested by the Secure AI post-handler.
get_secure_ai_detectionsDarktrace / SECURE AIRetrieves detections raised by Secure AI models with scores and OWASP/ATLAS mappings.
get_secure_ai_response_actionsDarktrace / SECURE AIRetrieves Autonomous Response actions taken by Secure AI.
manage_secure_ai_response_actionDarktrace / SECURE AIClears, confirms, extends, or reactivates a Secure AI response action.
get_shadow_ai_dashboardDarktrace / SECURE AIReturns the Shadow AI dashboard of unsanctioned AI/LLM services detected.
get_shadow_ai_detectionsDarktrace / SECURE AIRetrieves individual Shadow AI detections for unsanctioned AI/LLM service usage.
get_forensic_investigationsDarktrace / HYBRID NETWORKRetrieves forensic investigations with status, alarm counts, and AI summaries.
get_forensic_evidencesDarktrace / HYBRID NETWORKRetrieves evidence items with alarm counts, OS details, and processing status.
get_forensic_evidence_fileDarktrace / HYBRID NETWORKReturns detailed file metadata/content (hash, strings, VirusTotal, AI description) from an evidence item.
browse_forensic_evidence_filesDarktrace / HYBRID NETWORKBrowses the filesystem of a forensic evidence item, filtering by severity, path, or name.
get_forensic_alarmsDarktrace / HYBRID NETWORKRetrieves alarms from an investigation or evidence item with severity and MITRE techniques.
get_forensic_artifactsDarktrace / HYBRID NETWORKRetrieves detection artifacts (files, hashes, processes, users, IPs, domains) from an investigation.
get_forensic_detectionsDarktrace / HYBRID NETWORKRetrieves XDR/EDR detections with MITRE ATT&CK mappings.
get_forensic_indicatorsDarktrace / HYBRID NETWORKRetrieves indicators of compromise (IOCs) from an investigation.
get_forensic_vulnerabilitiesDarktrace / HYBRID NETWORKRetrieves vulnerabilities (CVEs) with CVSS scoring and package info.
get_forensic_pipelinesDarktrace / HYBRID NETWORKRetrieves processing/acquisition pipelines with real-time status.
get_forensic_timelineDarktrace / HYBRID NETWORKRetrieves or facets timeline events from a forensic investigation.
get_forensic_search_syntaxDarktrace / HYBRID NETWORKReturns the Forensic Search query syntax reference (call before forensic timeline queries).

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About the author
Jamie Bali
Technical Author (AI) Developer
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