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July 26, 2024

Understanding the WarmCookie Backdoor Threat

Discover effective strategies for disarming the WarmCookie backdoor and securing your systems against this persistent threat.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Justin Torres
Cyber Analyst
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26
Jul 2024

What is WarmCookie malware?

WarmCookie, also known as BadSpace [2], is a two-stage backdoor tool that provides functionality for threat actors to retrieve victim information and launch additional payloads. The malware is primarily distributed via phishing campaigns according to multiple open-source intelligence (OSINT) providers.

Backdoor malware: A backdoor tool is a piece of software used by attackers to gain and maintain unauthorized access to a system. It bypasses standard authentication and security mechanisms, allowing the attacker to control the system remotely.

Two-stage backdoor malware: This means the backdoor operates in two distinct phases:

1. Initial Stage: The first stage involves the initial infection and establishment of a foothold within the victim's system. This stage is often designed to be small and stealthy to avoid detection.

2. Secondary Stage: Once the initial stage has successfully compromised the system, it retrieves or activates the second stage payload. This stage provides more advanced functionalities for the attacker, such as extensive data exfiltration, deeper system control, or the deployment of additional malicious payloads.

How does WarmCookie malware work?

Reported attack patterns include emails attempting to impersonate recruitment firms such as PageGroup, Michael Page, and Hays. These emails likely represented social engineering tactics, with attackers attempting to manipulate jobseekers into engaging with the emails and following malicious links embedded within [3].

This backdoor tool also adopts stealth and evasion tactics to avoid the detection of traditional security tools. Reported evasion tactics included custom string decryption algorithms, as well as dynamic API loading to prevent researchers from analyzing and identifying the core functionalities of WarmCookie [1].

Before this backdoor makes an outbound network request, it is known to capture details from the target machine, which can be used for fingerprinting and identification [1], this includes:

- Computer name

- Username

- DNS domain of the machine

- Volume serial number

WarmCookie samples investigated by external researchers were observed communicating over HTTP to a hardcoded IP address using a combination of RC4 and Base64 to protect its network traffic [1]. Ultimately, threat actors could use this backdoor to deploy further malicious payloads on targeted networks, such as ransomware.

Darktrace Coverage of WarmCookie

Between April and June 2024, Darktrace’s Threat Research team investigated suspicious activity across multiple customer networks indicating that threat actors were utilizing the WarmCookie backdoor tool. Observed cases across customer environments all included the download of unusual executable (.exe) files and suspicious outbound connectivity.

Affected devices were all observed making external HTTP requests to the German-based external IP, 185.49.69[.]41, and the URI, /data/2849d40ade47af8edfd4e08352dd2cc8.

The first investigated instance occurred between April 23 and April 24, when Darktrace detected a a series of unusual file download and outbound connectivity on a customer network, indicating successful WarmCookie exploitation. As mentioned by Elastic labs, "The PowerShell script abuses the Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) to download WarmCookie and run the DLL with the Start export" [1].

Less than a minute later, the same device was observed making HTTP requests to the rare external IP address: 185.49.69[.]41, which had never previously been observed on the network, for the URI /data/b834116823f01aeceed215e592dfcba7. The device then proceeded to download masqueraded executable file from this endpoint. Darktrace recognized that these connections to an unknown endpoint, coupled with the download of a masqueraded file, likely represented malicious activity.

Following this download, the device began beaconing back to the same IP, 185.49.69[.]41, with a large number of external connections observed over port 80.  This beaconing related behavior could further indicate malicious software communicating with command-and-control (C2) servers.

Darktrace’s model alert coverage included the following details:

[Model Alert: Device / Unusual BITS Activity]

- Associated device type: desktop

- Time of alert: 2024-04-23T14:10:23 UTC

- ASN: AS28753 Leaseweb Deutschland GmbH

- User agent: Microsoft BITS/7.8

[Model Alert: Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location]

[Model Alert: Anomalous File / Masqueraded File Transfer]

- Associated device type: desktop

- Time of alert: 2024-04-23T14:11:18 UTC

- Destination IP: 185.49.69[.]41

- Destination port: 80

- Protocol: TCP

- Application protocol: HTTP

- ASN: AS28753 Leaseweb Deutschland GmbH

- User agent: Mozilla / 4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1;.NET CLR 1.0.3705)

- Event details: File: http[:]//185.49.69[.]41/data/b834116823f01aeceed215e592dfcba7, total seen size: 144384B, direction: Incoming

- SHA1 file hash: 4ddf0d9c750bfeaebdacc14152319e21305443ff

- MD5 file hash: b09beb0b584deee198ecd66976e96237

[Model Alert: Compromise / Beaconing Activity To External Rare]

- Associated device type: desktop

- Time of alert: 2024-04-23T14:15:24 UTC

- Destination IP: 185.49.69[.]41

- Destination port: 80

- Protocol: TCP

- Application protocol: HTTP

- ASN: AS28753 Leaseweb Deutschland GmbH  

- User agent: Mozilla / 4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1;.NET CLR 1.0.3705)

Between May 7 and June 4, Darktrace identified a wide range of suspicious external connectivity on another customer’s environment. Darktrace’s Threat Research team further investigated this activity and assessed it was likely indicative of WarmCookie exploitation on customer devices.

Similar to the initial use case, BITS activity was observed on affected devices, which is utilized to download WarmCookie [1]. This initial behavior was observed with the device after triggering the model: Device / Unusual BITS Activity on May 7.

Just moments later, the same device was observed making HTTP requests to the aforementioned German IP address, 185.49.69[.]41 using the same URI /data/2849d40ade47af8edfd4e08352dd2cc8, before downloading a suspicious executable file.

Just like the first use case, this device followed up this suspicious download with a series of beaconing connections to 185.49.69[.]41, again with a large number of connections via port 80.

Similar outgoing connections to 185.49.69[.]41 and model alerts were observed on additional devices during the same timeframe, indicating that numerous customer devices had been compromised.

Darktrace’s model alert coverage included the following details:

[Model Alert: Device / Unusual BITS Activity]

- Associated device type: desktop

- Time of alert: 2024-05-07T09:03:23 UTC

- ASN: AS28753 Leaseweb Deutschland GmbH

- User agent: Microsoft BITS/7.8

[Model Alert: Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location]

[Model Alert: Anomalous File / Masqueraded File Transfer]

- Associated device type: desktop

- Time of alert: 2024-05-07T09:03:35 UTC  

- Destination IP: 185.49.69[.]41

- Protocol: TCP

- ASN: AS28753 Leaseweb Deutschland GmbH

- Event details: File: http[:]//185.49.69[.]41/data/2849d40ade47af8edfd4e08352dd2cc8, total seen size: 72704B, direction: Incoming

- SHA1 file hash: 5b0a35c574ee40c4bccb9b0b942f9a9084216816

- MD5 file hash: aa9a73083184e1309431b3c7a3e44427  

[Model Alert: Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname]

- Associated device type: desktop

- Time of alert: 2024-05-07T09:04:14 UTC  

- Destination IP: 185.49.69[.]41  

- Application protocol: HTTP  

- URI: /data/2849d40ade47af8edfd4e08352dd2cc8

- User agent: Microsoft BITS/7.8  

[Model Alert: Compromise / HTTP Beaconing to New Endpoint]

- Associated device type: desktop

- Time of alert: 2024-05-07T09:08:47 UTC

- Destination IP: 185.49.69[.]41

- Protocol: TCP

- Application protocol: HTTP  

- ASN: AS28753 Leaseweb Deutschland GmbH  

- URI: /  

- User agent: Mozilla / 4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1;.NET CLR 1.0.3705) \

Cyber AI Analyst Coverage Details around the external destination, ‘185.49.69[.]41’.
Figure 1: Cyber AI Analyst Coverage Details around the external destination, ‘185.49.69[.]41’.
External Sites Summary verifying the geographical location of the external IP, 185.49.69[.]41’.
Figure 2: External Sites Summary verifying the geographical location of the external IP, 185.49.69[.]41’.

Fortunately, this particular customer was subscribed to Darktrace’s Proactive Threat Notification (PTN) service and the Darktrace Security Operation Center (SOC) promptly investigated the activity and alerted the customer. This allowed their security team to address the activity and begin their own remediation process.

In this instance, Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability was configured in Human Confirmation mode, meaning any mitigative actions required manual application by the customer’s security team.

Despite this, Darktrace recommended two actions to contain the activity: blocking connections to the suspicious IP address 185.49.69[.]41 and any IP addresses ending with '69[.]41', as well as the ‘Enforce Pattern of Life’ action. By enforcing a pattern of life, Darktrace can restrict a device (or devices) to its learned behavior, allowing it to continue regular business activities uninterrupted while blocking any deviations from expected activity.

Actions suggested by Darktrace to contain the emerging activity, including blocking connections to the suspicious endpoint and restricting the device to its ‘pattern of life’.
Figure 3: Actions suggested by Darktrace to contain the emerging activity, including blocking connections to the suspicious endpoint and restricting the device to its ‘pattern of life’.

Conclusion

Backdoor tools like WarmCookie enable threat actors to gather and leverage information from target systems to deploy additional malicious payloads, escalating their cyber attacks. Given that WarmCookie’s primary distribution method seems to be through phishing campaigns masquerading as trusted recruitments firms, it has the potential to affect a large number of organizations.

In the face of such threats, Darktrace’s behavioral analysis provides organizations with full visibility over anomalous activity on their digital estates, regardless of whether the threat bypasses by human security teams or email security tools. While threat actors seemingly managed to evade customers’ native email security and gain access to their networks in these cases, Darktrace identified the suspicious behavior associated with WarmCookie and swiftly notified customer security teams.

Had Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability been fully enabled in these cases, it could have blocked any suspicious connections and subsequent activity in real-time, without the need of human intervention, effectively containing the attacks in the first instance.

Credit to Justin Torres, Cyber Security Analyst and Dylan Hinz, Senior Cyber Security Analyst

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections

- Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location

- Anomalous File / Masqueraded File Transfer  

- Compromise / Beacon to Young Endpoint  

- Compromise / Beaconing Activity To External Rare  

- Compromise / HTTP Beaconing to New Endpoint  

- Compromise / HTTP Beaconing to Rare Destination

- Compromise / High Volume of Connections with Beacon Score

- Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Successful Connections

- Compromise / Quick and Regular Windows HTTP Beaconing

- Compromise / SSL or HTTP Beacon

- Compromise / Slow Beaconing Activity To External Rare

- Compromise / Sustained SSL or HTTP Increase

- Compromise / Sustained TCP Beaconing Activity To Rare Endpoint

- Anomalous Connection / Multiple Failed Connections to Rare Endpoint

- Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname

- Compromise / Sustained SSL or HTTP Increase

AI Analyst Incident Coverage:

- Unusual Repeated Connections

- Possible SSL Command and Control to Multiple Endpoints

- Possible HTTP Command and Control

- Suspicious File Download

Darktrace RESPOND Model Detections:

- Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious File Block

- Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious File Pattern of Life Block

List of IoCs

IoC - Type - Description + Confidence

185.49.69[.]41 – IP Address – WarmCookie C2 Endpoint

/data/2849d40ade47af8edfd4e08352dd2cc8 – URI – Likely WarmCookie URI

/data/b834116823f01aeceed215e592dfcba7 – URI – Likely WarmCookie URI

4ddf0d9c750bfeaebdacc14152319e21305443ff  - SHA1 Hash  – Possible Malicious File

5b0a35c574ee40c4bccb9b0b942f9a9084216816  - SHA1 Hash – Possiblem Malicious File

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

(Technique Name) – (Tactic) – (ID) – (Sub-Technique of)

Drive-by Compromise - INITIAL ACCESS - T1189

Ingress Tool Transfer - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1105

Malware - RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT - T1588.001 - T1588

Lateral Tool Transfer - LATERAL MOVEMENT - T1570

Web Protocols - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1071.001 - T1071

Web Services - RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT - T1583.006 - T1583

Browser Extensions - PERSISTENCE - T1176

Application Layer Protocol - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1071

Fallback Channels - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1008

Multi-Stage Channels - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1104

Non-Standard Port - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1571

One-Way Communication - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1102.003 - T1102

Encrypted Channel - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1573

External Proxy - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1090.002 - T1090

Non-Application Layer Protocol - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1095

References

[1] https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/dipping-into-danger

[2] https://www.gdatasoftware.com/blog/2024/06/37947-badspace-backdoor

[3] https://thehackernews.com/2024/06/new-phishing-campaign-deploys.html

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Justin Torres
Cyber Analyst

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November 12, 2025

Unmasking Vo1d: Inside Darktrace’s Botnet Detection

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What is vo1d APK malware?

Vo1d malware first appeared in the wild in September 2024 and has since evolved into one of the most widespread Android botnets ever observed. This large-scale Android malware primarily targets smart TVs and low-cost Android TV boxes. Initially, Vo1d was identified as a malicious backdoor capable of installing additional third-party software [1]. Its functionality soon expanded beyond the initial infection to include deploying further malicious payloads, running proxy services, and conducting ad fraud operations. By early 2025, it was estimated that Vo1d had infected 1.3 to 1.6 million devices worldwide [2].

From a technical perspective, Vo1d embeds components into system storage to enable itself to download and execute new modules at any time. External researchers further discovered that Vo1d uses Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs) to create new command-and-control (C2) domains, ensuring that regardless of existing servers being taken down, the malware can quickly reconnect to new ones. Previous published analysis identified dozens of C2 domains and hundreds of DGA seeds, along with new downloader families. Over time, Vo1d has grown increasingly sophisticated with clear signs of stronger obfuscation and encryption methods designed to evade detection [2].

Darktrace’s coverage

Earlier this year, Darktrace observed a surge in Vo1d-related activity across customer environments, with the majority of affected customers based in South Africa. Devices that had been quietly operating as expected began exhibiting unusual network behavior, including excessive DNS lookups. Open-source intelligence (OSINT) has long highlighted South Africa as one of the countries most impacted by Vo1d infections [2].

What makes the recent activity particularly interesting is that the surge observed by Darktrace appears to be concentrated specifically in South African environments. This localized spike suggests that a significant number of devices may have been compromised, potentially due to vulnerable software, outdated firmware, or even preloaded malware. Regions with high prevalence of low-cost, often unpatched devices are especially susceptible, as these everyday consumer electronics can be quietly recruited into the botnet’s network. This specifically appears to be the case with South Africa, where public reporting has documented widespread use of low-cost boxes, such as non-Google-certified Android TV sticks, that frequently ship with outdated firmware [3].

The initial triage highlighted the core mechanism Vo1d uses to remain resilient: its use of DGA. A DGA deterministically creates a large list of pseudo-random domain names on a predictable schedule. This enables the malware to compute hundreds of candidate domains using the same algorithm, instead of using a hard-coded single C2 hostname that defenders could easily block or take down. To ensure reproducible from the infected device’s perspective, Vo1d utilizes DGA seeds. These seeds might be a static string, a numeric value, or a combination of underlying techniques that enable infected devices to generate the same list of candidate domains for a time window, provided the same DGA code, seed, and date are used.

Interestingly, Vo1d’s DGA seeds do not appear to be entirely unpredictable, and the generated domains lack fully random-looking endings. As observed in Figure 1, there is a clear pattern in the names generated. In this case, researchers identified that while the first five characters would change to create the desired list of domain names, the trailing portion remained consistent as part of the seed: 60b33d7929a, which OSINT sources have linked to the Vo1d botnet. [2]. Darktrace’s Threat Research team also identified a potential second DGA seed, with devices in some cases also engaging in activity involving hostnames matching the regular expression /[a-z]{5}fc975904fc9\.(com|top|net). This second seed has not been reported by any OSINT vendors at the time of writing.

Another recurring characteristic observed across multiple cases was the choice of top-level domains (TLDs), which included .com, .net, and .top.

Figure 1: Advanced Search results showing DNS lookups, providing a glimpse on the DGA seed utilized.

The activity was detected by multiple models in Darktrace / NETWORK, which triggered on devices making an unusually large volume of DNS requests for domains uncommon across the network.

During the network investigation, Darktrace analysts traced Vo1d’s infrastructure and uncovered an interesting pattern related to responder ASNs. A significant number of connections pointed to AS16509 (AMAZON-02). By hosting redirectors or C2 nodes inside major cloud environments, Vo1d is able to gain access to highly available and geographically diverse infrastructure. When one node is taken down or reported, operators can quickly enable a new node under a different IP within the same ASN. Another feature of cloud infrastructure that hardens Vo1d’s resilience is the fact that many organizations allow outbound connections to cloud IP ranges by default, assuming they are legitimate. Despite this, Darktrace was able to identify the rarity of these endpoints, identifying the unusualness of the activity.

Analysts further observed that once a generated domain successfully resolved, infected devices consistently began establishing outbound connections to ephemeral port ranges like TCP ports 55520 and 55521. These destination ports are atypical for standard web or DNS traffic. Even though the choice of high-numbered ports appears random, it is likely far from not accidental. Commonly used ports such as port 80 (HTTP) or 443 (HTTPS) are often subject to more scrutiny and deeper inspection or content filtering, making them riskier for attackers. On the other hand, unregistered ports like 55520 and 55521 are less likely to be blocked, providing a more covert channel that blends with outbound TCP traffic. This tactic helps evade firewall rules that focus on common service ports. Regardless, Darktrace was able to identify external connections on uncommon ports to locations that the network does not normally visit.

The continuation of the described activity was identified by Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst, which correlated individual events into a broader interconnected incident. It began with the multiple DNS requests for the algorithmically generated domains, followed by repeated connections to rare endpoints later confirmed as attacker-controlled infrastructure. Cyber AI Analyst’s investigation further enabled it to categorize the events as part of the “established foothold” phase of the attack.

Figure 2: Cyber AI Analyst incident illustrating the transition from DNS requests for DGA domains to connections with resolved attacker-controlled infrastructure.

Conclusion

The observations highlighted in this blog highlight the precision and scale of Vo1d’s operations, ranging from its DGA-generated domains to its covert use of high-numbered ports. The surge in affected South African environments illustrate how regions with many low-cost, often unpatched devices can become major hubs for botnet activity. This serves as a reminder that even everyday consumer electronics can play a role in cybercrime, emphasizing the need for vigilance and proactive security measures.

Credit to Christina Kreza (Cyber Analyst & Team Lead) and Eugene Chua (Principal Cyber Analyst & Team Lead)

Edited by Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections

  • Anomalous Connection / Devices Beaconing to New Rare IP
  • Anomalous Connection / Multiple Connections to New External TCP Port
  • Anomalous Connection / Multiple Failed Connections to Rare Endpoint
  • Compromise / DGA Beacon
  • Compromise / Domain Fluxing
  • Compromise / Fast Beaconing to DGA
  • Unusual Activity / Unusual External Activity

List of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

  • 3.132.75[.]97 – IP address – Likely Vo1d C2 infrastructure
  • g[.]sxim[.]me – Hostname – Likely Vo1d C2 infrastructure
  • snakeers[.]com – Hostname – Likely Vo1d C2 infrastructure

Selected DGA IoCs

  • semhz60b33d7929a[.]com – Hostname – Possible Vo1d C2 DGA endpoint
  • ggqrb60b33d7929a[.]com – Hostname – Possible Vo1d C2 DGA endpoint
  • eusji60b33d7929a[.]com – Hostname – Possible Vo1d C2 DGA endpoint
  • uacfc60b33d7929a[.]com – Hostname – Possible Vo1d C2 DGA endpoint
  • qilqxfc975904fc9[.]top – Hostname – Possible Vo1d C2 DGA endpoint

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • T1071.004 – Command and Control – DNS
  • T1568.002 – Command and Control – Domain Generation Algorithms
  • T1568.001 – Command and Control – Fast Flux DNS
  • T1571 – Command and Control – Non-Standard Port

[1] https://news.drweb.com/show/?lng=en&i=14900

[2] https://blog.xlab.qianxin.com/long-live-the-vo1d_botnet/

[3] https://mybroadband.co.za/news/broadcasting/596007-warning-for-south-africans-using-specific-types-of-tv-sticks.html

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About the author
Christina Kreza
Cyber Analyst

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November 6, 2025

Darktrace Named the Only 2025 Gartner® Peer Insights™ Customers’ Choice for Network Detection and Response

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Darktrace: The only Customers’ Choice for NDR in 2025

In a year defined by rapid change across the threat landscape, recognition from those who use and rely on security technology every day means the most.

That’s why we’re proud to share that Darktrace has been named the only Customers’ Choice in the 2025 Gartner® Peer Insights™ Voice of the Customer for Network Detection and Response (NDR).

Out of 11 leading NDR vendors evaluated, Darktrace stood alone as the sole Customers’ Choice, a recognition that we feel reflects not just our innovation, but the trust and satisfaction of the customers who secure their networks with Darktrace every day.

What the Gartner® Peer Insights™ Voice of the Customer means

“Voice of the Customer” is a document that synthesizes Gartner Peer Insights reviews into insights for buyers of technology and services. This aggregated peer perspective, along with the individual detailed reviews, is complementary to Gartner expert research and can play a key role in your buying process. Peers are verified reviewers of a technology product or service, who not only rate the offering, but also provide valuable feedback to consider before making a purchase decision. Vendors placed in the upper-right “Customers’ Choice” quadrant of the “Voice of the Customer” have scores that meet or exceed the market average for both axes (User Interest and Adoption, and Overall Experience).It’s not just a rating. We feel it’s a reflection of genuine customer sentiment and success in the field.

In our view, Customers consistently highlight Darktrace’s ability to:

  • Detect and respond to unknown threats in real time
  • Deliver unmatched visibility across IT, OT, and cloud environments
  • Automate investigations and responses through AI-driven insights

We believe this recognition reinforces what our customers already know: that Darktrace helps them see, understand, and stop attacks others miss.

A rare double: recognized by customers and analysts alike

This distinction follows another major recogniton. Darktrace’s placement as a Leader in the Gartner® Magic Quadrant™ for Network Detection and Response earlier this year.

That makes Darktrace the only vendor to achieve both:

  • A Leader status in the Gartner Magic Quadrant for NDR, and
  • A Customers’ Choice in Gartner Peer Insights 2025

It’s a rare double that we feel reflects both industry leadership and customer trust, two perspectives that, together, define what great cybersecurity looks like.

A Customers’ Choice across the network and the inbox

To us, this recognition also builds on Darktrace’s momentum across multiple domains. Earlier this year, Darktrace was also named a Customers’ Choice for Email Security Platforms in the Gartner® Peer Insights™ report.

With more than 1,000 verified reviews across Network Detection and Response, Email Security Platforms, and Cyber Physical Systems (CPS), we at Darktrace are proud to be trusted across the full attack surface, from the inbox to the industrial network.

Thank you to our customers

We’re deeply grateful to every customer who shared their experience with Darktrace on Gartner Peer Insights. Your insights drive our innovation and continue to shape how we protect complex, dynamic environments across the world.

Discover why customers choose Darktrace for network and email security.

Gartner® Peer Insights™ content consists of the opinions of individual end users based on their own experiences, and should not be construed as statements of fact, nor do they represent the views of Gartner or its affiliates. Gartner does not endorse any vendor, product or service depicted in this content nor makes any warranties, expressed or implied, with respect to this content, about its accuracy or completeness, including any warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose.

GARTNER is a registered trademark and service mark of Gartner, Inc. and/or its affiliates in the U.S. and internationally and is used herein with permission. All rights reserved.

Magic Quadrant and Peer Insights are registered trademarks of Gartner, Inc. and/or its affiliates and is used herein with permission. All rights reserved.

Gartner, Voice of the Customer for Network Detection and Response, By Peer Community Contributor, 30 October 2025

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About the author
Mikey Anderson
Product Marketing Manager, Network Detection & Response
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