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April 16, 2025

Introducing Version 2 of Darktrace’s Embedding Model for Investigation of Security Threats (DEMIST-2)

Learn how Darktrace’s DEMIST-2 embedding model delivers high-accuracy threat classification and detection across any environment, outperforming larger models with efficiency and precision.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Margaret Cunningham, PhD
Director, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO
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16
Apr 2025

DEMIST-2 is Darktrace’s latest embedding model, built to interpret and classify security data with precision. It performs highly specialized tasks and can be deployed in any environment. Unlike generative language models, DEMIST-2 focuses on providing reliable, high-accuracy detections for critical security use cases.

DEMIST-2 Core Capabilities:  

  • Enhances Cyber AI Analyst’s ability to triage and reason about security incidents by providing expert representation and classification of security data, and as a part of our broader multi-layered AI system
  • Classifies and interprets security data, in contrast to language models that generate unpredictable open-ended text responses  
  • Incorporates new innovations in language model development and architecture, optimized specifically for cybersecurity applications
  • Deployable across cloud, on-prem, and edge environments, DEMIST-2 delivers low-latency, high-accuracy results wherever it runs. It enables inference anywhere.

Cybersecurity is constantly evolving, but the need to build precise and reliable detections remains constant in the face of new and emerging threats. Darktrace’s Embedding Model for Investigation of Security Threats (DEMIST-2) addresses these critical needs and is designed to create stable, high-fidelity representations of security data while also serving as a powerful classifier. For security teams, this means faster, more accurate threat detection with reduced manual investigation. DEMIST-2's efficiency also reduces the need to invest in massive computational resources, enabling effective protection at scale without added complexity.  

As an embedding language model, DEMIST-2 classifies and creates meaning out of complex security data. This equips our Self-Learning AI with the insights to compare, correlate, and reason with consistency and precision. Classifications and embeddings power core capabilities across our products where accuracy is not optional, as a part of our multi-layered approach to AI architecture.

Perhaps most importantly, DEMIST-2 features a compact architecture that delivers analyst-level insights while meeting diverse deployment needs across cloud, on-prem, and edge environments. Trained on a mixture of general and domain-specific data and designed to support task specialization, DEMIST-2 provides privacy-preserving inference anywhere, while outperforming larger general-purpose models in key cybersecurity tasks.

This proprietary language model reflects Darktrace's ongoing commitment to continually innovate our AI solutions to meet the unique challenges of the security industry. We approach AI differently, integrating diverse insights to solve complex cybersecurity problems. DEMIST-2 shows that a refined, optimized, domain-specific language model can deliver outsized results in an efficient package. We are redefining possibilities for cybersecurity, but our methods transfer readily to other domains. We are eager to share our findings to accelerate innovation in the field.  

The evolution of DEMIST-2

Key concepts:  

  • Tokens: The smallest units processed by language models. Text is split into fragments based on frequency patterns allowing models to handle unfamiliar words efficiently
  • Low-Rank Adaptors (LoRA): Small, trainable components added to a model that allow it to specialize in new tasks without retraining the full system. These components learn task-specific behavior while the original foundation model remains unchanged. This approach enables multiple specializations to coexist, and work simultaneously, without drastically increasing processing and memory requirements.

Darktrace began using large language models in our products in 2022. DEMIST-2 reflects significant advancements in our continuous experimentation and adoption of innovations in the field to address the unique needs of the security industry.  

It is important to note that Darktrace uses a range of language models throughout its products, but each one is chosen for the task at hand. Many others in the artificial intelligence (AI) industry are focused on broad application of large language models (LLMs) for open-ended text generation tasks. Our research shows that using LLMs for classification and embedding offers better, more reliable, results for core security use cases. We’ve found that using LLMs for open-ended outputs can introduce uncertainty through inaccurate and unreliable responses, which is detrimental for environments where precision matters. Generative AI should not be applied to use cases, such as investigation and threat detection, where the results can deeply matter. Thoughtful application of generative AI capabilities, such as drafting decoy phishing emails or crafting non-consequential summaries are helpful but still require careful oversight.

Data is perhaps the most important factor for building language models. The data used to train DEMIST-2 balanced the need for general language understanding with security expertise. We used both publicly available and proprietary datasets.  Our proprietary dataset included privacy-preserving data such as URIs observed in customer alerts, anonymized at source to remove PII and gathered via the Call Home and aianalyst.darktrace.com services. For additional details, read our Technical Paper.  

DEMIST-2 is our way of addressing the unique challenges posed by security data. It recognizes that security data follows its own patterns that are distinct from natural language. For example, hostnames, HTTP headers, and certificate fields often appear in predictable ways, but not necessarily in a way that mirrors natural language. General-purpose LLMs tend to break down when used in these types of highly specialized domains. They struggle to interpret structure and context, fragmenting important patterns during tokenization in ways that can have a negative impact on performance.  

DEMIST-2 was built to understand the language and structure of security data using a custom tokenizer built around a security-specific vocabulary of over 16,000 words. This tokenizer allows the model to process inputs more accurately like encoded payloads, file paths, subdomain chains, and command-line arguments. These types of data are often misinterpreted by general-purpose models.  

When the tokenizer encounters unfamiliar or irregular input, it breaks the data into smaller pieces so it can still be processed. The ability to fall back to individual bytes is critical in cybersecurity contexts where novel or obfuscated content is common. This approach combines precision with flexibility, supporting specialized understanding with resilience in the face of unpredictable data.  

Along with our custom tokenizer, we made changes to support task specialization without increasing model size. To do this, DEMIST-2 uses LoRA . LoRA is a technique that integrates lightweight components with the base model to allow it to perform specific tasks while keeping memory requirements low. By using LoRA, our proprietary representation of security knowledge can be shared and reused as a starting point for more highly specialized models, for example, it takes a different type of specialization to understand hostnames versus to understand sensitive filenames. DEMIST-2 dynamically adapts to these needs and performs them with purpose.  

The result is that DEMIST-2 is like having a room of specialists working on difficult problems together, while sharing a basic core set of knowledge that does not need to be repeated or reintroduced to every situation. Sharing a consistent base model also improves its maintainability and allows efficient deployment across diverse environments without compromising speed or accuracy.  

Tokenization and task specialization represent only a portion of the updates we have made to our embedding model. In conjunction with the changes described above, DEMIST-2 integrates several updated modeling techniques that reduce latency and improve detections. To learn more about these details, our training data and methods, and a full write-up of our results, please read our scientific whitepaper.

DEMIST-2 in action

In this section, we highlight DEMIST-2's embeddings and performance. First, we show a visualization of how DEMIST-2 classifies and interprets hostnames, and second, we present its performance in a hostname classification task in comparison to other language models.  

Embeddings can often feel abstract, so let’s make them real. Figure 1 below is a 2D visualization of how DEMIST-2 classifies and understands hostnames. In reality, these hostnames exist across many more dimensions, capturing details like their relationships with other hostnames, usage patterns, and contextual data. The colors and positions in the diagram represent a simplified view of how DEMIST-2 organizes and interprets these hostnames, providing insights into their meaning and connections. Just like an experienced human analyst can quickly identify and group hostnames based on patterns and context, DEMIST-2 does the same at scale.  

DEMIST-2 visualization of hostname relationships from a large web dataset.
Figure 1: DEMIST-2 visualization of hostname relationships from a large web dataset.

Next, let’s zoom in on two distinct clusters that DEMIST-2 recognizes. One cluster represents small businesses (Figure 2) and the other, Russian and Polish sites with similar numerical formats (Figure 3). These clusters demonstrate how DEMIST-2 can identify specific groupings based on real-world attributes such as regional patterns in website structures, common formats used by small businesses, and other properties such as its understanding of how websites relate to each other on the internet.

Cluster of small businesses
Figure 2: Cluster of small businesses
Figure 3: Cluster of Russian and Polish sites with a similar numerical format

The previous figures provided a view of how DEMIST-2 works. Figure 4 highlights DEMIST-2’s performance in a security-related classification task. The chart shows how DEMIST-2, with just 95 million parameters, achieves nearly 94% accuracy—making it the highest-performing model in the chart, despite being the smallest. In comparison, the larger model with 278 million parameters achieves only about 89% accuracy, showing that size doesn’t always mean better performance. Small models don’t mean poor performance. For many security-related tasks, DEMIST-2 outperforms much larger models.

Hostname classification task performance comparison against comparable open source foundation models
Figure 4: Hostname classification task performance comparison against comparable open source foundation models

With these examples of DEMIST-2 in action, we’ve shown how it excels in embedding and classifying security data while delivering high performance on specialized security tasks.  

The DEMIST-2 advantage

DEMIST-2 was built for precision and reliability. Our primary goal was to create a high-performance model capable of tackling complex cybersecurity tasks. Optimizing for efficiency and scalability came second, but it is a natural outcome of our commitment to building a strong, effective solution that is available to security teams working across diverse environments. It is an enormous benefit that DEMIST-2 is orders of magnitude smaller than many general-purpose models. However, and much more importantly, it significantly outperforms models in its capabilities and accuracy on security tasks.  

Finding a product that fits into an environment’s unique constraints used to mean that some teams had to settle for less powerful or less performant products. With DEMIST-2, data can remain local to the environment, is entirely separate from the data of other customers, and can even operate in environments without network connectivity. The size of our model allows for flexible deployment options while at the same time providing measurable performance advantages for security-related tasks.  

As security threats continue to evolve, we believe that purpose-built AI systems like DEMIST-2 will be essential tools for defenders, combining the power of modern language modeling with the specificity and reliability that builds trust and partnership between security practitioners and AI systems.

Conclusion

DEMIST-2 has additional architectural and deployment updates that improve performance and stability. These innovations contribute to our ability to minimize model size and memory constraints and reflect our dedication to meeting the data handling and privacy needs of security environments. In addition, these choices reflect our dedication to responsible AI practices.

DEMIST-2 is available in Darktrace 6.3, along with a new DIGEST model that uses GNNs and RNNs to score and prioritize threats with expert-level precision.

[related-resource]

Want more details?

Read the full research paper to explore how DEMIST-2 was built, trained, and optimized to meet the unique challenges of cybersecurity

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Margaret Cunningham, PhD
Director, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO

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April 10, 2025

Bytesize Security: Insider Threats in Google Workspace

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What is an insider threat?

An insider threat is a cyber risk originating from within an organization. These threats can involve actions such as an employee inadvertently clicking on a malicious link (e.g., a phishing email) or an employee with malicious intent conducting data exfiltration for corporate sabotage.

Insiders often exploit their knowledge and access to legitimate corporate tools, presenting a continuous risk to organizations. Defenders must protect their digital estate against threats from both within and outside the organization.

For example, in the summer of 2024, Darktrace / IDENTITY successfully detected a user in a customer environment attempting to steal sensitive data from a trusted Google Workspace service. Despite the use of a legitimate and compliant corporate tool, Darktrace identified anomalies in the user’s behavior that indicated malicious intent.

Attack overview: Insider threat

In June 2024, Darktrace detected unusual activity involving the Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) account of a former employee from a customer organization. This individual, who had recently left the company, was observed downloading a significant amount of data in the form of a “.INDD” file (an Adobe InDesign document typically used to create page layouts [1]) from Google Drive.

While the use of Google Drive and other Google Workspace platforms was not unexpected for this employee, Darktrace identified that the user had logged in from an unfamiliar and suspicious IPv6 address before initiating the download. This anomaly triggered a model alert in Darktrace / IDENTITY, flagging the activity as potentially malicious.

A Model Alert in Darktrace / IDENTITY showing the unusual “.INDD” file being downloaded from Google Workspace.
Figure 1: A Model Alert in Darktrace / IDENTITY showing the unusual “.INDD” file being downloaded from Google Workspace.

Following this detection, the customer reached out to Darktrace’s Security Operations Center (SOC) team via the Security Operations Support service for assistance in triaging and investigating the incident further. Darktrace’s SOC team conducted an in-depth investigation, enabling the customer to identify the exact moment of the file download, as well as the contents of the stolen documents. The customer later confirmed that the downloaded files contained sensitive corporate data, including customer details and payment information, likely intended for reuse or sharing with a new employer.

In this particular instance, Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability was not active, allowing the malicious insider to successfully exfiltrate the files. If Autonomous Response had been enabled, Darktrace would have immediately acted upon detecting the login from an unusual (in this case 100% rare) location by logging out and disabling the SaaS user. This would have provided the customer with the necessary time to review the activity and verify whether the user was authorized to access their SaaS environments.

Conclusion

Insider threats pose a significant challenge for traditional security tools as they involve internal users who are expected to access SaaS platforms. These insiders have preexisting knowledge of the environment, sensitive data, and how to make their activities appear normal, as seen in this case with the use of Google Workspace. This familiarity allows them to avoid having to use more easily detectable intrusion methods like phishing campaigns.

Darktrace’s anomaly detection capabilities, which focus on identifying unusual activity rather than relying on specific rules and signatures, enable it to effectively detect deviations from a user’s expected behavior. For instance, an unusual login from a new location, as in this example, can be flagged even if the subsequent malicious activity appears innocuous due to the use of a trusted application like Google Drive.

Credit to Vivek Rajan (Cyber Analyst) and Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Get the latest insights on emerging cyber threats

Attackers are adapting, are you ready? This report explores the latest trends shaping the cybersecurity landscape and what defenders need to know in 2025.

  • Identity-based attacks: How attackers are bypassing traditional defenses
  • Zero-day exploitation: The rise of previously unknown vulnerabilities
  • AI-driven threats: How adversaries are leveraging AI to outmaneuver security controls

Stay ahead of evolving threats with expert analysis from Darktrace. Download the report here.

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections

SaaS / Resource::Unusual Download Of Externally Shared Google Workspace File

References

[1]https://www.adobe.com/creativecloud/file-types/image/vector/indd-file.html

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Technqiue – Tactic – ID

Data from Cloud Storage Object – COLLECTION -T1530

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About the author
Vivek Rajan
Cyber Analyst

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April 18, 2025

RansomHub Ransomware: investigación de Darktrace sobre la herramienta más nueva en ShadowSyndicate's Arsenal

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What is ShadowSyndicate?

ShadowSyndicate, also known as Infra Storm, is a threat actor reportedly active since July 2022, working with various ransomware groups and affiliates of ransomware programs, such as Quantum, Nokoyawa, and ALPHV. This threat actor employs tools like Cobalt Strike, Sliver, IcedID, and Matanbuchus malware in its attacks. ShadowSyndicate utilizes the same SSH fingerprint (1ca4cbac895fc3bd12417b77fc6ed31d) on many of their servers—85 as of September 2023. At least 52 of these servers have been linked to the Cobalt Strike command and control (C2) framework [1].

What is RansomHub?

First observed following the FBI's takedown of ALPHV/BlackCat in December 2023, RansomHub quickly gained notoriety as a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) operator. RansomHub capitalized on the law enforcement’s disruption of the LockBit group’s operations in February 2024 to market themselves to potential affiliates who had previously relied on LockBit’s encryptors. RansomHub's success can be largely attributed to their aggressive recruitment on underground forums, leading to the absorption of ex-ALPHV and ex-LockBit affiliates. They were one of the most active ransomware operators in 2024, with approximately 500 victims reported since February, according to their Dedicated Leak Site (DLS) [2].

ShadowSyndicate and RansomHub

External researchers have reported that ShadowSyndicate had as many as seven different ransomware families in their arsenal between July 2022, and September 2023. Now, ShadowSyndicate appears to have added RansomHub’s their formidable stockpile, becoming an affiliate of the RaaS provider [1].

Darktrace’s analysis of ShadowSyndicate across its customer base indicates that the group has been leveraging RansomHub ransomware in multiple attacks in September and October 2024. ShadowSyndicate likely shifted to using RansomHub due to the lucrative rates offered by this RaaS provider, with affiliates receiving up to 90% of the ransom—significantly higher than the general market rate of 70-80% [3].

In many instances where encryption was observed, ransom notes with the naming pattern “README_[a-zA-Z0-9]{6}.txt” were written to affected devices. The content of these ransom notes threatened to release stolen confidential data via RansomHub’s DLS unless a ransom was paid. During these attacks, data exfiltration activity to external endpoints using the SSH protocol was observed. The external endpoints to which the data was transferred were found to coincide with servers previously associated with ShadowSyndicate activity.

Darktrace’s coverage of ShadowSyndicate and RansomHub

Darktrace’s Threat Research team identified high-confidence indicators of compromise (IoCs) linked to the ShadowSyndicate group deploying RansomHub. The investigation revealed four separate incidents impacting Darktrace customers across various sectors, including education, manufacturing, and social services. In the investigated cases, multiple stages of the kill chain were observed, starting with initial internal reconnaissance and leading to eventual file encryption and data exfiltration.

Attack Overview

Timeline attack overview of ransomhub ransomware

Internal Reconnaissance

The first observed stage of ShadowSyndicate attacks involved devices making multiple internal connection attempts to other internal devices over key ports, suggesting network scanning and enumeration activity. In this initial phase of the attack, the threat actor gathers critical details and information by scanning the network for open ports that might be potentially exploitable. In cases observed by Darktrace affected devices were typically seen attempting to connect to other internal locations over TCP ports including 22, 445 and 3389.

C2 Communication and Data Exfiltration

In most of the RansomHub cases investigated by Darktrace, unusual connections to endpoints associated with Splashtop, a remote desktop access software, were observed briefly before outbound SSH connections were identified.

Following this, Darktrace detected outbound SSH connections to the external IP address 46.161.27[.]151 using WinSCP, an open-source SSH client for Windows used for secure file transfer. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) identified this IP address as malicious and associated it with ShadowSyndicate’s C2 infrastructure [4]. During connections to this IP, multiple gigabytes of data were exfiltrated from customer networks via SSH.

Data exfiltration attempts were consistent across investigated cases; however, the method of egress varied from one attack to another, as one would expect with a RaaS strain being employed by different affiliates. In addition to transfers to ShadowSyndicate’s infrastructure, threat actors were also observed transferring data to the cloud storage and file transfer service, MEGA, via HTTP connections using the ‘rclone’ user agent – a command-line program used to manage files on cloud storage. In another case, data exfiltration activity occurred over port 443, utilizing SSL connections.

Lateral Movement

In investigated incidents, lateral movement activity began shortly after C2 communications were established. In one case, Darktrace identified the unusual use of a new administrative credential which was quickly followed up with multiple suspicious executable file writes to other internal devices on the network.

The filenames for this executable followed the regex naming convention “[a-zA-Z]{6}.exe”, with two observed examples being “bWqQUx.exe” and “sdtMfs.exe”.

Cyber AI Analyst Investigation Process for the SMB Writes of Suspicious Files to Multiple Devices' incident.
Figure 1: Cyber AI Analyst Investigation Process for the SMB Writes of Suspicious Files to Multiple Devices' incident.

Additionally, script files such as “Defeat-Defender2.bat”, “Share.bat”, and “def.bat” were also seen written over SMB, suggesting that threat actors were trying to evade network defenses and detection by antivirus software like Microsoft Defender.

File Encryption

Among the three cases where file encryption activity was observed, file names were changed by adding an extension following the regex format “.[a-zA-Z0-9]{6}”. Ransom notes with a similar naming convention, “README_[a-zA-Z0-9]{6}.txt”, were written to each share. While the content of the ransom notes differed slightly in each case, most contained similar text. Clear indicators in the body of the ransom notes pointed to the use of RansomHub ransomware in these attacks. As is increasingly the case, threat actors employed double extortion tactics, threatening to leak confidential data if the ransom was not paid. Like most ransomware, RansomHub included TOR site links for communication between its "customer service team" and the target.

Figure 2: The graph shows the behavior of a device with encryption activity, using the “SMB Sustained Mimetype Conversion” and “Unusual Activity Events” metrics over three weeks.

Since Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability was not enabled during the compromise, the ransomware attack succeeded in its objective. However, Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst provided comprehensive coverage of the kill chain, enabling the customer to quickly identify affected devices and initiate remediation.

Figure 3: Cyber AI Analyst panel showing the critical incidents of the affected device from one of the cases investigated.

In lieu of Autonomous Response being active on the networks, Darktrace was able to suggest a variety of manual response actions intended to contain the compromise and prevent further malicious activity. Had Autonomous Response been enabled at the time of the attack, these actions would have been quickly applied without any human interaction, potentially halting the ransomware attack earlier in the kill chain.

Figure 4: A list of suggested Autonomous Response actions on the affected devices."

Conclusion

The Darktrace Threat Research team has noted a surge in attacks by the ShadowSyndicate group using RansomHub’s RaaS of late. RaaS has become increasingly popular across the threat landscape due to its ease of access to malware and script execution. As more individual threat actors adopt RaaS, security teams are struggling to defend against the increasing number of opportunistic attacks.

For customers subscribed to Darktrace’s Security Operations Center (SOC) services, the Analyst team promptly investigated detections of the aforementioned unusual and anomalous activities in the initial infection phases. Multiple alerts were raised via Darktrace’s Managed Threat Detection to warn customers of active ransomware incidents. By emphasizing anomaly-based detection and response, Darktrace can effectively identify devices affected by ransomware and take action against emerging activity, minimizing disruption and impact on customer networks.

Credit to Kwa Qing Hong (Senior Cyber Analyst and Deputy Analyst Team Lead, Singapore) and Signe Zahark (Principal Cyber Analyst, Japan)

[related-resource]

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections

Antigena Models / Autonomous Response:

Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena Network Scan Block

Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena SMB Enumeration Block

Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena Internal Anomalous File Activity

Antigena / Network / Insider Threat / Antigena Large Data Volume Outbound Block

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Significant Anomaly from Client Block

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Breaches Over Time Block

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Controlled and Model Breach

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Significant Server Anomaly Block

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Enhanced Monitoring from Server Block

Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious Activity Block

Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious File Pattern of Life Block

Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena File then New Outbound Block


Network Reconnaissance:

Device / Network Scan

Device / ICMP Address Scan

Device / RDP Scan
Device / Anomalous LDAP Root Searches
Anomalous Connection / SMB Enumeration
Device / Spike in LDAP Activity

C2:

Enhanced Monitoring - Device / Lateral Movement and C2 Activity

Enhanced Monitoring - Device / Initial Breach Chain Compromise

Enhanced Monitoring - Compromise / Suspicious File and C2

Compliance / Remote Management Tool On Server

Anomalous Connection / Outbound SSH to Unusual Port


External Data Transfer:

Enhanced Monitoring - Unusual Activity / Enhanced Unusual External Data Transfer

Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data Transfer

Anomalous Connection / Data Sent to Rare Domain

Unusual Activity / Unusual External Data to New Endpoint

Compliance / SSH to Rare External Destination

Anomalous Connection / Application Protocol on Uncommon Port

Enhanced Monitoring - Anomalous File / Numeric File Download

Anomalous File / New User Agent Followed By Numeric File Download

Anomalous Server Activity / Outgoing from Server

Device / Large Number of Connections to New Endpoints

Anomalous Connection / Multiple HTTP POSTs to Rare Hostname

Anomalous Connection / Uncommon 1 GiB Outbound

Lateral Movement:

User / New Admin Credentials on Server

Anomalous Connection / New or Uncommon Service Control

Anomalous Connection / High Volume of New or Uncommon Service Control

Anomalous File / Internal / Executable Uploaded to DC

Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Activity On High Risk Device

File Encryption:

Compliance / SMB Drive Write

Anomalous File / Internal / Additional Extension Appended to SMB File

Compromise / Ransomware / Possible Ransom Note Write

Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Read Write Ratio

List of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

IoC - Type - Description + Confidence

83.97.73[.]198 - IP - Data exfiltration endpoint

108.181.182[.]143 - IP - Data exfiltration endpoint

46.161.27[.]151 - IP - Data exfiltration endpoint

185.65.212[.]164 - IP - Data exfiltration endpoint

66[.]203.125.21 - IP - MEGA endpoint used for data exfiltration

89[.]44.168.207 - IP - MEGA endpoint used for data exfiltration

185[.]206.24.31 - IP - MEGA endpoint used for data exfiltration

31[.]216.148.33 - IP - MEGA endpoint used for data exfiltration

104.226.39[.]18 - IP - C2 endpoint

103.253.40[.]87 - IP - C2 endpoint

*.relay.splashtop[.]com - Hostname - C2 & data exfiltration endpoint

gfs***n***.userstorage.mega[.]co.nz - Hostname - MEGA endpoint used for data exfiltration

w.api.mega[.]co.nz - Hostname - MEGA endpoint used for data exfiltration

ams-rb9a-ss.ams.efscloud[.]net - Hostname - Data exfiltration endpoint

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Tactic - Technqiue

RECONNAISSANCE – T1592.004 Client Configurations

RECONNAISSANCE – T1590.005 IP Addresses

RECONNAISSANCE – T1595.001 Scanning IP Blocks

RECONNAISSANCE – T1595.002 Vulnerability Scanning

DISCOVERY – T1046 Network Service Scanning

DISCOVERY – T1018 Remote System Discovery

DISCOVERY – T1083 File and Directory Discovery
INITIAL ACCESS - T1189 Drive-by Compromise

INITIAL ACCESS - T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application

COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1001 Data Obfuscation

COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1071 Application Layer Protocol

COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1071.001 Web Protocols

COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1573.001 Symmetric Cryptography

COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1571 Non-Standard Port

DEFENSE EVASION – T1078 Valid Accounts

DEFENSE EVASION – T1550.002 Pass the Hash

LATERAL MOVEMENT - T1021.004 SSH

LATERAL MOVEMENT – T1080 Taint Shared Content

LATERAL MOVEMENT – T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer

LATERAL MOVEMENT – T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares

COLLECTION - T1185 Man in the Browser

EXFILTRATION - T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

EXFILTRATION - T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage

EXFILTRATION - T1029 Scheduled Transfer

IMPACT – T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact

References

1.     https://www.group-ib.com/blog/shadowsyndicate-raas/

2.     https://www.techtarget.com/searchsecurity/news/366617096/ESET-RansomHub-most-active-ransomware-group-in-H2-2024

3.     https://cyberint.com/blog/research/ransomhub-the-new-kid-on-the-block-to-know/

4.     https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2024-05/AA24-131A.stix_.xml

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About the author
Qing Hong Kwa
Senior Cyber Analyst and Deputy Analyst Team Lead, Singapore
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