Bytesize Security: A Guide to HTML Phishing Attachments
Darktrace guides you through the common signs of HTML phishing attachments, including common phishing emails, clever impersonations, fake webpages, and more.
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
One of the most common types of phishing email seen by the Darktrace SOC, involves the use of HTML attachments (Figure 1). These emails make use of an attachment to hide redirects to overtly malicious or suspicious domains. Some even impersonate legitimate web pages and send any entered or captured information back to the attacker's infrastructure once opened or filled out by the recipient. Indicators of these attempts can be identified from a few key patterns found across multiple emails.
Figure 1: An example of a suspicious HTML attachment containing dynamic content
A typical feature of these HTML attachments is the use of a generic-sounding filename that relates to the message's subject line, but with no specific information pertaining to the recipient or their line of business. These files almost always contain some form of Javascript code, as they often make use of external Javascript libraries to accomplish whatever goal is being pursued. For example, an attacker might use Javascript to convincingly impersonate a trustworthy website and trick the recipient into providing credentials or sensitive information, or they might use it to deploy malware and get a foothold on the device for further compromise once opened. This can be further identified by the presence of certain links in the HTML file itself (Figure 2).
Figure 2: The HTML file previously referenced contained multiple rare and suspicious links
Figure 2 above is an example of an HTML file containing multiple links with calls for .js files. This shows that the attachment contains Javascript and is making calls for external libraries for an undetermined purpose.
Another common red flag is when the file contains links to common Product or Service images from domains wholly unrelated to those services, as seen below (Figure 3).
Figure 3: An example of an unusual .png call from a rare domain. The subsequent image called is for a company with no apparent relation to the hosting domain
The examples above imply an obvious (and poor) attempt by the HTML file to impersonate a Microsoft webpage, likely a fake login page set up for credential harvesting, as the ‘Microsoft’ logo is being pulled from a domain entirely unrelated to Microsoft or any common image-hosting service.
Rather than impersonating a website directly in the file and loading resources from external sources, these HTML files will instead directly point toward a webpage that already contains these elements. This comes with its own set of pros and cons: by hosting their phishing page in a public setting, they are far more likely to be taken down, however it may be easier to appear legitimate than if they were to build it all out in the HTML file itself.
The final routine element in these types of HTML phishing emails is the mechanism by which the attacker intends to receive any successfully scammed credentials or information. If the fake webpage is entirely contained in the HTML file, this often presents as a suspicious PHP link present in the file itself (Figure 4).
Figure 4: Phishing HTMLs often include links to rare domains with PHP destinations as an indication that it will engage in some form of HTTP POST communication
PHP calls suggest that some part of the webpage is intended to submit an HTTP POST or equivalent ‘submission’ call, often present in the ‘Login’ button in these scenarios. After the victim clicks this button, the webpage sends all the form-submission items to the endpoint hosting the PHP page, which is commonly an indicator of the webserver hosting the attacker infrastructure running the phishing attack.
If the HTML file redirects to an externally hosted phishing page, identical PHP links are often found in the source code of those pages (Figure 5). This serves the same function as sending any entered credentials back to the attacker.
Figure 5: The source-code of an external-hosted phishing page, showing calls for PHP pages hosted on alternate attacker infrastructure
The process of HTML attacks is so standardized that they are commonly released in the form of easily deployable phishing kits. These can be deployed on unsuspecting compromised webservers with little to no modification, resulting in virtually identical attacks being seen year-round. WordPress seems to be a prime target for hosting such attacks, with the site owners often becoming unsuspecting victims in propagating these phishing campaigns. An unfortunate side effect of these kits being readily available is that the attackers often don't bother to set any sort of access restrictions on their phishing servers once established, which can result in their entire setup being publicly viewable with a simple link modification. One example is seen below (Figure 6).
Figure 6: The parent directory of the website hosting a suspicious PHP page was fully accessible without restriction
In this incident, the website hosting the PHP link seen earlier had a publicly accessible parent directory structure, where both the PHP file above and an additional suspicious .txt file could be seen. This .txt file appears to be where any information submitted by victims ultimately ended up written to (Figure 7).
Figure 7: The TXT file in the parent directory above appeared to contain the login information that was likely submitted to the PHP page referred to in the initial HTML attachment
Figure 7 above presents the unusual risk of not only having the victims’ credentials at the disposal of the original attacker, but also potentially exposed to any malicious actor that can get creative with a web-crawler to identify key elements of the files used by these particular phishing kits.
Fortunately, due to the standardized nature of these ready-made phishing kits, these types of attacks often conform to a series of common behaviors that Darktrace / EMAIL excels in identifying. Despite being a popular technique, it is extremely rare for attempts using this HTML attachment method to successfully get through a correct Darktrace / EMAIL deployment. Overall, this means one less risk for the end user to worry about.
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Darktrace / EMAIL Expands Behavioral Defense Across Email and Collaboration Workflows
New capabilities help employees understand suspicious content, give administrators more control over sensitive data, and show security teams where risky workflows sit across the organization.
Agentic attacks in the wild: Inside three ARTEX investigations
Key insights
· Darktrace observed activity in several customer environments involving infrastructure and behaviors associated with reported ARTEX-enabled campaigns, including activity linked to China-nexus espionage and financially motivated attacks.
· In the higher-confidence cases, known infrastructure appeared alongside beaconing, unusual TLS, reconnaissance, tunneling, script retrieval, SMB activity and external data transfer. One Azure case had no observed network command and control at all, only key listing and application identity activity.
· ARTEX is now used by actors with different objectives. Identifying the framework can help locate relevant activity, while the behavior around the affected system provides the stronger evidence for understanding compromise and attribution.
Introduction
Attackers have moved beyond using AI for phishing and are running agentic frameworks; open-source tools like ARTEX, CAIRN, PentAGI and Hexstrike that let AI agents scan, exploit and move through an environment with little human input [1]. ARTEX has moved quickly from an offensive security project into live intrusion activity. Since at least August 2026, the framework has been associated with espionage, financially motivated attacks and opportunistic campaigns across government, financial services, technology, defense, telecommunications and other sectors. The FBI has documented ARTEX activity spanning reconnaissance, exploitation, credential abuse, lateral movement, collection, command and control, and exfiltration [2].
Darktrace has observed activity in customer environments that overlaps with infrastructure, tooling and behaviors reported in several of these campaigns. The cases below highlight how those intrusions appeared on the network, including the activity visible before an analyst can determine which actor or framework may be responsible.
ARTEX as part of the attacker workflow
ARTEX is an open-source, multi-agent offensive security platform that converts high-level objectives into actions carried out by specialized agents [2]. Operators have used it to automate activity across the attack lifecycle, including scanning, exploitation, credential activity and post-compromise operations. Some reported intrusions moved from initial targeting to privileged access in under three hours [2].
The framework is now associated with actors pursuing different objectives and using different post-exploitation tooling. The original public repository was removed in October 2026, but archived copies and localized versions remain available. For defenders, ARTEX is more useful as context for an investigation than as an attribution shortcut.
Darktrace observations show the same point at network level. Infrastructure linked to reported ARTEX campaigns appeared alongside beaconing, tunneling, unusual TLS, reconnaissance, file retrieval and lateral activity.
Case 1: Espionage-linked activity
Darktrace observed activity associated with BLOODALCHEMY command-and-control (C2) infrastructure in two customer environments. In one environment, five devices communicated with nginxmysql[.]com and 45.153.126[.]223 between October 23 and November 2. Both indicators had previously been linked to China-nexus espionage activity involving ARTEX [4].
The connections were accompanied by suspicious beaconing, repeated successful connections and unusual self-signed TLS. One system began making suspicious TLS connections to nginxmysql[.]com on October 23. Beaconing followed on October 24, and SMB scanning appeared later in the sequence. Other affected systems subsequently communicated with previously unseen external endpoints.
Prior to the observed C2, Darktrace detected curl requests retrieving executable and script content including /systemd, /wazuh, linux_amd64, u.sh and q.sh. Related telemetry included DRSGetNCChanges activity consistent with DCSync, LDAP enumeration, DNS zone transfers, network scanning, certificate downloads and SMB writes involving start.bat.
Figure 1: Darktrace investigation showing suspicious network activity associated with infrastructure linked to reported ARTEX activity.
Figure 2: Darktrace detection showing anomalous self-signed TLS activity during the espionage-linked investigation.
BLOODALCHEMY has been reported in more than one China-nexus cluster [5]. SoftEther infrastructure observed in one environment provided another point of correlation with reported VAPOR PANDA tradecraft. The moderate-confidence assessment tying this to a Chinese nexus threat actor is based on infrastructure, victim context, tradecraft behavior that followed the initial connection, and public reporting.
Case 2: Financial-sector activity
In early November, Darktrace observed activity in two financial-sector environments that overlap with reported ARTEX infrastructure. On November 5, a server connected to 213.111.150[.]145:8099 and downloaded wisp-agent, associated with WISP C2 activity.
In a second environment, a device attempted connections to 85.11.167[.]52 on November 1 and 2. The connections occurred alongside beaconing to new and rare destinations, anomalous TLS, possible tunneling and unusual package downloads.
The device also communicated with temp[.]sh, ssh.localhost[.]run, localhost[.]run, termbin[.]com, pastebin[.]com and GitHub-hosted release infrastructure. The sequence showed potential tooling retrieval, C2, tunneling and use of external services capable of staging or moving data.
Figure 3: Darktrace investigation showing connections to new and rare external destinations during the financial-sector activity.
Case 3: Credential collection in Azure
On October 20, Darktrace observed a sweep of credential collection in a customer’s Azure environment that is consistent with ARTEX use. The intrusion began with connections to the virtual network from 43.98.196[.]73 (Alibaba Cloud). Open-source scanning data associates the address with ARTEX.
A compromised user identity made requests to the Azure Resource Manager API, though how it was compromised is unknown. The requests listed keys and secrets across API Management, web and function apps, Cognitive Services, Event Hubs, storage accounts and a managed Kubernetes cluster. With those credentials the attacker compromised multiple application identities. The attacker then used the application identities and the user identity to retrieve more credentials, change firewall and security rules and run scripts on virtual machines. Microsoft Defender alerts showed attempted execution of scripts related to Mimikatz and Impacket.
In a cloud environment, such privileged and enumerative operations are potentially indistinguishable from legitimate administrative actions. Consequently, the sequence and context of such operations signified more than any specific API call. There was no C2 traffic to match, and listing keys and using application identities are also what administrators and automation do. A compromised user, credential retrieval across several Azure services, new application identities, more credential collection and changes to security controls only made sense together, and by then access was spreading through the cloud environment.
Figure 4: Darktrace Advanced Search showing Azure AD operation names associated with the activity.
Figure 5: Darktrace Advanced Search showing the Azure Resource Manager action used to execute scripts.
Figure 6: Darktrace Device Event log window showing the triggered models related to the suspicious Azure activity.
Shared tooling weakens attribution signals
The three cases looked different on the network: BLOODALCHEMY infrastructure and espionage-consistent tradecraft, WISP infrastructure in financial-sector systems, and Azure identity and control-plane activity with no C2 at all.
Shared tooling has complicated attribution for years, and ARTEX adds to it because the framework carries out more of the attack, so reconnaissance, exploitation attempts and some post-compromise activity can look the same whoever set the objective. Attribution still needs infrastructure, malware, victimology, timing and the sequence of behavior inside the environment, and an ARTEX link is one input to that. Moreover, the behavior and the agent will still be shaped by the biases, preferences, and tradecraft of its operators.
At its core, ARTEX’s planner and worker agents identify and record facts, while exploring intents. However, the way the Large Language Model (LLM) chooses its next steps toward an objective is shaped fundamentally by the skills and tools available in its context. This includes its starting context, as well as various possible Model Context Protocol (MCP) plugins and user-injected context (e.g. user input mid-operation). Operators still have preferred tradecraft, and this preference shapes the pathways the harness will provide to the LLM in context prompts. Even on the same platform, customization based on operator preferences and goals will remain a key facet of campaign and actor identification.
Detection and response
Across the Darktrace cases, the stronger signals came from behavior after the connection: beaconing, abnormal TLS, reconnaissance, unusual authentication, tunneling, script retrieval, SMB activity and outbound transfer. Automated activity also produced compressed bursts of requests, sequential enumeration and repeated attempts with small changes.
With agentic tools reaching privileged access in under three hours, analysts may have only a short window to connect scanning or authentication activity to credential changes, new administrative access, tooling retrieval or lateral movement. Keeping network, identity and cloud telemetry together shows what happened before and after the first match, and whether a connection was noise or an intrusion moving toward privileged access.
ARTEX won’t be the last of these frameworks. The next ones will come with new capabilities and defaults, but an intrusion still must interact with the target environment, and that shows up in how systems, identities and applications behave even after the indicator has aged out. The harder intrusions to catch will have no infrastructure to match, just ordinary API calls and legitimate identities. Detecting those depends on knowing what normal looks like for each identity and device.
Credit to Nathaniel Jones (SVP, Global Threat Intelligence), Eugene Chua (Principal Analyst), Sam Lister (Senior Security Researcher), Adam Potter (Associate Principal Cyber Analyst)
Appendices
Darktrace model detections
· Anomalous Connection / Multiple HTTP POSTs to Rare Hostname
· Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Successful Connections
· Compromise / Suspicious Beaconing Behaviour
· Compromise / Agent Beacon to New Endpoint
· Compromise / Beacon to Young Endpoint
· Compromise / SSL Beaconing to Rare Destination
· Compromise / Suspicious TLS Beaconing To Rare External
· Compromise / Possible Tunnelling to Bin Services
· Device / Anomalous Github Download
· Device / Anomalous Package Download
· Device / Initial Attack Chain Activity
Indicators of compromise (IoCs)
nginxmysql[.]com
45.153.126[.]223
213.111.150[.]145
wisp-agent
85.11.167[.]52
43.98.196[.]73
192.121.47[.]20
www[.]ddduuuppp[.]com
89.46.234[.]50
sqlserver-sqlite[.]com
199.19.95[.]66
graphics-hook-filter64.dll
graphics-hook_config.bin
References
1. Google. GTIG AI Threat Tracker - https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/agentic-threat-activity-crosses-a-significant-threshold
2. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Threat Overview of ARTEX Autonomous Penetration Testing Framework, FLASH-20261113-001, 13 November 2026: https://www.ic3.gov/CSA/2026/261113.pdf
3. Microsoft Security Blog, Storm-0940 Uses ARTEX Agentic AI in ConnectWise Supply Chain Compromise: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/10/21/storm-0940-uses-artex-agentic-ai-connectwise-supply-chain-compromise/
4. CrowdStrike, VAPOR PANDA Uses ARTEX to Scale Global Campaign: https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/blog/vapor-panda-uses-artex-to-scale-global-campaign/
5. Bitdefender, SilkParasite: Tracking a China-Nexus APT Across Central Asia: https://www.bitdefender.com/en-us/blog/businessinsights/silkparasite-tracking-china-nexus-apt-across-central-asia
Darktrace qualifies for NATO’s Cybersecurity Dynamic Marketplace
Darktrace has been selected to join NATO’s Cybersecurity Dynamic Marketplace (CSDM), an initiative designed to give NATO faster, more flexible access to cybersecurity technology and services in support of its missions.
Established by the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA), the marketplace brings together qualified suppliers whose technical capabilities have been reviewed, helping NATO match specialist expertise to project needs and respond more quickly to changing operational priorities.
Qualified across all eight cybersecurity categories
The program’s first phase, known as Lot 1, covers eight cybersecurity categories. Suppliers can qualify in individual categories; Darktrace has qualified to compete for future work across all eight:
Identity, Credential and Access Management
Endpoint Protection and Platforms
Network and Perimeter Security
Cloud Security
Threat Detection and Analytics Platforms
Vulnerability and Exposure Management
Digital Forensics and Evidence Platforms
Professional Services
Darktrace’s qualification across all eight categories reflects the breadth of our technology and services.
Supporting government and defense organizations
Nation-state attacks, compromised suppliers, the rapid exploitation of security weaknesses and attackers’ growing use of AI are increasing pressure on public-sector organizations. At the same time, agencies are adopting cloud services, connecting the technology that runs physical operations, and introducing automation and AI. Security teams must manage these changes while keeping essential operations running and sensitive information secure.
Protecting these environments requires an understanding of how people, AI and connected systems interact, and the ability to recognize when their activity creates risk. Threats can span several systems, making it essential for security teams to connect related activity and respond quickly.
The Darktrace Behavioral Defense Platform™ supports this approach through unified visibility, continuous behavioral monitoring and autonomous response across AI, people and infrastructure.
At its core, Darktrace’s Adaptive AI™ continuously learns how each organization behaves, building a unique understanding of its people, AI agents and connected systems. This enables the platform to help identify activity that does not belong, connect related behavior across the organization, and investigate and respond to threats autonomously in real time, helping prevent disruption to essential operations.
Our selection builds on work to meet government security requirements internationally. Darktrace recently completed an independent assessment under Australia’s InfoSec Registered Assessors Program (IRAP) for Darktrace / NETWORK™ and Darktrace / OT™ against the Australian Government’s Information Security Manual PROTECTED-level controls. In the United States, Darktrace Federal continues to deliver the Darktrace technology to Department of War, Department of State, and Federal civilian organizations via its on-premises and FedRAMP CLASS D (High) Authorization platforms.
Together, these achievements demonstrate Darktrace’s ability to meet rigorous public-sector security requirements and reinforce its position as a trusted provider of mission-critical cybersecurity technology for government environments.
Meet us at NATO Edge 2026
Darktrace representatives will attend NATO Edge 2026, NCIA’s flagship technology event, in İzmir, Türkiye, from 17 to 19 November. We look forward to meeting government, military, and industry partners to discuss their cybersecurity priorities and how we can support them.