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August 7, 2024

How Darktrace’s AI Applies a Zero-Trust Mentality within Critical Infrastructure Supply Chains

Darktrace prevented a Critical National Infrastructure organization from falling victim to a SharePoint phishing attack originating from one of its trusted suppliers. This blog discusses common perceptions of zero-trust in email security, how AI that uses anomaly-based threat detection embodies core zero-trust principles and the relevance of this approach to securing CNI bodies with complex but interdependent supply chains from Cloud account compromise. 
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Nicole Wong
Cyber Security Analyst
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07
Aug 2024

Note: In order to name anonymity, real organization names have been replaced, all names used in this blog are fictitious.

What are critical national infrastructure sectors?

Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) sectors encompass of assets, systems, and networks essential to the functioning of society. Any disruption or destruction of these sectors could have wide-reaching and potentially disastrous effects on a country’s economy, security and/or healthcare services [1].

Cyber risks across Transportation Systems sector

Transportation Systems is one such CNI sector comprising of interconnected networks of fixed and mobile assets managed by both public and private operators. These systems are highly interdependent with other CNI sectors too. As such, the digital technologies this sector relies on – such as positioning and tracking, signaling, communications, industrial system controls, and data and business management – are often interconnected through different networks and remote access terminals. This interconnectedness creates multiple entry points that need to be security across the supply.

Digital transformation has swept through CNI sectors in recent years, including Transportation Systems. These organizations are now increasingly dependent on third-party and cloud providers for data storage and transmission, making their supply chains vulnerable to exploitation by malicious actors [2].

The exploitation of legitimate and popular cloud services mirrors the well-known “living-off-the-land” techniques, which are not being adapted to the cloud along with the resources they support. In one recent case previously discussed by Darktrace, for example, a phishing attack attempted to abuse Dropbox to deliver malicious payloads.

Zero-Trust within CNI Sectors

One recommended approach to secure an organization’s supply chain and cloud environments is the implementation of zero-trust strategies, which remove inherent trust within the network [3] [4]. The principle of “never trust, always verify” is widely recognized as an architectural design, with 63% of organizations surveyed by Gartner reportedly implementing a zero-trust strategy, but in most cases to less than 50% of their environments [5]

Although this figure reflects the reality and challenge of balancing operations and security, demands from the threat landscape and supply chain risks mean that organizations must adopt zero-trust principles in areas not traditionally considered part of network architecture, such as email and cloud environments.

Email is often the primary entry point for cyber-attacks with Business Email Compromise (BEC) being a major threat to CNI organizations. However, the application of zero-trust principles to secure email environments is still not well understood. Common misconceptions include:

  • “Positively identifying known and trusted senders” – Maintaining a list of “known and trusted senders” contradicts the zero-trust model, which assumes that no entity is inherently trustworthy.
  • “Using DMARC, DKIM and SPF” – While these protocols offer some protection, they are often insufficient on their own, as they can be bypassed and do not protect against email account takeovers. Research published from Darktrace’s last two threat reports consistently shows that at least 60% of phishing emails detected by Darktrace had bypassed Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting & Conformance (DMARC) [6] [7].  
  • “Mapping transaction flows between internal and external users to determine what access is required/not required” – Although this aligns with the principles of least privilege, it is too static for today’s dynamic supply chains and evolving digital infrastructure. This approach also suggests the existence of “trusted” access routes into a network.

Attack Overview

In July 2024, Darktrace / EMAIL™ detected and contained a sophisticated phishing attack leveraging Microsoft SharePoint. This attack exploited the trusted relationship between a Darktrace customer in the public transport sector and a compromised supplier. Traditional methods, such as those detailed above, would likely have failed to defend against such an advanced threat. However, Darktrace’s behavioral analysis and zero-trust approach to email security allowed it to successfully identify and neutralize the attack, preventing any potential disruption.

Initial Intrusion Attempt

The observed phishing attack by Darktrace would suggest that the customer’s supplier was targeted by a similar campaign beforehand. This initial breach likely allowed the attacker to use the now compromised account as a vector to compromise additional accounts and networks.

On July 9, Darktrace / EMAIL identified a significant spike in inbound emails from “supplier@engineeringcompany[.]com”. The emails appeared to be legitimate notifications sent via SharePoint and contained a file named “Payment Applications Docs”.

Email correspondence in the weeks around the phishing attack.
Figure 1: Email correspondence in the weeks around the phishing attack. The sender is an established correspondent with ongoing communications prior to and after the attack, however there is a significant spike in incoming emails on the day of the attack.

This reflects a common technique in malicious social engineering attempts, where references to payment are used to draw attention and prompt a response. Darktrace observed a large number of recipients within the organization receiving the same file, suggesting that the motive was likely credential harvesting rather than financial gain. Financially motivated attacks typically require a more targeted, ‘under-the-radar’ approach to be successful.

These phishing emails were able to bypass the customer’s email gateways as they were sent from a trusted and authoritative source, SharePoint, and utilized an email address with which the customer had previously corresponded. The compromised account was likely whitelisted by traditional email security tools that rely on SPF, DKIM, and DMAC, allowing the malicious emails to evade detection.

Autonomous Response

Darktrace / EMAIL analysis of the unusual characteristics of the phishing email in relation to the supplier’s typical behaviour, despite the email originating from a legitimate SharePoint notification.
Figure 2: Darktrace / EMAIL analysis of the unusual characteristics of the phishing email in relation to the supplier’s typical behavior, despite the email originating from a legitimate SharePoint notification.

However, Darktrace / EMAIL did not use these static rules to automatically trust the email. Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI detected the following anomalies:

  • Although the sender was known, it was not normal for the supplier to share files with the customer via SharePoint.
  • The supplier initiated an unusually large number of file shares in a short period of time, indicating potential spam activity.
  • The SharePoint link had wide access permissions, which is unusual for a sensitive payment document legitimately shared between established contacts.

Darktrace understood that the email activity constituted a significant deviation in expected behavior between the sender and customer, regardless of the known sender and use of a legitimate filesharing platform like SharePoint.

As a result, Darktrace took action to hold more than 100 malicious emails connected to the phishing attack, preventing them from landing in recipient inboxes in the first instance.  By taking a behavioral approach to securing customer email environments, Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI embodies the principles of zero trust, assessing each interaction in real-time against a user’s dynamic baseline rather than relying on static and often inaccurate rules to define trust.

Conclusion

Cloud services, such as SharePoint, offer significant advantages to the transportation sector by streamlining data exchange with supply chain partners and facilitating access to information for analytics and planning. However, these benefits come with notable risks. If a cloud account is compromised, unauthorized access to sensitive information could lead to extortion and lateral movement into mission-critical systems for more damaging attacks on CNI. Even a brief disruption in cloud access can have severe economic repercussions due to the sector’s dependence on these services for resource coordination and the cascading impacts on other critical systems [9].

While supply chain resilience is often evaluated based on a supplier’s initial compliance with baseline standards, organizations must be wary of potential future threats and focus on post-implementation security. It is essential for organizations to employ strategies to protect their assets from attacks that would exploit vulnerabilities within the trusted supply chain. Given that CNI and the transportation sector are prime targets for state-sponsored actors and Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) groups, the complex and interconnected nature of their supply chains opens the door for opportunistic attackers.

Defenders face the challenge of ensuring secure access and collaboration across numerous, dynamic assets, often without full visibility. Therefore, security solutions must be as dynamic as the threats they face, avoiding reliance on static rules. Real-time assessment of devices behavior, even if deemed trusted by end-users and human security teams, is crucial for maintaining security.

Darktrace’s AI-driven threat detection aligns with the zero-trust principle of assuming the risk of a breach. By leveraging AI that learns an organization’s specific patterns of life, Darktrace provides a tailored security approach ideal for organizations with complex supply chains.

Credit to Nicole Wong, Senior Cyber Analyst Consultant and Ryan Traill, Threat Content Lead

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections

Key model alerts:

  • Personalized Sharepoint Share + New Unknown Link
  • Personalized Sharepoint Share + Bad Display Text
  • Personalized Sharepoint Share + Distant Recipient Interaction with Domain
  • Personalized Sharepoint Share + Sender Surge
  • Personalized Sharepoint Share + Wide Access Sharepoint Link

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Resource Development • Compromise Accounts: Cloud Accounts • T1586.003

Initial Access • Supply Chain Compromise • T1195

References

[1] https://www.cisa.gov/topics/critical-infrastructure-security-and-resilience/critical-infrastructure-sectors

[2]  https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/126313/pdf/

[3] https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-161r1.pdf

[4] https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/press-releases/2023/11/15/cloud-security-alliance-launches-the-industry-s-first-authoritative-zero-trust-training-and-credential-the-certificate-of-competence-in-zero-trust-cczt

[5] https://www.gartner.com/en/documents/5286863#:~:text=Summary,anticipate%20staffing%20and%20cost%20increases.

[6] https://darktrace.com/threat-report-2023

[7] https://darktrace.com/resources/first-6-half-year-threat-report-2024

[8] https://dfrlab.org/2023/07/10/critical-infrastructure-and-the-cloud-policy-for-emerging-risk/#transportation

[9] https://access-national-risk-register.service.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/risk-scenario/cyber-attack-transport-sector

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Nicole Wong
Cyber Security Analyst

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April 29, 2025

MFA Under Attack: AiTM Phishing Kits Abusing Legitimate Services

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In late 2024 and early 2025, the Darktrace Security Operations Center (SOC) investigated alerts regarding separate cases of Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) account compromises on two customer environments that presented several similarities, suggesting they were part of a wider phishing campaign.

This campaign was found to leverage the project collaboration and note-taking application, Milanote, and the Tycoon 2FA phishing kit.

Legitimate services abused

As highlighted in Darktrace's 2024 Annual Threat Report [1], threat actors are abusing legitimate services, like Milanote, in their phishing campaigns. By leveraging these trusted platforms and domains, malicious actors can bypass traditional security measures, making their phishing emails appear benign and increasing the likelihood of successful attacks.

Darktrace categorizes these senders and platforms as free content senders. These services allow users to send emails containing custom content (e.g., files) from fully validated, fixed service address belonging to legitimate corporations. Although some of these services permit full body and subject customization by attackers, the structure of these emails is generally consistent, making it challenging to differentiate between legitimate and malicious emails.

What is Tycoon 2FA?

Tycoon 2FA is an Adversary-in-the-Middle (AitM) phishing kit, first seen in August 2023 and distributed via the Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) model [2]. It targets multi-factor authentication (MFA) by intercepting credentials and MFA tokens during authentication on fake Microsoft or Google login pages. The attacker captures session cookies after MFA is completed, allowing them to replay the session and access the user account, even if credentials are reset. The rise in MFA use has increased the popularity of AitM phishing kits like Tycoon 2FA and Mamba 2FA, another AiTM phishing kit investigated by Darktrace.

Initial access via phishing email

At the beginning of 2025, Darktrace observed phishing emails leveraging Milanote being sent to multiple internal recipients in an organization. In this attack, the same email was sent to 19 different users, all of which were held by Darktrace.

The subject line of the emails mentioned both a legitimate internal user of the company, the company name, as well as a Milanote board regarding a “new agreement” in German. It is a common social engineering technique to mention urgent matters, such as unpaid invoices, expired passwords, or awaiting voicemails, in the subject line to prompt immediate action from the user. However, this tactic is now widely covered in phishing awareness training, making users more suspicious of such emails. In this case, while the subject mentioned a “new agreement,” likely raising the recipient’s curiosity, the tone remained professional and not overly alarming. Additionally, the mention of a colleague and the standardized language typical of free content sender emails further helped dispel concerns regarding the email.

These emails were sent by the legitimate address support@milanote[.]com and referenced "Milanote" in the personal field of the header but originated from the freemail address “ahnermatternk.ef.od.13@gmail[.]com”. Darktrace / EMAIL recognized that none of the recipients had previously received a file share email from Milanote, making this sender unfamiliar in the customer's email environment

The emails contained several benign links to legitimate Milanote endpoints (including an unsubscribe link) which were not flagged by Darktrace. However, they also included a malicious link designed to direct recipients to a pre-filled credential harvesting page hosted on Milanote, prompting them to register for an account. Despite not blocking the legitimate Milanote links in the same email, Darktrace locked the malicious link, preventing users from visiting the credential harvester.

Credential harvesting page sent to recipients, as seen in. sandbox environment.
Figure 1: Credential harvesting page sent to recipients, as seen in. sandbox environment.

Around one minute later, one recipient received a legitimate email from Milanote confirming their successful account registration, indicating they had accessed the phishing page. This email had a lower anomaly score and was not flagged by Darktrace / EMAIL because, unlike the first email, it did not contain any suspicious links and was a genuine account registration notification. Similarly, in the malicious Milanote email, only the link leading to the phishing page was blocked, while the benign and legitimate Milanote links remained accessible, demonstrating Darktrace’s precise and targeted actioning.

A legitimate and a malicious Milanote email received by one recipient.
Figure 2: A legitimate and a malicious Milanote email received by one recipient.

Around the same time, Darktrace / NETWORK observed the same user’s device making DNS query for the domain name “lrn.ialeahed[.]com” , which has been flagged as a Tycoon 2FA domain [2], suggesting the use of this phishing platform.

Once the user had entered their details in the credential harvester, it is likely that they were presented a document hosted on Milanote that contained the final payload link – likely hidden behind text instructing users to access a “new agreement” document.

External research indicates that the user was likely directed to a Cloudflare Turnstile challenge meant to reroute unwanted traffic, such as automated security scripts and penetration testing tools [2] [3]. After these checks and other background processes are completed, the user is directed to the final landing page. In this case, it was likely a fake login prompt hosted on the attacker’s server, where the user is asked to authenticate to their account using MFA. By burrowing malicious links and files in this manner, threat actors can evade analysis by traditional security email gateways, effectively bypassing their protection.

Darktrace’s analysis of the structure and word content of the phishing emails resulted in an 82% probability score that the email was malicious, and the email further received a 67% phishing inducement score, representing how closely the structure and word content of the emails compared to typical phishing emails.

All these unusual elements triggered multiple alerts in Darktrace / EMAIL, focusing on two main suspicious aspects: a new, unknown sender with no prior correspondence with the recipients or the environment, and the inclusion of a link to a previously unseen file storage solution.

Milanote phishing email as seen within Darktrace / EMAIL.
Figure 3: Milanote phishing email as seen within Darktrace / EMAIL.

After detecting the fifth email, the “Sender Surge” model alert was triggered in Darktrace / EMAIL due to a significant number of recipients being emailed by this new suspicious sender in a short period. These recipients were from various departments across the customer’s organization, including sales, marketing, purchasing, and production. Darktrace / EMAIL determined that the emails were sent to a highly unusual group of internal recipients, further raising doubts about the business legitimacy.

Darktrace / EMAIL suggested actions to contain the attack by holding all Milanote phishing emails back from recipient’s inboxes, except for the detailed email with locked links. However, autonomous actions were not enabled at the time, allowing the initial email to reach recipients' inboxes, providing a brief window for interaction. Unfortunately, during this window, one recipient clicked on the Milanote payload link, leading to the compromise of their account.

SaaS account takeover

About three minutes after the malicious Milanote email was received, Darktrace / IDENTITY detected an unusual login to the email recipient’s SaaS account. The SaaS actor was observed accessing files from their usual location in Germany, while simultaneously, a 100% rare login occurred from a location in the US that had never been seen in the customer’s environment before. This login was also flagged as suspicious by Microsoft 365, triggering a 'Conditional Access Policy' that required MFA authentication, which was successfully completed.

Tycoon 2FA adnimistration panel login page dated from October 2023 [3].
Figure 4: Tycoon 2FA adnimistration panel login page dated from October 2023 [3].

Despite the successful authentication, Darktrace / IDENTITY recognized that the login from this unusual location, coupled with simultaneous activity in another geographically distant location, were highly suspicious. Darktrace went on to observe MFA-validated logins from three separate US-based IP addresses: 89.185.80[.]19, 5.181.3[.]68, and 38.242.7[.]252. Most of the malicious activity was performed from the latter, which is associated with the Hide My Ass (HMA) VPN network [5].

Darktrace’s detection of the suspicious login from the US while the legitimate user was logged in from Germany.
Figure 5: Darktrace’s detection of the suspicious login from the US while the legitimate user was logged in from Germany.
Darktrace’s detection of the suspicious login following successful MFA authentication.
Figure 6: Darktrace’s detection of the suspicious login following successful MFA authentication.

Following this, the malicious actor accessed the user’s inbox and created a new mailbox rule named “GTH” that deleted any incoming email containing the string “milanote” in the subject line or body. Rules like this are a common technique used by attackers to leverage compromised accounts for launching phishing campaigns and concealing replies to phishing emails that might raise suspicions among legitimate account holders. Using legitimate, albeit compromised, accounts to send additional phishing emails enhances the apparent legitimacy of the malicious emails. This tactic has been reported as being used by Tycoon 2FA attackers [4].

The attacker accessed over 140 emails within the legitimate user’s inbox, including both the inbox and the “Sent Items” folder. Notably, the attacker accessed five emails in the “Sent Items” folder and modified their attachments. These emails were mainly related to invoices, suggesting the threat actor may have been looking to hijack those email threads to send fake invoices or replicate previous invoice emails.

Darktrace’s Cyber AI AnalystTM launched autonomous investigations into the individual events surrounding this suspicious activity. It connected these separate events into a single, broad account takeover incident, providing the customer with a clearer view of the ongoing compromise.

Cyber AI Analyst’s detection of unusual SaaS account activities in a single incident.
Figure 7: Cyber AI Analyst’s detection of unusual SaaS account activities in a single incident.
Cyber AI Analyst investigation of suspicious activities performed by the attacker.
Figure 8: Cyber AI Analyst investigation of suspicious activities performed by the attacker.

Darktrace's response

Within three minutes of the first unusual login alert, Darktrace’s Autonomous Response intervened, disabling the compromised user account for two hours.

As the impacted customer was subscribed to the Managed Threat Detection Service, Darktrace’s SOC team investigated the activity further and promptly alerted the customer’s security team. With the user’s account still disabled by Autonomous Response, the attack was contained, allowing the customer’s security team valuable time to investigate and remediate. Within ten minutes of receiving the alert from Darktrace’s SOC, they reset the user’s password, closed all active SaaS sessions, and deleted the malicious email rule. Darktrace’s SOC further supported the customer through the Security Operations Service Support service by providing information about the data accessed and identifying any other affected users.

Autonomous Response actions carried out by Darktrace / IDENTITY to contain the malicious activity
Figure 9: Autonomous Response actions carried out by Darktrace / IDENTITY to contain the malicious activity.

A wider Milanote phishing campaign?

Around a month before this compromise activity, Darktrace alerted another customer to similar activities involving two compromised user accounts. These accounts created new inbox rules named “GFH” and “GVB” to delete all incoming emails containing the string “milanote” in their subject line and/or body.

The phishing emails that led to the compromise of these user accounts were similar to the ones discussed above. Specifically, these emails were sent via the Milanote platform and referenced a “new agreement” (in Spanish) being shared by a colleague. Additionally, the payload link included in the phishing emails showed the same UserPrincipalName (UPN) attribute (i.e., click?upn=u001.qLX9yCzR), which has been seen in other Milanote phishing emails leveraging Tycoon 2FA reported by OSINT sources [6]. Interestingly, in some cases, the email also referenced a “new agreement” in Portuguese, indicating a global campaign.

Based on the similarities in the rule’s naming convention and action, as well as the similarities in the phishing email subjects, it is likely that these were part of the same campaign leveraging Milanote and Tycoon 2FA to compromise user accounts. Since its introduction, the Tycoon 2FA phishing kit has undergone several enhancements to increase its stealth and obfuscation methods, making it harder for security tools to detect. For example, the latest versions contain special source code to obstruct web page analysis by defenders, prevent users from copying meaningful text from the phishing webpages, and disable the right-click menu to prevent offline analysis [4].

Conclusion

Threat actors are continually employing new methods to bypass security detection tools and measures. As highlighted in this blog, even robust security mechanisms like MFA can be compromised using AitM phishing kits. The misuse of legitimate services such as Milanote for malicious purposes can help attackers evade traditional email security solutions by blurring the distinction between legitimate and malicious content.

This is why security tools based on anomaly detection are crucial for defending against such attacks. However, user awareness is equally important. Delays in processing can impact the speed of response, making it essential for users to be informed about these threats.

Appendices

References

[1] https://www.darktrace.com/resources/annual-threat-report-2024

[2] https://www.validin.com/blog/tycoon_2fa_analyzing_and_hunting_phishing-as-a-service_domains

[3] https://blog.sekoia.io/tycoon-2fa-an-in-depth-analysis-of-the-latest-version-of-the-aitm-phishing-kit/#h-iocs-amp-technical-details

[4] https://blog.barracuda.com/2025/01/22/threat-spotlight-tycoon-2fa-phishing-kit

[5] https://spur.us/context/38.242.7.252    

[6] https://any.run/report/5ef1ac94e4c6c1dc35579321c206453aea80d414108f9f77abd2e2b03ffbd658/be5351d9-53c0-470b-8708-ee2e29300e70

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

IoC         Type      Description + Probability

89.185.80[.]19 - IP Address - Malicious login

5.181.3[.]68 - IP Address -Malicious login

38.242.7[.]252 - IP Address - Malicious login and new email inbox rule creation -  Hide My Ass VPN

lrn.ialeahed[.]com – Hostname - Likely Tycoon 2FA domain

Darktrace Model Detections

Email alerts

Platforms / Free Content Sender + High Sender Surge

Platforms / Free Content Sender + Sender Surge

Platforms / Free Content Sender + Unknown Initiator

Platforms / Free Content Sender

Platforms / Free Content Sender + First Time Recipient

Unusual / New Sender Surge

Unusual / Sender Surge

Antigena Anomaly / High Antigena Anomaly

Association / Unknown Sender

History / New Sender

Link / High Rarity Link to File Storage

Link/ Link To File Storage

Link / Link to File Storage + Unknown Sender

Link / Low Link Association

Platforms / Free Content Sender + First Time Initiator

Platforms / Free Content Sender + Unknown Initiator + Freemail

Platforms / Free Content Sender Link

Unusual / Anomalous Association

Unusual / Unlikely Recipient Association

IDENTITY

SaaS / Access / Unusual External Source for SaaS Credential Use

SaaS / Compromise / Login from Rare High Risk Endpoint

SaaS / Access / M365 High Risk Level Login

SaaS / Compromise / Login From Rare Endpoint While User Is Active

SaaS / Access / MailItemsAccessed from Rare Endpoint

SaaS / Unusual Activity / Multiple Unusual SaaS Activities

SaaS / Unusual Activity / Multiple Unusual External Sources For SaaS Credential

SaaS / Compliance / Anomalous New Email Rule

SaaS / Compromise / Unusual Login and New Email Rule

SaaS / Compromise / SaaS Anomaly Following Anomalous Login

Antigena / SaaS / Antigena Suspicious SaaS Activity Block

Antigena / SaaS / Antigena Enhanced Monitoring from SaaS User Block

Antigena / SaaS / Antigena Unusual Activity Block

Antigena / SaaS / Antigena Suspicious SaaS and Email Activity Block

Cyber AI Analyst Incident

Possible Hijack of Office365 Account

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Tactic – Technique

DEFENSE EVASION, PERSISTENCE, PRIVILEGE ESCALATION, INITIAL ACCESS - Cloud Accounts

INITIAL ACCESS - Phishing

CREDENTIAL ACCESS - Steal Web Session Cookie

PERSISTENCE - Account Manipulation

PERSISTENCE - Outlook Rules

RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT - Email Accounts

RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT - Compromise Accounts

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About the author
Alexandra Sentenac
Cyber Analyst

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April 29, 2025

The Importance of NDR in Resilient XDR

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As threat actors become more adept at targeting and disabling EDR agents, relying solely on endpoint detection leaves critical blind spots.

Network detection and response (NDR) offers the visibility and resilience needed to catch what EDR can’t especially in environments with unmanaged devices or advanced threats that evade local controls.

This blog explores how threat actors can disable or bypass EDR-based XDR solutions and demonstrates how Darktrace’s approach to NDR closes the resulting security gaps with Self-Learning AI that enables autonomous, real-time detection and response.

Threat actors see local security agents as targets

Recent research by security firms has highlighted ‘EDR killers’: tools that deliberately target EDR agents to disable or damage them. These include the known malicious tool EDRKillShifter, the open source EDRSilencer, EDRSandblast and variants of Terminator, and even the legitimate business application HRSword.

The attack surface of any endpoint agent is inevitably large, whether the software is challenged directly, by contesting its local visibility and access mechanisms, or by targeting the Operating System it relies upon. Additionally, threat actors can readily access and analyze EDR tools, and due to their uniformity across environments an exploit proven in a lab setting will likely succeed elsewhere.

Sophos have performed deep research into the EDRShiftKiller tool, which ESET have separately shown became accessible to multiple threat actor groups. Cisco Talos have reported via TheRegister observing significant success rates when an EDR kill was attempted by ransomware actors.

With the local EDR agent silently disabled or evaded, how will the threat be discovered?

What are the limitations of relying solely on EDR?

Cyber attackers will inevitably break through boundary defences, through innovation or trickery or exploiting zero-days. Preventive measures can reduce but not completely stop this. The attackers will always then want to expand beyond their initial access point to achieve persistence and discover and reach high value targets within the business. This is the primary domain of network activity monitoring and NDR, which includes responsibility for securing the many devices that cannot run endpoint agents.

In the insights from a CISA Red Team assessment of a US CNI organization, the Red Team was able to maintain access over the course of months and achieve their target outcomes. The top lesson learned in the report was:

“The assessed organization had insufficient technical controls to prevent and detect malicious activity. The organization relied too heavily on host-based endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions and did not implement sufficient network layer protections.”

This proves that partial, isolated viewpoints are not sufficient to track and analyze what is fundamentally a connected problem – and without the added visibility and detection capabilities of NDR, any downstream SIEM or MDR services also still have nothing to work with.

Why is network detection & response (NDR) critical?

An effective NDR finds threats that disable or can’t be seen by local security agents and generally operates out-of-band, acquiring data from infrastructure such as traffic mirroring from physical or virtual switches. This means that the security system is extremely inaccessible to a threat actor at any stage.

An advanced NDR such as Darktrace / NETWORK is fully capable of detecting even high-end novel and unknown threats.

Detecting exploitation of Ivanti CS/PS with Darktrace / NETWORK

On January 9th 2025, two new vulnerabilities were disclosed in Ivanti Connect Secure and Policy Secure appliances that were under malicious exploitation. Perimeter devices, like Ivanti VPNs, are designed to keep threat actors out of a network, so it's quite serious when these devices are vulnerable.

An NDR solution is critical because it provides network-wide visibility for detecting lateral movement and threats that an EDR might miss, such as identifying command and control sessions (C2) and data exfiltration, even when hidden within encrypted traffic and which an EDR alone may not detect.

Darktrace initially detected suspicious activity connected with the exploitation of CVE-2025-0282 on December 29, 2024 – 11 days before the public disclosure of the vulnerability, this early detection highlights the benefits of an anomaly-based network detection method.

Throughout the campaign and based on the network telemetry available to Darktrace, a wide range of malicious activities were identified, including the malicious use of administrative credentials, the download of suspicious files, and network scanning in the cases investigated.

Darktrace / NETWORK’s autonomous response capabilities played a critical role in containment by autonomously blocking suspicious connections and enforcing normal behavior patterns. At the same time, Darktrace Cyber AI Analyst™ automatically investigated and correlated the anomalous activity into cohesive incidents, revealing the full scope of the compromise.

This case highlights the importance of real-time, AI-driven network monitoring to detect and disrupt stealthy post-exploitation techniques targeting unmanaged or unprotected systems.

Unlocking adaptive protection for evolving cyber risks

Darktrace / NETWORK uses unique AI engines that learn what is normal behavior for an organization’s entire network, continuously analyzing, mapping and modeling every connection to create a full picture of your devices, identities, connections, and potential attack paths.

With its ability to uncover previously unknown threats as well as detect known threats Darktrace is an essential layer of the security stack. Darktrace has helped secure customers against attacks including 2024 threat actor campaigns against Fortinet’s FortiManager , Palo Alto firewall devices, and more.  

Stay tuned for part II of this series which dives deeper into the differences between NDR types.

Credit to Nathaniel Jones VP, Security & AI Strategy, FCISO & Ashanka Iddya, Senior Director of Product Marketing for their contribution to this blog.

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About the author
Nathaniel Jones
VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO
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