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May 29, 2026

Reimagining Your SOC: Overcoming Alert Fatigue with AI-Led Investigations  

Reimagining your SOC Part 2/3: This blog explores how the challenges facing the modern SOC can be addressed by transforming the investigation process, unlocking efficiency and scalability in SOC operations with AI.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Brittany Woodsmall
Senior Product Marketing Manager, AI
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29
May 2026

Key takeaways

  • AI-led investigation can help combat SOC alert fatigue by extending automation beyond detection into triage, contextual analysis, prioritization, and investigation, reducing repetitive analyst work while preserving human judgment for critical security decisions.
  • Alert fatigue becomes an operational risk when high alert volumes, fragmented context, manual investigation, and limited analyst capacity prevent SOC teams from efficiently assessing potentially meaningful security activity.
  • Effective alert fatigue solutions should combine automated triage, contextual analysis, intelligent prioritization, and explainable investigation workflows so analysts can understand why activity matters and focus attention on higher-priority incidents.
  • AI-led investigation can improve SOC efficiency by expanding investigation coverage and freeing analysts from repetitive evidence gathering, creating more capacity for threat hunting, recovery activities, strategic decisions, and proactive cyber risk reduction.

The efficiency of a Security Operations Center (SOC) hinges on its ability to detect, analyze and respond to threats effectively. With advancements in AI and automation, key early SOC team metrics such as Mean Time to Detect (MTTD) have seen significant improvements:

  • ‍96% of defenders believing AI-powered solutions significantly boost the speed and efficiency of prevention, detection, response, and recovery.
  • Organizations leveraging AI and automation can shorten their breach lifecycle by an average of 108 days compared to those without these technologies.

While tool advances have improved performance and effectiveness in the detection phase, this has not been as beneficial to the next step of the process where initial alerts are investigated further to determine their relevance and how they relate to other activities. This is often measured with the metric Mean Time to Analysis (MTTA), although some SOC teams operate a two-level process with teams for initial triage to filter out more obviously uninteresting alerts and for more detailed analysis of the remainder. SOC teams continue to grapple with alert fatigue, overwhelmed analysts, and inefficient triage processes, preventing them from achieving the operational efficiency necessary for a high-performing SOC.

Addressing this core inefficiency requires extending AI's capabilities beyond detection to streamline and optimize the following investigative workflows that underpin effective analysis.

Challenges with SOC alert investigation

Detecting cyber threats is only the beginning of a much broader challenge of SOC efficiency. The real bottleneck often lies in the investigation process.

Detection tools and techniques have evolved significantly with the use of machine learning methods, improving early threat detection. However, after a detection pops up, human analysts still typically step in to evaluate the alert, gather context, and determine whether it’s a true threat or a false alarm and why. If it is a threat, further investigation must be performed to understand the full scope of what may be a much larger problem. This phase, measured by the mean time to analysis, is critical for swift incident response.

Challenges with manual alert investigation:

  • Too many alerts
  • Alerts lack context
  • Cognitive load sits with analysts
  • Insufficient talent in the industry
  • Fierce competition for experienced analysts

For many organizations, investigation is where the struggle of efficiency intensifies. Analysts face overwhelming volumes of alerts, a lack of consolidated context, and the mental strain of juggling multiple systems. With a worldwide shortage of 4 million experienced level two and three SOC analysts, the cognitive burden placed on teams is immense, often leading to alert fatigue and missed threats.

Even with advanced systems in place not all potential detections are investigated. In many cases, only a quarter of initial alerts are triaged (or analyzed). However, the issue runs deeper. Triaging occurs after detection engineering and alert tuning, which often disable many alerts that could potentially reveal true threats but are not accurate enough to justify the time and effort of the security team. This means some potential threats slip through unnoticed.

What are the key stages of detecting and stopping a cyber-attack?

Detecting and stopping a cyber incident involves several connected stages: identifying a trace of suspicious activity, generating a detection, investigating the alert to determine its context and scope, and containing confirmed threats. Each stage affects how quickly a SOC can move from identifying potentially malicious activity to taking effective action.

First we need a trace of an attack…

The attack will produce some sort of digital trace. Novel attacks, insider threats, and attacker techniques such as living-off-the-land can make attacker activities extremely hard to distinguish.

A detection is created…

Then we have to detect the trace, for example some beaconing to a rare domain. Initial detection alerts being raised underpin the MTTD (mean time to detection). Reducing this initial unseen duration is where we have seen significant improvement with modern threat detection tools.

When it comes to threat detection, the possibilities are vast. Your initial lead could come from anything: an alert about unusual network activity, a potential known malware detection, or an odd email. Once that lead comes in, it’s up to your security team to investigate further and determine if this is this a legitimate threat or a false alarm and what the context is behind the alert.

Investigation begins…

It doesn’t just stop at a detection. Typically, humans also need to look at the alert, investigate, understand, analyze, and conclude whether this is a genuine threat that needs a response. We normally measure this as MTTA (mean time to analyze).

Conducting the investigation effectively requires a high degree of skill and efficiency, as every second counts in mitigating potential damage. Security teams must analyze the available data, correlate it across multiple sources, and piece together the timeline of events to understand the full scope of the incident. This process involves navigating through vast amounts of information, identifying patterns, and discerning relevant details. All while managing the pressure of minimizing downtime and preventing further escalation.

Containment begins…

Once we confirm something as a threat, and the human team determines a response is required and understand the scope, we need to contain the incident. That's normally the MTTC (mean time to containment) and can be further split into immediate and more permanent measures.

For more about how AI-led solutions can help in the containment stage read here: Autonomous Response: Streamlining Cybersecurity and Business Operations

The challenge is not only in 1) detecting threats quickly, but also 2) triaging and investigating them rapidly and with precision, and 3) prioritizing the most critical findings to avoid missed opportunities. Effective investigation demands a combination of advanced tools, robust workflows, and the expertise to interpret and act on the insights they generate. Without these, organizations risk delaying critical containment and response efforts, leaving them vulnerable to greater impacts.

While there are further steps (remediation, and of course complete recovery) here we will focus on investigation.

Developing an AI analyst: How Darktrace replicates human investigation

Darktrace has been working on understanding the investigative process of a skilled analyst since 2017. By conducting internal research between Darktrace expert SOC analysts and machine learning engineers, we developed a formalized understanding of investigative processes. This understanding formed the basis of a multi-layered AI system that systematically investigates data, taking advantage of the speed and breadth afforded by machine systems.

With this research we found that the investigative process often revolves around iterating three key steps: hypothesis creation, data collection, and results evaluation.

All these details are crucial for an analyst to determine the nature of a potential threat. Similarly, they are integral components of our Cyber AI Analyst which is an integral component across our product suite. In doing so, Darktrace has been able to replicate the human-driven approach to investigating alerts using machine learning speed and scale.

Here’s how it works:

  • When an initial or third-party alert is triggered, the Cyber AI Analyst initiates a forensic investigation by building multiple hypotheses and gathering relevant data to confirm or refute the nature of suspicious activity, iterating as necessary, and continuously refining the original hypothesis as new data emerges throughout the investigation.
  • Using a combination of machine learning including supervised and unsupervised methods, NLP and graph theory to assess activity, this investigation engine conducts a deep analysis with incidents raised to the human team only when the behavior is deemed sufficiently concerning.
  • After classification, the incident information is organized and processed to generate the analysis summary, including the most important descriptive details, and priority classification, ensuring that critical alerts are prioritized for further action by the human-analyst team.
  • If the alert is deemed unimportant, the complete analysis process is made available to the human team so that they can see what investigation was performed and why this conclusion was drawn.
Darktrace cyber ai analyst workflow, how it works

To illustrate this via example, if a laptop is beaconing to a rare domain, the Cyber AI Analyst would create hypotheses including whether this could be command and control traffic, data exfiltration, or something else. The AI analyst then collects data, analyzes it, makes decisions, iterates, and ultimately raises a new high-level incident alert describing and detailing its findings for human analysts to review and follow up.

Learn more about Darktrace's Cyber AI Analyst

  • Cost savings: Equivalent to adding up to 30 full-time Level 2 analysts without increasing headcount
  • Minimize business risk: Takes on the busy work from human analysts and elevates a team’s overall decision making
  • Improve security outcomes: Identifies subtle, sophisticated threats through holistic investigations

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How does AI-led investigation improve SOC efficiency?

AI-led investigation can improve SOC efficiency by shifting repetitive evidence gathering and triage away from analysts while preserving human judgment for higher-value decisions. The operational benefit is broader investigation coverage, faster prioritization, clearer reasoning, and more analyst time for activities such as threat hunting, recovery, and proactive cyber risk reduction.

Every relevant alert is investigated

The Cyber AI Analyst is not a generative AI system, or an XDR or SEIM aggregator that simply prompts you on what to do next. It uses a multi-layered combination of many different specialized AI methods to investigate every relevant alert from across your enterprise, native, 3rd party, and manual triggers, operating at machine speed and scale. This also positively affects detection engineering and alert tuning, because it does not suffer from fatigue when presented with low accuracy but potentially valuable alerts.

Retain and improve analyst skills

Transferring most analysis processes to AI systems can risk team skills if they don't maintain or build them and if the AI doesn't explain its process. This can reduce the ability to challenge or build on AI results and cause issues if the AI is unavailable. The Cyber AI Analyst, by revealing its investigation process, data gathering, and decisions, promotes and improves these skills. Its deep understanding of cyber incidents can be used for skill training and incident response practice by simulating incidents for security teams to handle.

Create time for cyber risk reduction

Human cybersecurity professionals excel in areas that require critical thinking, strategic planning, and nuanced decision-making. With alert fatigue minimized and investigations streamlined, your analysts can avoid the tedious data collection and analysis stages and instead focus on critical decision-making tasks such as implementing recovery actions and performing threat hunting.

Stay tuned for part 3/3

Part 3/3 in the Reimagine your SOC series explores the preventative security solutions market and effective risk management strategies.

Coming soon!

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Brittany Woodsmall
Senior Product Marketing Manager, AI

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October 20, 2026

Why Kubernetes Security Needs A Behavioral Approach

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Kubernetes has become a foundational technology for modern cloud-native infrastructure. It can orchestrate everything from customer-facing applications to data pipelines and, increasingly, AI workloads. This is due to the highly scalable nature of Kubernetes, making it cost efficient and reliable.

Gartner projects that by 2028, 95% of new AI deployments will run on Kubernetes, up from less than 30% today1. However, the same qualities that make Kubernetes powerful also make it uniquely challenging to secure, leaving many organizations with limited visibility into their clusters. This lack of visibility increases risk - it’s difficult to secure what you can’t see.

However, this risk is often looked at as purely a posture management challenge. While Cloud Security Posture Management (CSPM) solutions can tell you how a cluster should be configured, they don’t tell you what it is doing in real time. This requires runtime behavioral monitoring of clusters to detect active threats.

Yet existing approaches to securing Kubernetes by most Cloud Detection and Response (CDR) and Network Detection and Response (NDR) vendors often have limited coverage or require a third-party integration to forward traffic and metadata. This means that capabilities can be limited and detections can lack the context of the wider environment, which slows down triage, investigation and response.

Why Kubernetes is hard to secure

Traditional security tooling was built for persistent, long-term infrastructure such as servers and virtual machines with fixed identities that last months or years. Some elements of Kubernetes environments can have a much shorter lifespan, breaking many assumptions those tools rely on:

  1. Increased complexity
    1. Kubernetes environments can be complex in comparison to traditional infrastructure, with many different elements to consider such as nodes, clusters, containers, pods and the workloads themselves.
  2. Ephemeral by design
    1. Kubernetes pods can spin up and terminate in seconds. A container that was compromised may no longer exist by the time a deeper investigation is required, leaving no artifact to analyze. This poses a unique challenge for security operations.
  3. Weaker workload boundaries
    1. Kubernetes containers use lightweight, shared-kernel isolation rather than separate virtual machines, improving efficiency but reducing separation between workloads and the host. As a result, a compromised container may have a greater potential impact on the node and neighboring workloads than a compromised virtual machine (VM).2
  4. Recent vulnerabilities have shown that threat actors can escape a container and gain access to the underlying host.3, 4
    1. Everything is API-driven
  5. Dozens or hundreds of microservices communicate over internal APIs, and the Kubernetes control plane itself is an API. This creates a large and dynamic attack surface, making it difficult to distinguish legitimate activity from malicious behavior.
    1. Without identity-aware runtime visibility, threat actors can move laterally between pods and exploit misconfigured role-based access controls (RBAC) with little chance of detection.

Rising to the challenge of securing Kubernetes

With the release of Darktrace 7.2, Darktrace / HYBRID NETWORK can extend behavioral security into Kubernetes, delivering visibility, detection and response capabilities across runtime activity. Darktrace addresses the challenges of securing Kubernetes environments in several ways.

Behavioral detection, not static rules

Many Kubernetes runtime tools rely on predefined rules and signatures - a fixed list of “bad” behaviors to match against. That approach struggles with novel attacks and generates noise at scale. Darktrace takes a different approach: our Adaptive AI builds a Unique Behavioral Profile for each organization from the ground up, learning the normal behavior of every workload, node and identity in your cluster. It then uses this understanding to detect meaningful deviations from expected behavior, which serves as the basis for surfacing suspicious and malicious activity.  

A pod reaching out to an unfamiliar destination, an unexpected executable launching inside a workload, or an identity performing an action it has never performed, all surface as anomalies without anyone having to write a rule in advance.

Darktrace surfaces unexpected Kubernetes activity that does not align with an organization’s Unique Behavioral Profile

Visibility across the network, the process, and the control plane

Darktrace monitors Kubernetes at three levels that together provide comprehensive runtime visibility:

  1. Network-layer
    1. Traffic between pods, across nodes and out to the internet. This helps to detect lateral movement and unusual connectivity, whether internal or external.
  2. Process-layer
    1. What is executing inside your containers. If a process reads a sensitive credential file or spawns an unexpected shell inside a production pod, Darktrace can identify that activity and use it as context for further detections.
  3. Control plane
    1. Activity against the Kubernetes API itself: someone executes a command in a running pod, RBAC changes, or unusual administrative actions. Many high-impact security events involve the control plane, an area that is often less visible to solutions that only analyze or scan network-layer telemetry.

Misconfiguration and vulnerability awareness

Runtime detection is strongest when combined with posture and exposure management. Darktrace surfaces risky pod configurations, such as privileged containers, host networking, and over-permissive service accounts as workloads are deployed, and links CVEs from images to the workloads running them. Security teams can go beyond simply knowing that a vulnerability exists and see exactly where it is in the cluster. When combined with behavior-based detections, this provides invaluable context that can help prioritize incidents and proactively identify areas that need further attention. For example, anomalous workload behavior on its own might not be very interesting to a security team at first, but if that same workload is known to host sensitive data, is known to have critical vulnerabilities associated with it, or is publicly accessible, then this narrative becomes much more suspicious and demanding of their attention.

Darktrace highlights Kubernetes misconfigurations such as privileged containers, host networking, and missing security controls, helping teams prioritize runtime alerts with valuable exposure and risk context.

Response, tailored to Kubernetes

Detection is most effective when paired with response. Darktrace can take precise actions on Kubernetes workloads, including blocking a malicious connection at the pod level, helping to safely contain threats while security teams investigate. Response actions can be taken fully autonomously or via a human-in-the-loop process, which is completely configurable depending on the desired level of autonomy and scope. Darktrace is expanding the number of Kubernetes-native response actions to give customers even more flexibility when containing threats.

Forensics that survive the workload

Because containers are so short-lived, evidence disappears fast and this can make it very difficult to answer questions related to the initial detections. Darktrace solves this with Forensic Acquisition & Investigation capabilities that extend to Kubernetes containers, allowing investigations to be triggered manually by an analyst, or automatically from an alert, preserving evidence before the workload is gone.

For incident responders, this addresses a key challenge in container security: being able to answer “what actually happened?” after an ephemeral workload has vanished.

One platform, not another silo

Kubernetes doesn't exist in isolation, and neither should its security. Darktrace correlates cluster activity with the surrounding cloud environment, including AWS, Azure and GCP identities, network activity and cloud assets, allowing analysts to pivot between a Kubernetes workload and its wider context. A single anomalous action can be traced from the control plane to the pod, and from the pod to the cloud identity behind it, all within a single investigation workflow. This can also include alerts from other areas of hybrid infrastructure or third-party sources where relevant, adding more context to investigations and speeding up workflows for human analysts.

Built to deploy easily

Operational complexity can be a barrier to security adoption. Darktrace / HYBRID NETWORK for Kubernetes installs with a single command, and for teams that manage their infrastructure as code, it supports raw manifests so the deployment can live in a Git repository and be managed through existing GitOps workflows. The same deployment approach works across Kubernetes environments in AWS, Azure, Google Cloud, and on-premises infrastructure. Early adopters of Darktrace’s Kubernetes capabilities have highlighted the simplicity of deployment and time to value.

Darktrace can deploy across your Kubernetes environment and wider hybrid infrastructure, while also providing visibility into Kubernetes deployment structure and status.

Next steps

Kubernetes environments are dynamic, ephemeral and API-driven in ways that challenge traditional security tooling. With Kubernetes usage increasing due to widespread AI adoption, it is essential to secure Kubernetes environments as part of securing what AI can do. Darktrace / HYBRID NETWORK addresses these challenges by learning normal behavior in Kubernetes environments across network, process and control-plane layers, identifying meaningful threats and enabling targeted response. Combined with the context of wider hybrid infrastructure and forensic investigation capabilities, Darktrace provides visibility into both emerging threats and active incidents.

To see how Darktrace can help secure your Kubernetes environment and your wider hybrid infrastructure, get in touch to arrange your free trial. Existing customers can contact their Darktrace Account Team for more information about deployment options and licensing.

[related-resource]

Sources

[1] Gartner, Container Management research, 2025: "By 2028, 95% of new AI deployments will use Kubernetes, up from less than 30% today."  https://www.gartner.com/en/documents/7913109. (quote reproduced under Gartner reprint at https://www.kubermatic.com/magic-quadrant-and-critical-capabilities-for-container-management/)

[2] Palo Alto Networks (Unit 42) – Container Breakouts: Escape Techniques in Cloud Environments. https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/container-escape-techniques/

[3] runC container-escape vulnerabilities (CVE-2025-31133, CVE-2025-52565, CVE-2025-52881), disclosed by a SUSE researcher on November 5, 2025. https://www.securityweek.com/runc-vulnerabilities-can-be-exploited-to-escape-containers/

[4] NVIDIAScape (CVE-2025-23266), CVSS 9.0. https://www.wiz.io/blog/nvidia-ai-vulnerability-cve-2025-23266-nvidiascape

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About the author
Elise Longhurst
Senior Product Executive

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October 15, 2026

CikaBika Bot: Inside a Discord RAT

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Key Takeaways

·      Darktrace malware researchers have found an ongoing malware campaign using a document-themed lure containing a malicious LNK file and a PDF with an embedded payload.

·      The Nim based loader deploys a Rust-based remote access trojan (RAT), using a UAC bypass and DLL search-order hijacking technique targeting Microsoft Edge.

·      The RAT uses Discord for C2, creating dedicated channels to manage infected devices and execute commands.

·      CikaBika Bot supports system reconnaissance, remote command execution, screenshot capture, and file transfers.

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Introduction

In a threat landscape where attackers continue to rely on social engineering techniques to deliver malware, legitimate services are increasingly being abused to support malicious operations. Communications platforms like Discord can provide attackers with a ready-made channel for command-and-control (C2), allowing them to manage compromised devices without establishing dedicated infrastructure.

Malware researchers at Darktrace have identified a campaign distributing CikaBika, a Rust-based RAT that uses Discord for C2. The infection chain begins with a disk image and a malicious Windows shortcut. A Nim loader extracts the final payload and attempts to plant it in Microsoft Edge’s installation directory using a PowerShell UAC bypass. Once running, the RAT collects host information, registers the device with Discord, and accepts commands through a dedicated channel.

Technical Analysis

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Figure 1: Contents of Proposition_Projet.img.

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Initial access and PDF payload

The malware is packaged within a disk image named Proposition_Projet.img. Inside are a PDF titled “Presentation_Generale.pdf.pdf” and a Windows shortcut (LNK) disguised as a Word document, “Proposition_Projet_Personnalisable.docx”. The delivery method has not been confirmed; however, the filenames and document-themed lure are consistent with a phishing campaign.

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Figure 2: PowerShell command embedded in the malicious shortcut.


Opening the shortcut launches a hidden PowerShell process while displaying the PDF as a decoy. The French-language document explains how to produce a written summary or contraction of a text. In the background, PowerShell reads the PDF as bytes and uses the value at offset 239 (0x20) as an XOR key to decode an embedded executable. The resulting payload is written to %TEMP%\IfyuUapz.txt and executed using cmd /c.

Nim loader and UAC bypass

“IfyuUapz.txt” is a Nim-based loader that contains two Base64-encoded blobs: a Rust dynamic-link library (DLL)  and a PowerShell deployment script. Both are decoded and written to temporary files, referenced to within the loader as “dllFile” and “copyPs1”. The loader runs the script through a hidden PowerShell process using an encoded command, then attempts to load the DLL using Nim’s loadLib function. If loading fails, it invokes regsvr32.exe and retries.

Figure 3: Silent DLL deployer.

The PowerShell component is responsible for moving the DLL to C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\dbghelp.dll. It first copies the DLL to C:\Windows\Temp\dbghelp.tmp, then modifies HKCU\Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command so that launching computerdefaults.exe can trigger a command to move the staged DLL into the protected Edge directory. This is an attempt to bypass User Account Control (UAC), which depends on the target’s Windows configuration.

The script also compiles a small C# helper that calls ShowWindow to hide windows associated with Windows Settings and ApplicationFrameHost. It launches the bypass helper three times, checks for the presence of the destination DLL, and attempts to delete the temporary scripts, intermediate DLL, and associated registry changes.

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Figure 4: Legitimate msedge.exe function to load the legitimate dbghelp.dll.

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The legitimate msedge.exe has a delay-loaded dependency on dbghelp.dll, and the malicious DLL exports a subset of the functions associated with Microsoft’s debugging library. The attacker appears to be exploiting this dependency through DLL search-order hijacking. However, it does not export every function in Edge’s delay-import table, meaning its compatibility with the host is incomplete. The observed code establishes the intended sideloading route, rather than proving that Edge successfully loaded the planted DLL.

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Rust RAT payload

Figure 5: Discord configuration within the RAT.

The malicious dbghelp.dll (IfyuUapz.txt) is a Rust-based RAT. At startup, the RAT registers the compromised device with Discord and begins collecting information about the host. Its reconnaissance routine gathers system details, runs tasklist to enumerate processes, executes ipconfig to obtain network configuration, and attempts to take a screenshot. The resulting artifacts include tasklist_startup.txt, network_info.txt, and screenshot.png.

Figure 6: Network configuration notification in Discord channel.

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Figure 7: Network configuration output from network_info.txt.

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Discord C2

The RAT uses Discord channels to send commands and report results. The operator can send commands to the device’s channel and receive the resulting output in the same conversation. This gives the attacker an interactive command interface without having to operate and maintain a dedicated C2 server.

Figure 8: Commands available in Discord.

The command set includes !shell for remote command execution; !sysinfo and !info for host details; !isOn for status checks; !tasklist and !ps for process enumeration; and !kill for process termination. File-transfer commands include !upload and !download. Additional strings and command handlers reference screenshots (!src), camera access (!camera), streaming (!stream), and broadcasting (!broadcast).

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Figure 9: Device registration in Discord.

During device registration, the malware retrieves the victim’s public IP address using ipify.com. The registration message records the device ID, hostname, registration time, private and public IP addresses, status, uptime, and the Discord channel assigned to that device.

Operator activity and exfiltration

Figure 10: Powershell commands sent through Discord to exfiltrate data.

Once a device is registered, the attacker can issue commands through its dedicated Discord channel. In the observed activity, the attacker compressed a directory into a ZIP and exfiltrated it using ngrok.

Figure 11: Download command to retrieve a document from the target.

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The operator can also use !download to retrieve files from target. The example above displays a request for a specific document on the victim’s desktop. The requested file is then returned through the device’s Discord channel, giving the attacker a direct way to store and access selected data.

Conclusion

CikaBika Bot demonstrates how attackers continue to rely on social engineering techniques to deliver malware. Although the initial distribution method has not been confirmed, the use of a disk image containing a shortcut disguised as a Word document, alongside a legitimate-looking PDF, suggests the campaign was designed for phishing.

While Nim is less commonly encountered than C in Windows malware, it has increasingly appeared in malicious tooling. In this case, Nim is used to unpack and deploy a Rust-based RAT, adding another layer to the infection chain.

Once installed, CikaBika Bot uses Discord as its C2 platform, allowing the attacker to manage compromised devices, execute commands, and retrieve files without maintaining dedicated C2 infrastructure. The observed use of Discord channels for individual victims, alongside additional data exfiltration through ngrok, shows how legitimate services can be repurposed to support malicious operations.

Credit to Tara Gould (Malware Research Lead)

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

Presentation_Generale.pdf.pdf - eeb52cb95113a131c2c7713c17872da6

Proposition_Projet_Personnalisable.docx.lnk - 62e3e85eca78a0cd7e6669e9f33d936d

dbghelp.dll - c66858718d883bcfb9ce2c19b59f96c9

IfyuUapz.txt - 2deb724a709b0b892248405323350e9b

MITRE ATTACK

T1204.002 – User Execution: Malicious File
T1036.007 – Masquerading: Double File Extension
T1059.001 – PowerShell
T1027 – Obfuscated Files or Information
T1140 – Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
T1548.002 – Bypass User Account Control
T1112 – Modify Registry
T1574.001 – DLL Search Order Hijacking
T1036.005 – Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
T1082 – System Information Discovery
T1016 – System Network Configuration Discovery
T1057 – Process Discovery
T1113 – Screen Capture
T1059.003 – Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell
T1102.002 – Web Service: Bidirectional Communication
T1560.001 – Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility
T1567 – Exfiltration Over Web Service
T1070.004 – Indicator Removal: File Deletion
T1218.010 – Regsvr32
T1005 – Data from Local System
T1074.001 – Data Staged: Local Data Staging
T1041 – Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
T1564.003 – Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window
T1027.013 – Encrypted/Encoded File

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About the author
Tara Gould
Malware Research Lead
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