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January 30, 2025

Reimagining Your SOC: Overcoming Alert Fatigue with AI-Led Investigations  

Reimagining your SOC Part 2/3: This blog explores how the challenges facing the modern SOC can be addressed by transforming the investigation process, unlocking efficiency and scalability in SOC operations with AI.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Brittany Woodsmall
Product Marketing Manager, AI
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30
Jan 2025

The efficiency of a Security Operations Center (SOC) hinges on its ability to detect, analyze and respond to threats effectively. With advancements in AI and automation, key early SOC team metrics such as Mean Time to Detect (MTTD) have seen significant improvements:

  • 96% of defenders believing AI-powered solutions significantly boost the speed and efficiency of prevention, detection, response, and recovery.
  • Organizations leveraging AI and automation can shorten their breach lifecycle by an average of 108 days compared to those without these technologies.

While tool advances have improved performance and effectiveness in the detection phase, this has not been as beneficial to the next step of the process where initial alerts are investigated further to determine their relevance and how they relate to other activities. This is often measured with the metric Mean Time to Analysis (MTTA), although some SOC teams operate a two-level process with teams for initial triage to filter out more obviously uninteresting alerts and for more detailed analysis of the remainder. SOC teams continue to grapple with alert fatigue, overwhelmed analysts, and inefficient triage processes, preventing them from achieving the operational efficiency necessary for a high-performing SOC.

Addressing this core inefficiency requires extending AI's capabilities beyond detection to streamline and optimize the following investigative workflows that underpin effective analysis.

Challenges with SOC alert investigation

Detecting cyber threats is only the beginning of a much broader challenge of SOC efficiency. The real bottleneck often lies in the investigation process.

Detection tools and techniques have evolved significantly with the use of machine learning methods, improving early threat detection. However, after a detection pops up, human analysts still typically step in to evaluate the alert, gather context, and determine whether it’s a true threat or a false alarm and why. If it is a threat, further investigation must be performed to understand the full scope of what may be a much larger problem. This phase, measured by the mean time to analysis, is critical for swift incident response.

Challenges with manual alert investigation:

  • Too many alerts
  • Alerts lack context
  • Cognitive load sits with analysts
  • Insufficient talent in the industry
  • Fierce competition for experienced analysts

For many organizations, investigation is where the struggle of efficiency intensifies. Analysts face overwhelming volumes of alerts, a lack of consolidated context, and the mental strain of juggling multiple systems. With a worldwide shortage of 4 million experienced level two and three SOC analysts, the cognitive burden placed on teams is immense, often leading to alert fatigue and missed threats.

Even with advanced systems in place not all potential detections are investigated. In many cases, only a quarter of initial alerts are triaged (or analyzed). However, the issue runs deeper. Triaging occurs after detection engineering and alert tuning, which often disable many alerts that could potentially reveal true threats but are not accurate enough to justify the time and effort of the security team. This means some potential threats slip through unnoticed.

Understanding alerts in the SOC: Stopping cyber incidents is hard

Let’s take a look at the cyber-attack lifecycle and the steps involved in detecting and stopping an attack:

First we need a trace of an attack…

The attack will produce some sort of digital trace. Novel attacks, insider threats, and attacker techniques such as living-off-the-land can make attacker activities extremely hard to distinguish.

A detection is created…

Then we have to detect the trace, for example some beaconing to a rare domain. Initial detection alerts being raised underpin the MTTD (mean time to detection). Reducing this initial unseen duration is where we have seen significant improvement with modern threat detection tools.

When it comes to threat detection, the possibilities are vast. Your initial lead could come from anything: an alert about unusual network activity, a potential known malware detection, or an odd email. Once that lead comes in, it’s up to your security team to investigate further and determine if this is this a legitimate threat or a false alarm and what the context is behind the alert.

Investigation begins…

It doesn’t just stop at a detection. Typically, humans also need to look at the alert, investigate, understand, analyze, and conclude whether this is a genuine threat that needs a response. We normally measure this as MTTA (mean time to analyze).

Conducting the investigation effectively requires a high degree of skill and efficiency, as every second counts in mitigating potential damage. Security teams must analyze the available data, correlate it across multiple sources, and piece together the timeline of events to understand the full scope of the incident. This process involves navigating through vast amounts of information, identifying patterns, and discerning relevant details. All while managing the pressure of minimizing downtime and preventing further escalation.

Containment begins…

Once we confirm something as a threat, and the human team determines a response is required and understand the scope, we need to contain the incident. That's normally the MTTC (mean time to containment) and can be further split into immediate and more permanent measures.

For more about how AI-led solutions can help in the containment stage read here: Autonomous Response: Streamlining Cybersecurity and Business Operations

The challenge is not only in 1) detecting threats quickly, but also 2) triaging and investigating them rapidly and with precision, and 3) prioritizing the most critical findings to avoid missed opportunities. Effective investigation demands a combination of advanced tools, robust workflows, and the expertise to interpret and act on the insights they generate. Without these, organizations risk delaying critical containment and response efforts, leaving them vulnerable to greater impacts.

While there are further steps (remediation, and of course complete recovery) here we will focus on investigation.

Developing an AI analyst: How Darktrace replicates human investigation

Darktrace has been working on understanding the investigative process of a skilled analyst since 2017. By conducting internal research between Darktrace expert SOC analysts and machine learning engineers, we developed a formalized understanding of investigative processes. This understanding formed the basis of a multi-layered AI system that systematically investigates data, taking advantage of the speed and breadth afforded by machine systems.

With this research we found that the investigative process often revolves around iterating three key steps: hypothesis creation, data collection, and results evaluation.

All these details are crucial for an analyst to determine the nature of a potential threat. Similarly, they are integral components of our Cyber AI Analyst which is an integral component across our product suite. In doing so, Darktrace has been able to replicate the human-driven approach to investigating alerts using machine learning speed and scale.

Here’s how it works:

  • When an initial or third-party alert is triggered, the Cyber AI Analyst initiates a forensic investigation by building multiple hypotheses and gathering relevant data to confirm or refute the nature of suspicious activity, iterating as necessary, and continuously refining the original hypothesis as new data emerges throughout the investigation.
  • Using a combination of machine learning including supervised and unsupervised methods, NLP and graph theory to assess activity, this investigation engine conducts a deep analysis with incidents raised to the human team only when the behavior is deemed sufficiently concerning.
  • After classification, the incident information is organized and processed to generate the analysis summary, including the most important descriptive details, and priority classification, ensuring that critical alerts are prioritized for further action by the human-analyst team.
  • If the alert is deemed unimportant, the complete analysis process is made available to the human team so that they can see what investigation was performed and why this conclusion was drawn.
Darktrace cyber ai analyst workflow, how it works

To illustrate this via example, if a laptop is beaconing to a rare domain, the Cyber AI Analyst would create hypotheses including whether this could be command and control traffic, data exfiltration, or something else. The AI analyst then collects data, analyzes it, makes decisions, iterates, and ultimately raises a new high-level incident alert describing and detailing its findings for human analysts to review and follow up.

Learn more about Darktrace's Cyber AI Analyst

  • Cost savings: Equivalent to adding up to 30 full-time Level 2 analysts without increasing headcount
  • Minimize business risk: Takes on the busy work from human analysts and elevates a team’s overall decision making
  • Improve security outcomes: Identifies subtle, sophisticated threats through holistic investigations

Unlocking an efficient SOC

To create a mature and proactive SOC, addressing the inefficiencies in the alert investigation process is essential. By extending AI's capabilities beyond detection, SOC teams can streamline and optimize investigative workflows, reducing alert fatigue and enhancing analyst efficiency.

This holistic approach not only improves Mean Time to Analysis (MTTA) but also ensures that SOCs are well-equipped to handle the evolving threat landscape. Embracing AI augmentation and automation in every phase of threat management will pave the way for a more resilient and proactive security posture, ultimately leading to a high-performing SOC that can effectively safeguard organizational assets.

Every relevant alert is investigated

The Cyber AI Analyst is not a generative AI system, or an XDR or SEIM aggregator that simply prompts you on what to do next. It uses a multi-layered combination of many different specialized AI methods to investigate every relevant alert from across your enterprise, native, 3rd party, and manual triggers, operating at machine speed and scale. This also positively affects detection engineering and alert tuning, because it does not suffer from fatigue when presented with low accuracy but potentially valuable alerts.

Retain and improve analyst skills

Transferring most analysis processes to AI systems can risk team skills if they don't maintain or build them and if the AI doesn't explain its process. This can reduce the ability to challenge or build on AI results and cause issues if the AI is unavailable. The Cyber AI Analyst, by revealing its investigation process, data gathering, and decisions, promotes and improves these skills. Its deep understanding of cyber incidents can be used for skill training and incident response practice by simulating incidents for security teams to handle.

Create time for cyber risk reduction

Human cybersecurity professionals excel in areas that require critical thinking, strategic planning, and nuanced decision-making. With alert fatigue minimized and investigations streamlined, your analysts can avoid the tedious data collection and analysis stages and instead focus on critical decision-making tasks such as implementing recovery actions and performing threat hunting.

Stay tuned for part 3/3

Part 3/3 in the Reimagine your SOC series explores the preventative security solutions market and effective risk management strategies.

Coming soon!

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Brittany Woodsmall
Product Marketing Manager, AI

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July 9, 2026

When AI Infrastructure Becomes Part of the Attack Surface

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AI Infrastructure and the Evolving Attack Surface

As organizations deploy generative AI into production environments, a new layer of infrastructure has emerged inside enterprise cloud environments: AI gateways.

What is an AI gateway?

AI gateways are systems that sit between users, applications, and foundation models, often holding privileged cloud permissions and managing access to AI services at scale.

Because of that role, AI gateways are becoming an increasingly important part of the enterprise attack surface. A compromise may provide attackers with access not only to compute resources, but also to cloud identities, model services, sensitive prompts, and other connected systems.

This blog examines how Darktrace investigated a compromised AI gateway connected to Amazon Bedrock services that was subsequently observed communicating with cryptomining infrastructure. Based on its configuration and associated Identity and Access Management (IAM) role, the instance appeared to function as a gateway to Amazon Bedrock-hosted AI services. Following suspected compromise activity, the host was observed communicating repeatedly with known cryptomining infrastructure before subsequently being shut down. Darktrace detected and escalated the activity through its Enhanced Monitoring and Managed Threat Detection services.

While the ultimate impact in this case appeared to be unauthorized cryptomining, the incident is notable because of where it occurred. The compromised asset sat at the intersection of cloud infrastructure, identity, and AI services. Recent research has highlighted how AI gateways such as LiteLLM can become attractive targets due to their ability to centralize credentials, model access, and cloud permissions. Although Darktrace found no evidence linking this activity directly to publicly disclosed LiteLLM vulnerabilities, the incident demonstrates why organizations should treat AI infrastructure as part of their critical attack surface rather than as a standalone application tier [1].

Why cryptomining remains a common cloud post-compromise activity

Cryptomining can be a lucrative post-compromise activity in cloud environments. After gaining access to a cloud asset, attackers may deploy mining software to abuse the victim’s compute resources for financial gain. This type of activity is likely to be opportunistic, targeting exposed services, weak credentials, leaked access keys, vulnerable applications, or misconfigured cloud workloads.

A typical cloud cryptomining intrusion may involve:

  • Identifying exposed or vulnerable cloud infrastructure
  • Gaining access through exposed services, credentials, or application weaknesses
  • Downloading and executing mining software
  • Establishing repeated outbound connectivity to mining pool infrastructure
  • Continuing to consume compute resources until the activity is detected and disrupted

The notable element in this case is not the cryptomining alone, but where it occurred: on cloud infrastructure supporting AI-related activity. This shows how assets used to enable AI services can still be exposed to familiar cloud compromise risks.

Investigating a compromised AI gateway connected to Amazon Bedrock

On June 12, 2026, Darktrace observed activity consistent with active cryptomining from an Amazon Web Service (AWS) EC2 instance named LiteLLM-Proxy. The instance appeared to support LiteLLM activity and was associated with an instance profile that had access to Amazon Bedrock resources.

AI gateways are designed to centralize access to large language models, often handling authentication, routing, logging, and policy enforcement for AI applications. From a security perspective, they also aggregate cloud permissions, model access, and application workflows into a single control point. As a result, compromise of an AI gateway can have implications beyond the affected host itself.

While the exact initial access vector could not be confirmed, the activity appears to follow a sequence often seen in compromises of internet-facing systems: brute-forced access, payload delivery, and repeated outbound connectivity to mining pool infrastructure.

Stage 1: Internet-exposed SSH enabled initial access

Prior to the observed cryptomining activity, the LiteLLM-Proxy EC2 instance appeared to be externally exposed over SSH, with port 22 open to 0.0.0.0/0.

Figure 1: Darktrace’s misconfiguration alert EC2 instance allowing all inbound traffic to SSH port 22.

Prior to the cryptomining activity, Darktrace observed a large volume of inbound connection attempts to the instance over port 22 from external IP addresses, predominantly from 145.241.123[.]102, suggesting brute-force activity [2]. Many of these connections were short-lived, lasting only a few seconds, indicating scanning or failed login attempts.

Figure 2: Darktrace’s detection of unusual incoming connection attempts to the device over port 22.

The available telemetry did not confirm whether any inbound SSH connection resulted in successful authentication, preventing this activity from being confirmed as the initial access vector. However, the combination of public SSH exposure, inbound connections from external IP addresses, and subsequent miner activity suggests that SSH was a plausible access path.

Stage 2: XMRig malware downloaded to the AI gateway

Before the first observed connection to the mining pool, the EC2 instance downloaded 3.42 MB of data over an HTTP connection on port 80 to the external endpoint, 185.62.1[.]8, which appears to host a ZIP file containing XMRig crypto-mining malware [3][4]. As host-level logs were not available, Darktrace could not confirm how the miner was executed or whether the earlier SSH activity directly enabled payload delivery. However, the timing of the download, followed shortly by repeated mining pool connectivity, supported the assessment that the instance had been compromised and was being used for unauthorized compute activity.

Stage 3 – Compromised AI gateway communicates with cryptomining infrastructure

Just a few minutes later, Darktrace observed the LiteLLM-Proxy EC2 instance connecting to the hostname pool.hasvault[.]pro over HTTPs on port 443. Following the initial connection, repeated outbound connectivity to the same hostname was observed. This pattern is consistent with active cryptomining pool communication, where a compromised host communicates with mining infrastructure to receive work and submit results.

This activity triggered the Enhanced Monitoring model “Compromise / High Priority Crypto Currency Mining”, which was escalated to the customer by Darktrace’s SOC. The activity was also summarized by Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst, which grouped the relevant events into a single investigation narrative, helping to identify the repeated mining pool connectivity from the affected cloud asset.

Figure 3: Cyber AI Analyst’s investigation of the cryptocurrency mining activity.

The use of HTTPS over port 443 is notable because, when viewed in isolation, this traffic may not appear inherently suspicious. In this case, however, the destination, volume of connections, and lack of similar activity provided the behavioral context needed to identify the communication as suspicious.

Stage 4: Managed Threat Detection identifies active resource abuse

The cryptomining activity was received by Darktrace’s Managed Threat Detection service and reviewed by Darktrace’s SOC. Following review, the activity was escalated to the customer. This escalation provided the customer with timely notification of active resource abuse in the AWS environment.

Stage 5: Suspicious IAM activity suggests possible cloud credential misuse

Separately, on June 13, Darktrace observed suspicious activity originating from an additional IAM user.

Figure 4: Darktrace’s Advanced Search highlighting suspicious activity performed by a second IAM user.

First, the user was observed attempting the “GetSendQuota” event, an action that had not performed by the account within at least the previous three months. Additionally, the source IP address of this command appeared to be 14.176.1[.]47, geolocated in Vietnam, whereas activity for this user had mostly been seen from Amazon IP addresses. Furthermore, the AWS CLI was also observed being used for this activity, which was also unusual for the user. This was detected by the model “IaaS / Unusual Activity / Unusual AWS CLI Activity”.

Figure 5: Darktrace’s detection of the “GetSendQuota” event.

Further suspicious activity was observed from the IAM user using the long-term access key. Notably, failed “InvokeModel” and “ListFoundationModels” commands were detected, suggesting attempted interaction with Amazon Bedrock services, including model enumeration or invocation. While this may suggest relation to the LiteLLM compromise observed the previous day, there is insufficient evidence to conclusively link the two events.

The attempted “CreateUser” command was also notable because the requested username appeared low-meaning, which may indicate an attempt to establish persistence by creating a new account. This activity triggered the model “IaaS / Admin / New AWS User Account Creation”.

Figure 6: Darktrace’s detection of the “CreateUser” event.

Even without a confirmed link between the two incidents, the IAM activity remains significant. It demonstrates the importance of incorporating workload both telemetry and control-plane telemetry into cloud compromise investigations. While the EC2 cryptomining activity indicated compute resource abuse, the IAM activity suggested potential credential compromise or misuse involving long-term access keys, along with attempted cloud service abuse.

Key lessons for securing AI infrastructure

This incident was notable not because of the cryptomining activity itself, but because of where it occurred. The compromised system appeared to function as an AI gateway with access to Amazon Bedrock services, placing it at the intersection of cloud infrastructure, identity, and AI operations. As organizations deploy AI capabilities into production environments, these platforms are becoming part of the same attack surface that adversaries already target through exposed services, credential theft, and cloud misconfigurations.

While the exact intrusion path could not be confirmed, and no definitive link was established between the compromised workload and the suspicious IAM activity observed during the investigation, both events reinforce a broader reality: AI infrastructure must be secured as part of the wider cloud environment rather than treated as a separate technology stack.

In this case, the most obvious sign of compromise was communication with cryptomining infrastructure. The more important lesson is that Darktrace’s behavioral analysis revealed risk surrounding a privileged AI-enabled asset before the full scope of the incident was understood. As AI gateways increasingly concentrate cloud permissions, model access, and application workflows, defenders will need to focus less on individual alerts and more on understanding how behaviors connect across workloads, identities, and services.

Credit to Angel Arribas Lopez (Associate Principal Cyber Analyst), Nathaniel Jones (Field CISO/VP Threat Research), Emma Foulger (Global Threat Ops),  and Mark Turner (Security Researcher)

Edited by Ryan Traill (Content Manager)

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections

·       Compromise / High Priority Crypto Currency Mining

·       Compromise / Monero Mining

·       Device / Internet Facing Device with High Priority Alert

·       IaaS / Unusual Activity / Unusual AWS CLI Activity

·       IaaS / Admin / New AWS User Account Creation

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Initial Access – External Remote Services – T1133

Initial Access – Valid Accounts – T1078

Execution – Command and Scripting Interpreter – T1059

Persistence – Create Account – T1136

Discovery – Cloud Service Discovery – T1526

Impact – Resource Hijacking – T1496

References

[1] https://docs.litellm.ai/blog/security-update-march-2026

[2] https://www.abuseipdb.com/check/145.241.123.102

[3] https://urlscan.io/search/#185.62.1.8

[4] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/85de36ff66fae9f4b059cbedf6d36e017ebc26c828f99f911a96e78636f21200/community

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About the author
Angel Arribas Lopez
Associate Principal Cyber Analyst

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July 8, 2026

Securing AI: Analysis of the Complete Security Stack with Governance and Controls

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Why traditional cybersecurity approaches are not enough for AI

AI adoption outpaces most security programs’ ability to adapt.  That gap is now one of the most consequential sources of cyber risk facing enterprises. As organizations embed generative and agentic AI into development workflows, business operations, and security tooling itself, the question is no longer whether AI will introduce risk. The question is whether organizations understand where that risk actually lives and how to manage it operationally.  

Two recent pieces of guidance underscore this shift:

  1. The upcoming Cybersecurity Framework Profile for AI from NIST
  1. The Five Eyes government guidance on the careful adoption of agentic AI services

Taken together, they point to a critical conclusion. AI security cannot be reduced to model hardening or prompt filtering. It requires a defense in depth strategy that treats AI as both a new attack surface and a force multiplier for defense, while accounting for how AI fundamentally changes scale, speed, and autonomy.  

Recent threat research suggests that today's cyber risk is driven less by initial compromise and more by an adversary's ability to blend into normal operations over time. AI systems create the same exposure in a new form: more autonomy, more scale, and more opportunities for risky behavior to blend into normal operations.

How NIST defines the three core pillars of AI security

The NIST profile organizes AI risk across three inseparable focus areas that span all cybersecurity functions, Secure, Defend and Thwart. These areas are not sequential. They exist simultaneously and must be addressed together.

Secure

This treats AI as an attack surface. It includes models, prompts, agents, pipelines, training and inference data, retrieval augmented generation corpora, and the AI supply chain itself. AI systems are opaque, probabilistic, and non-deterministic by design. Some vulnerabilities are inherent in how models are trained or how data is sourced. Traditional patching does not fully mitigate these risks. This is also where many enterprises are weakest today and, critically, where many security programs stop.  

Defend

This is AI as a defensive force multiplier. AI can improve detection speed, scale, correlation, and response, but only if the right models are used and operationalized correctly. Machine-speed behavior-based detection, response and containment becomes critical in defending non-deterministic systems. Accuracy, explainability, governance, testing, validation, and integration into SOC workflows matter as much as capability. Without those controls, hallucination risk, over automation, and misplaced trust become security risks themselves.  

Thwart

This treats AI as an adversarial accelerant. Threat actors are already using AI to generate targeted social engineering attacks, deepfakes, malware, and autonomous attack agents. Asymmetric warfare is highlighting faster vulnerability discovery and exploitation with a lag on patch development, testing and deployment.  

How this looks in practice

Darktrace researchers observed scaled, automated exploitation of the React2Shell vulnerability within days of disclosure. A vulnerable cloud asset was exploited in under 120 seconds of being deployed. Darktrace research team observed an AI/LLM-generated malware sample used in exploitation activity tied to React2Shell. The significance isn't novelty. It is that AI lowers the barrier to producing usable offensive tooling and compresses the time between experimentation and deployment.  

Tactics are getting more and more creative in order to string together steps of an attack kill chain. This creates a dependency on behavior-based detection, autonomous investigation, autonomous containment, training, resilience investment, and recovery planning across the entire enterprise.

Why agentic AI fundamentally changes enterprise cyber risk

The Five Eyes guidance on agentic AI highlights material changes to the cyber risk profile of an organization. Unlike generative AI systems that produce content for human consumption, agentic AI systems reason, plan, and act autonomously across tools, data, and environments. That autonomy, combined with access to real systems, amplifies the impact of traditional cyber failures and introduces new system level risks that are difficult to predict, observe, and contain.  

Risk in agentic systems does not live in the model alone. It emerges from interactions between models, prompts, memory, tools, APIs, identities, privileges, inter-agent trust relationships, and human assumptions baked into design. Vulnerabilities are often introduced through data, connectors, natural language interfaces, protocols, and drift by design.

In supply-chain incidents, attackers did not need sophisticated exploits to scale impact. They abused trusted systems built for automation and implicit access. Agentic AI inherits that model. Once a system can act across tools, data, and workflows, compromise propagates through trust relationships that were never designed for machine autonomy.

The major agentic AI risk classes include the following:  

  • The identity control for non-human identities or autonomous agents makes it difficult to mitigate over-permissioning, limiting access, scope, and duration, as well as access hygiene
  • Agents are frequently over permissioned
  • Compromised tools inherit agent authority
  • Static secrets enable impersonation
  • Implicit trust between agents enables lateral movement

Design and configuration risks compound this, including privileges evaluated once at startup, poor segmentation, unvetted third party tools, reused authorization decisions outside their original context, and guardrail limitations.  

Behavioral risk  

Agents can optimize for goals in unsafe ways, misinterpret ambiguous intent, chain actions into unintended sequences, change behavior during evaluation, and exhibit deceptive or sycophantic responses.  

Structural risk  

Structural risk follows from agentic systems that are tightly coupled, multicomponent ecosystems. Failures can propagate across agents. Hallucinations cascade downstream. Resource exhaustion becomes systemic. Tool misuse enables indirect prompt injection and command execution. Rogue agents can poison peer agents through trust relationships.  

Accountability

Accountability becomes unclear as autonomy increases. Autonomous agents assume human identity permissions, and humans should have clear ownership of these agents, but they don’t, and this model is flawed. Decision paths are opaque and non-deterministic. Logs are fragmented and difficult to interpret. Reproducing an incident will be impossible without explicit design for observability and forensics. An agent compromise is functionally an insider threat, often with better access and fewer behavioral constraints than a human.  

What does defense in depth look like for AI?

Agentic AI runs on software, networks, identities, and data. It must be governed using the same foundational principles that have proven resilient under uncertainty, including secure by design, defense in depth, zero trust, least privilege, continuous monitoring, behavior-based advanced threat detection and containment, and incident response and recovery.

Core components to a Defense in depth Strategy for Securing the use of AI:

  • Strong, precise identity control plane to include an identity per agent (cryptographic, non‑shared)
    • Privilege monitoring and just‑in‑time access
  • Data Governance
  • Secure‑by‑default configurations
    • Security Posture Management  
    • Zero Trust principles  
  • Strong guardrails, deny‑by‑default policies, and isolation
  • Explicit instruction hierarchies and controlled context
  • Behavioral-based detection across entire enterprise to include inputs, tools, and outputs as well as AI used on the endpoint, across the network, cloud, SaaS, email, and OT
    • Runtime anomaly detection and goal‑drift detection
    • Autonomous containment to mitigate risk and minimize damage
  • Hard boundaries on autonomy and delegation
  • Testing, Evaluation, Validation and Verification  
    • Determine when autonomous action and when human in the loop
    • Adversarial training and agent‑specific testing
    • Simulation, red teaming, and chaos testing
  • Kill‑switches, rollback, and containment mechanisms
    • Forensics data captures, interpretability, autonomous containment, and remediation/recovery plans  

Until standards, tooling, and assurance methods mature, organizations should assume agentic AI systems will behave unexpectedly and design deployments around resilience, behavior-based detection, reversibility, and containment, not efficiency.

How security leaders should prepare for enterprise AI adoption

AI security is not model security alone. Data, pipelines, identities, and agents are first class assets. Many AI attacks succeed through standard cyber failures amplified by AI. Identity, data, and supply chain risk dominate. Behavior-based detection and response are critical, not optional. Logging, provenance, versioning, and forensics data capture of detections are mandatory because you cannot investigate or recover from AI incidents without them.  

Risk will often be visible in behavior before it is clearly defined in policy or guidance. The same pattern has been seen in pre-CVE disclosure detection, where abnormal activity appears before the industry has named or described the vulnerability. AI systems introduce that uncertainty by design.

Security leaders should prioritize controls before AI is fully deployed, avoid generic AI security checklists, integrate AI risk into existing cyber programs, and mitigate the risk of non-deterministic technology with continuous oversight, monitoring, behavior analytics, anomaly detection, autonomous investigation, and autonomous containment.

Visibility has a different connotation with AI. Previously, audit logging worked for software/people, but with Generative AI-based systems, interpretability and explainability is difficult to understand, you cannot "undo" what has been done, or see the logic or control a chain of events. This is why behavioral-based detections and containment becomes critical.  

What capabilities should every AI security program include?

If an organization asked “what must be in place before scaling AI?”:

  1. AI Risk board and approval workflow
  1. IAM + PAM for all AI services and agents
  1. AI asset inventory
  1. Prompt/output DLP with sanctioned AI access – This is not just pre- and post- filters, but behavior-based detections of semantic interface as well as behavior-based analysis of output with associated risk context.  
  1. Shadow AI identification
  1. Secure MLOps – This is an entire paper itself
  1. Runtime guardrails and tool restrictions
    • Including AI Gateway/SASE/Zero trust/
  1. Runtime security with behavior-based detections
    • Complete visibility, monitoring, behavior analytics, anomaly detection, risk/intent/context evaluation of anomalies, autonomous investigation and autonomous containment of all AI assets across endpoint, network, SaaS, SASE, cloud, OT, email, and messaging platforms
  1. Secure data pipelines and data governance
  1. SOC workflow changes from malicious classification workflows to behavior-based detection workflows
  1. Remediation plans for AI-related incidents  

Layered Governance and Security Stack for Securing AI  

The following outline considers governance and security tools that should be considered, well-integrated, deployed, tested, operationalized and embedded within security workflows. These tools and controls map to NIST’s CMF for AI.  

These considerations do not need to be implemented in order. Runtime Detect and Respond will help mitigate risk while Governance, Visibility, and Identity mature.

Category Tooling Controls
Governance & Visibility
  • AI asset inventory / AI CMDB
  • Shadow AI discovery
  • SaaS discovery
  • AI usage on non-endpoint managed systems via network or cloud telemetry
  • MCP server/client usage via protocols
  • Browser telemetry
  • Gateway or SASE telemetry
  • Establish a risk board to set up controls
  • Mandatory registration of AI systems
  • Owner, data classification, intended use, and risk tier
  • Supplier disclosure requirements
  • Risk mitigation plan for AI adoption, innovation, or development
Identity, Access & Agent Control

Non-human autonomous agents should not have the full permissions associated with a human user.

  • IAM with workload identities
  • PAM for AI service accounts
  • Secrets management with short-lived tokens
  • Zero Trust principles
  • Identity, permission, and token hygiene
  • Unique identities per model, agent, and pipeline
  • Least privilege for tools, data, and APIs
  • Explicit approval for autonomous actions
Data Security & Privacy
  • Data classification and labeling
  • Enterprise DLP across endpoint, email, network, cloud, and SaaS
  • Forensics data capture after risky detections
  • Prompt-level DLP through behavior-based semantic analysis with risk and intent context
  • Input/interface analysis for risky data requests
  • Output analysis for sensitive data
  • Data integrity evaluation
  • Retention and redaction policies for prompts and responses
Secure MLOps / LLMOps
  • Secure CI/CD with AI-specific gates
  • Model registries with approval workflows
  • Dependency, container, and artifact scanning
  • SBOM/AIBOM generation
  • IaC security scanning
  • Security posture management
  • Misconfiguration identification
  • Hardening recommendations
  • Signed models and prompts
  • Versioned datasets, configurations, logging, and controls
  • Securing data pipelines
  • Controlled promotion
  • Quality assurance
  • Adversarial testing
Runtime Security

Securing runtime goes beyond guardrails and model firewalls to include behavior-based detections, response, and containment.

  • Detection, monitoring, and SOC integration
  • Centralized visibility into prompts, outputs, and tool calls
  • AI-specific detections
  • Behavior-based detection for AI usage patterns
  • Model drift and behavior monitoring
  • Autonomous containment
  • Behavior-based detection of model inputs and outputs
  • Prompt injection detection
  • Model manipulation, including jailbreaking, poisoning, and related attacks
  • Sensitive data access attempts
  • Behavior-based detection across low-code agents, high-code agents, MCP clients and servers, endpoint, network, cloud, email, SaaS, SASE, IoT, and OT
  • Policy enforcement between users, models, tools, agents, SaaS models/tools, and MCP servers/clients
  • Risk, intent, and context evaluation for detections and response actions
Response & Recovery
  • Autonomous containment
  • AI-assisted playbooks
  • Forensics data capture for AI-related events
  • Model rollback mechanisms
  • Backup and restore for models and datasets
  • Kill switch for agents
  • Autonomous response to agents performing risky behaviors
  • Model and dataset rollback
  • Remediation plans
  • Tabletop exercises
  • Supplier coordination plans
  • Post-incident AI performance validation

AI security requires continuous visibility and behavioral detection

AI changes how fast systems move, how decisions are made, and how risk propagates. It does not change the fundamentals of security. Organizations that succeed will be the ones that apply those fundamentals rigorously, assume failure, and build systems that can detect, contain, and recover when AI behaves in ways they did not anticipate. Security is not what AI is allowed to do. It is whether the organization can understand, trust, and control what AI actually does in practice.  

Take this guidance to understand different initiatives that organizations should be considering. Securing AI is the most critical component to AI safety. As organizations invest more in AI adoption, they should be investing in security in order to mitigate the risk of AI adoption. Organizations should be evaluating their governance and security stack to include well-integrated tools that are deployed, tested, operationalized and embedded within security workflows. While organizations mature in governance, visibility and identity access management, they should be investing in behavior-based detection and autonomous containment to mitigate AI risk.  

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About the author
Nicole Carignan
SVP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO
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